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Introduction 
1 
The broad objective of this thesis is to restore the significance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
to the evolution of Nietzsche’s thoughts. The philosophical commentary on Nietzsche 
focuses mostly on his objections to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and pessimism, but 
generally ignores the fundamental philosophical agreements between them. With the 
notable exception of Janaway’s (2007) influential analysis of Nietzsche’s GM, which offers 
a brief commentary. I aim to show that there are significant philosophical agreements 
between them that are crucial for our understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophical interests 
and focus on certain topics. I will argue that they agree on fundamental concepts and 
distinctions, e.g., the will-body identity, but disagree over the explanatory and evaluative 
framework we should derive from these concepts and distinctions. This is because both have 
different criteria for explaining phenomena like agency, morality, aesthetic contemplation 
and ascetic resignation. Furthermore, they disagree on the philosophical method that sets 
the limits of their respective explanatory and evaluative frameworks. For Schopenhauer, the 
method that is apposite for explaining phenomena is transcendental idealism and the limits 
it sets through our first-person experience. Nietzsche prefers an alternative method, namely, 
what he calls ‘historical philosophising’ in combination with his so-called drive psychology. 
I aim to demonstrate that both philosophical methods are rooted in the so-called will-body 
identity, which we find in Schopenhauer.   
The narrower objective of the thesis focuses on their philosophy of value, 
specifically, their ethics and aesthetics: their views on selflessness and compassion, but also 
disinterestedness and objectivity. I decided to extend the thesis to other topics such as their 
respective analysis of agency and ascetic resignation (‘ascetic ideal’, in Nietzsche’s case). 
My reason for doing so is that they are core areas of both contention and agreement between 
them, which inform not only their ethical and aesthetic views, but also shed light on their 
distinct philosophical methods. Analysing the previous allows us to recognise what 
underpins Nietzsche’s interest in agency or selfhood, morality, the arts and the ascetic ideal. 
Nietzsche substantially deviates from Schopenhauer’s views on agency following 
his critique of the concept of the ‘will’ as apposite for comprehending the insights inherent 
to the will-body identity, but his interest and focus on ‘agency’ and its explanatory value is 
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actually rooted in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. Nietzsche accepts the insight of 
the will-body identity, but he derives a different explanatory and evaluative framework from 
that insight, which is premised on his use of the concept of the ‘drive’ as a replacement of 
the ‘will’.  
By offering an extensive analysis of the two thinkers in a broader selection of topics, 
I aim to provide readers with a picture that demonstrates the ways in which their reasons, 
distinctions and evaluations intertwine and diverge. To achieve this and where appropriate, 
I introduce terminology and-or translations for disambiguating concepts or ironing out 
inconsistencies. Each concept I introduce is based on their propositions and distinctions. 
Likewise, I aim to challenge common assumptions or doxies about Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, e.g., the touted claim that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is 
pessimistic, which Atwell aptly summarises as follows:  
“The double-sided world [i.e., the world as will and as representation] is the striving 
of the will to become conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-
divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach 
salvation.” (Atwell 1995, 28; my emphasis) 
Though Atwell is rightly cautious to state that it ‘may’ annul itself, many commentators 
throw such caution to the wind and argue that self-cognition of the will’s efficacy leads to 
‘salvation’ or ascetic resignation. To challenge this doxy, I utilise the so-called ‘double-
cognition’ of the body as ‘will’ and ‘representation’ (or as ‘object’) and the ‘will-body 
identity’ to propose the ‘correlation theory of cognition’. The correlation theory of cognition 
constitutes the foundations of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and epistemology. It sets a clear 
boundary around what we can know and how we can (re)act. Using the correlation theory 
of cognition and key textual evidence, I will argue that we have good grounds for resisting 
the conclusion that ‘self-cognition’ of the will leads to or causes ascetic resignation such 
that we can claim that his philosophy is ‘pessimistic’.  
The correlation theory of cognition also changes how we make sense of key concepts 
such as disinterestedness, compassion, selflessness and objectivity. These concepts do not 
link to ascetic resignation in the way we initially assume when we construe his philosophy 
as ‘pessimistic’. To aid readers in recognising the previous, I suggest that we distinguish 
Schopenhauer the ‘individual’, who may be a ‘pessimist’, from the proposition that his 
‘philosophy’ is pessimistic. His philosophy can resist the charge of pessimism in subtle, but 
fundamental ways. It can show that pessimism is an aspect of individuals and so their will, 
which, in turn, can explain why the world itself appears as not worth much, albeit to them. 
In short, ‘pessimism’ is the subjective correlate of the world that appears to us in a 
pessimistic light. It compels us to focus on those features of it such as the suffering of others 
or our own and, in turn, to conflate that suffering with the character of the world itself. It 
also engenders actions in us that further entrench the previous character. Our pessimism 
colours our experience of the whole world and, in turn, limits on our actions. Accordingly, 
it is not our cognition of the world as it is in itself that leads to pessimism. It is the projection 
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of our own pessimism onto the world that limits our actions in it and, in turn, leads us to 
perceive the world as not worth much. The world’s character is a mirror of our will.   
The difference between Schopenhauer the individual and his philosophy likewise 
shows the intimate relationship between the two thinkers that informs Nietzsche’s 
philosophical interest, focus and method. It shows why Nietzsche focuses on agency, 
morality, the ascetic ideal and the arts, but also his general approach to philosophical 
problems as well as his skepticism with respect to the so-called thing in itself and the purity 
of ‘truth’. I will argue we can characterise Nietzsche’s approach to philosophical problems 
as stemming from the perspective of an individual or individuality, i.e., our personal needs, 
drives and so on. Even his analysis of communities, morality and the so-called ‘herd’ shows 
the stamp and seal of ‘individuality’, as I will aim to demonstrate. Nietzsche acquires his 
approach from objections to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but equally from fundamental 
philosophical agreement, which we rarely notice. We are can appreciate this agreement 
more easily if we note the intimate relationship between them as from Nietzsche’s point of 
view.  
In his early writings, Nietzsche describes Schopenhauer as his ‘educator’, which he 
defines in the following way:  
“Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you that the true, original 
meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable of being 
educated or formed and is in any case something difficult of access, bound and 
paralysed; your educators can be only your liberators.” (UM, ‘Schopenhauer’, 1; my 
emphasis)  
Notice that the above indirectly refers to Schopenhauer’s claims about willing and 
instruction:  
“What someone truly wills, the striving from his innermost essence and the goal he 
pursues accordingly – this is something we could never alter with external influences 
such as instruction: otherwise we could recreate him. Seneca makes the apposite 
remark: ‘velle non discitur’[willing cannot be taught]; which shows that he preferred 
the truth over his fellow Stoics, who said that virtue can be taught.” (WR, 320-321)  
Nietzsche, then, employs Schopenhauer’s passage to inform his definition of a true educator. 
Note how the above definition compares with Nietzsche’s subsequent description of his 
encounter with Schopenhauer and, specifically, the role Schopenhauer played in his life:  
“It was in this condition of need, distress and desire that I came to know Schopenhauer. 
I am one of those readers of Schopenhauer who when they have read one page of him 
know for certain they will go on to read all the pages and will pay heed to every word 
he ever said. I trusted him at once and my trust is the same now as it was nine years 
ago.” (UM, ‘Schopenhauer’, 2’ my emphasis)  
This early description of Schopenhauer’s influence, which is markedly more intimate and 
personal than we would expect from a philosophical opponent, substantially informs and 
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guides my analysis. It guides my approach to their philosophical relationship, but also to 
them as individual thinkers in their own right and with their own philosophies. I aim to show 
that Nietzsche construes philosophical problems, inquiries and interests as stemming from 
something personal or individual, similar to the above description of his reasons for ‘coming 
to know’ and ‘trusting’ Schopenhauer. This interest in the individual is not unique to 
Nietzsche, but stems from Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will.  
In sum, the thesis aims to assess the philosophical agreements and disagreements 
between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s views on ethics and aesthetics; specifically, on how 
they define and evaluate concepts like disinterestedness and objectivity, likewise 
selflessness and compassion. After recognising that focusing solely on their ethical and 
aesthetic propositions detracts attention from the fundamental agreements between them, I 
extend the scope of my assessment. This extension aims to provide a clearer framework for 
identifying the subtle, but fundamental agreements between them, which, in turn, gives us 
a clearer view of their ethical and aesthetic differences. However, the drawback of this 
approach is that it substantially broadens the thesis in content and focus. Below, I offer an 
overview of my journey into each philosopher and a brief summary of the various chapters, 
starting with Schopenhauer.  
 
2 
While reading into Schopenhauer’s ethics and aesthetics, I came across a disharmony 
between his various accounts of the ‘pure subject of cognition’, which led me to inquire into 
what he means by the ‘objectivity’ of a cognition. On the one hand, the pure subject of 
cognition perceives ‘things’ (including her ‘body’) as a representation and thus as ‘foreign’ 
to her (cf. WR, 124). On the other hand and during aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject 
of cognition collapses the distinction between herself and the object when she perceives its 
Idea. She no longer perceives it as ‘foreign’ (cf. WR, 201-2). Accordingly, the pure subject 
of cognition sometimes perceives things as ‘foreign’, but likewise as similar to her will and 
so as familiar to her as is her own willing, striving and so on. I sought to resolve this 
disharmony because of its implications for Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, which is invaluable 
for laying out clearly what he means by aesthetic contemplation.    
The above disharmony in his account of the pure subject of cognition encouraged 
me to take a step back and re-read Schopenhauer’s WR. I followed his suggestion that we 
should read it as ‘the unfolding of a single thought [ein einzige Gedanke]’ (WR, 312). 
Accordingly, I read each book as though it was a part of the unfolding of a single thought. 
What was important for my research into his ethics was the single thought’s ability to 
explain Schopenhauer’s proposition that “from the same source that gives rise to all 
goodness, love, virtue and nobility there ultimately emerges also what I call the negation of 
the will to life” (WR, 405).  
While reading closely and searching for the single thought, I noticed that the pure 
subject of cognition in books one and two of WR differ substantially from the pure subject 
of cognition in books three and four. I realised that their difference was due to the 
introduction of the concept of the ‘will’ and its role in Schopenhauer’s epistemology. 
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Schopenhauer uses the ‘will’ to render meaningful the ‘thing in itself’, which he derives 
from Kant who sometimes argues that it is merely a limiting concept and so not substantial, 
and, at other times, that it is substantial, but unknowable. Schopenhauer’s construes the 
‘thing in itself’ not solely as a limiting concept, but as substantial. He aims to render it 
meaningful without overstepping Kant’s limits of possible cognition, however. In short, he 
sought to ‘access’ it without arguing that we can cognise something as it is in itself. I read 
him as offering as close an approximation of what something is in itself as is possible in 
accordance with the limits of cognition set out by Kant’s transcendental idealism. He 
attempts to do so by using our relationship to ourselves, i.e., our first-person experience, as 
the basis for this approximation. We can access the thing in itself from within without 
thereby claiming that we can ‘cognise’ it as an ‘object among other objects’ in the world, 
according to Schopenhauer. The ‘will-body identity’ and the so-called ‘double cognition’ 
demonstrate his unique and novel philosophical approach to the problems raised and left 
unanswered by Kant’s transcendental idealism. The previous led me to develop what I called 
the ‘correlation theory of cognition’, which, I will argue, is fundamental to his philosophy. 
I found that we can construe the ‘single thought’ variously, but settled for two variations: 
the ‘will-body identity’ and ‘correlation theory of cognition’. 
Using the correlation theory of cognition, we can resolve the above ambiguity 
between the two accounts of the ‘pure subject of cognition’ starting with distinguishing 
between three cognitions of something: cognition of an ‘object’, of a ‘motive’ and an ‘Idea’. 
Noting Schopenhauer’s irregular uses of ‘Objekt’ and ‘Gegestand’, I coined the generic term 
of the ‘target’ of a cognition rather than the ‘object’ or ‘representation’. I chose ‘target’ for 
brevity and clarity, but also to emphasise the directionality of a cognition parallel to the 
directionality of the will or willing. To understand what he means by cognition of an object, 
a motive or an Idea, I argue, we should assess their respective ‘targets’, but also their 
subjective correlates. When we do so, we recognise that something appears as an ‘object’ 
only when we assume a particular subjective stance in relation to it; the same applies with 
respect to when it appears as a ‘motive’ or an ‘Idea’. Each one have their distinct subjective 
correlates. A core assumption of the correlation theory of cognition, then, is that the same 
target of cognition can, at different times and based on the subjective stance we take in 
relation to it, appear as an object, a motive or an Idea. We perceive the same thing in each 
instance, but the nature of our perception and thus how it appears changes in relation to 
changes in us, i.e., our subjectivity or the subjective correlate. The previous changes have 
implications with respect to the actions we can take in relation to something. In other words, 
how something appears places or removes a limit on our possible actions in relation to it.  
Finally, I found that the ‘source of goodness, love etc.’ is disinterestedness and its 
cognitive modus, namely, aesthetic contemplation. The previous stems from our projecting 
the ‘will’ on the target of our cognition and, in turn, on the world itself. I then focused on 
explaining how it can be possible for someone to be ‘disinterested’ and still (re)act in 
relation to something. 
In sum, the concept of the ‘will’ plays a pervasive role in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, but we have to first construe it as derivable from the first-person experience of 
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willing something. The previous experience is difficult to ‘conceptualise’ without, at the 
same time, losing sight of the fact that it is a first-person experience. I construe it as the 
event that shows the will-body identity and thus the bridge between the (first-person) 
subjective world of thoughts (wishes, desires etc.) and the (third-person) objective world of 
actions (objects, events etc.). The philosophical commentary generally reflects the previous, 
but it often misses the nuanced and distinct roles that the will plays in his explanation of 
certain phenomena, which inform us about his concepts and resolve apparently 
contradictory propositions such as the ‘intellect’s effect on the will’. Consequently, I used 
the ‘ill-body identity, the correlation theory of cognition and the different uses of the will 
as the conceptual framework that resolves Schopenhauer’s apparently contradictory or 
inconsistent propositions. I would summarise my reading of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as 
an attempt to unfold the essential role that the previous conceptual framework plays in his 
philosophy and how it disambiguates his ethical and aesthetic propositions.  
Below, I give a slightly more detailed overview of the various chapters in 
Schopenhauer’s section and their arguments, which could be useful as an outline for how I 
derived the conceptual framework and used it to resolve various inconsistencies and 
disambiguate certain core concepts.  
 
1. The will, the Intellect and the Meaningful World-View. In this chapter, I provide an 
overview of the foundations of Schopenhauer’s epistemology. I assess why and how he 
introduces the concept of the ‘will’ using the so-called double cognition and I analyse 
what Atwell aptly calls the ‘will-body identity thesis’. I also introduce the correlation 
theory of cognition and argue that the ‘pure subject of cognition’ still assumes the 
‘willing stance’ on things. Accordingly, the so-called ‘pure’ subject’s ‘purity’ here is 
dubious, especially, if it yields cognition of an ‘object’.  
2. Self-cognition and the Correlation Theory of Cognition. In this chapter, I lay out in detail 
what I call the correlation theory of cognition and develop the distinctions and 
propositions from the previous chapter. I define it as the theory that there is a by-fit 
relationship between the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ of a cognition. I also suggest a 
distinction between the ‘object’ and the ‘target’ of a cognition to clarify how 
Schopenhauer conceives the difference between the cognition of an ‘object’, a ‘motive’ 
or an ‘Idea’. These types of cognition have their own corresponding subjective correlate, 
which are, respectively, the ‘impure subject of cognition’ (or what I call the ‘willing 
stance’), the ‘willing subject’ (or the ‘individual’)’ and the genuinely ‘pure subject of 
cognition’ (or the ‘disinterested stance’).  
3. Aesthetic Contemplation and the Projection of Willing. I argue that the correlation theory 
of cognition permits a novel understanding of aesthetic contemplation that distinguishes 
it from ordinary cognition and reflection of an object or a motive. Aesthetic 
contemplation is a type of cognition, which we can comprehend as the by-fit 
relationship between assuming a disinterested stance on something and cognising it as 
an ‘Idea’, or, more clearly, cognising its Idea.  
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4. The Objective Picture and the Schopenhauerian Idea. This chapter aims to give a detailed 
analysis of the objective side of aesthetic contemplation. I assess what he means by 
cognition of an Idea by juxtaposing it to cognition of an ‘object’ and ‘motive’. I attempt 
to give a novel view of what he means by ‘perceiving the target independent from its 
relations to other targets of cognition’. I argue that, after he introduces of the concept 
of the ‘will’, what he means by an ‘Idea’ rests on our perceiving the target as the 
representation of willing, striving and so on. In short, it rests on what I call the 
‘projection of willing’ whose basis is the double cognition of the body as will and as an 
object among objects. Likewise, I critically evaluate the status of the ‘Schopenhauerian 
Idea’ in light of alternative readings. I argue against the Platonic and Kantian readings 
of the Ideas.     
5. The Willing Stance and the Disinterested Individual. Following from the previous, this 
chapter assesses the subjective side of aesthetic contemplation by juxtaposing the 
‘willing stance’—which is the subjective correlate of ordinary cognition (i.e., of an 
object or a motive)—to ‘disinterestedness’ or the ‘disinterested stance’. After 
Schopenhauer introduces the ‘will’, the ‘pure subject of cognition’ changes its meaning 
to reflect disinterestedness or our assuming a disinterested stance on the target of our 
cognition. I construe the latter as the ‘genuinely’ pure subject of cognition to emphasise 
that projection of willing onto the world offers us a more veracious cognition of its 
target, than cognition of an object or a motive. The same occurs with cognition of the 
world itself, which, after introducing the will, he construes as a representation of 
willing, striving and so on. Finally, I evaluate my proposed reading of disinterestedness 
in light of other readings.  
6. Aesthetic Contemplation from the Viewpoint of the Artist and the Spectator. I assess 
whether or not Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation supports a 
distinction between the arts and aesthetics. I propose an insight into Schopenhauer’s 
‘philosophy of art’ by distinguishing artists based on their respective aims. I distinguish 
artists tout court from ‘aesthetic’ artists. Aesthetic artists aim to incite aesthetic 
contemplation and therefore cognition of an Idea in their spectators, whereas non-
aesthetic artists have different aims or prioritise different aspects of the arts. Finally, I 
suggest Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art leaves us with two conflicting demands of 
aesthetic artists, which may be irreconcilable.  
7. The Beautiful, the Sublime and the ‘Felt Consciousness’. In this chapter, I argue that we 
should comprehend beauty and sublimity as ‘properties’ or ‘features’ of ‘objects’ that 
incite aesthetic contemplation. I object to the proposition that beauty and sublimity are 
features of something on which we aesthetic contemplate, i.e., features of ‘Ideas’. 
According to Schopenhauer, beauty and sublimity are prerequisites of aesthetic 
contemplation and not consequences of aesthetically contemplating on something. I 
derive the previous from an analysis of his conflicting remarks on ‘aesthetic pleasure’. 
I argue that an account of aesthetic pleasure is derivable from his views on our pleasure 
in beauty. This account has the benefit of being consistent with his general account of 
pleasure. Thus, I argue that aesthetic pleasure is still alleviation of pain or suffering; it 
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works ‘against the back drop’ of a thwarted will and so it presupposes the will. The 
difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic pleasure is that the former alleviates pain 
or suffering by redirecting our attention from our suffering and the (personal) will 
underpinning it to something else, not by our actions or by attaining the object of our 
will. We derive aesthetic pleasure from projecting the will onto something, but 
projection is pleasing to us because it distracts us from our own woe. Finally, I consider 
how this theory applies to sublimity and discuss the intimate relationship between 
sublimity, aesthetic contemplation and what he calls the ‘felt consciousness’. The felt 
consciousness, I suggest, is a bridge between his aesthetics and ethics.  
8. Motives and Mainsprings. This chapter aims to make smoother the transition from 
aesthetics to ethics by arguing that there is a distinction between a ‘motive’ (Motiv) and 
a ‘mainspring’ (Triebfeder) of action. Common translations of Triebfeder as ‘incentive’ 
can be misleading by not taking into account the distinction between the will and the 
intellect in Schopenhauer’s philosophy based on his correlation theory of cognition. We 
have epistemic access to our mainsprings only in reflection over an action and its 
corresponding motive, because, while we act, we identify with our mainsprings and so 
merely experience their reflection in the motive. Thus, we only have indirect cognition 
of a mainspring, but we directly cognise our ‘motives’, since they are the objects 
impelling us to act.  
9. Wellbeing, Woe and the Pleasure in Willing Something. In this chapter, I clarify and 
nuance the distinction between wellbeing and woe by assessing his claim that wellbeing 
and woe mean— respectively—in ‘accordance’ and ‘discordance’ with a will. I use this 
chapter to prepare the ground for a subsequent overview and definition of the various 
mainsprings of action by arguing that willing is directional and thus positive in the sense 
that it aims for something. I utilise a distinction between one’s state and one’s aim to 
argue that his various mainsprings suggest that we can conceive of a pleasure in willing 
itself as distinct from a pleasure in accordance with a ‘specific aim of the will (or a 
specific mainspring)’. Consequently, we can construe pleasure in willing itself as 
underpinning the differences in mainsprings.   
10. The Mainsprings of our Actions. This chapter aims to nuance and further refine the 
definition of the concept of a ‘mainspring’ of action. Likewise, it breakdown the various 
mainsprings that Schopenhauer discusses in his works. I assess some possible 
objections to the definitions I offer and defend the proposition that the will is always 
positive. I also argue that we can derive his negative conception of willing, i.e., “all 
willing springs from need, and thus from lack, and thus from suffering” (WR, 219), from 
the positive conception of what the will aims for. We can distinguish between the bodily 
‘state’ which urging us to act and the action’s ‘aim’; the aim characterises the act of will 
proper, which is always positive in that it aims for something rather than against it. I 
construe the act of will as the movement of reaching for something, which explains or 
underpins our reacting to or against something that ‘blocks’ this reaching.   
11. The Will to Life. The analysis of the concept of the ‘will to life’ and its epistemological 
limits is, in my view, the most important part of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. I argue 
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the concept rests wholly on epistemic foundations and its purpose is to provide a 
meaningful view of the ‘will’ in the ‘metaphysical sense’. However, there is also an 
ambiguity and potential impasse between the fact that the will to life is a cognition, but 
nothing in particular corresponds to it, which would legitimate extending the concept as 
his does, i.e., to make sense of motivation, stimulation and causation. I despair over not 
being able to further disambiguate the concept, but I utilise it throughout to reveal an 
overlooked distinction between the ‘will to life’ and the will. The distinction is crucial 
for resolving some conceptual knots around the relationship between his views on 
ethics, asceticism and metaphysics.  
12. The Difference between Selflessness and Compassion (Mitleid). In this chapter, I suggest 
a possible reading of Schopenhauer’s proposition in OBM that compassion [Mitleid] is 
the basis of morally worthy actions. I assess how moral actions are possible in the first 
place by utilising a distinction between sympathy and empathy, which shows that 
compassion stems from the change in our cognition stemming from aesthetic 
contemplation. Our assuming the disinterested stance in relation to someone allows us 
to empathise with her without this necessarily leading to compassionate action, but we 
could not possibly act compassionately or feel it for her without empathising with her. 
Disinterestedness enables compassion, but it does not guarantee it, since it also enables 
malice and asceticism, both of which require perceiving something or someone as 
willing, striving etc., which is the minimal condition of identifying with her and her 
situation. Likewise, I critically assess a misreading of Schopenhauer’s proposition that 
compassion rests on identifying with the recipient and her woe, which I find in 
Cartwright’s objection and his alternative suggestion to Schopenhauer’s claim that we 
‘feel someone’s pain in their body’.   
13. The Metaphysical Egoism Objection. This chapter demonstrates the so-called 
metaphysical egoism objection as described by various commentators; I opt for Julian 
Young’s reading as an example. I suggest that there are two possible interpretations of 
it, which I call the ‘categorical’ and the ‘motivational’ interpretation. The categorical 
interpretation suggests that Schopenhauer fails to demonstrate how compassion 
genuinely differs from egoism considered metaphysically, which means we can 
construe compassion as a kind of egoism. The motivational interpretation suggests that 
the metaphysical identity between agent and the recipient does not guarantee 
compassion, because she can likewise act egoistically based on this identity. After 
rejecting the ‘motivational’ interpretation based on what I discussed previously about 
the limited role of disinterestedness in compassion, I argue that the categorical 
interpretation requires assessment and a response. I conclude the categorical 
interpretation makes two errors. Firstly, it misapplies Schopenhauer’s two uses of ‘will’, 
because it fails to recognise these uses. One use refers to the ‘individual’, whereas the 
other refers to the ‘will to life’; one use is individuated or individual whereas the other 
is metaphysical. The second error is a misunderstanding of the distinction between the 
‘will to life’ as the urge to do something and the ‘mainspring’ of an action. 
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14. Compassion and Egoism: A Response to the Metaphysical Egoism Objection. In this 
chapter, I suggest a response to the categorical interpretation by arguing we cannot, in 
principle, conflate compassion with egoism. We can distinguish the will to life from a 
mainspring that stems from it. Instead, we should read his claim about ‘seeing through 
the principium individuationis’ (PI) as representing our overcoming egoism without 
implying what follows from this overcoming, whether morality follows through 
compassion, or immorality through malice or even ascetic resignation through the 
asceticism (the mainspring). Though he often suggests that morality and ascetic 
resignation follow from seeing through the PI, we cannot overlook how malice is also 
rooted in the same cognition. I argue that seeing through the PI is our assuming a 
disinterested stance on something such that we can perceive it as willing, striving and 
so on.  
15. The Conscience and Self-Knowledge. Here, I argue that Schopenhauer views the 
conscience as inextricably linked to self-knowledge, but they are not synonyms. The 
former stems from how we respond to the latter. We can distinguish various ‘responses’ 
to our self-knowledge and thus treat self-knowledge as the cognition of something, i.e., 
cognition of an object. In responding to our self-knowledge, we assume the willing 
stance and thus perceive ourselves as an object first and then a motive. We construct 
this ‘object’ from our various actions and their motives using the faculty of reason based 
on the will-body identity. I call the object of self-knowledge our self-image, for brevity. 
Our response to our self-image and so how the previous motivates us, determines 
whether we have a conscience or not. We can have various responses to our self-image, 
however, some of which are not ‘conscientious’. Our conscience is thus one response 
to our self-image among others. I substantiate the previous propositions by a detailed 
analysis of how he distinguishes ‘remorse’ from ‘guilt’, but likewise ‘direct’ from 
‘indirect’ (dis)approval of conscience.  
16. Schopenhauer’s Objection to Kant on the Conscience and the Impasse of Self-knowledge. 
I argue that we can find a basis for Schopenhauer’s distinction between the conscience 
and self-knowledge in his objections to Kant’s account of the conscience. Schopenhauer 
argues that Kant failed to distinguish our deliberation about any course of action from 
our conscience. For Schopenhauer, our conscience reflects the voice of morality, whose 
source is the mainspring of compassion; it is our compassion reacting to our self-image 
based on an action we undertook or based on an action we resolve to undertake. The 
latter uses our memory of a previous similar action(s) as its criterion for evaluating the 
impending action. Finally, I suggest that there is an impasse in Schopenhauer’s views 
on self-knowledge, which we recognise in the following two conflicting proposition. 
First, the intellect cannot possibly change the will and, second, self-knowledge of the 
will can lead to the negation of the will to life, i.e., ascetic resignation. 
17. The Paradox of Ascetic Resignation and Schopenhauer’s Error. In this last chapter of the 
Schopenhauer section, I analyse the impasse in self-knowledge and argue that negation 
of the will to life reveals a paradox in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. I start by 
defining ascetic resignation using a distinction between negation of the will to life and 
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self-negation. I support this distinction by arguing that guilt and negation of the will to 
life are different responses with correspondingly different targets and mainsprings. I 
also critically assess Reginster’s reading of ascetic resignation, which suggests that 
ascetic resignation is indifference with respect to our desires engendered by an 
expectation about the nature of desiring itself, which we derive from aesthetic 
contemplation. The expectation is that we never fulfill our desiring itself, because it will 
always lead to suffering. The intellect’s activity explains ascetic resignation: it ‘focuses’ 
us on features that are inhospitable to our will. I argue that Reginster overlooks a 
passage in Schopenhauer, which shows that the previous expectation and its 
corresponding indifference can also produce affirmation of the will to life. Likewise, he 
overlooks the role of the will in the intellect’s focusing on a particular feature of the 
world, because he conflates ordinary reflection with aesthetic contemplation. When we 
reflect on something, the will distinguishes and selects the features we focus on. The 
previous is different from the free play of the intellect in aesthetic contemplation, which 
allows us to identify with and focus wholly on a target of our cognition at the expense 
of our will and the self-consciousness underpinning its activity. Accordingly, we can 
reflect on our aesthetic contemplation and infer something about our will from it, but 
we must not conflate the previous reflection and its inferences with aesthetic 
contemplation itself. Correspondingly, I argue that we should distinguish the 
‘reflective’ objectivity of ordinary cognition from the ‘aesthetic’ objectivity of aesthetic 
contemplation. Given the previous, I argue that ascetic resignation itself is paradoxical, 
because it reflects an activity of the will, namely, one of its mainspring, but not the 
activity of the intellect on the will. I defend the previous by arguing that there is a 
difference between ‘satisfaction’ and ‘complete’ satisfaction. Our aiming for ‘complete’ 
satisfaction is not inherent to the ‘will to life’ itself, but is, paradoxically, one way in 
which the will to life expresses itself, i.e., it is a mainspring of action. Thus, aiming for 
complete satisfaction results from ascetic resignation or represents one of its early 
stages; it does not cause it. The intellect reflects the will, it does not change it. It offers 
self-knowledge, but it cannot possibly respond to this knowledge independent from the 
will and thus its mainsprings.1 Lastly, I conclude by demonstrating a crucial error 
Schopenhauer makes in linking the artistic genre of tragedy to negation of the will to 
life. 
 
3 
The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian 
philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection 
 
                                               
1 I leave open the conditions under which the intellect provides us with self-knowledge, that is, what impels our 
intellect to make an object of our will in the first place, because it did not concern Schopenhauer directly, but he 
addresses it mostly indirectly through his conception of ‘aesthetic pleasure’. Nietzsche did consider these 
conditions, however. They arguably inform his philosophical method of addressing hard cases and phenomena by 
assessing the conditions under which these phenomena and-or concepts emerge.  
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of the very concept of ‘being’—all these are more closely related to me than anything 
else people have thought so far.” (EH, ‘BT’, 3) 
The above passage from Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo has been my map into Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and Weltanschauung. There are three key philosophical areas implicit to it, 
which, I believe, define his philosophical interests. Firstly, his focus on life’s ‘value’ and its 
construal as a problem, that is, the problem of pessimism, which he argues is addressed by 
the assessments of philosophers, but also the creative activities of artists. Secondly, his 
ethical evaluation of willing, egoism and their cognates, which he construed as undermined 
by the dominant morality of his day. Thirdly, his philosophical method or approach to 
philosophical problems, which he constructs from his training as a philologist, albeit also 
from his philosophical interests in German idealism, especially, Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of the will. The previous areas interested both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but they had 
diametrically opposed evaluations and approaches to them. As a preliminary to a more 
detailed discussion in the main body of the text, I offer a broad overview of my reading of 
Nietzsche that underscores what, I will argue, is his indebtedness to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy.  
Nietzsche’s ‘affirmation of passing away and destruction’ accentuates a difference 
between himself and Schopenhauer, whose views on death oppose this affirmation. Recall 
that, after quoting a famous passage from Calderon’s Life is a Dream2, Schopenhauer asks, 
“how could it [being born] not be an offence, given that it is followed by death in accordance 
with an eternal law” (WR, 381; my emphasis). Schopenhauer’s evaluation of death as an 
offence conceals the subjective correlate underscoring our construing death as an offence, 
i.e., as something negative or as a wrong, for which we have to repent. Only the will to life 
that expresses itself as an individual, i.e., egoistically, could underpin this negative 
evaluation of the ‘eternal law’ and lead to a depreciation of life. 
Likewise, Nietzsche’s saying ‘yes to opposition and war’ evidences a radical 
departure from his educator, who construes opposition and war as the “highest expression 
of egoism” and “struggle between individuals” (WR, 359; my emphasis). They are both 
objective correlates of egoism, which Schopenhauer blames for the profoundest suffering 
of humankind and even the suffering inherent to life itself, when he later construes egoism 
as following necessarily from the affirmation of the will to life and thus preservation of the 
body. He champions compassion, which he construes as the natural ground of morality, for 
its ability to suppress and mitigate the negative consequences of egoism.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s views on “the family failing of all philosophers” (HHI 2)—
their ‘lack of historical sense’—is implicit to his ‘saying yes to becoming’ and ‘radical 
 
                                               
2 The quote is from the following a statement by Sigmund in Act I: “Oh, what a miserable, unlucky wretch am I! 
Please explain to me, heavens, given the way you treat me, what crime I committed against you with my birth; 
although if I was born, my crime is clear, and the severity of your sentence has sufficient cause, for birth itself is 
man’s greatest crime. But I would just like to know, to ease my distress—leaving aside, heavens, the crime of 
birth—what else I did to merit further punishment. Weren’t others born as well? And if so, what privileges were 
they granted that I’ve never enjoyed?” (Calderon 2004, 93). 
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rejection of the very concept of being’. They demonstrate his objections to those 
explanations of natural phenomena that appeal exclusively to what he calls ‘metaphysics’. 
Schopenhauer understands philosophy’s task, or the philosophical relevance of being and 
becoming, in a different and opposed manner: 
“[W]e feel that people are infinitely remote from a philosophical knowledge of the 
world when they imagine that its essence can somehow (however delicately 
concealed) be grasped historically. Yet this is the case with anyone whose views of 
the intrinsic essence of the world include a becoming or a having-become or 
becoming-becoming, anyone who attributes the slightest significance to the concepts 
of earlier or later, and consequently, who implicitly or explicitly looks for and locates 
a beginning and an endpoint for the world together with a path between them, along 
which the philosophising individual can recognise his own location. In most cases, 
such historical philosophising produces a cosmogony… [S]uch historical philosophy, 
whatever airs it gives itself, acts as if Kant never existed, and treats time as a 
determination of things in themselves, thus remaining in what Kant called appearance 
(as opposed to the thing in itself), or what Plato called that which becomes and never 
is (as opposed to what is and never becomes), or finally what the Indians call the web 
of māyā.” (WR, 299f)  
The above reveals Schopenhauer’s most ardent philosophical aim, i.e., to substantiate and 
render meaningful the ‘thing in itself’, which Nietzsche describes as the “vain urge to be the 
unriddler of the world” (GS 99). Nietzsche’s evaluation of being and becoming 
demonstrates a key philosophical departure from Schopenhauer in terms of their respective 
conceptual frameworks and thereby what counts as an explanation of something. According 
to Nietzsche, we have insufficient knowledge of any target of our cognition, we likewise do 
not possess an ‘organ’ for this knowledge, which would thereby permit us to distinguish its 
reality from its appearance, on which depends the concept of the ‘thing in itself’ (cf. GS 
354; HHI 16; WLN 2[149], 5[14]). I will argue the previous objections rest on Nietzsche’s 
distinctive philosophical method or conceptual framework, which aims to render irrelevant 
the distinction between the thing in itself and its appearance (cf. HHI 10).  
We would be remiss to ignore the differences and disagreements between 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in aesthetics, ethics and their respective philosophical 
methods, but the philosophical commentary regularly discloses and discusses them. What 
we rarely discuss is Nietzsche’s appraisal of Schopenhauer as his educator and continued 
trust of him after rejecting his method, evaluations, explanations and even his conceptual 
framework. I aim to attend to their philosophical disagreement and Nietzsche’s reasons for 
appraising Schopenhauer in spite of their many disagreements. These reasons, I will argue, 
stem from the fact that their agreement is fundamental and philosophical. This agreement 
plays a central role in Nietzsche’s philosophy and Weltanschauung, but we rarely notice it 
or adequately appreciate it.   
Attempting to compare Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s philosophies in a clear and 
detailed manner, which does justice to differences and fundamental agreements between 
 14 
them, but respects their individual viewpoints, proves difficult. Their different styles of 
writing and presentation, which are as different as their evaluations, only compounds the 
difficulty. However, recent Anglophone philosophical commentary on Nietzsche’s 
philosophy can be useful for guiding our assessment with respect to resolving this difficulty. 
For example, Gardner’s (2009) argument that there is a ‘lack of fit’ in Nietzsche’s views on 
agency and selfhood has offered me an important platform for rethinking Nietzsche’s 
fundamental concept of the ‘drive’ through its relationship to self-conscious thought. It has 
permitted me to assess Nietzsche’s core philosophical concepts, which here I approach from 
his objections to Schopenhauer’s account of the ‘will’, ‘self-knowledge’ and ‘deliberation’. 
Likewise, this platform has allowed me to account for his appraisal and trust of 
Schopenhauer as his educator. It led me to notice and propose an alternative solution to 
Gardner’s ‘lack of fit’, which differs from the current solutions and shows their limitations. 
Accordingly, I approach Nietzsche’s thoughts from their foundations: his conception of the 
drives and consciousness. From the previous, I determine his descriptive and normative 
views on morality, aesthetic contemplation and reflection, but also his views on ideals.  
We often take the influence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy on Nietzsche as 
undeniable, but our approach to this influence is often as from Nietzsche’s objections to it. 
We know these objections inform Nietzsche’s Weltanschauung, but we rarely comment on 
the fundamental philosophical agreements between them, which, I will argue, are more 
informative. We can condense the previous philosophical agreement to two interrelated 
concepts rooted in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will: 
A) The ‘will-body’ identity.  
B) Immanence and ontological monism.  
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche derive differing philosophical methods and conceptual 
frameworks on the basis of the above concepts and their insights, which, in turn, leads them 
to different explanations of phenomena. Their views on aesthetics, ethics, philosophical 
method, conceptual framework and distinct writing style conceal this fundamental 
agreement between them. The previous, in turn, leads the Anglophone philosophical 
commentary on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to focus generally on their differences in 
respect to the above areas. For example, Nietzsche’s preference over the concept of the 
‘drive’ stems from his critique of Schopenhauer’s use of the concept of the ‘will’, but does 
not stem from his rejection of the insight inherent to the will-body identity. Nietzsche argues 
that he is more consistent with respect to the will-body identity than his educator who 
seemingly wavered when it came to his normative views. Schopenhauer emphasises the 
first-person perspective of willing, i.e., self-conscious willing, to disambiguate the will-body 
identity. He derives a conceptual framework from it that leads him to overextend the limited 
concept of self-conscious willing to apply it to non-conscious things. Nietzsche emphasises 
the third-person perspective of the body and its vicissitudes, instead. The previous leads him 
to use the concept of the ‘drive’ as a replacement of the obsolete concept of the ‘will’. The 
‘drive(s)’, he argues, is more consistent with the insight inherent to the will-body identity. 
Furthermore, transcendental idealism is the philosophical method that guarantees 
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immanence and ontological monism, for Schopenhauer, whereas for Nietzsche, we require 
a revisionist, naturalist and unique method, for which proposes the compound of his drive 
psychology and so-called ‘historical philosophising’ (cf. HHI 2).3 Therefore, Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer disagree in various ways, but their disagreements are rooted in agreement on 
the will-body identity and their philosophical commitment to immanence and ontological 
monism. What each one makes of the will-body identity and what they derive from it, shapes 
their philosophy and Weltanschauung. Nietzsche argues he is more consistent with the will-
body identity as well as his commitment to ontological monism and immanence than his 
educator was, who seemingly wavers in his aesthetics, ethics and ascetic resignation.  
I defend two core propositions with respect to Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
Weltanschauung independent from his relationship to Schopenhauer. First, there is an 
identity relationship between our ‘self-conscious thoughts’ and ‘drives’, which I use to 
defend an alternative solution to the ‘lack of fit’. Second, he grounds this identity on his 
revisionist and naturalist account of self-conscious agency stemming from his distinct and 
unique philosophical method and conceptual framework. I attempt to disambiguate this 
philosophical method and conceptual framework by introducing what I call the ‘conceptual 
link’, which stems from two propositions he uses to describe his method. The propositions 
I have in mind are, a) what he calls the ‘chemistry of concepts and sensations’ (HHI 1), 
which he argues explain phenomena without appealing to metaphysics or metaphysical 
entities, and b) the so-called ‘evolution’4 of something, which he argues is crucial to 
understanding the origin and development of things that underscores the chemistry in a). I 
argue his method and framework lead him to posit a revisionist and naturalist account of 
‘consciousness’ (and its cognates). Thus, consciousness is a drive among other drives or 
represents the activity of a drive(s) in the trenches with the other drives, which he explains 
by appealing to the concept or process of ‘internalisation’ (cf. GM II, 16; D 301; TI, 
‘Skirmishes’, 23, 47). Thus, Nietzsche’s explanations and descriptions of phenomena are 
rooted in a unique and distinctive philosophical method and conceptual framework. The 
previous differs from his evaluation of the phenomena in question and thus from his 
normative philosophical viewpoint in an important way, as I attempt to show in the main 
body of the text. 
Nietzsche utilises his philosophical method beyond his alternative account of 
consciousness. He also defends a revisionist and naturalist account of ‘morality’, which, he 
argues, emerges from contractual relationships between individuals living in a community. 
Similarly, self-conscious agency and deliberation are activities that ‘emerge’ from 
 
                                               
3 Nietzsche initial training in Philology and his interest in classics no doubt contributes greatly to the evaluation 
and formulation of this unique method, but I was unable to explore this contribution here.  
4 Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘evolution’ of something is broad in its application, for example, in his early 
writing, he lists the following: the evolution of ‘organisms’, ‘concepts’, ‘art and its genres’, ‘reason’, ‘morality’, 
‘philosophical science’ and ‘culture’ (cf. HHI 10, 11, 43, 158, 215, 221, 261). I will argue the previous remains 
rooted fundamentally in the will-body identity and his commitment to ontological monism and immanence. Thus, 
what applies to individual actions and drives applies collective human activities and culture, according to 
Nietzsche. 
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somewhere, according to him; so, they are explicable in terms of the drives, their relations 
and their development or evolution. His critique of morality reveals his use of his revisionist 
account of consciousness and self-conscious agency, which, I will argue, are attempts to 
attune and prepare his readers for a broader evaluative task. This task starts with an inquiry 
into morality’s entrenched role in our lives. He construes it as a drive among other drives 
and then demonstrates its effects on our ‘health’. I strive to disambiguate this evaluative 
task by assessing what underpins his writing style and rhetoric, how he challenges his 
readers’ conscience and affects them using his propositions, questions and irony. 
Nevertheless, there is a difference between his attunement and his subsequent evaluation or 
normative claims about that to which we attune, which, I suggest, we should identify to 
avoid a misleading conflation. This conflation leads us to miss a fundamental aspect of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts: his distinctive method of evaluation. What is distinctive about it is his 
introduction of the individual’s perspective (or the perspective of individuality) into moral 
considerations using seemingly morally neutral concepts like ‘life’, ‘willing’ and ‘health’. 
This method of evaluation, I argue, culminates in his attempts to harmonise our communal 
life with our individuality using the creative and life-affirming activities of so-called 
‘sovereign individuals’ (or sovereign individuality).  
In sum, Nietzsche’s propositions stem from a particular philosophical method and 
approach, which offers a revisionist and naturalist account and explanation of phenomena. 
This method is indebted to the fundamentals of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which explains 
his sustained appraisal of Schopenhauer and trust in him as his educator. Nietzsche’s 
Weltanschauung is not solely based on his objections, replacements and alternative 
evaluations to Schopenhauer, but also his distinctive aim to harmonise individuality with 
communal life. This harmonisation starts by demonstrating the damaging constraints that 
communal life places on individuality and its effects on health, but it then suggests an 
alternative way of managing those constraints and mitigating their damaging effects via 
what he calls ‘sovereign individuality’. 
Below, I offer a detailed overview of various chapters in Nietzsche’s section, which 
shows how I derive his unique explanatory and evaluative method, but also how I use it to 
disambiguate fundamental concepts and even resolve the lack of fit. 
 
1. Nietzschean Agency: Conscious Thought and the Drives. In this first chapter of 
Nietzsche’s section, I inquire into the foundations of his philosophy and so his concept 
of the drive [Trieb]. I suggest that drives play a similar role in Nietzsche as the 
mainsprings play in Schopenhauer: they complete the objective picture of the world by 
accounting for the interest that we take in something. They likewise explain why 
something in the world (also the world itself) appears differently to us at different times. 
Construing drives as dispositions is as unclear as the concept of a drive, however. Thus, 
I assess four attempted definitions of the drives by the philosophical commentary. I 
argue these definitions reveal a split between two readings. First, drives are basic units 
of effort or movement. Second, drives are tendencies operating on self-conscious, 
rational agents with the aim of engendering their characteristic action or behavior. These 
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two readings correspond to different pictures of Nietzschean agency, both of which 
carry certain ontological commitments or presuppositions.  
2. The Lack of Fit and the Two Commitments. I expand on the picture of Nietzschean agency 
that emerges by assessing what Gardner (2009) calls the ‘lack of fit’ between 
Nietzsche’s theoretical claims about selfhood as reducible to drive relations and his 
practical claims about the sovereign individual’s self-knowledge and self-mastery. I 
distinguish between two solutions to the lack of fit resulting from the two pictures of 
agency that emerged in the previous chapter: the ‘transcendentalist’ and 
‘epiphenomenalist’ solution. Both make apposite and important claims about 
Nietzschean agency, but fail to resolve the lack of fit for different—albeit fundamentally 
related—reasons. I summarise these reasons under two commitments, which, I argue, 
Nietzsche aims to avoid. The first I call the ‘conscious identity’ commitment, which 
posits a relationship of identity between the unity of the ‘I’ and the unity of agency. The 
second is the ‘subjectivity’ commitment, which defends the claim that the ‘I’ is a simple 
and irreducible unity without a third-person representation.  
3. The Nuanced Solutions to the Lack of Fit. In this chapter, I assess two nuanced solutions 
to the lack of fit. I construe them as the ‘interaction theory’ and the ‘repository theory’ 
of Nietzschean agency. Both are sophisticated extensions of the transcendentalist and 
the epiphenomenalist readings. Accordingly, they struggle to prevent the lack of fit from 
resurfacing. The interaction theory struggles to explain the basis on which there is an 
interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘drives’ without inflating Nietzsche’s ontology and 
so shifting the burden of explaining the lack of fit. The repository theory struggles to 
explain how a repository of drives can ‘stand over and above’ itself without appealing 
to the subjectivity commitment and invoking the homunculi problem.  
4. Towards an Alternative Solution to the Lack of Fit. I summarise the two different pictures 
of Nietzschean agency and their limitations with respect to resolving the lack of fit. I 
argue that they disagree on how to make sense of the sovereign individual’s ‘self-
mastery’, which they construe as ‘control’ over and-or ‘ownership’ of the drives. For 
both pictures, the drives are ‘mechanical’ and there is some interaction between the 
agent and her drives, which leads both of them to reintroduce inadvertently what I call 
the third-person phantom. I propose an alternative approach and solution, which rejects 
the interaction theory of the ‘I’-drive relationship. My alternative solution construes the 
relationship as two distinct perspectives on the same thing or event and so posits an 
identity relationship between the ‘I’ and the drives. I am grateful to May’s (2009) 
account of ‘self-mastery’ as ‘hierarchy’ for leading me to the identity relationship. To 
defend my alternative solution to the lack of fit which aims to avoid the homunculi 
problem, I search for the foundations of Nietzsche’s Weltanschauung and philosophical 
method, which, I argue, stem from Schopenhauer’s influence.  
5. Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and the Will-Body Identity. I look at the textual evidence 
suggesting that Nietzsche accepts Schopenhauer’s will-body identity thesis and the 
limits the latter places on the meaningfulness of the objective picture. Nietzsche derives 
something different from the will-body identity than Schopenhauer did, however, which 
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means that he explains differently the meaningfulness of the objective picture. To 
navigate effectively through their agreements and disagreements, I distinguish the ‘will-
body’ identity from the ‘I-action’ (or individual-action) identity. We can construe the 
will-body identity as the precondition of agency itself: it explains on what basis we are 
causally efficacious. The ‘I-action’ identity is a precondition of individuality, however, 
and so it explains on what basis we are free, responsible agents. I argue that the 
differences between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the preconditions of agency and 
individuality are twofold and related. Firstly, they disagree about starting with the first-
person experience of willing. The previous leads Nietzsche to prefer the concept of the 
‘drive’ instead of the ‘will’ to avoid appealing to unities without a third-person 
representation. Secondly, they disagree over the role of deliberation in individuality.  
6. Nietzsche on Individuality and Generality following the Will-Body Identity. In this chapter, 
I look at Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s views on individuality and 
generality, but also demonstrate the basis on which he constructs his revisionist and 
naturalist account out of those objections. Nietzsche takes the body and its multiplicity 
as his starting point for making sense of the will-body identity and deriving a 
philosophical method and conceptual framework from it, contra Schopenhauer who 
starts with the first-person experience of willing. Willing is a multiplicity (of ‘drives’), 
for Nietzsche: it is an activity of the whole body and its parts working together, not the 
result of one part of the body in opposition to or as distinct from the other parts. This 
activity of the whole body (or the drives) appears as an action or an affect. For brevity, 
I suggest a tripartite distinction mapping out the generic and individual activities of the 
whole body. First, our actions themselves represent who one is as an individual. Second, 
our feelings represent experiences we inherit from our ancestors and our own previous 
experiences. Third, our so-called ‘herd instincts’ as represented in custom, which we 
acquire from communal life and which represent common values and actions we learn 
from our community’s authority figures.  
7. Nietzsche’s Reversal: Individuality, Deliberation and our Self-image. This chapter 
analyses in detail Nietzsche’s revisionist and naturalist account of the individuality and 
generality of our actions. I argue he reverses Schopenhauer’s claim that deliberation 
makes our actions individual by juxtaposing their different conceptions of a self-image 
and self-knowledge. Nietzsche has a naturalist and revisionist conception of 
deliberation and argues that it is explicable in terms of the drives. We can distinguish 
its activity from the activities of the other drives by recognising its association with 
consciousness and self-conscious thought, which indicates the introduction of a self-
image to our actions. Deliberation is a drive relation expressed in assuming another’s 
perspective on ourselves prior to acting; it makes our actions appear generic by forcing 
us to assume another’s perspective. This perspective partakes in and shapes our actions, 
which he explains genealogically. It represents a need for authority which we inherit 
from our ancestors. Thus, Nietzsche’s conception of the generality and individuality of 
our actions is limited. To recognise what grounds this limited account and how he 
supports it, we have to address and lay out his distinct philosophical method. 
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8. Nietzsche’s Method, the ‘Conceptual Link’ and the Origin of Self-conscious Agency. In this 
chapter, I focus on demonstrating Nietzsche’s philosophical method. This method is 
composed of two elements: a) his drive psychology and b) what he calls ‘historical 
philosophising’. His drive psychology replaces Schopenhauer’s concept of the ‘will’ 
without undermining the will-body identity. His turn to history or historical reasoning 
represents his recognition of the limits of Schopenhauer’s explanation of phenomena. 
This turn to history most likely demonstrates the influence of his philological training 
on his philosophical thought. I introduce a new concept to clarify how the previous two 
elements entwine to constitute his philosophical method, which I will call the 
‘conceptual link’. I derive the conceptual link from a close reading of what he calls the 
‘chemistry of concepts and sensation’ (HHI 1). I use the previous to assess how he 
explains the superfluity of ‘consciousness’ after arguing that it demonstrates a problem. 
I chose to apply his method to consciousness because it is the fundamental feature of 
self-conscious agency. His account of consciousness is genealogical. He argues that it 
arose from the so-called ‘need to communicate’, which he describes as a ‘terrible must’, 
and the emergence of language, which he construes as ascribing a ‘communication 
symbol’ (i.e., a word, a gesture etc.) to the target of our awareness. The need to 
communicate, however, emerges from communal life and the pressures associated with 
establishing a community and maintaining it. Therefore, there is what I call a 
‘conceptual link’ between consciousness, communication, language and communal life, 
which he explains through historical philosophising and using his drive psychology, 
which is rooted in the will-body identity. 
9. Self-conscious Agency and the Origin of Morality. In this chapter, I focus on arguably the 
most important part of Nietzsche’s analysis, i.e., his account of how morality partakes 
in our lives and actions. He requires this account to explain how the actions legislated 
by Judeo-Christian morality (by appealing to God, the incorporeal soul and an afterlife) 
are possible in a mechanical world (which rejects the legitimacy of appealing to the 
previous concepts). How are such actions possible following rejecting the metaphysical 
or ontological pictures underpinning the belief in God, the incorporeal soul and an 
afterlife, some of which marginally cohere with the mechanical world? I argue he does 
so by building upon the conceptual link. Morality emerges from relations between 
individuals in a community, albeit at a specific stage in its development. Communities 
themselves emerge from an act of willpower by individuals that establish command-
obedience relations with other individuals to form a ‘rank order’ of values and actions 
premised on strength and violence. The need to communicate, language, consciousness 
and so on emerge from these relationships. From the previous emerges what I call 
‘contractual relationships’ and their typical rank order of values and actions premised 
on debts, contracts, obligations, responsibility and so on. He explains the emergence of 
contractual relationships using his drive psychology and by appealing to the so-called 
‘internalisation of man’. According to this theory, we internalise command-obedience 
relationships through the memory of pain and violence stemming from living in 
communities whose rank order is determined by relationships premised on strength, 
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violence and the infliction of pain. Internalising those relationships, in turn, makes 
possible contractual relationships, which characterises obedience without a command. 
Morality stems from contractual relationship and represents a further stage in the 
development of a community and the process of internalisation that characterises it. 
Fundamentally, and this is where I argue we find Nietzsche’s definition, morality 
opposes what is individual and represents the interests of a community. It commits to 
maintaining, defending and championing the rank order of values and actions 
characterising a particular community. It represents the ‘herd perspective’, which 
conceptually links to deliberation, our self-image and self-conscious agency such that 
we cannot have self-conscious thoughts and actions without our equally entertaining a 
morality or moral value, which is often our community’s rank order of actions and 
values. I support the previous claims by analysing Nietzsche’s example of the ‘pale 
criminal’ in Z.   
10. Nietzsche’s Evaluation of Morality: Egoism and the Sovereign Individual. I take 
Nietzsche’s views on morality a step further by assessing his evaluation of morality. I 
argue we can construe his genealogical analysis as aiming to attune readers to his 
Weltanschauung in preparation for his evaluation of morality, which is as revisionist as 
his descriptive, genealogical account of morality. Morality requires non-moral 
evaluation, according to Nietzsche, but this evaluation cannot be immoral. He rejects 
the moral method of evaluating, because it can, at best, only suggest another morality 
Y instead of X, which bypasses the critique of morality and fails to recognise what he 
identifies as the ‘harmful’ effects of morality itself, rather than the harmful effects of a 
particular morality. In short, Nietzsche seeks a higher authority than moraltiy or one on 
an equal footing to it with a view to developing a distinct evaluation of morality. I 
attempt to make sense of his distinct evaluation by unearthing the propositions 
underpinning his rhetoric and writing style. The latter reveal that he firstly introduces 
another perspective than the herd perspective into our reflections over moral matters 
and commitments to moral principles. We can derive this method from his definition of 
morality as opposing individuality. The perspective he aims to introduce has to oppose 
the herd perspective and have equal (or higher) value to it. The individual perspective 
satisfies both criteria, while the concept of ‘health’ makes possible the introduction of 
the previous perspective into our reflections over moral matters. He encourages readers 
to take seriously the concept of ‘health’ in moral deliberation, because, or so he claims, 
‘health’ is both morally neutral and determined by who one is as a whole, which includes 
one’s individuality. Through his of the individual perspective into moral deliberations 
via the concept of health, he prepares his readers for a non-moral evaluation of morality. 
The previous leads him to argue for what I construe as another stage in the process of 
internalisation, which transcends what he calls the ‘morality of custom’ [Sittlichkeit der 
Sitte], namely, what we construe as ‘sovereign individuality’. I clarify this stage using 
his example of Goethe and I argue that he describes it as unifying or harmonising the 
herd with the individual perspective in us.  
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11. The Bridge: An Alternative Solution to the Lack of Fit. In this chapter, I offer my 
alternative solution to the lack of fit, which aims to point us in the right direction for 
identifying the guiding thread that will reveal his conceptual framework and 
Weltanschauung. I ground my solution on the limits he places on causal explanations 
and so-called mechanical picture, which he builds from Schopenhauer’s objections to 
causal explanations. Nietzsche limits the application of causality by arguing that 
causally explaining the (self-conscious) thought-action relationship risks circular 
reasoning, because causality is based on a ‘belief’ or ‘faith’ in ‘conscious willing’ or in 
the fact that ‘willing suffices for action’. The limitations he places on causal 
explanations lead him to argue that we should first observe and analyse what happens 
when we ‘will something’ before we commit to a conception of willing and what 
follows from it and, in turn, to a conception of ‘causality’. Therefore, his aim is 
revisionist. Following his analysis of what happens when we will something, he argues 
that willing is an ‘activity’ that is discernible in both the first-person and third-person 
perspectives. I argue that this activity works as a bridge by demonstrating an identity 
relationship between the self-conscious ‘I’ and the drives (or their ‘total state’). The ‘I’ 
and the ‘total state of the drives’ are two different perspectives on the same activity of 
overpowering, overcoming etc., which we perceive as ‘acting upon (or reacting to) 
something’. Therefore, our actions fall on the same spectrum as thoughts, decisions, 
desires, wishes and so on. Similarly, our actions fall on the same spectrum as micro-
movements, drive relations, their ‘total state’ and so on. The thought-action relation or 
‘I’-drive relation is one of identity, which depicts two distinct ways of apprehending 
our willing, acting and so on. It is nothing over and above or distinct from this willing, 
acting and so on.   
12. Nietzsche on Objectivity and Aesthetic Contemplation. Here I assess how Nietzsche’s 
views on aesthetic contemplation and objectivity differ from Schopenhauer’s account, 
which, I argue, conflates aesthetic contemplation with objectivity. Schopenhauer 
defends a veridical account of aesthetic contemplation by arguing that ‘focusing on 
something’ in aesthetic contemplation means that we are ‘interested wholly in what it 
is in itself’. Nietzsche rejects the previous and distinguishes aesthetic contemplation 
from objective reflection by arguing that there are many different reasons for (or 
interests in) focusing wholly on something. These reasons and interests correspond to 
different rank orders of drives. Equally, aesthetic contemplation and objective reflection 
are both active rather than passive. Aesthetic contemplation is ‘creative’, whereas 
objective reflection is not, because it aims at veracity. Nietzsche’s objections to 
Schopenhauer’s account of genius and her ‘excesses’ reveal the basis on which he builds 
his phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation, which, as Reginster (2014) rightly 
argues, conceives the artist as a creator. Nietzsche construes the ‘excesses’ of genius as 
Rausch, albeit he also construes Rausch as the physiological counterpart to what he calls 
the ‘act of idealising’, which he associates with the act of making something beautiful 
or sublime, i.e., ascribing aesthetic properties to things or picking out and focusing on 
those properties and thereby individuating them. Rausch and idealisation are two 
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perspectives on the same activity, similar to the ‘I’ and the ‘total state’ of the drives. He 
also offers a different conception of objectivity, which revises Schopenhauer’s veridical 
account of ‘purity’ and the ‘mirror’. He does not explain objectivity in terms of the 
relationship between the will and the intellect, or apply it to aesthetic contemplation, 
like Schopenhauer did. His account of objectivity is limited: we have a drive for 
knowledge that is in the trenches with the other drives and so forms relationships with 
them prior to discharging in an action. In short, our drive for knowledge can take higher 
or lower positions in the rank order of drives, but it cannot be ‘pure’ or ‘isolate’ itself 
from the other drives, like we saw with the ‘I’, the ‘soul’ or the ‘will’. In short, our drive 
for knowledge does not guarantee its success, and certainly not in the so-called 
‘metaphysical’ sense that would then allow us to meaningfully assume a distinction 
between a thing in itself and its appearance. 
13. The Morality of Mitleid5 and the Ascetic Ideal. In the final chapter, I analyse the basis for 
his claim that Mitleid is a great ‘danger to mankind’. I argue we can understand this 
danger in light of Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s approach to morality. I 
undertake the previous by defending two related propositions Nietzsche makes about 
Mitleid. Firstly, his warnings of the dangers of Mitleid do not aim at Mitleid itself, i.e., 
compassion, pity and their cognates, but at our ‘evaluation’ of them. They aim at the 
‘morality’ or the ‘moralisation’ of Mitleid. I argue we can infer from the previous that 
what applies to Mitleid, applies to anything we value as highly as we do something we 
construe as morally valuable, or that we value as highly as meriting the status of the 
ground of moral values, actions and propositions. Secondly, his warning over high 
evaluations of something reveal that his concerns aim at ideals or the ascetic ideal. 
Following May’s (1999) reading of the ascetic ideal, I argue values relate to the ascetic 
ideal if they possess the properties of ‘parasitism’ and ‘completeness’. It is unclear 
whether these properties pertain to all ideals or only of the ascetic ideal, since there is 
reason and textual evidence to suggest both. Nonetheless, the morality of Mitleid (or the 
high value we ascribe to Mitleid) relates to the ascetic ideal by exhibiting these 
properties. The point Nietzsche makes, then, is about the evaluative framework 
underpinning morality, which demonstrates its association to the ascetic ideal by 
possessing the properties of completeness and parasitism. Next, I assess his analysis of 
the potential opponents to the ascetic ideal, namely, science and art. I argue he rejects 
both for different reasons. He rejects science because according to its evaluative 
framework it places a characteristically high value on the ‘truth’, which makes it 
vulnerable to assuming the properties of completeness and parasitism. He argues art is 
more effective at opposing the ascetic ideal, because its evaluative framework 
champions ‘lies’ and ‘deception’. I make sense of the previous by distinguishing lies 
 
                                               
5 I leave Mitleid untranslated to avoid the debate in the commentary about whether Schopenhauer defends 
‘compassion’ and Nietzsche attacks ‘pity’, which would mean they are talking past each other. The point I aim to 
make is not about compassion and-or pity, but about morality and its relationship to the ascetic ideal. I chose to 
refer to Mitleid, because the emotion plays a significant role in morality for both thinkers.   
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and deceptions from ‘falsehoods’ and so distinguishing the evaluative framework 
underpinning science from that underpinning the arts. Artists are also prone to what he 
calls ‘changing valuations’, which makes them vulnerable to ‘corruption’ by the ascetic 
ideal, e.g., Wagner’s case. Moreover, given their proneness to ‘changing valuations’, 
artists lack the will to commit to and enforce any ideal irrespective of whether or not 
they created it. They exhibit features that are invaluable for (sovereign) individuals who 
genuinely overcome and replace ideals, but artists fall short of being those individuals. 
Finally, I close the chapter with the proposition that Nietzsche did not fully work out an 
alternative to the ascetic ideal or an alternative ethics. He leaves us with questions, 
objections, critiques, evaluations, methods and pieces of an ideal or an ethics. In many 
respects, his project remains incomplete, but full of fruitful revisions and steps in a 
particular direction, underpinned by a clear concern over the status of individuals and 
individuality in community. Thus, I understand Nietzsche as aiming to restore the value 
of individuals, that is, to find a harmonious role for individuality in communal life.  
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 1 Schopenhauer on Self-Cognition, 
Disinterestedness and Compassion 
Schopenhauer begins the first book of his main work with his famous Idealist statement that 
“the world is my representation” (WR, 23) and that “this holds true for every living, 
cognitive being” (WR, 23), i.e., for beings who have sense organs and a brain. What 
distinguishes humans from animals is that humans make concepts out of their experiences 
and perceptions, whereas animals only possess an intuitive, non-conceptual relationship to 
their perceptions and experiences. In short, one being has both intuitive and abstract 
representations, whereas the other is bound to intuitive representations. Moreover, only 
human beings recognise that, for them, the world exists only in relation to their own 
cognition. A human being’s conceptual capacities allow her to have self-conscious access 
to her participation in the world. This self-conscious access allows her to do something 
animals cannot do, which becomes the theme of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and ethics.  
In this section, I will argue that Schopenhauer rarely deviates from the above 
propositions. Some of the inconsistencies we find in his aesthetics and ethics are often a 
misapplication of the conceptual framework underpinning these propositions. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that Schopenhauer never deviates from this framework. I will assess one 
such deviation, which I believe is in his account of ascetic resignation, but equally his views 
on the artistic genre of tragedy. I will start by clarifying his conceptual tools, i.e., the will 
and the intellect. I will likewise assess how they relate to one another based on his so-called 
will-body identity and what I will call the ‘correlation theory of cognition’. Subsequently, I 
will defend an alternative reading of the ‘thing (or object) in itself’ in Schopenhauer whose 
implications extend to the core of his ethics and aesthetics. The latter implications will 
constitute the theme of the various chapters in this section.  
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1.1 The Will, the Intellect and the Meaningful World-
View 
The intellect’s role is to represent the world in preparation for us to will something in it. In 
other words, the intellect is instrumental to willing something. The world of objects, object-
relations and natural forces, which the intellect represents, reflects its instrumentality to the 
will by providing a world in which we can (re)act through the cognition of something we 
can will, namely, an ‘object’. This kind of cognition of the world finds its limit in what 
Schopenhauer calls the ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ (PSR). He does not stop at the PSR, 
however. He aims to show that the PSR is not the limit of the world itself, but the limit of 
one kind of cognition (or experience) of the world, which he describes as follows: 
“…only after the reader has fully recognised (by means of this essay) what the 
principle of sufficient reason is and means, where it is valid and where it is not, the 
fact that it is not prior to all things and the whole world does not exist only in 
consequence of and according to this principle, as something like its correlate; only 
after the reader has fully recognised that this principle is really nothing more than the 
form in which an object (which is always conditioned by the subject) of whatever sort 
it may be, is always cognised, so long as the subject is a cognising individual” (WR, 
Pref. 1st ed.: 7; my emphasis) 
The subject-object correlation is foundational to our experiences or cognition. However, the 
PSR is distinct from this correlation in an important way. Its validity extends as far as the 
cognising ‘individual’. In other words, the PSR is the limit of a cognition whose subjective 
correlate is individuality. Thus, the PSR is not the absolute limit of cognition, but the limit 
of one kind of cognition, namely, that of an object for a willing subject or for an individual. 
Consequently, we can have a cognition of the world not limited to the PSR, according to 
Schopenhauer. Let us clarify this proposition.   
The fundamental claim is that the subject-object correlation is inherent to any 
cognition. Even given this different cognition of something, which is not cognition of an 
object (or motive), we cannot possibly have a cognition of something (or experience 
anything) without the subject-object correlation: 
“This form is more universal than any other form, more universal than time, space 
and causality, which, in fact, presuppose it.” (WR, 3) 
In short, the proposition seems to be that we can have cognition of the world that is different 
from the one instrumental to our individuality and willing, for Schopenhauer. Nevertheless, 
we cannot possibly cognise something without reference to the subject of the cognition. 
Every cognition is still the representation of ‘something by someone’. Even this different 
kind of cognition adheres to the minimal requirement of a cognition of something. However, 
it is not, strictly speaking, the cognition of an ‘object’, nor that of a ‘motive’, but it is still 
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the cognition of ‘something by someone’ (more on this below). Thus, for Schopenhauer, a 
different subject-object correlation yields a different cognition or experience; it is not the 
experience of a different world, but a different experience or cognition of this world. To 
make sense of these contentious claims I begin by asking what, according to Schopenhauer, 
is a ‘cognition’, a ‘representation’ or an ‘experience’?  
Schopenhauer distinguishes between two functions of the intellect that cooperate to 
provide the cognition of something: ‘understanding’ (Verstand) and ‘reason’ (Vernunft). The 
understanding is the ‘intuitive’ function and reason is the ‘abstract’ function, both of which 
correspond to different representations. Intuitive representations are perceptions in general 
that “encompass the entire visible world or the whole of experience” (WR, 27), e.g. 
perception of an apple, a cup or a dog, whose universal forms of space, time and causality 
constitute “the ground of being” (WR, 28) and underpin the manner of their appearance.6 
We cannot perceive nor conceive of anything without its having some root in the intuitive 
representation from which it then acquires its ‘meaning or significance’. The world we 
cognise begins with our being affected by something that the intellect then traces to some 
particular location at a particular time through the understanding and its application of 
causality. He summarises the previous in the following manner:  
“The first and simplest manifestation of the understanding which, in addition, is 
always present, is the intuition of the actual world, and this is absolutely nothing other 
than cognition of the cause based on the effect. Consequently, all intuition is 
intellectual. Nonetheless we might never reach this if we were not immediately 
acquainted with some effect that could serve as a starting point: but there are in fact 
such effects on the animal body. To this extent, such bodies are the immediate objects 
of the subject: they mediate the intuition of all other objects.” (WR, 32) 
Thus, we have cognition of a world in which we can (re)act based on our bodily affections, 
which he also calls “merely data” (WR, 33) and denotes the activity of something on us via 
our body.  
An ‘abstract’ representation, which is a product of the faculty of reason, is “a 
representation of a representation” (WR, 64), which he likewise calls a concept (Begriff). 
Some animals are cognitive, i.e., they have a way of representing the world, but only humans 
additionally possess reason and reflection. He construes these additional capacities as, 
“…a mirroring, something derived from intuitive cognition, although it has assumed 
a nature and constitution fundamentally different from such cognition and is ignorant 
of its forms…” (WR, 59) 
We have a capacity for mirroring the world through concepts, which permit discursive 
judgments and, in turn, communication of our experiences with other human beings for 
 
                                               
6 He construes the understanding as the primary sub-function of the intellect because it is shared with, and inherent 
to, other cognitive beings, i.e. animals. 
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coordinated action. Concepts form relations with one another that appear different from 
their intuitive counterparts (i.e., the ‘perception’ of an apple as juxtaposed to the ‘concept’ 
apple), but they are meaningless without any connection to their intuitive representations: 
“Although concepts are fundamentally different from intuitive representations, they 
nevertheless stand in a necessary relation to them; without this relation, concepts 
would be nothing, and so this relation constitutes their whole essence and existence. 
Reflection is necessarily a copy or repetition of the original intuitive world, although 
a copy of a very special kind in a completely heterogeneous material. Concepts may 
therefore be quite aptly termed representations of representations.” (WR, 63) 
The relation between an intuition and a concept is that between ground and its consequent, 
according to Schopenhauer. Concepts arise out of intuitions or percepts, but acquire a life 
and order of their own by forming relations with other concepts. Nevertheless, the meaning 
or the significance of a concept remains attached to the intuition, which the listener uses to 
make sense of it: 
“Just because words communicate mere universal concepts which are absolutely 
different from the representations of perception, all the hearers will of course receive 
the same concepts during the narration of an event, for example. But if subsequently 
they wish to make the event clear to themselves, each will sketch in his imagination 
a different picture or image of it, and this differs considerably from the correct picture 
that only the eyewitness has.” (WRII, 67) 
We can infer from Schopenhauer’s claims that the more intuitive something is the more 
directly meaningful it is to us. The previous inference is, I will argue, crucial to why he puts 
the ‘will’ at the heart of his philosophy.   
In sum, one of Schopenhauer’s conceptual tools is the ‘intellect’, whose main role is 
to provide us with the cognition of a world in which we can (re)act, or with a cognition of 
something enabling action. It achieves this by applying its forms to immediate bodily 
changes (or sensations) that serve as raw data preceding an intuitive representation. The 
previous leads to the cognition of ‘something’ (an object) for ‘someone’ (a subject). From 
this intuitive representation we can construct what he calls ‘abstract representations’ or 
‘concepts’, which assume a life of their own independent from their root in intuition through 
the relations they form with each other. Nevertheless, the key proposition I would like to 
take forward here is that ‘concepts’ only have meaning by their reference to some ‘intuitive’ 
representation.7  
Note that, for him, the starting point of the process that yields the cognition of a 
world in which we can (re)act is immediate awareness of bodily changes, that is, “pure 
 
                                               
7 I want to avoid a discussion of Schopenhauer’s implicit philosophy of language, but note there is considerable 
room for arguing that he possesses a ‘reference’ theory of meaning. Meaning, for Schopenhauer, would be the 
reference of the word or sentence, and the reference is the intuitive representation (something with spatiotemporal 
coordinates). 
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sensations” (WR, 41). Sensations are immediate, whereas the PSR mediates them to provide 
a perception: 
“Now, as far as it is the starting-point, i.e. the mediator, for our perception of all other 
objects, I have called the bodily organism, in the first edition of the present work, the 
Immediate Object; this, however, must not be taken in a strictly literal sense. For 
although our bodily sensations are all apprehended directly, still this immediate 
apprehension does not yet make our body itself perceptible to us as an object; on the 
contrary, up to this point all remains subjective, that is to say, sensation. From this 
sensation certainly proceeds the perception of all other objects as the causes of such 
sensations, and these causes then present themselves to us as objects; but it is not so 
with the body itself, which only supplies sensations to consciousness. It is only 
indirectly that we know even this body objectively, i.e. as an object, by its presenting 
itself, like all other objects, as the recognised cause of a subjectively given effect and 
precisely on this account objectively in our Understanding, or brain (which is the 
same).” (FR, §22, 99) 
The intellect works with our immediate bodily sensations8 to give perception of ‘something 
for someone’. Bodily sensations then are ‘least like’ a representation or the closest we can 
get to the other side of a representation, i.e., the thing itself. Sensations are the limits of the 
subject-object correlation. What is least like a representation, he claims, will show us what 
our world is other than a representation.  
 Schopenhauer’s approach in the first book of WR (but likewise in FR as we see above) 
is from what I will call a ‘speculative perspective’, which we can see as the abstract aspect 
of our experiences removed from their reference in intuition. Consequently, he construes 
sensations as falling under ‘representations’; he treats them as ‘immediate representations’ 
or ‘immediate objects’, which he readily acknowledges that it is ‘too one-sided’ (cf. WR, 
24). Nevertheless, he abandons this one-sided view after he introduces the other aspect of 
our experiences and conceptual tool, i.e., the will.9  
Schopenhauer is not clear about whether a ‘sensation’ is just a representation or also 
something else. I will argue that the reason for his lack of clarity is that his ‘correlation 
theory’ of cognition permits us to see them as both a ‘representation’ and ‘something else’. 
Construed as from the ‘speculative perspective’ they are ‘representations’. After he has 
 
                                               
8 Construed from another standpoint, which must be defended and argued for, they are the closest we can get to 
the thing in itself, albeit mediated by one form of the PSR, i.e., time. The person, for him, is the sensing being that 
comprehends and acts on the basis of perceptions and reflections constructed out of the pure material of the body 
that are its sensations or affections, which are the same thing seen from different standpoints. Schopenhauer intends 
sensations to fall equally on both camps of the will and representation since he uses them as a bridge from one to 
the other. There are passages in Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetics that likewise indicate this line of thought, 
where he argues for a distinction in degree and intensity between sensations that engender perception and those 
sensations (or affects) that arouse the will and lead to some (re)action (WRII, 368-370). I have not pressed this 
further and have stayed with his understanding that time is the only condition of our cognition of the thing in itself, 
or the last veil, as he understands it (WRII, 197-8).   
9 We can find a similar line of thought regarding ‘sensations’, but with more arguments and textual support in 
Atwell (1995, 32-52). 
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made the association between the ‘will’ and the ‘thing in itself’ using the will-body identity, 
they are modifications of the will. Nonetheless, the distinction between the two is one of 
different perspectives on the same thing premised on our standpoint. It becomes clear as we 
proceed and after the elucidation of the will that, initially, following his Kantian roots, he 
views sensations as the most ‘direct’ or ‘concrete’ representations: as the ground of the 
cognition of an ‘object’. After he has expounded and introduced us to the distinct encounter 
with the body as ‘will’, he modifies his approach to making sense of sensations. This change 
in approach demonstrates how he moves further from his Kantian influences onto a novel 
world-view and corresponding philosophy. He later construes them as ‘modifications’ (or 
‘affections’) of the will whose identical object is the body, albeit seen as an object. Therefore, 
he advances two perspectives on ‘sensations’, whose starting and focal point are the body. 
The body is a kind of sensation seen as a representation (i.e., an ‘immediate object’), albeit, 
in addition, it is the host and medium of all others sensations, movements and full-fledged 
actions. The body, in the second sense, is the locus for our interactions with other supposedly 
external and-or foreign objects. It is the seat of self-hood and of agency.10 Accordingly, we 
can say that, from one standpoint, sensations are the limits of the intellect, which, being its 
limit, means they are equally representations. They are not wholly representations, however, 
because they also suggest something beyond the limit of a representation, i.e., the thing in 
itself, which is where the will (or willing) enters the picture.  
Schopenhauer introduces the concept of the will in the second book of WR and does 
so by voicing a concern over the inadequacy of ‘the speculative perspective’ on things and 
the world, which yields cognition of ‘objects’. He begins by bringing to our attention the 
subjective correlate of the world filled with objects, object-relations, the natural laws 
governing those relations and the forces of nature underpinning those laws. The subjective 
correlate of the previous, which I will call the ‘objective picture’ for brevity, is what he calls 
the ‘pure subject of cognition’, whose one-sidedness he condemns: 
“In this First Book we consider the world from this side alone, namely in so far as it 
is representation. However, the inner reluctance with which anyone accepts that the 
world is merely their representation – even though the acceptance is inescapable – 
shows that, irrespective of its truth, this aspect is one-sided and hence the result of 
some arbitrary abstraction.” (WR, 24)  
The objective picture may not be false, but it does not tell us anything about the significance 
or meaning (Bedeutung)11 of what appears to us. We often explain the ‘objective picture’ by 
 
                                               
10 For further elucidations of the previous, see (WRII, 367). 
11 Although I have primarily followed Janaway’s translation, I believe translating ‘Bedeutung’ as ‘meaning’ does 
not fully capture what Schopenhauer aims at based on the distinction between the intellect and the will. My worry 
is we risk confusing his sense of ‘meaning’ here with the ‘meaning’ ascribed to language or utterances. Translating 
it as ‘significance’, which is Payne’s translation, is more useful for elucidating a key distinction of his philosophy 
of the will, which we would miss if we approach it as from linguistic utterances. It is not meaning in the linguistic 
sense that concerns him, but significance in the sense of ‘sparking our interest’, or in the ‘evaluative sense’, or in 
  31 
appealing to the operations of an unknown quantity we call ‘matter’. However, cognition of 
‘matter’ is a result of sensations traced to some cause deemed as having ‘X’ spatiotemporal 
coordinates:  
“This amounts to saying that for matter, its being is its acting: and it is inconceivable 
that matter has any other being. Only by acting can it fill space and time: its action on 
the immediate object (which is itself matter) is a condition for intuition, and matter 
can exist only in intuition. We can know the result of one material object acting upon 
another only if the second object now has a different effect on the immediate object 
than it did before – indeed the effect is nothing more than this. The whole being of 
matter therefore lies in cause and effect: for matter, its being is its acting.” (WR, 29) 
The application of causality and spatiotemporal coordinates on our affects rests on our 
distinguishing between what is ‘of us’ (or within us) and what is not ‘of us’ (or what is of 
‘other than us’ or without us). Consequently, since the ground of a cognition is the subject-
object correlation, the objective picture begins with the application of the subject-object 
correlation before we trace sensations to causes and thus before we have the cognition of 
something. Put differently, the cognition of an object for a subject begins with our assuming 
the stance of an individual affected by something deemed as outside of her. The basis of 
what we perceive as ‘matter’ or a ‘material thing’, which we construe as the operation of 
 
                                               
the ‘sufficient for action’ sense. What the will adds to a representation is the object’s significance or relevance to 
us, which makes it a motive or motivates us. If Bedeutung or ‘meaning’ in Janaway’s translation is understood in 
the evaluative or purposive sense, i.e., the ‘why’ and ‘what for’ of a representation, then it comes closer to capturing 
Schopenhauer’s distinction between the two aspects of the world and the individual (intellect and will), and why 
he calls the ‘will’ the ‘essence’ of the representation. The ‘will’ paves the way for a value-laden or a purpose-laden 
view of the world not premised on, but rather elucidating the significance of the causal order we perceive; the latter 
which, on its own, is devoid of significance (or meaning). Further, translating it as somewhere between meaning 
and significance also explains the claim that representations without ‘will’ lack Bedeutung; they are empty or 
incomplete. Representations have, on their own, a ‘what’ without a ‘why’. Willing has both a ‘what’ and ‘why’, 
because to will is to will something. Furthermore, what we will changes its appearance from our seeing it as an 
object to our seeing it as a motive. The ‘what’ of the representation turns into its ‘why’ after we introduce ‘the 
will’ into the objective picture. In other words, the representation turns into a ‘motive’ when it relates to our will. 
For example, the body with hair, skin, flesh, organs and bones we see as our beloved when we introduce the will 
or when we will something in it. The significance of the object we call a body changes when we will something in 
it. Thus, it changes appearance in accordance with our will. Furthermore, the usefulness of this translation is also 
recognisable in his metaphor of the “ghostly phantasm” (WR, 123). Representations would have no significance 
in our lives, they would be empty and action as well as value (we can say life itself in the way we experience it) 
would not ensue, if the will was absent from the picture. Without that which he denotes as the ‘will’, there would 
be no life, as we know it. Bedeutung in Schopenhauer’s use seemingly sits at the boundary between the will and 
the intellect; it implies both, but it primarily denotes the will and its effect on our cognition. For example, apples 
are fruits and members of the kingdom Plantae and thus objects of perception relating to other objects in different 
ways. Apples are also nourishing and taste a specific way to certain individuals; for some of us they are worth 
picking, distributing and eating, for others they are not because of differences in taste or allergies. Notice how the 
picture of the apple changes according to the perspective we take on it, i.e., according to the subjective correlate. 
Apples are not only the perception of an object relative to another, they also move and affect us in certain ways. 
For Schopenhauer, the speculative intellectual stance on apples does not determined the Bedeutung (meaning or 
significance) of apples; only the willing stance does. Our willing something determines the Bedeutung of that 
‘something’, for us. Perceptions have no Bedeutung if we do not presuppose the ‘will’ or ‘willing’. From here on, 
I will use ‘meaning’ and ‘significance’ interchangeably, albeit I intend neither to refer to a linguistic conception 
of ‘meaning’.  
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some “natural force [Naturkraft]” (WR, 121), is, when presented in this way, a “qualitas 
occulta” (WR, 106). His objection to this approach is summarised as follows: 
“The operation of occult qualities is tacitly assumed although no enlightenment is 
expected on that score, since people had intended to build upon them, not beneath 
them. This sort of thing, as we have said, cannot work. But apart from this, such 
structures are always built on air. What use are explanations that in the end lead back 
to something just as unfamiliar as the initial problem had been?” (WR, 150) 
We have no genuine insight into these natural forces when we approach them from the 
perspective of the pure subject; they are meaningless to us. Let us then see what, he thinks, 
is required to make natural forces meaningful; also, why he thinks they are meaningless. 
We remember that, for Schopenhauer, the world is our representation and we arrive 
at this insight as pure subjects of cognition. We are driven to question and wonder what the 
world is ‘in itself’, what it might be ‘independent from us’, what it might be like beyond the 
limits of the intellect, when we recognise that natural forces are entirely mysterious to us 
independent from their effects in an object. We wonder about the ‘something X’ that affects 
us and that constitutes the raw data for intuitive representation of something. Our inquiry 
into that ‘something X’ too-often leads us to posit something wholly devoid of ‘significance’ 
to us such as an ‘object in itself’, which he calls ‘dogmatic realism’ and bemoans its claiming 
to, 
“…separate the representation from the object (even though they are one and the 
same) by treating the representation as the effect of the object. This involves assuming 
the existence of a cause that is completely distinct from the representation, an object 
in itself that is independent of the subject. But this is totally inconceivable because, 
as an object, it would always presuppose a subject and hence is only ever the 
representation of a subject… To insist that objects exist outside the representation of 
a subject – and to insist that actual objects have a being distinct from their acting – 
these demands are completely meaningless and contradictory.” (WR, 35; my 
emphasis) 
To posit something outside of our cognition such an ‘object in itself’, or even a ‘force in 
itself’ etc., is to posit something like an experience (i.e., an object or a force) outside of an 
experiencing subject, which is a meaningless and contradictory enterprise. We approach it 
wrong, according to Schopenhauer. We try to make that ‘something X’ (cf. WR, 23-4), or 
‘thing in itself’, an object of cognition and then posit it as outside of our experience and the 
limits of our cognition. By doing so, we either deny or affirm its existence, but both are 
wrong because they strive to represent that which cannot possibly be a ‘representation’. We 
cannot cognise it directly, because it requires us to go beyond the subject-object correlation, 
which is impossible. In trying to think about what lies behind matter or what a natural force 
is independent from its effects on something that we perceive by virtue of its effect on us, 
we grasp only its shell. We acquire a concept without its correlate intuitive representation, 
namely, a concept without reference.  
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There is, for Schopenhauer, another way to approach our metaphysical inquiry into 
the thing in itself and thus vent the wonder driving this inquiry. This other way is not via the 
pure subject of cognition, its objective picture and the stance of the individual that underpins 
it. This other way goes to the bottom of the objective picture, namely, to the pure sensations, 
which are ‘least like’ a representation. Thus, he uses our sensations as his starting point for 
this renewed inquiry, which finally leads him to the will.  
The limits of the PSR are unfruitful, but they are nevertheless informative over what 
it means to be an ‘object’, which paves the way for making the concept of the ‘thing in itself’ 
significant in another way. The PSR deprives the ‘thing in itself’ of significance, but it also 
shows us the conditions for significance by its negation. To perceive an ‘object’ is not to 
perceive something significant, because we would then perceive a motive or something that 
motivates us, i.e., a delicious apple. The best we can say about the significance of an object 
is that it permits, enables and-or underpins motivation. An object is the sort of thing that can 
be a motive or that can be significant to us. The degree of its affection is what determines 
how significant it is to us. In other words, objects are the conceptual or perceptual correlates 
of motives. They coincide with motives in that this object X (e.g. an apple) at time Y can be 
motive X* (e.g., a delicious apple) at another time Z. However, to perceive X as an object is 
different from perceiving X* as a motive. It is only in the latter sense that it has significance. 
In other words, it is when we will that we no longer perceive someting as an object among 
objects, but as what we are ‘looking for’ or what we ‘need’.  
In sum, the world and its objects are my representations, so whatever I cognise cannot 
possibly be a ‘thing in itself’. We cannot complete the one-sided objective picture of the 
world through the cognition of an ‘object’. To cognise something is to stand in some relation 
to it and so for us to become conscious of anything we must be affected by something, which 
entails that we are not cognising it as it ‘in itself’. Our inquiry into the ‘thing in itself’ leaves 
us dissatisfied by leading us back to the recognition we were initially trying to overcome, 
namely, that the world is nothing but ‘my representation’. I cannot overcome my relation to 
a target of cognition such that I can cognise it is as it is in itself. Schopenhauer summarises 
the above as follows: 
“…we are not satisfied with knowing that we have representations, that they are such 
and such, and that they are joined according to this or that law whose general 
expression is always the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the meaning 
[Bedeutung] of those representations: we ask if this world is nothing more than 
representation; in which case it would have to pass over us like an insubstantial dream 
or a ghostly phantasm [Luftgebilde], not worth our notice; or in fact whether it is 
something else, something more, and if so, what this could be.” (WR, 123)  
What drives our inquiry into the ‘true’ or real ‘nature’ of the world, viz., into what the world 
might be independent from us, which he calls “the need for metaphysics that is peculiar to 
man alone” (WRII, 160), is our dissatisfaction with the recognition that the world is nothing 
other than our representation. Our inquiry comes to a halt following the recognition that all 
we can conclude about the world is ‘we are inseparably related to it’. What, then, does he 
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hope to show when he claims that “only the will is thing in itself” (WR, 135)? What can this 
statement mean in light of the above?  
We recognise that there is always a position or a perspective from which the world 
appears as it does to us; we are the inseparable correlates of the world. We forget to ask the 
pertinent question arising from our positing a world filled with objects, underpinned by a 
‘thing in itself’ or ‘natural force’, namely, to whom does the world appear as it does? If we 
cannot overcome the subjective correlate of our cognition, then we should embrace it. The 
question we should ask is why do we need to be ‘pure subjects of cognition’? What is it that 
we want when we perceive the world as filled with objects? Put another way, what drives 
the inquiry that leaves us with the objective picture? Can we trust the assumption that what 
drives us is pure cognition or a sort of naive curiosity? When we focus entirely on an external 
object—also when we treat our body as an object among objects—we make an error akin to 
a psychological denial over the position or the perspective from which we cognise it as an 
object. Even pure subjects of cognition perceive the world as the representation of something 
by someone. The objective picture is her representation; she has not succeeded in plucking 
her eyes out such that her perception is without some perceiver. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer 
concedes, her failure to pluck her eyes out reveals to her what she sought all along, i.e., what 
drives her when she perceives a world filled with objects. This becomes apparent whenever 
we direct our attention from the external object to ourselves, as we must in certain mundane 
moments, e.g., when we are hungry. We notice in such moments that what was driving our 
inquiry was reason separated from its significant or meaningful counterpart, i.e., intuition 
whose root is the body, which is also the focal point of our ‘willing’. 
The objective picture lacks significance because we removed the precondition of 
significance: the will. Furthermore, we fail to demonstrate what the objective world is other 
than ‘our representation’, because it is how it appears to the ‘pure’ subject of cognition, not 
how it is in itself. We have not overcome the subjective correlate to arrive at the world as it 
is ‘in itself’, but have merely taken away what makes anything significant to us. Thus, there 
is a difference between the objective picture, which is devoid of significance and premised 
on suppression of our individual and narrow perspective (our individuals needs, interests 
etc.) and a significant world tainted by that perspective. We incline to construe the previous 
two pictures as antinomies. Schopenhauer, however, construes them as equivalents and has 
a subtle argument for doing so.  
 The objective picture is true, but lacks significance. What is missing? Schopenhauer 
wants an alternative way to make it significant without appealing to such mysterious powers 
or faculties of mind, which evade demonstration. His way, he contends, is easy to 
demonstrate. He proposes reason and ‘something else’, albeit not reason on its own through 
some mysterious corresponding faculty. We already have the concept of the ‘thing in itself’ 
from Kant, but do not have its corresponding percept, which will then make it meaningful. 
The pinnacle of the objective picture is the ‘thing in itself’, which is meaningless, so our 
task is to find what corresponds to the ‘thing in itself’ on the other side, i.e., the pinnacle of 
meaningfulness.  
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The strategy, then, is to recognise what happens when we find something meaningful 
and apply it to everything else we perceive and so fill our concept of the thing itself. This 
‘something else’ explains why some objects of cognition invite our focus effortlessly 
whereas others do not. What makes a cognitive object meaningful and how does it ordinarily 
appear to us? What makes an object X stand out from Y? Why do we focus more intently on 
X than Y? Why does X stimulate us and Y does not? Why is it that, sometimes, object X 
becomes our whole world by how it invites our attention, whereas object Y is just another in 
a world filled with them? This difference in attention, which our reactions to something that 
affects us (and so become a motive) aptly reveal, is key to understanding the meaningfulness 
or significance of something.  
We think we are assuming a purely objective stance on the world, i.e., independent 
from its subjective correlate, when we assume the posture of a pure subject of cognition, but 
we are in denial, according to Schopenhauer. All cognitions (intuitive or abstract) have their 
subjective correlates. The objective picture’s subjective correlate is the ‘pure’ subject of 
cognition, but there are other subjective correlates. Recognising this and resigning ourselves 
to it allows us to gain insight into what the world is other than our representation. The latter 
insight is that “‘the world is my will’” (WR, 24).  
Schopenhauer devotes considerable attention to the above insight, but only after he 
argued that, the ‘thing in itself’ is without meaning or significance. In his own words: 
“For the world is, on the one side, completely representation, just as it is, on the other 
side, completely will. However, a reality that would be neither of these, but rather an 
object in itself (and unfortunately this is what Kant’s thing in itself has surreptitiously 
degenerated into) is a fantastic absurdity [erträumtes Unding] and to assume such a 
thing is a philosophical will-o’-the wisp.” (WR, 25) 
To dispel this absurdity, he argues, we must remember the position from which the world 
appears as filled with objects, including the so-called ‘object in itself’. We should reflect on 
and direct our attention to the only place left after we have exhausted our reflection of things 
‘outside of us’, namely, to ourselves. There is something compromising, if not intellectually 
damning, about a so-called ‘pure’ subject of cognition, which Schopenhauer calls “a winged 
cherub’s head without a body” (WR, 124). Assuming the perspective of a ‘pure’ subject of 
cognition yields a meaningless objective picture. It does so because we have forgotten the 
subjective correlate of the cognition of any object, which is sensation or the affection of our 
body. The target of our cognition is an object, because only an object can become a motive 
for the will; they enable willing.  
As so-called pure subjects of cognition, we perceive something meaningless because 
we have not yet found what will satisfy or relieve us, but we nonetheless represent something 
in such a way as to permit willing or to be capable of relieving us. In short, we seek relief. 
The subjective correlate of sensations underpinning cognition of an object is individuality; 
our seeking without finding something to will. Thus, the subjective correlate of the objective 
picture, namely, the so-called ‘pure’ subject of cognition, is still an individual. How, then, 
do we distinguish ‘individuality’ from the ‘will’? By virtue of its preoccupation with 
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individuality, Schopenhauer contends, the ‘pure’ subject of cognition is the less turbulent 
or a weakly affected equivalent of willing, which is as rooted in the world as is full-fledged 
willing.12 The difference between them is in the degree of affection or sensation, rather than 
in the kind of affection or sensation.  
 What is an individual, for Schopenhauer, and what does it mean to be “rooted in this 
world” (WR, 124)? Individuality is construed as a ‘special relation’ to one of the objects we 
cognise: 
“The subject of cognition is an individual precisely because of this special relation 
with the one body that, aside from all this, is only a representation like any other.” 
(WR, 128; my emphasis) 
The ‘one body’ he refers to is our own body. The ‘special relation’ is our identity with it, 
which we notice when we act upon or react to something:  
“Willing and doing are different only for reflection: in actuality they are one. Every 
true, genuine and immediate act of will is instantly and immediately also the 
appearance of an act of the body.” (WR, 125; my emphasis)   
The special relationship is two-fold. We relate to our body as identical with our will and as 
the focal point or ground of our experience of something. Our body is ‘an immediate object’ 
and we see it as an object. However, it is likewise identical with our will and so it is our will.    
The difference between our willing and cognising then, for Schopenhauer, is that in 
willing we perceive an identity relationship between the will and a movement of the body, 
not a causal relationship. Causality applies only to the objective picture and what lies within 
its framework. It does not apply to its edges and beyond, i.e., to its subjective correlate or 
the subject-object correlation itself. Its subjective correlate is the ‘pure’ subject of cognition 
whose experience of the body is as an immediate object forming causal relationships with 
other objects in the world. The ‘pure’ subject of cognition perceives bodily stimuli as an 
effect whose cause is an external object. In willing, she experiences these stimuli as action 
inducing and so her relationship to her body changes. For example, she wants an apple and 
reaches for it, but she does not think (or even perceive) the apple as causing her to want and 
reach for it. Only when she does not will something does she perceive a causal relationship 
between her body and some object in the world. Yet, her ‘not willing’ something can be 
misleading because, as will become more apparent below, the ‘pure’ subject of cognition is 
still preoccupied with willing by seeing herself as an individual.  
 
                                               
12 Schopenhauer’s conception of individuality is conditional on the body and its affection, irrespective of its 
strength. If something affected us, then we are individuals for Schopenhauer. Some affections lead to cognition of 
an object for a subject, whereas others lead to embodied reactions characterised as pleasure and pain. Thus, when 
“no stimulation disturbs the will, this simply delivers to the understanding the data that become intuition. But any 
stronger or atypical affection of the sense organs causes pain, i.e. is contrary to the will, and so these organs are 
also part of the will’s objecthood” (WR, 126). The same is the case with what is in accordance with the will, 
however, which causes pleasure (as we will see below). 
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In willing, the experience of our body changes entirely and likewise our experience 
of the world. Schopenhauer summarises the experience of the body when we will something 
in the following way: 
“An act of the will and an act of the body are not two different states cognised 
objectively, linked together in a causal chain, they do not stand in a relation of cause 
and effect; they are one and the same thing, only given in two entirely different ways: 
in one case immediately and in the other case to the understanding in intuition. An 
action of the body [Aktion des Leibes] is nothing but an objectified act of will, i.e. an 
act of will that has entered intuition.” (WR, 124-5) 
He is moreover clear in arguing that we cannot apply causality to the subject-object 
correlation, but we can apply it to our body perceived as an object (i.e., immediate object) 
and its relationship to another object. The reason for this is that we cannot literally perceive 
a subject, but must ‘project’ subjectivity (or the will) on an object and so perceive it as the 
representation or mirror of a subject or willing thing (more on this below). Accordingly, we 
must not let our perceiving our body as an object lead us to postulate a relationship that does 
not exist, according to Schopenhauer: 
“We must, however, guard against the gross misunderstanding of supposing that 
because intuition is mediated by cognition of causality there must therefore be a cause 
/ effect relation between subject and object, whereas in fact such a relation only ever 
exists between the immediate and the mediate object, i.e. between objects…what 
cannot be emphasised enough is that in terms of the principle of sufficient reason 
there is no relation at all between subject and object.” (WR, 34; my emphasis) 
We are individuals when something affects us irrespective of the ‘strength’ of that affection. 
A weak affection or stimulation prepares cognition of the world by providing the data for 
the understanding to apply causality to it, which leads to cognition of an object for a subject. 
This cognition of an object (for a subject) is the basis on which our intellect represents the 
picture of the world in which we can (re)act. A strong affection, however, directly leads us 
to willing or (re)acting through the sensation of pleasure or pain.  
Causal relations presuppose something ‘A’ acting on something ‘B’ underpinned by 
a natural force, but the previous also presupposes a perceiving subject weakly affected by 
A and B. The will-body relationship is an identity relationship.13 We may perceive the will 
‘causing’ an effect on the objects of the world through the body, but we have to guard against 
the misunderstanding inherent to the claim that the will causes something on the body. We 
can perceive our will causing an effect on our body, but in doing so we are willing something 
on a part of our body, which we perceive as an object or motive. ‘What we will’ we represent 
as an object or motive. Consequently, to will anything located in our body we must identify 
 
                                               
13 For more on the relationship between what I call the ‘causal’ and ‘identity’ relationship, and why Schopenhauer 
relies on one over the other, see Koßler (2008, 230-250). Koßler’s reading offers a wealth of insight into 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical manoeuvres at the intersection between metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics.   
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with another part of the body, i.e., the part that acts upon the part we perceive as an object. 
The part through which we act is identical to our will. This identity relationship does not 
permit application of causality. Thus, in ‘willing something’, we identify with something in 
the world through which we act upon something else. Our willing something is, we can say, 
our bridge to the world as opposed to our cause of it or even its cause of us.  
In willing something we have caused something to happen in the world through our 
action and its target of, not ‘caused’ the action itself or the target itself. Our will is the action. 
Our experience of our body when we are acting differs from our experience of it as causing 
something. The world appears different when we will something or have found something to 
will. We can recognise the previous difference through the identity relationship between our 
willing and the changes in the object we perceive, which makes the object appear different 
from all others; it is no longer seen as an object. To will something means both to identify 
with something in the world and to cause something to happen in it. We recognise this dual-
aspect of our experience only when we will something, however. Pure subjects of cognition 
fail to recognise it, because they have not yet found something to will, but they still perceive 
a world permitting or enabling willing by thecognition of an ‘object’. Thus, a pure subject 
of cognition sometimes confuses the cognition of an object for perceiving something as it 
is in itself, i.e., an object in itself.  
In sum, the world appears full of meaning or significance when we will something 
in it, and in doing so can we notice that the world is both will and representation. As a pure 
subjects of cognition we identify with something that either causes an effect on something 
else or perceives causal relationships in things. As willing subjects we have found what we 
were looking for or what is valuable to us in that moment. When we will something, that 
with which we identify we do not perceive as an object among other objects forming causal 
relations with them, but as our will. What we aim our will towards we see as an object or 
motive, not the means (or the object) by which we aim towards it. In most cases, and by 
default (though not always, as I will aim to demonstrate below), we identify with our body 
because we can only will something (or seek something to will, i.e., cognise) through our 
body.  
The general claim is that in approaching the world as individuals who will something, 
we make our world appear meaningful. If we direct our attention to the position from which 
our world appears full of objects and object-relations etc., then we recognise that we 
perceive an object as opposed to ‘something else’, because we assume the position of an 
individual who seeks for something to will. The pure subject of cognition is affected weakly 
by something. This is why it might be more accurate to construe it as an ‘impure subject of 
cognition’. In perceiving an object, we assume the stance of an unaffected individual and so 
we are not genuinely pure subjects of cognition; we still perceive a world permitting willing. 
In other words, by clinging to our individuality—which is mirrored by our focusing on and 
cognising an ‘individual’ object or a network of such individuals relating with one another—
we are still looking for something to will, or for something that will affect us strongly enough 
to bring about an action, pleasure and-or pain. We can clarify the previous by describing the 
stance as a kind of ‘readiness to act’, which permeates us. It makes what we cognise—a 
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particular object or world filled with objects—appear as the kind of thing that permits action 
upon it. Objects, in other words, are the kinds of things permitting or enabling action upon 
them. This insight grounds Schopenhauer’s conception of individuality, which presupposes 
willing by working through the body and by having the body affected weakly. I think we 
can more easily acquire this insight over about readiness to act as pure subjects of cognition 
if we juxtapose perceiving something as an ‘object’ to perceiving it as an organism, or as a 
human being; notice what happens to our freedom to act upon it in each case. Accordingly, 
we perceive the world filled with objects when, and only when, we seek something to will 
(or to do) in it, which I will call assuming ‘the willing stance’ on it, for brevity. This ‘willing 
stance’ means a ‘readiness to act’ upon something. 
 Atwell’s reading of what he calls Schopenhauer’s ‘will-body identity thesis’ is a useful 
reference point for further clarifications on the above arguments, themes and philosophical 
manoeuvres.14 What I want to focus on here, however, is that the objective picture has the 
‘willing stance’ on something as its subjective correlate; alternatively, its subjective correlate 
is our searching for ‘something to will’. The world appears as filled with objects, because 
we approach it as individuals searching for something to will. We would not perceive an 
object at all unless this perception had individuality as its subjective correlate and so the 
willing stance. The impure subject of cognition is individual by being the weakly affected 
counterpart of the willing subject, both of whom are different expressions of the willing 
stance. Therefore, there is a by-fit relationship between our willing something or our seeking 
something to will and the objective picture. This must be the case, for Schopenhauer, or else 
our body would only appear as an object in the strictest sense and not as ‘immediate object’. 
Our relationship to our body is distinct in kind from our relationship to an object perceived 
as a foreign body in so far as it does not become part our body or is not incorporated into it. 
Schopenhauer capitalises on the previous distinction and its implications.  
Schopenhauer recognises that the objective picture finds its limits in the PSR, but, 
even if this picture is correct or true, it is incomplete owing to its being meaningless. He 
describes the limits of the objective picture starting with the scientific inquiry into objects, 
object-relations and natural forces in the following way:  
“But if we devote ourselves to this teaching [morphology and aetiology in mechanics, 
physics, chemistry and physiology] we soon realise that the information we are 
looking for does not belong to aetiology any more than it belongs to morphology. The 
latter presents us with an infinite variety of innumerable forms that are clearly related 
through an unmistakable family resemblance; these are representations that will 
forever remain foreign to us if we approach them along this path; looking at them 
only in this way, they stand before us like hieroglyphs we do not comprehend.” (WR, 
121) 
 
                                               
14 See Atwell (1990, 27-30) and Atwell (1995, 81-91). For more on the will-body identity and the act of will see 
Koßler (2012, 194-195). 
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The picture has at its summit a set of unknown (and unknowable) forces, but not agents with 
interests and motives that can change things. The latter, which is the ethical and aesthetic 
complement to the objective picture, is recognisable only when we will something. Though 
it is ‘true’ that we are also a locus of forces (or we can be seen as a locus of forces), this 
truth is merely the objective correlate of one perspective on us, which we associate with the 
third-person perspective, where we perceive our body as an immediate object. The latter 
perspective, for Schopenhauer, is that of an individual who seeks something to will and has 
assumed a readiness to act. Perceiving the body as a locus of forces as opposed to a willing 
individual (appearing as a locus of forces) means the perceiving subject assumes a narrow 
perspective of searching for something to will. From this narrow perspective, she is unable 
to grasp what it means to be a locus of forces ‘from within’. She can only perceive that this 
set of forces X, which remain mysterious (in what they are and what they feel like 
independent from their effects on the objects we perceive), along with external conditions 
(Y), lead body B to act in some way or undergo changes (Z). Notice, that none of this is 
exhaustive of our experience of acting and reacting to something and it is meaningless. The 
perspective supporting the objective picture—irrespective of its truth or ‘objectivity’—does 
not complete nor does it encapsulate our first-person experience. Thus, a cognition can be 
true and meaningless. The perception of an object or natural force (if the latter perception 
is possible, which Schopenhauer doubts15) is different from an affection and-or our willing 
something.  
If the objective picture fully accounted for our experience of the world, including 
our experience of ourselves, then there would only be a difference in degree between our 
experience of a chair and that of our arm or tongue. The difference between our bodily parts 
and the chair would amount to a difference of spatiotemporal co-ordinates and of causal 
relations between two or more objects. We would not be “rooted” (WR, 124) in the world 
and so uniquely identify with something, but be consistently uprooted from it. We are rooted 
in the world we experience, however. Some objects of cognition affect us and we experience 
this affection in a way that we cannot reduce our relation to our body to spatiotemporal and 
causal relations. He construes this ‘rootedness’ as ‘individuality’16, which is encapsulated 
by an evaluative or motivational stance—i.e., a willing stance—on things. I have suggested 
that we should construe the latter as a kind of readiness to act. What we ordinarily encounter 
in our first-person experience as our ‘will’, which refers to our interest in something, makes 
things significant or meaningful. It shows that there is an identity relationship between our 
 
                                               
15 He tells us that we do not perceive natural forces directly; they cannot be objects of cognition. All that we “could 
ever know is this natural law, these conditions, this emergence at a particular time and place. The force that is itself 
expressed, the inner essence of the appearances that emerge according to these laws will remain an eternal mystery 
to it, something as entirely foreign and unfamiliar in the simplest phenomenon as in the most complicated… 
Consequently, even the best aetiological explanation of the whole of nature would really be nothing more than a 
catalogue of inexplicable forces and an authoritative specification of the rule according to which they emerge, 
succeed one another, and displace one another in space and time: but it must always leave unexplained the inner 
essence of the forces that thus appear, and content itself with appearances and their arrangement” (WR, 121-2). 
16 Not to be confused with egoism, though one of the consequences and expressions of our individuality is egoism. 
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will and one object in the world (i.e., our body) and it shows that there is more to the world 
than causal relationships between objects. Identifying with something in the world makes 
the world appear meaningful. The act of identification and the recognition of something as 
meaningful are correlates, according to Schopenhauer.  
I will assess one of Schopenhauer’s philosophically rich defenses of the will-body 
identity that aptly shows us the difference between the causal and the ‘identity’ relationship 
to our own body. I will use the distinction between deliberating and willing to do so. Our 
deliberation is a process of reflection over the possible actions we can take given some 
circumstance and its supposed parameters. These ‘possible actions’ can swirl around in our 
thoughts ad infinitum without ever resulting in a bodily movement. If we were bound only 
to the objective picture and were purely cognitive beings uprooted from the world we 
perceive, then, if an action did somehow ensue, it would appear as object ‘A’ moving 
relative to another one ‘B’. There would be no evaluation and no genuine bodily affect that 
corresponds to it; likewise, we would not identify with A or B. We should be inclined to ask 
if it was a genuine action at all. It would appear as something moving and as something else 
being moved by it. This would be tantamount to telling an imaginary story and considering 
all the various ways some object O can undergo changes X, Y, Z…N, but not ‘O undergoes 
X because O desires X (or Y)’; nor even a description in retrospect, e.g., ‘O underwent X 
because it wanted Y’. The concept of ‘desire’ or ‘want’ is explanatory only through the 
introduction of willing and the different perspective that follows it. Our deliberation process 
would be a transition from one possible change of state(s) in an object to another without 
‘willing’ and what pertains to it: the first-person perspective of acting, desiring etc. We 
would be detached bystanders or separated observers of our body and its changes, we could 
not even call it ‘our’ body.  
In sum, there are two ways our body is cognised. First, as a ‘representation’, namely, 
an object like any other with spatiotemporal and causal relations. Second, as ‘will’ and so 
as our sense of self and agency premised on an identity relationship with our body. What is 
different in the latter is that we identify with something in the world and thereby experience 
that ‘things’ differently to anything else. Nevertheless, what connects them is ‘sensation’, 
i.e., that the same or ‘one’ body is affected, either weakly, which leads to the pure subject 
of cognition or strongly which leads to the willing subject. Schopenhauer uses these 
cognitions to formulate his correlation theory of cognition. There is an equally useful 
clarification of his correlation theory of cognition in ‘Prise Essay on the Freedom of the 
Will’ (FW), which I will analyse below to expand and hopefully clarify the above.  
 42 
1.2 Self-Cognition and the Correlation Theory of 
Cognition 
In FW, Schopenhauer distinguishes between ‘consciousness of one’s own self, i.e., self-
consciousness’ and ‘consciousness of other things’ (cf. FW, 37). Self-consciousness, he 
claims is preoccupied with the ‘will’ or ‘willing’. When we become self-conscious, we do 
so as ‘willing something’ (cf. FW, 38), which is exemplified in an act of will. We become 
self-conscious when we will something or when something affects us. The ‘consciousness 
of other things’, however, is preoccupied with what is independent, distinct or outside of us. 
These two kinds of cognition are interdependent: they are two directions of focus inherent 
to any cognition of something. We become self-conscious when something affects us, albeit 
the degree of its affection, i.e., its strength, determines how it does so and, in turn, how that 
which affected us appears. Accordingly, we would not be able to cognise anything unless 
something affects us to some degree. Whatever we direct our attention towards we perceive 
as distinct or separate from us, and so cognition of anything at all has the subject-object 
correlation as a minimum requirement, for Schopenhauer. 
The above describes Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition. He fleshes out 
the theory in different ways, however. In the passage below, for example, he employs 
different terminology, but offers the same insight as above:  
“But the object [Objekt] as such always presupposes the subject as its necessary 
correlate: so the subject always remains outside the jurisdiction of the principle of 
sufficient reason. The dispute over the reality of the external world is in fact based on 
this improper extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to the 
subject: given this mistake, the dispute could make no sense, even on its own terms... 
To insist that objects exist outside the representation of a subject – and to insist that 
actual objects have a being distinct from their acting – these demands are completely 
meaningless and contradictory.” (WR, 35) 
For any cognition of something, there are two inseparable and irreducible components, 
which constitute a relationship of fit. For everything we become cognizant of there is equally 
some place or position from which we become cognizant of it, which we cannot separate or 
remove from our cognition. The two fit hand-in-glove such that we cannot cognise 
something without correspondingly cognising ourselves in relation to it. 
Schopenhauer advances his correlation theory of cognition to correct what he 
identified as the misguided readings and conceptions of Kant’s ‘thing in itself’. He aimed 
to defend the proposition that the thing in itself “can never be an object [Objekt], because 
an object [Objekt] is only its appearance and not what it really is” (WR, 135). The limits of 
both directions of consciousness, i.e., the furthest we can go from the ‘representation’ (or 
the closest we can arrive to the ‘thing in itself’), is the same limit as that of any cognition. 
The PSR determines both. Their limit is the ‘most immediate’ or the ‘least objectified’ 
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representation, namely, what appears least like a determinant object. What appears least like 
a determinant object with respect to self-cognition is our body, which he likewise calls the 
immediate object. As we saw in the previous section, however, in certain moments, we 
experience our body as something unlike an object, i.e., as (synonymous with our) will. 
The “most immediate cognition” (WR, 127) is arrived at in both directions of 
consciousness as two roads leading to the same junction. One of these roads leads us to our 
‘acts of will’ in time, which we cognise as movements of the body. The other road leads to 
natural forces, which we perceive as the effects of unknown or an unknowable thing in itself. 
The root of these effects is the sensations of our body, which captures his version of 
transcendental idealism. The key proposition is that their root is our body, which appears to 
us as either an immediate object or as (synonymous with) our will. The difference between 
the two directions is that the former represents a causal world-view, whereas the latter 
world-view is based on ‘(acts of) will’. Schopenhauer construed the latter as metaphysically 
primary since it is least like a representation, more like the ‘thing itself’. Consequently, will 
‘sheds light’ on (or makes meaningful) causality by applying the identity relationship 
between the will and the object through which the will has a real effect on things, namely, 
one’s body:  
“To the extent that I really cognise my will as an object, I cognise it as a body: but 
this brings me back again to the first class of representations described in that essay, 
that of real objects. In what follows, we will increasingly realise that this first class of 
representations can be explained and unriddled only through the fourth class described 
there, which no longer really confront the subject as object. Accordingly, we will 
realise that we need to use the law of motivation governing that fourth class in order 
to understand the inner essence of the law of causation (valid in the first class) and 
what takes place according to this law.” (WR, 126-7; my emphasis) 
The will and body are two different ways of looking at the same thing. In willing something, 
we experience an identity relationship between the two limits of the two directions of 
consciousness, whereas previously we recognised an interdependent relationship between 
them. Accordingly, our body (as an ‘immediate object’ with spatiotemporal and causal 
relations to other ‘objects’) and its vicissitudes is the same as our acts of will. The difference 
between the will and our body is in the way it appears to us given how things affect us, not 
in the thing itself; the distinction between our will and body is not metaphysical, but 
phenomenological. What we perceive as causal relations between (two or more) distinct 
things, we sometimes perceive as an identity relationship.  
To illustrate what Schopenhauer has in mind with the above consider the following 
metaphor. Imagine a bottle on a desk positioned such that its commercial label directly faces 
you. Now, imagine you alter your position to see it from the back of the label. The bottle 
now seems as if it has no label at all, nor even a ‘front’. The bottle itself has not changed in 
the interval, only your perspective and thus its ‘effect’ or ‘action’ upon you. You know it is 
and remains a bottle; it has not become something else in the interval. Your standpoint on 
it has changed and thus its appearance to you. By directing your focus wholly outwards, and 
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so forgetting the position from which you are perceiving something, you see the roots of 
objects as ‘natural forces’ for life-less objects, ‘life-forces’ for plants, ‘instincts’ for animals 
and finally ‘characters’ for humans. The previous, for Schopenhauer, are pinnacles of a 
meaningless world-view and-or constitute the limits of the objective picture. They are 
meaningless because they do not affect us to a requisite degree to spark the precondition for 
meaningfulness, i.e., the will. We perceive them as objects because they permit or enable 
action upon them; we perceive them as the kinds of things upon which we can act. The 
previous propositions reveal another reason why the objective picture is meaningless, but 
also allow an argument for how we can make it meaningful without losing its objectivity.  
A look at how Schopenhauer distinguishes ‘objects’ from ‘motives’ gives us further 
insight into what makes ‘objects’ meaningful and paves the way for the argument supporting 
the objective, but meaningful world-view. If an object motivated us, then it would produce 
a sensation of pleasure or pain, which leads us to perceive it as a motive in Schopenhauer’s 
technical sense: 
“So what does it mean to will something? It means: the act of will, which itself is at 
first only an object of self-consciousness, arises on the occasion of something that 
belongs to consciousness of other things, thus something that is an object for the 
cognitive faculty, an object that, in this relation, is called a motive and at the same 
time is the material of the act of will, in the sense that the act of will is directed towards 
it, i.e. aims at some alteration in it, or reacts to it. The whole being of the act of will 
consists in this reaction.” (FW, 40) 
Accordingly, objects of cognition that relate to our will (i.e., to our urges, needs and aims) 
strongly affect us or impress upon us; in so doing, they are perceived as ‘motives’. The same 
is not the case for ostensibly weaker sensations and impressions giving rise to cognition of 
an object. Nonetheless, a weaker impression is the basis for any cognition, including that of 
a motive. Schopenhauer puts it in the following way:  
“But it is quite wrong to call pain and pleasure representations: they are nothing of 
the sort, but rather immediate affections of the will in its appearance, the body: a 
forced, momentary willing or not-willing of the impression the body is undergoing. 
There are only a few, specific impressions on the body that can be immediately 
considered as mere representations and are thus exceptions to what has just been said; 
these impressions do not stimulate the will and it is only through them that the body 
becomes an immediate object of cognition, because, as an intuition in understanding, 
the body is mediated just like all other objects. What I have in mind are the affections 
of the purely objective senses: sight, hearing and touch, and only to the extent that these 
organs are affected in ways that are specific, natural and fitting for each of them. This 
involves such an exceptionally weak stimulation to the enhanced and specifically 
modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will; and since no 
stimulation disturbs the will, this simply delivers to the understanding the data that 
become intuition. But any stronger or atypical affection of the sense organs causes pain, 
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i.e. is contrary to the will, and so these organs are also part of the will’s objecthood.” 
(WR, 126-7; my emphasis) 
The ‘will’, for him, is what our character appears as to us from within, which gives an insight 
into what ‘character’ means. The assumption is that ‘to will something’ is more meaningful 
than referring to what we will as our ‘character’. What makes the concept of someone’s 
‘character’ meaningful is our construing it as identical to someone’s will. Something similar 
is the case with the inner and outer experiences of plants and their ‘life-force’, or inanimate 
objects and their ‘natural forces’, or animals and their ‘instincts’. Given that we do not have 
direct access to the first-person experience of something external to us such that we can 
flesh out what these forces, instincts and characters mean, then, to make these concepts 
meaningful, we have to project our sense of willing onto them. The projection of willing is, 
I argue, central to the meaningful world-view he defends and to his philosophy as a whole. 
Furthermore, it is useful for explaining his core views in aesthetics, morality and ascetic 
resignation, as we will see below. 
Consciousness is always ‘about something’: it is ‘intentional’. Self-consciousness 
and the consciousness of other things aim at something or are ‘about something’. So, they 
minimally refer to an ‘object’, i.e., they fall within the domain of ‘objects’. In 
Schopenhauer’s terms, consciousness of anything at all adheres to some form of the PSR 
and (minimally) adheres to the subject-object correlation, which is its foundational form. 
We reach the limit of consciousness in each direction with ‘that which is least like a 
representation’. For self-consciousness, the limit is an ‘affect’ or an ‘act of will’. For 
consciousness of other things, it is a ‘sensation’, which is a weaker affection that is required 
for cognition of anything, including ‘cognition’ of our own body. Our sensations and affects 
appear to be different, but, for Schopenhauer, they are the same ‘thing’ seen as from two 
different standpoints. Their difference is merely in degree of affection, i.e., the strength of 
their affection and thus relation to our will. According to him, one direction ‘sheds light’ on 
the ‘inner essence’ of the objects of our cognition, which appear to us as,   
“…an infinite variety of innumerable forms that are clearly related through an 
unmistakable family resemblance; these are representations that will forever remain 
foreign to us if we approach them along this path; looking at them only in this way, 
they stand before us like hieroglyphs we do not comprehend.” (WR, 121) 
The above hieroglyphs refer to what we correspondingly call a ‘natural force’, a ‘life-force’, 
an ‘instinct’, a ‘drive’, an ‘impulse’, a ‘character’ and so on. The previous is incomplete 
since the cognition it yields is meaningless. In sum, the pinnacle of both directions is the 
cognition of the ‘inner essence’ of something from two distinct perspectives, which leads to 
two different appearances of the same thing. Only self-consciousness and what we do with 
it makes the ‘inner essence’ of something ‘meaningful’, because this refers directly to the 
basis of meaningfulness, i.e., the will and its cognates.  
In addition, the target of self-consciousness (i.e., our will) is directly recognisable or 
known, whereas the external object that is its target we know indirectly by comparison. For 
 46 
Schopenhauer, we can trace the meaningless cognition of an object, including the immediate 
object that is our body, back to the most meaningful ‘thing’ we experience, i.e., the will, in 
the following way: 
“So when we trace the concept of force back to that of will we are only tracing an 
unknown back to something infinitely better known, indeed, to the only thing that we 
have actual, immediate and absolute knowledge of, and we have very greatly 
extended our cognition. If on the other hand, we subsume the concept of will under 
that of force, as people used to do; then we relinquish the only immediate cognition 
we have of the inner essence of the world by sinking it under a concept abstracted 
from appearance – a concept which, for that reason, would never let us escape from 
appearances.” (WR, 137)  
Unfortunately17, he does not defend the proposition that ‘the will is what is best known’, but 
construes it as a brute fact, of sorts: 
“On the other hand, by its nature it can never be demonstrated, i.e. derived as mediate 
cognition from some other immediate source, precisely because it is itself the most 
immediate cognition there is… It is an entirely distinctive mode of cognition and this 
is precisely why its truth cannot really be placed into one of the four rubrics I used to 
classify all truths in the essay On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §§29ff., those 
rubrics being logical, empirical, transcendental and metalogical.” (WR, 127) 
He advises his readers to take ‘willing’ as its own category and thus as constituting its own 
kind of ‘thing’ using the will-body identity as a basis for establishing this category.  
The ‘object’ of self-consciousness is the will, or more precisely, the ‘I will’ that 
accompanies all actions and affections. Schopenhauer cautions about trying to make the ‘I 
will’ itself an object of cognition, however. He argues that doing so would lead us to 
immediately cognise the ‘I will’ as if it is outside of us or distinct from us, and therefore it 
would appear as partially conditioned by the PSR:  
“For even in self-consciousness, the I is not absolutely simple, but consists of a 
knower (intellect) and a known (will); the former is not known and the latter is not 
knowing, although the two flow together into the consciousness of an I. But on this 
very account, this I is not intimate with itself through and through, does not shine 
through so to speak, but is opaque, and therefore remains a riddle to itself… In 
consequence of the form of time which still adheres to it, everyone knows his will 
only in its successive individual acts, not as a whole, in and by itself.” (WRII, 197)  
We cannot cognise the ‘I’ stripped from all forms of the PSR. The ‘I will’ adheres to the 
forms of ‘time’ and the subject-object correlation, and thus offers us a thin self-cognition 
(WRII, 196). When we cognise something, we direct our attention to it and so treat it as if it 
 
                                               
17 I say unfortunately because Nietzsche attacks this proposition after he recognises it, as we will see below.  
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is outside or separate from us. Accordingly, what might be called the ‘directionality of 
consciousness’ does not permit us to be conscious of something without some form of the 
PSR. Put another way, in willing we always will something. So, we cannot cognise our will 
without our firsly making an ‘object’ of it. We do not grasp the object of self-consciousness 
as it is in itself, because we have to make it an ‘object’ of cognition to grasp it.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the ‘I will’ and our body is not causal, but one 
of identity; their difference is only apparent, not real, which he summarises as follows:  
“It is clear from what has been said that by far the greatest part of our consciousness 
as a whole is not self-consciousness, but consciousness of other things, or our cognitive 
faculty. This faculty, with all its powers, is directed outwards and is the arena (and 
even, from the standpoint of a more profound investigation, the condition) of the real 
external world, towards which it first relates itself in intuitive apprehension, and, later, 
as if ruminating, works up what it has gained in this way into concepts, in the endless 
combination of which, accomplished with the help of words, thinking consists. – 
Therefore only what we have left after removing this, by far the largest part of our 
overall consciousness, would be self-consciousness.” (FW, 37-8) 
Self-consciousness refers to bodily vicissitudes, which he also calls “simply movements” 
(FW, 38). If we stripped from the ‘I’ all that pertains to the PSR, then we would be left with 
just ‘will’, which we can no longer construe as an ‘object’ of cognition. It is dubious if there 
is a cognition of anything at all in the previous instance, because nothing like ‘a will’ can 
ever be an object of cognition, i.e., something to which we can point. We can only point to 
an object, which, by projecting willing on it, we can conceive of (or perceive) as mirroring 
or representing a will. Therefore, we cannot perceive a will, but we can perceive a willing 
thing, which requires us first to project willing on it.   
Self-consciousness stripped of all forms of the PSR amounts to ‘an act of 
identification’ without something to identify with. Nevertheless, this is not how we 
ordinarily experience self-consciousness and its so-called preoccupation with willing. When 
we will something, we do identify with something in the world. Ordinarily, this ‘something’ 
is our body. This is why will and representation are inseparable correlates. Without 
representation, our will is blind, it cannot identify with anything in the real world and so it 
cannot move anything in it. Without will, our representations lack direction or movement. 
Nonetheless, we identify with something when we will something else and, ordinarily, the 
former is what appears as our body to the impure subject of cognition. Put differently, when 
we are unaffected or weakly impressed upon by something, the body ordinarily expressing 
our will appears as an object. In sum, the PSR fully mediates the cognition of the body when 
we assume the standpoint of impure subjects of cognition. When we are willing something, 
however, only time mediates, which is another way of saying we experience our willing one 
act at a time. If we try to cognise what the ‘I will’ refers to, then we merely reintroduce the 
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PSR and the cognition of an object.18 The best insight we can attain from the previous is the 
identity relationship between our ‘willing in time’ and the ‘object we call our body’.  
In sum, self-consciousness is preoccupied with willing; it demonstrates that we are 
what we will and that we are constantly willing. In short, we are something (or someone) if 
and when we will something. Likewise, with respect to the will’s more elusive counterpart, 
we are something or someone to the extent we are looking for something to will, which was 
the preoccupation of the impure subject of cognition. Self-consciousness on its own does 
not tell us what the object of our will is, but that we are the ‘will’. To have ‘an object for the 
will’ we require the consciousness of other things. Our body—or a part of it to be precise—
can be something we will only if we first perceive it ‘as if it is an object’ and so as if we see 
it as something ‘distinct and separate from us’. The ‘I will’ is an act of identification and so 
it demonstrates the identity relationship rather than the causal relationship between the will 
and the body or a part of it: 
“Everyone will soon become aware, on observing his own self-consciousness, that its 
object is at all times his own willing.” (FW, 38) 
The above passage can be misleading because it discusses the ‘object’ of self-consciousness. 
The sense of ‘object’ in reference to the ‘object’ of self-consciousness (or cognition) is 
different from the ‘object’ in reference to the ‘object’ of our will.19 We can demonstrate 
these different senses if we clarify the concept of being-an-object [Objektseyn].20 We can 
distinguish ‘objects’ in the broad sense from ‘objects’ in the narrow sense. The broad sense 
refers to the subject matter or target of our cognition (or willing), i.e., to the ‘something X’ 
we focus on or towards which we direct our attention. This sense does not imply the kind of 
relationship we as a subject of cognition have to it, but merely demonstrates that we have 
some relationship to something. We can likewise call it the abstract sense of the term ‘object’ 
or the ‘target’ of cognition. The narrow sense of ‘object’ refers to the kind of relationship 
we have to it and tracks that relationship. Consequently, something we cognise is an ‘object’ 
 
                                               
18 A useful consideration and discussion on Schopenhauer’s conception of the self-conscious ‘I’ refer to Reginster 
(2009: 99-102).  
19 Something analogous is the case with what we call the ‘object’ of aesthetic contemplation, as we will see below. 
20 I am grateful to Bart Vandenabeele for pressing me to clarify this distinction. One suggestion made by 
Vandenabeele is to look at the difference between Objekt and Gegenstand in Schopenhauer’s usage. I found that 
Schopenhauer too often uses the two terms interchangeably. For example, he claims, “a child learns to have 
intuitions by comparing the impressions of the same object [Objekt] received by the various senses; how in fact 
this is the only thing that sheds light on so many sensory phenomena such as seeing a single image with two eyes; 
or the experience of double vision when squinting or when viewing objects [Gegenstände] at different distances 
from the eye in a single glance” (WR, 33). It is hard to distinguish one use from another in the previous passage. 
Yet, there are other passages where the case for a difference is on firmer footing: “it would therefore be absurd to 
demand that they be established through experience (if by this is meant the real world outside of us, itself an 
intuitive representation) or brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects [Objekte] of intuition. Concepts 
can only be thought, not intuited, and only the effects that people bring about through concepts are objects 
[Gegenstände] of experience proper” (WR, 62). It is difficult to expect terminological consistency from 
Schopenhauer at this level of analysis, so I settled for letting go of this expectation. I decided to suggest a 
distinction between ‘object’ in the broad and the narrow sense premised on other distinctions and arguments he 
makes in an attempt to fill this analytic gap in his thoughts.  
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in the narrow sense if we relate to it in such way that it can be a target for our will (i.e., it 
can yield a motive or permit motivation). We perceive it as an ‘object’ if it is such that we 
can utilise it towards an end we may have or we look for. Those objects with which we 
identify, do not permit action upon them for some independent interest (including our own 
interest). The ‘object’ in the narrow sense has the status of a tool in a toolbox. Nevertheless, 
in both senses we take an interest ‘in something’, but the kind of interest in it differs. The 
difference between the two senses of ‘object’ does not rest solely on the target of cognition, 
nor solely on the stance we assume correlative to it, but on the correlation itself. In short, it 
rests on the relationship between us (or whatever stance we take) and the target. The subject-
object correlation is a by-fit relationship, not a causal or hierarchical relationship. Hereafter, 
for clarity and brevity, I will use ‘object’ to refer only to the narrow sense of ‘being-an-
object’ and ‘target’ to refer to the broad sense.  
Schopenhauer is clear about the above by claiming the will and the body appear as 
separate, but this is not in acts of will, which are identical to bodily movement rather than 
causing this movement. Without our body and the ‘object’ we perceive as a motive, which 
incites (re)action through it, we cannot conceive of willing: 
“If a human being wills, then he wills something: his act of will is in every case 
directed towards an object and can be conceived only in relation to one.” (FW, 40) 
The ‘I will’ is an act of identification rather than a full-fledged cognition; it does not tell us 
‘what’ we are, but ‘that’ we are something. The ‘I will’ is our bridge to the objective world. 
Only cognition of something that is other-than-I or separate from us tells us what we are. 
The ‘I will’ shows us what I will call our ‘identical object’, but it still shows us (or it seeks) 
an ‘object’. As we will see in subsequent sections, the previous has implications about ‘what 
we are’ by changing our perception of the world from its being confound to one filled with 
objects to one filled with ‘willing’ (things) that appear as objects when we do not will them 
or when we do not will something in relation to them.  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition flies in the face of dualistic theories 
of the mind-body relation, notably stemming from some readings of Descartes’ philosophy. 
Willing something and reflecting on the bodily actions that correspond to our willing shows 
that our body mirrors our will. It is not something foreign or distinct from us whose 
movement is caused by something else, which we call ‘our will’, even though it does appear 
as such in certain moments. He summarises the previous in the following manner: 
“…we find in any case that all those movements of the will, that alternation of willing 
and not-willing which, in its constant ebb and flow, makes up the sole object of self-
consciousness” (FW, 39) 
These movements and alterations we can call our affects, which are either agreeable or 
disagreeable, i.e., pleasurable or painful, or as propensities towards or away from a target 
of cognition. He defines pleasure and pain (or ‘to and from’) in the following manner:  
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“…the essence of all these affections consists in their entering self-consciousness as 
something in accordance with the will or as something contrary to it” (FW, 39) 
 
“Willing and doing are different only for reflection: in actuality they are one. Every 
true, genuine and immediate act of will is instantly and immediately also the 
appearance of an act of the body: correspondingly, any effect on the body is instantly 
and immediately an effect on the will as well: it is called pain when it is contrary to 
the will; and it is called comfort or pleasure when it is in accordance with the will. 
The gradations of the two are very different.” (WR, 126) 
What characterises self-consciousness is its direction; it is towards us. The pain and pleasure 
referred to in the above quote is not ‘pain’ aimed at ‘the loss over a recently departed 
relative’ or the ‘pleasure’ of laughter aimed ‘at a friend’s joke’. They are what pain and 
pleasure feel like independent from their cognitive object or target, but rather in their relation 
to us. Their targets allow us to classify the different affections and their degrees, but likewise 
to compare them. What can differ is the intensity of each affect correlative to its target. We 
cannot reflect on this difference in intensity unless we used different targets in making the 
comparison. We need targets for any comparison to occur and so for differences to emerge. 
Thus, the difference is in the ‘target’ and not the ‘affect’. We use these differences in target 
to speak as if there are differences in affect, but in comparing these targets using our reason, 
we conflate our affects with their targets and then speak as if there is a difference in affects 
themselves. In short, to recognise differences in degree of pain or pleasure and to distinguish 
one affect from another, we have to appeal to different targets that incited pain or pleasure, 
which we then use to make a comparison. What differentiates this pain from that pain is not 
the ‘affect’ of pain, but the ‘target’ we associate with it. Metaphysically speaking, the only 
difference in our affects is in whether the will is active or not and whether it moves toward 
something or away from something.  
The ‘act of will’ provides us with a clue about the bridge between a meaningless 
objective world and us. Schopenhauer summarises it in the following way:  
“Thus the feeling present in self-consciousness, ‘I can do what I will’, accompanies 
us constantly, but testifies merely that the resolves or decisive acts of our will, despite 
springing from the dark depths of our insides, will make the transition into the world 
of intuition [anschauliche Welt] because our body, like everything else, belongs to that 
world. This consciousness forms the bridge between inner world and outer world, 
which otherwise would remain divided by a bottomless chasm, since in the latter there 
could be mere intuitions independent of us in every sense, as objects, and in the former 
nothing but ineffectual and merely felt acts of will.” (FW, 43; my emphasis) 
This identity between our will and body, which he construes as the ‘I will’ of self-
consciousness finding its expression in bodily movement, is most salient in the ownership 
and originality we have over our actions: 
  51 
“…that ‘I will’ that accompanies all our actions and upon the consciousness of the 
originality and independence through which they are our actions” (FW, 49) 
We identify with our actions, and by extension our body, in a way we do not with another 
target of cognition. Consider, e.g., the juxtaposition between two distinct movements in the 
objective world, both of which we perceive, but seem different. Juxtapose our perception of 
two magnets drawn to each other with our decision (whether reflective or unreflective) over 
a circumstance and the ensuing bodily movement following it. These two cognitions are 
distinct not only in their composition, but aslo in their relation, closeness and significance or 
meaningfulness to us. Thus, how we comprehend the will’s relationship to the world is what 
will give us a meaningful grasp of the so-called ‘thing in itself’. 
To illustrate the above point about the distinction between objects let us employ a 
different and subtler example. Consider our perception of a video clip showing us throwing 
a ball at a wall. Next, juxtapose the previous clip with our actually throwing the ball at the 
same wall. The event and our experience of it in the moment of action is different from its 
cognition post hoc, whether that cognition is through the clip or in memory. The two refer 
to the same event, hwoever. They merely differ in their respective experience of that event, 
which, Schopenhauer claims, we should construe as a difference in affection. In perceiving 
ourselves throwing something, we do not undergo the same experience as we do when we 
are actually throwing it, but this difference in experience, is for him, merely one of degree 
in affection. Our will (and so our body) are wholly in it in the act of throwing in a way they 
are not when we subsequently perceive that act through another medium, for example, the 
screen or memory. The difference in experience and affection lingers irrespective of our 
referring to the same event. Also, in both circumstances, we identify with our will through 
our body, albeit we experience this identification differently because of a difference in the 
degree of our affection.  
We identify with our actions in such a way that is not immediately apparent in 
reflection. This identification is derived from the ‘I will’ in self-consciousness, but it can 
appear differently at different times, which, for those of us who espouse mind-body dualism, 
is sufficient to demonstrate that there is no identity between the ‘I will’ and the body. 
Schopenhauer argues that we cannot lose this connection to our will and accuses the impure 
subject of cognition of disingenuous purity. The impure subject of cognition is an unaffected 
or weakly impressed upon subject of willing or individual. In other words, the impure subject 
of cognition seeks ‘something to will’; she has not found that which affects her enough to 
incite her to action. She perceives her body as if it is external to her and so as if it is an object 
among objects. Equally, she cognises it differently from any other object, i.e., as the focal 
point of any cognition and action. If we remember to not confound the difference in 
appearance with a difference in ‘thing’ and so stay true to his correlation theory of cognition, 
then Schopenhauer’s objection to the impure subject of cognition is more accessible. In fact, 
we preserve the identification with our body when we focus on objects in the objective world 
and so when we assume the position of impure subjects of cognition. When we assume the 
previous stance, we are not as affected by the objects of our cognition as we are when willing 
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something. Yet, we should not confuse this ‘weakness in affection’, which is necessary for 
cognition of an object, for the pure cognition of something. Schopenhauer’s account of 
aesthetic contemplation will be immensely useful for clarifying how to avoid the previous 
confusion, to which we return below. 
In sum, the impure subject of cognition perceives the world as filled with objects 
that are fair game for her will; she searches for something to will. She assumes the ‘willing 
stance’ in relation to things. Only when we will, or search for something to will, does the 
world appear as filled with objects. We perceive the targets of cognition as objects because 
of their connection to our will and not in spite of it. We preserve this connection to the will 
because of the weaker affection underpinning all cognition of an object. The connection 
appears lost in some moments because we are not as affected by this object as when we came 
across one that does motivate us and thereby becomes a motive. The following propositions 
summarise Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition: 
1) We identify with our will or willing through self-consciousness: the ‘I’ or ‘I will’.  
2) Our will expresses itself through our body and its vicissitudes. 
3) We identify with our body as the one object that represents or mirrors our will since 
our willing something always corresponds to a bodily action or vicissitude.  
4) The will and body appear different because of our standpoint, not because they are 
different things that somehow interact with one another. In fact, our will and body 
are identical.  
5) We perceive our body as an object among other objects that causally interacts with 
other objects rather than our will (i.e., ourselves), because we are in that moment 
unaffected by what we are cognising that is thus seen as an object.  
Our body then is the identical object to our willing, not the effect whose cause is our will, 
which we see as another ‘thing’. We can experience our body both as our will and as an 
object, which is the double cognition (WR, 128) to which Schopenhauer refers. The affective 
strength of the target of cognition determines whether we see it as an object (and our body 
as an immediate object), or we see it as a motive (and our bodily movements as acts of will). 
In sum, we are will and body, for Schopenhauer, but they are not different things interacting 
with each other. They are the same thing seen as from two perspectives underpinned by a 
difference in affection.  
1.3 Aesthetic Contemplation and the Projection of 
Willing  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition is the bedrock of his philosophy. I will argue 
he uses it to offer a novel account of aesthetic contemplation. The theory provides the insight 
  53 
that, in aesthetic contemplation, it is not only the target of cognition that appears different, 
but the world itself. I received the support for this proposition from the following passage: 
“For at the moment when, torn free from willing, we surrender ourselves to pure, will-
less cognition, we enter into another world, as it were, where everything that moves 
our will and agitates us so powerfully no longer exists.” (WR, 221; my emphasis) 
I understand the above as the proposition that those immersed in aesthetic contemplation 
perceive and evaluate the world differently to those immersed in the ordinary tumult of their 
personal urges and needs. In aesthetic contemplation, we experience the same correlation 
between the subject and the object as we do in any cognition. Thus, there is an ‘object’ and 
a correlative ‘subject’ to aesthetic contemplation. Koßler likewise rightly emphasises the 
subjective and objective correlates of aesthetic contemplation: 
““Pure” subject of cognition does not mean a subject without object. This is 
Schopenhauer’s foundation of transcendental idealism that subject and object are 
correlatives.” (Koßler 2012, 194; my emphasis) 
The sense of ‘object’ in reference to the ‘object of aesthetic contemplation’ is different from 
the ‘object’ of non-aesthetic cognition. We should construe the ‘Idea’ not as the ‘object’ of 
aesthetic contemplation, but as its ‘target’, to avoid the confusion. In addition, we should be 
cautious not to construe the ‘subject’ of aesthetic contemplation as a ‘willing individual’.  
There is not only one kind of interest we take in the targets of cognition. When we 
take an ‘interest’ in something, we do not always seek to utilise it towards a personal or 
impersonal end; we are not limited to only perceiving something upon which we can act and 
utilise towards some end independent from the thing itself. There are other kinds of interest, 
which are not reducible to the previous. Schopenhauer’s account of disinterestedness, i.e., 
the ‘disinterested subject’, represents one such distint interest in something. The correlation 
of theory of cognition implies that changing our interest in something also changes how it 
appears to us. 
We can recognise the novelty of the ‘disinterested subject’ if we construe it using 
the correlation theory of cognition, which suggests that how something appears alters in 
accordance with the subjective correlate of the cognition or the standpoint that we assume 
on it. The so-called ‘subjective correlate’ coincides with how the target of cognition affects 
us, however. Therefore, some targets of cognition (e.g., something beautiful) affect us in 
such a way as to alter our interest in them. Nevertheless, according to Schopenhauer, unless 
our interest in something changes, our perception of it will not, no matter how effective the 
thing is said to be (or supposedly is) for other people. In short, the relationship between the 
appearance of something and the stance adopt on in is interdependent or mutual. 
The correlation theory of cognition also shows that what gives the target meaning is 
not focusing on it alone, but the stance or position from which we focus on it. What will 
make the objective picture of the world meaningful is recognition that we are more than a 
‘representing’ subject; we will something (or are looking for something to will) in the world. 
The impure subject of cognition perceives the world as foreign, empty, and detached, i.e., 
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as an object among objects. Conversely, ‘willing something’ makes it appear meaningful to 
her in some moment because an object she perceives becomes a motive while at the same 
time she now identifies with the so-called immediate object, namely, her body. The impure 
subject of cognition was not purely cognising all along, but was vehemently searching for 
something to will. In other words, she cannot possibly perceive an object unless she assumes 
the willing stance, which is a sort of readigness to act. If the world appears meaningless to 
her, then she is in denial over its meaning, because in that moment she is not reacting to, or 
strongly affected by, something. The objective picture appears meaningless, because she has 
not hitherto found something to will among all the objects she perceives. Nevertheless, she 
searches for it. We recognise her search, because she perceives the targets of cognition as 
objects, i.e., as the sorts of things she can will. When she does react, her perception of the 
target is still the perception an object, of something that permits willing and thus allows her 
use it towards some end or other independent from the thing itself, but one that affects her 
more than others. There is a distinction in degree between two sensations. Firstly, the weak 
sensation that produces cognition of an object, which is the subjective correlate of an 
intuition (i.e. the basis of perceptions and the concepts that arise from them21). Secondly, 
the more powerful or destabilising sensation that is the subjective correlate of an apple when 
we are hungry or desire it. The second sensation is a motive [Motiv].22 In short, the objective 
picture of the world is a precondition for willing and is inextricably linked to it. Objects are 
the kind of targets of cognition that can be motives for our will, or that can motivate us even 
if they are currently motivating us. There is another and different target of cognition, which 
does not fit this distinction, however. This target does not permit willing (or utilising) in the 
same way.  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition leads to an even more crucial insight 
than the above. What we perceive can have significance or meaning in a manner that is not 
encapsulated by ‘objects’ and their more affective siblings or counterparts, namely, motives. 
 
                                               
21 For Schopenhauer, concepts (abstract representation) necessarily find their root in a percept (intuitive 
representation), which he summarises in the following manner: “the whole essence of an abstract representation 
lies in just one single thing: its relation to another representation, its cognitive ground. Now to start with, this 
ground can be another concept, i.e. another abstract representation; and even this concept can itself have another 
such abstract cognitive ground. But not forever: in the end, the series of cognitive grounds must terminate with a 
concept that has its ground in intuitive cognition. For the world of reflection as a whole is based on the intuitive 
world as its cognitive ground” (WR, 64). 
22 Schopenhauer intimates this relation between a sensation that yields cognition of an object and one that yields 
cognition of a ‘motive’ clearly in his discussion of the relation between light and beauty. The presuppositions that 
underpin it he lays out in the will-body identity. He claims: “just as a human being is dark and vehement impulse 
[Drang] of willing (signified by the pole of the genitals as the focal point of willing) and at the same time eternal, 
free, serene [heiter] subject of pure cognition (signified by the pole of the brain), similarly and corresponding to 
this contrast, the sun is a source of both light, the condition for the most perfect type of cognition, and for precisely 
this reason the most joyful [erfreulichste] of things, – and heat, the primary condition for all life, i.e. of all 
appearance of the will on its higher levels. Thus, what heat is for the will, light is for cognition” (WR, 227). A 
further intimation of the same claim is also found earlier where he discusses cognition of the body as an ‘immediate 
object’: “this involves such an exceptionally weak stimulation to the enhanced and specifically modified sensibility 
of these parts that it does not affect the will; and since no stimulation disturbs the will, this simply delivers to the 
understanding the data that become intuition. But any stronger or atypical affection of the sense organs causes 
pain, i.e. is contrary to the will, and so these organs are also part of the will’s objecthood” (WR, 126).  
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This other kind of significance is recognisable in aesthetic contemplation and it is reflected 
the cognition of an ‘Idea’. Purportedly, there is a difference in kind between an object or a 
motive and an ‘Idea’, but there is a conceptual problem with this proposition. If the ‘will’ is 
what gives meaning to the target of cognition, then aesthetic contemplators equally ‘will 
something’. Otherwise, the so-called ‘Ideas’ that contemplators purportedly perceive are as 
meaningless as the concept of an ‘object in itself’. In short, the will must play some role in 
aesthetic contemplation if it is to yield cognition of something meaningful. Put another way, 
we must identify with something during aesthetic contemplation, otherwise our cognition is 
meaningless and the Idea does not mean anything. 
The proposition that disinterested subjects are actually interested is one that we have 
to swallow. It is easier to do so if, much like we argued with the two conceptions of ‘object’, 
there is a broader and a narrower sense of the ‘will’. The aesthetic contemplator’s ‘will’ is 
broad. It refers to the necessary correlate of meaning; it does not suggest what we personally 
will. Aesthetic contemplation aims for the target’s own will and corresponding meaning. If 
the previous claim is conceptually tenable, then we can jettison the claim that Ideas are 
distinct in kind from objects and motives. To achieve this reasonably, we have to flesh out 
what their difference hinges on. The following questions will guide my inquiry into the 
difference between an Idea, an object and-or a motive. What does the difference between 
‘Ideas’ and ‘objects’ and ‘motives’ hinge on? How different is the ‘willing individual’ from 
the ‘disinterested individual’, and what underpins their difference? Can we argue that the 
disinterested individual is ‘willing differently’ rather than ‘not willing’ at all, which is the 
conventional reading of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics?  
Construing the Ideas as the cognition of something as a ‘pure subject of cognition’ 
misleads us in subtle ways. One way is by leading us to conceive of the Ideas as ‘entities’ 
or ‘things’, which introduces a perspective to aesthetic contemplation that yields objects and 
motives. Yet, for Schopenhauer, an Idea is not a ‘motive’ nor an ‘object’. Something’s Idea 
is as ‘meaningful’ as a motive and as ‘objective’ as an object. What makes Ideas meaningful 
is our willing something, but not in the sense of yielding an object and motive. I will defend 
the following three propositions:  
1) The Ideas are not entities; they are different ways of perceiving any entity.  
2) The (genuine) pure subject of cognition is different from the unaffected or weakly 
willing subject, i.e., the impure subject of cognition.  
3) Aesthetic contemplation yields something meaningful if we project the will onto the target 
of our cognition, rather than ‘not will’ or ‘suspend the will’.  
Aesthetic contemplators still will something, but not the same way as the willing and weakly 
affected individual. The previous propositions become clearer as we show the difference 
between the subject-object correlation of ordinary (or non-aesthetic) cognition and aesthetic 
contemplation. To help us towards the previous end we should bear in mind the following 
two correlates: 
A) Willing (or weakly affected) Individual – motive (or object)  
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a. The ‘motive (or object)’ is an object both in the broad and narrow sense. 
B) ‘Disinterested’ Individual – Idea  
b. The ‘Idea’ is an object in the broad sense of refering to the target of cognition. 
‘A’ refers to ‘non-aesthetic cognition’ and ‘B’ refers to ‘aesthetic contemplation’. Both 
constitute the subject-object correlation foundational to ‘cognition of something’, but refer 
to different kinds of cognitions. The ‘Idea’ and the ‘object’ are both targets of our cognition 
and so fall on the objective side of the subject-object correlation. Each suggests a different 
relation between the subject and object (or between ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘consciousness 
of other things’, or between the ‘will’ and its ‘motives’). I will aim to make this difference 
meaningful and to demonstrate the propositions on which they rest. We can summarise it 
by what I will call the ‘projection of the will or willing’ onto the target of cognition. Thus, 
I begin by juxtaposing the ‘Idea’ to the ‘object’ whilst defending the proposition that 
‘projecting willing’ on something is what makes the Idea meaningful independent from the 
PSR and the willing stance on which it rests. I will flesh out the previous starting with the 
objective correlate, i.e., the Idea, which he construes as the “most adequate objecthood of 
the will” (WR, 197). Afterward, I assess the subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation, 
i.e., “the pure, will-less, timeless subject of cognition” (WR, 223) by juxtaposing it to the 
‘ordinary, non-aesthetic (or willing) subject or willing individual’.  
1.4 The Objective Picture and the Schopenhauerian Ideas   
Aesthetic contemplation is a kind of cognition. It consists of something cognised (i.e., the 
‘Idea’) and its inseparable subjective correlate (i.e., the ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
subject of cognition’). To avoid confusing the pure subject of cognition with the unaffected 
or weakly affected individual I will call the subjective correlate of the Idea the ‘disinterested 
subject’. This indicates that, according to his correlation theory of cognition, the Ideas are 
also representations or targets of cognition. We should not confuse the Ideas with ‘objects’, 
however, which would render it as meaningless the object ‘in itself’. To construe an Idea as 
an object is not the conclusion Schopenhauer aims for, or his entire philosophical project 
rests on the very error he aimed to avoid, namely, that our only experience of the world is 
as filled with objects, some of which motivate us.  
What makes the ‘Schopenhauerian’ Idea meaningful? The previous question will guide 
my inquiry. I start by first assessing the difference between ordinary cognition of an object 
limited by the PSR and aesthetic contemplation of an Idea.  
The targets of aesthetic contemplation are not objects in the way a stone or a dog is 
an object, but a different way we can perceive stones and objects. Relations between objects 
find their root in natural forces, which are not objects, but we cognise them because of their 
expression in objects and their changes. The target of ordinary (non-aesthetic) cognition is 
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an object among objects with spatiotemporal and causal relations underpinned by the various 
natural forces. The kind of cognition that yields objects is wholly within the PSR, which 
acquires its meaning from our assuming the ‘willing stance’. In other words, it is meaningful 
to the extent that we are unaffected or weakly affected individuals, at any given moment. 
Considered wholly from the objective correlate, a target of cognition is an object because of 
its spatiotemporal and causal relations with other targets of cognition.  
By contrast, the objective correlate of aesthetic contemplation, or ‘Idea’, is distinct 
from the object in one way: we no longer cognise the target of cognition as relating to other 
objects, but as what it is ‘in and of itself’. Absent the insight stemming from the will-body 
identity, this proposition is meaningless. What kind of cognition do we have if we isolate or 
remove the target of cognition from its ‘relations’ to other targets of cognition? We cannot 
possibly subtract all of the effects of other objects on it and still be left with something 
resembling cognition of an object. Consequently, it is misleading to argue that we can (or 
that we should) separate the target from its relations to other targets and still argue that we 
have the cognition of an object. We can argue that we do not perceive an object, but an Idea. 
Ideas pose a different challenge, however. How do we make sense of an Idea without 
appealing to the objective picture and so without confusing them with objects? In short, how 
do we make the proposition that ‘aesthetic contemplation involves cognition of an Idea’ 
meaningful without appealing to objects? This is a key challenge to Schopenhauer’s account 
of aesthetics, which, I will argue, he can overcome.  
According to Schopenhauer, in aesthetic contemplation, the effects of other objects 
on the target of cognition do not constitute or partake in its identity. We do not identify the 
stone or the dog with its relations to other objects, i.e., to water or a cat. The relations sink 
to the background of our cognition and fall out of focus when we aesthetically contemplate 
on it. The previous does not entail that the relations to other objects no longer exist or that 
we perceive another ‘object’ or ‘thing’ entirely, which we call the ‘Idea’. By confounding 
the two senses of ‘object’, we misconstrue the Idea as an ‘object’ rather than as a ‘target’ of 
cognition, which is more appropriate for preserving the difference between non-aesthetic 
cognition and aesthetic contemplation.  
I will argue that the Idea represents what the target wills to be. We project the will 
on it. We try—and perhaps frustratingly fail—to perceive what it wills to be. It is still the 
same target of cognition, albeit the nature of our perception has changed from an object or 
a motive to the ‘Idea’. The ‘dog’ that was the object of cognition is not replaced by another 
‘thing’, which we now call the ‘Idea’ of the dog. We perceive the same dog, but in a different 
manner, which, as Vandenabeele rightly claims, “enables us to become alive to usually 
unnoticed significant features” (Vandenabeele 2012A, 59). We become attentive to the dog 
not as an object, but as something that is ‘willing’, ‘striving’, ‘struggling’ and so on. 
In aesthetic contemplation we apply to the target of cognition the same relationship 
we have to our own body, namely, its double cognition as will [Wille] and representation 
[Vorstellung]. The previous grounds his conception of aesthetic contemplation: 
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“We now clearly understand our double cognition of the essence and operation of our 
own body, a cognition that we are given in two completely different ways; and we 
will go on to use this cognition as a key to the essence of every appearance in nature; 
and when it comes to objects other than our own body, objects that have not been 
given to us in this double manner but only as representations in our consciousness, 
we will judge them on the analogy with our body, assuming that, since they are on the 
one hand representations just like the body and are in this respect homogeneous with 
it, then on the other hand, what remains after disregarding their existence as 
representation of a subject must have the same inner essence as what we call will.” 
(WR, 129; my emphasis) 
What makes the Idea meaningful is that we no longer perceive the target of cognition as an 
object, but as ‘willing’, ‘striving’ and so on. We construe the target of cognition as having 
a similar relationship to its body that we do to our body. We make an inference by ‘analogy’ 
using the faculty of reason, which allows us to project ‘willing’ onto the target of our 
cognition. We cannot perceive the will directly, so we require the faculty of imagination to 
perceive it indirectly. Schopenhauer clarifies this further in the following passage: 
“…every individual is on the one hand the cognitive subject, i.e. the complementary 
condition for the possibility of the whole objective world, and on the other hand a 
single appearance of the will, which is precisely what objectifies itself in every thing. 
But this duality of our essence does not remain in a self-subsisting unity: otherwise 
we would be able to be aware of ourselves in ourselves and independent of the objects 
of cognition and willing: but this is absolutely impossible” (WR, 304; footnote)  
Only when we will something do we become self-conscious, according to Schopenhauer. It 
is only through self-consciousness that the target of cognition acquires its significance and 
meaning [Bedeutung]. The same is true with respect to our will: we do not perceive it as the 
target is in itself, but as it appears in individual acts of will and thus bodily actions over time. 
Schopenhauer does not overstep the Kantian limits of cognition, but substantially stretches 
them. Moreover, his hasty rhetoric on the will being the ‘thing in itself’ can be misleading, 
but not if we consider the identity relationship between willing and bodily movement. What 
he calls the ‘will’ is a cognition and so accords with the subject-object correlation: 
“I do not have cognition of my will as a whole, in its unity, in perfect accordance with 
its essence; rather I cognise it only in its individual acts, which is to say in time, time 
being the form in which my body (like every other object) appears: this is why the 
body is the condition of cognition of my will.” (WR, 126; my emphasis) 
We do not have direct cognitive access to ‘our will as a whole’, but indirectly through our 
individual acts of will over time, which we then unify using the faculty of reason. We have 
direct cognitive access to the identity relationship between our will and body, but this is not 
cognition of ‘the will’. The identity relationship does not permit us to argue that our will is 
an object, because we only cognise objects through their relationship to other objects. When 
we will something, we relate to our body in a manner different to any other object. An act 
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of will is not an inference from the will to the body, neither is it a cognition of a causal 
relation between willing and bodily movement, but an identity relationship between the will 
and the ‘object through which it expresses itself’, viz., the body, which then makes it our 
body.  
We do not make an inference from our will to our body, but we do make an inference 
from our ‘act of will’ to our character. This inference reflects a change in our perspective, 
however. We have moved from the first-person to a third-person persepctive on ourselves. 
Reason unifies the pieces into a whole picture, while imagination makes it meaningful. If we 
perceived our ‘acts of will’ only as representations (or objects), then our life would unfold 
like a movie, whose director is a strange unknown thing X. When we attempt to cognise the 
will, we make an ‘object’ of it. Additionally, when we project the will on the target of our 
cognition, we make an inference and thus see the target as a representation or the objective 
outcome of willing, striving etc. Accordingly, in aesthetic contemplation, we use our distinct 
relationship to our body as the basis for an inference from analogy that allows us to make a 
cognitive leap: we assume that a target appears as an object, but ‘in itself’ it wills as we do.  
 Wicks rightly reads the Ideas as based on an “idealising act of the imagination” (Wicks 
2008, 98), but we cannot ignore the fundamental role of reason in aesthetic contemplation. 
We require imagination for intuitive representation and thus the ‘perception’ of an Idea, but 
we require reason to make the inference from our relationship to our body to the target of 
cognition having this same relationship to its body. Imagination, then, works in combination 
with reason to yield cognition of the Ideas as opposed to reason working alone, which yields 
(at best) an ‘an object in itself’. Wicks is also right to construe an Idea as ideal, but we should 
clarify that it is not our ideal for the object, or one taken from any perspective other than the 
target’s own. By projecting willing on the target, we assume that it has a perspective (i.e., a 
will) of its own. This makes meaningful Schopenhauer’s claim that aesthetic contemplation 
yields “this object’s clearest image” (WR, 202; my emphasis), but it does so not in the way 
we might initially expect.23  
In aesthetic contemplation, we project willing on a target of cognition. This changes 
our perception of it qualitatively, not quantitatively. We still perceive the same thing without 
addition or subtraction. We do not perceive something ‘else’, or something ‘more’, when 
we aesthetically contemplate on the dog; we perceive the dog differently. We do not lose the 
connection to the target of cognition in aesthetic contemplation, but there is a qualitative 
change that does not entail or presuppose a change in ‘the dog itself’ independent from us. 
Another person may still perceive ‘just another dog’ while we aesthetically contemplate on 
it and thus perceive it as willing, striving and so on. 
In sum, we use our relationship to our body as grounds for an analogy between the 
target of cognition and its will. We know our body relates to various objects in the objective 
world. We project this same relationship on the dog. Our body is apparently different to the 
 
                                               
23 Perhaps construing it as the target’s clearest image as opposed to the object’s clearest image can help us avoid 
a persistent confusion between aesthetic contemplation and ordinary cognition of objects, which plagues many 
readings. 
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dog, however. Why is that so? What makes our body so different? Is it another object(s) and 
our body’s relationship to it? ‘What we are’ is just as much a result of our will and therefore 
our responses to objects as it is a result of their effect on us. In (re)acting, we recognise that 
we aslo will and participate in determining our body’s limits; we co-determine the limits of 
the effects of other objects on us. Our body is both our will and the effects of objects on it. 
It is more than its causal and-or spatiotemporal relations to other objects and so, by analogy, 
we infer the same about the dog’s relationship to its body.  
What can the difference between my body and the dog rely on (and if we want to say 
more about them than their spatiotemporal and causal relations can tell us) other than that 
we actually will differently; we respond differently to the effects of objects on us? Our focus 
moves away from its relations to other objects and their effects, i.e., away from the cognition 
of it as an object with such and such (relational) properties. We focus on the relationship 
between ‘how it appears now’ and ‘what it wills to appear as’. Accordingly, cognition of an 
Idea is cognition of something as it strives to appear or as it would appear if nothing strove 
in opposition to it. It is the previous aim to cognise the target’s will, which drives our focus 
and thereby makes our cognition meaningful. Its relations to other objects remains, but these 
relations change in their quality and significance: they have no significance for our aesthetic 
contemplation and subjective stance that correlates to it. It is also in this sense that an ‘Idea’ 
is the counterpart of a ‘concept’, for Schopenhauer (more on this below). 
Schopenhauer grounds aesthetic contemplation on cognition enabled by a projection 
of our first-person experience of willing something onto the world, which is at the heart of 
his philosophy:  
“…we must learn to understand nature from ourselves, not ourselves from nature. 
What is directly known to us must give us the explanation of what is only indirectly 
known, not conversely” (WRII, 196)  
Nonetheless, he is careful to make clear that ‘will’ does not only apply to ‘human willing’:  
“…anyone incapable of broadening the concept in the way we require will remain in 
a state of perpetual misunderstanding, using the word will to mean just the one species 
that has borne the name so far, the will that is accompanied by cognition and is 
expressed exclusively in accordance with motives – and indeed only through abstract 
motives, under the guidance of reason” (WR, 136)  
He seeks to offer a different, more meaningful way of comprehending the changes in the 
objects of cognition. The projection of willing underpinning aesthetic contemplation is not 
the projection of our ‘individual self’ or what is specific to human willing, but the unique 
relationship we have to our body in (re)acting. Our body is the bridge from ourselves to the 
objective world. We project onto the target of cognition this same bridge, i.e., its body and 
willing are as identical as our body and will. The previous allows us to perceive it as pushing 
and pulling ‘something’ or striving after ‘something’ or overpowering something and so on. 
We take a stance on it as if it also wills.  
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Aesthetic contemplation differs from other cognitions by our perceiving things as 
‘striving’, ‘struggling’ etc. Schopenhauerian Ideas are based on our perceiving (or our trying 
to perceive) the target ‘as it strives to be or become’ or as it ‘would be if nothing was striving 
in opposition to it’. The following passages support the above propositions: 
“Everywhere in nature we see conflict, we see struggle, we see victory changing 
hands; later we will recognise this more clearly as the internal rupture [deren Abbild 
er ist] that is essential to the will. Each level of the will’s objectivation is in conflict 
with the others over matter, space and time… In fact, this conflict is itself only the 
revelation of the internal rupture that is essential to the will.” (WR, 171-2) 
 
“A more perfect Idea will result from such a victory over several lower Ideas or 
objectivations of the will; and by absorbing an analogue of higher power from each 
of the Ideas it overpowers, it will gain an entirely new character: the will is objectified 
in a new and clearer fashion... No victory without a struggle: since the higher Idea or 
objectivation of the will can come forward only by overpowering the lower Ideas, it 
encounters resistance on their part. Even when the lower Ideas are quickly brought 
into submission, they nonetheless keep striving to express their essence in a complete 
and self-sufficient manner.” (WR, 173) 
 
“It can thus also be said that each organism presents the Idea that it is modelled on, 
but only after discounting the part of its force used for overpowering the lower Ideas 
that compete with it for matter. Jacob Böhme seems to have thought of this when he 
says somewhere that all human and animal bodies, indeed all plants, are really half 
dead. Now an organism will be a more or less perfect expression of its Idea in 
proportion to its success in overpowering the natural forces that express the lower 
levels of the objecthood of the will; that is, it will be closer to or further from the ideal 
that is the mark of beauty in the species.” (WR, 171) 
In aesthetic contemplation, we do not perceive the target as an object, but as the ‘result of 
its successful or unsuccessful struggle’. Prior to our projecting willing on it, we perceive it 
in terms of its spatiotemporal and causal relations in accordance with certain rules or laws, 
i.e., a consistency in its appearance, which is premised on the expression of a meaningless 
natural force. To perceive something as striving, struggling, overpowering etc. requires us 
to project willing on it. Thus, Schopenhauerian Ideas relate to one another differently than 
how objects and motives relate; they relate in terms of overpowering, striving, struggling in 
opposition to something and so on. The latter terms pertain to willing and its expression, not 
to objects, object-relations and natural forces. They fall outside the frame of the objective 
picture.  
The juxtaposition between the cognition of an object and aesthetic contemplation of 
an Idea is obscurely summarised in the following passage, which I will try to clarify further: 
“Without the object, without the representation, I am not a cognising subject but 
rather mere blind will; and similarly, without me as the subject of cognition, the thing 
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cognised is not an object but rather mere will, blind urge. In itself, i.e. outside of 
representation, this will is one and the same thing as my own will: only in the world 
as representation, whose form is always minimally that of subject and object, are we 
separate from each other as the cognising individual and the individual cognised. As 
soon as cognition, the world of representation, is suppressed, absolutely nothing is 
left but mere will, blind urge. The fact that it retains its objecthood and becomes 
representation presupposes at once both subject and object: but the fact that this 
objecthood is the pure, complete and adequate objecthood of the will presupposes the 
object as Idea, free from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and the subject 
as pure subject of cognition, free from individuality and servitude to the will.” (WR, 
203) 
The Idea is the purest, clearest and most complete cognition we can have of something, but 
it is still a cognition of something. It is not the cognition of an object or of another entity 
(e.g., a metaphysical entity) to which the target relates; both of the previous conceptions of 
the Ideas yield ‘objects’, not ‘Ideas’ and so fail to track the fundamental difference between 
them. There is no ‘entity’ or ‘thing’ conceivable outside of the will and its representation in 
cognition. Our ability to cognise something as a representation of willing, striving etc. finds 
its ground in the double cognition of the body. The relationship we have to the target of our 
cognition when perceiving its Idea is as if it ‘wills’ (overpowers, strives, struggles etc.). We 
project willing onto the world to saturate it with meaning or significance to us in an entirely 
different way than its being a potential motive for our will, i.e., its being ‘an object’.   
Schopenhauerian Ideas are neither Platonic Forms24 nor quite the Kantian ‘thing in 
itself’. Recall, that the ‘thing in itself’ is a meaningless concept, for Schopenhauer. We make 
it meaningful by ‘projecting willing’ onto the target of cognition. His account accords with 
what Kant argued were the limits of possible experience while aiming for Plato’s insight 
into the ‘thing in itself’.25 Therefore, he seeks to sit between Plato and Kant. The following 
passage, which merits quoting in full, summarises his reasons for doing so: 
“This is because, just as Kant claimed, the thing in itself is supposed to be free of all 
the forms that are attached to cognition as such: and (as will be shown in the appendix) 
Kant was simply mistaken in failing to consider being-an-object-for-a-subject as one 
of these forms, and indeed before all others, since precisely this is the first and most 
universal form of all appearance, i.e. representation; he should therefore have explicitly 
denied that his thing in itself was an object, as this would have saved him from that 
great inconsistency, an inconsistency that was discovered quite early. By contrast, the 
 
                                               
24 Though, he does show ambivalence with respect to whether or not his Ideas are just Platonic Forms; he 
sometimes claims that he does not intend them in Plato’s sense, e.g., “given our view, we cannot agree with Plato” 
(WR, 236); also, “many of his [Plato’s] examples and descriptions of Ideas are applicable only to concepts” (WR, 
259). At other times, he claims, “the Ideas, in my sense, which agrees with the original Platonic meaning, of this 
grossly misused word” (WRII, 364). It seems that in the supplementary essays he settles for the claim that his 
conception of the Ideas represents a different reading of Plato’s Ideas, which he believes is closer to Plato’s 
‘original meaning’. 
25 The supplementary essays are clear about the Kantian limits of his philosophy (cf. WRII, 197-8).  
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Platonic Idea is necessarily an object, something cognised, a representation and, for 
precisely this reason (but for only this reason), distinct from the thing in itself. It has 
merely shed the subordinate forms of appearance (which are all comprehended under 
the principle of sufficient reason) – or rather it has not yet entered into these forms; 
but it has retained the first and most general form, that of representation in general, 
of being an object for a subject.” (WR, 197; my emphasis) 
He wants Plato’s metaphysical insights and the proposed truth-value of the Ideas to accord 
with Kant’s epistemic boundaries, i.e., his conditions for possible experience. He settled for 
an account that renders meaningful Kant’s ‘thing in itself’. It is thus misleading to construe 
the Schopenhauerian Ideas as the ‘concepts of reason’ translated into intuition (i.e., made 
perceptible), or metaphysical ‘entities’ (i.e., objects in a different realm). Schopenhauerian 
Ideas have Plato’s truth-value, but reside within Kant’s epistemic boundaries and limits of 
possible experience.  
An important distinction between ‘Ideas’ and ‘concepts’ is that they correlate to the 
different ‘stances’ we take on a target of cognition. One stance yields the ‘representation’ 
of willing, striving etc., whereas the other yields ‘an object’ for (some) will. For example, 
with respect to the ‘particularity’ of the target of cognition, the aesthetic contemplator has 
a ‘qualitatively distinct’ sense of the target than the person assuming the willing stance. In 
assuming the willing stance, we perceive the target’s particularity within the framework of 
a possible object for willing, if not a full-fledged motive. Thus, an Object O is ‘particular’ 
by virtue of its relationship to other objects, i.e., to Ob, Oz… On. It has what we can call 
‘relative or relational particularity’. This yields a cognition that distinguishes objects from 
each other by their functionality; Ob is ‘particular’ because it is ‘functionally distinct’ from 
Oz. Although, any object O is part of the same whole characterised by its usefulness with 
respect to a task (purpose, aim etc.). Oz is particular by serving a different function within a 
whole determined solely by the functionality of something, either for us, or an independent 
will. Notable examples of the previous ‘independent will’ are ‘Nature’ or ‘God’. Ob still 
relates to Oz and others before relating to an independent will by its conception of serving a 
‘function’; often this independent will is our own, which we then project onto nature or onto 
God. This is the same ‘particularity’ that hammers have in relation to screwdrivers or chisels 
in the ‘tool-box’, that is, as fit for some use that the worker (or the legislator, or the owner 
of the ‘wider whole that is the box’) can put it to. This functional particularity of an object 
differs qualitatively from the ‘particularity’ of the Idea.  
Aesthetic contemplation revises our conception of particularity by changing its 
meaning, not by denying its existence or by positing an alternative existence, i.e., some 
realm of ‘Ideas’. Particularity seen through aesthetic contemplation refers to the same target 
of cognition, i.e., the stone, the flower or the person, but the significance of each changes. 
It changes from an object whose significance derives from the will of the cognising subject, 
to the target having its own significance based on its willing. The previous is guaranteed by 
the double cognition of the body and the projection of willing it enables.  
The claim that an Idea is ‘another object’ representing itself through Ox, e.g., a 
perfect ‘tool’ without a wielder, is as misleading and as meaningless as the ‘object in itself’, 
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which Schopenhauer calls “a philosophical will-o’-the wisp” (WR, 25). Accordingly, the 
Schopenhauerian Idea is not an object in this sense, but it is nonetheless a target of cognition. 
In aesthetic contemplation, we perceive the result of a struggle between opposing wills, 
which result we call Ideas. Notice, however, that nothing about a world filled with objects 
relating spatiotemporally, causally and natural forces implies ‘willing’, ‘striving’ or even a 
‘struggle’. To perceive anything like a struggle, or to make meaningful what we construe as 
the outcome or representation of a struggle (i.e., the Ideas), we must project the first-person 
experience of willing something on objects of cognition. The projection of willing transforms 
entirely our worldview.  
There is a core objection to the Schopenhauerian Ideas in the philosophical literature 
that is focused on the claim that aesthetic contemplation is not concerned with the target’s 
‘particularity’, but with the ‘Idea’ of which the object is an ‘instantiation’. This objection 
voices the worry that the object’s ‘particularity’ is rendered ‘irrelevant’ or ‘transcended’ by 
aesthetic contemplation, because the ‘Idea’ is construed as universal whereas the so-called 
‘object’ of aesthetic contemplation is not. This objection is clearly formulated by Soll who 
argues: 
“…the object of an aesthetic experience is not made up of individuals, distinguished 
by their locations in space and time, but by the a-spatial and a-temporal Ideas or 
Platonic Forms, the eternal, unchanging species or types of things that all individuals 
exemplify.” (Soll 1998, 93) 
Soll’s reading construes the relationship between the Idea and the target as an ontological 
relationship. In other words, he makes sense of the Ideas using the objective picture, which 
is what Schopenhauer tries to avoid. It brings back the PSR and yields cognition of an object 
(or motive) rather than an ‘Idea’, which, in turn, fails to track their difference. Schopenhauer 
could have called the ‘Idea’ an object if he did not aim to differentiate it from objects and 
motives.  
Soll’s reading wrongly posits two distinct ‘things’: physical objects and metaphysical 
Ideas, which relate to one another. He does not construe them as different ways of looking 
at something. Hamlyn, on the other hand, avoided this confusion by rightly recognising that: 
“Schopenhauer is less concerned with the ontological status of the Ideas than with 
their logical character as representations. Hence, when he says that the grades of the 
objectification of the will are Ideas in Plato’s sense, we are not meant to ask whether 
in that case they exist in another world or whatever.” (Hamlyn 1980, 112) 
With respect to Hamlyn’s suggestion, however, we have to clarify what we mean by the 
‘logical’ status of something while guarding against overly rational conceptions of the Ideas. 
Is the relationship between the Idea and its target one of two distinct things relating logically? 
We have neither offered any insight nor made sense of the Ideas by speaking of two distinct 
things. The insight of the claim that it is ‘two distinct cognitions of the same thing’ is more 
useful, because it preserves an identity relationship between the Idea and the target, which 
allows us to juxtapose it to the object. The Idea is the same target not perceived as an object.  
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Other readings appeal to the objective picture to make sense of the Schopenhauerian 
Ideas by construing them as ‘concepts’. These readings argue an Idea is a universal ‘thing’ 
in juxtaposition to a particular ‘thing’; they form a relationship of subsumption. The object 
Ox is subsumed under the ‘Idea’ of O.26 We remember that the relationship he posits 
between the Idea and the object is one of identity. Also, he construes the Idea as the particular 
object’s ‘clearest image’. Hamlyn rightly points out that the relationship between the target 
and its Idea is not synonymous to that between a ‘particular’ and its ‘universal’ type or kind. 
Hamlyn’s reading implies the identity relationship between them without fully fleshing it 
out, however:  
“Grades of the objectification of the will are not just kinds either, if that term suggests 
something that is merely universal in character and simply instantiated in a number 
of particulars — a mere class. There remains a gulf between particulars and grades of 
objectification of the will, just because the will has nothing to do with plurality. The 
grade of the will's objectivity which is the oak is the oak; not the class of oaks, but the 
prototype oak which no single oak tree in the world may quite match or live up to. It 
is an ideal entity, something that is both token and type.” (Hamlyn 1980, 106)  
The Ideas are universal, albeit in another sense, because the conception of universality under 
aesthetic contemplation changes form that under ordinary reflection or cognition of objects. 
We cannot construe the universality of an Idea through the objective picture because we 
then lose its individuality, i.e., that there is nothing else like it. The universality of an Idea 
rests on the insight that what we perceive as an object is also a representation of its inherent 
willing, striving and so on. The Idea is a product of reason and imagination in combination, 
so its universality cannot be something that applies only to reason and its concepts. Aesthetic 
contemplation requires the use of reason for projection of willing and imagination for us to 
have an intuitive representation of willing from a viewpoint we cannot directly access. What 
is universal about an Idea is what is universal about a ‘willing thing’. Our perspective on 
and the meaning of ‘universality’ (‘individuality’,‘particularity’ etc.) change the moment 
we construe the relationship between the ‘concept’ and its particular ‘instantiation’ through 
aesthetic contemplation.  
We cannot fault readings that are tempted to make sense of the Idea using what 
obtains only in the objective picture, which reintroduces a perspective that loses sight of the 
Idea. Schopenhauer’s abstruse descriptions of the Ideas mislead us. Let us take the following 
passages as examples of how his claims mislead us:  
“The Idea is unity shattered into multiplicity through the temporal and spatial form of 
our intuitive apprehension; the concept on the other hand is unity reassembled from 
 
                                               
26 This reading of the ‘Ideas’ is prolific in the literature, see, e.g., Gardiner (1963, 205-7 & 213-4); Vandenabeele 
(2011, 51-3); Vandenabeele (2012B); Atwell (1995, 148-150); Magee (1983, 165); Janaway (1989, 9-10) and 
Wicks (2005, 130). 
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plurality by means of the abstraction of our reason: it can be designated as unity after 
the fact, and the Idea as unity before the fact.” (WR, 261) 
 
“…there are two inseparable components of the aesthetic way of looking at things: 
cognition of the object, not as a particular thing but rather as a Platonic Idea, i.e. as a 
permanent form of this whole genus of things; and then the self-consciousness of the 
one who has this cognition, not as an individual, but as pure, will-less subject of 
cognition.” (WR, 219) 
 
“Every individual at once represents its species; accordingly, we now apprehend the 
universal in beings. What we know in such a way are the Ideas of things; but from 
these there now speaks a higher wisdom than that which knows of mere relations.” 
(WRII, 372) 
The above passages do not tell us what makes an Idea meaningful. It tries to compare the 
Ideas to concepts and misleadingly invites us to make Ideas meaningful using what is 
furthest from an Idea, i.e., the objective correlate of the willing stance. Yet, he is likewise 
adamant to prevent a ‘conceptual’ apprehension of the Ideas, which he found dissatisfactory 
about Plato’s account of the Forms: 
“… it is not the individual thing, the object of our common apprehension, nor is it the 
concept, the object of rational thought and science. Although Idea and concept have 
something in common, namely the fact that as unities both stand for [vertreten] a 
multiplicity of actual things… I certainly do not mean to say that Plato had a clear 
conception of this distinction: in fact, many of his examples and descriptions of Ideas 
are applicable only to concepts.” (WR, 259-60) 
What, I believe, he is aiming to demonstrate is that ‘concepts’ acquire a different meaning 
when we aesthetically contemplate; it revises our perspective on objects and concepts. Ideas 
are counterparts of concepts. They are what concepts look like when we are aesthetically 
contemplating on something. However, to conceptualise aesthetic contemplation is to make 
it fit with a world-view that yields objects, concepts and motives, i.e., the objective picture. 
Therefore, we miss what is unique about aesthetic contemplation by the previous approach. 
Passages like the following are helpful for an insight into the difference between Ideas and 
concepts: 
“…the distinction between concept and Idea can be expressed figuratively by saying: 
concepts are like dead receptacles; what we place inside actually lies next to each 
other, and we cannot take out more (through analytic judgments) than we have put in 
(through synthetic reflection): in those who have grasped them, on the other hand, 
Ideas develop representations that are novel with respect to concepts sharing the same 
name: the Idea is like a living and developing organism endowed with generative 
powers, an organism that can produce things that were not already packaged up inside 
it.” (WR, 261) 
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Aesthetic contemplation individuates the target of cognition in a different manner than the 
‘relative or relational individuality’ that is its conceptual counterpart. It picks out the same 
target, but perceives and conceives it differently.  
It is important to note that the Idea is a striving independent from its ‘success’ hitherto. 
Its striving shows both what the target has achieved so far and what it aims to look like. We 
can make this meaningful by construing the Idea as how a target wills to appear.  
The Idea, then, is the result of another way of looking at something, not our ‘looking 
at something else’. Another useful passage that further nuances these differences is one that 
distinguishes concepts from melodies: 
“This is because melodies are to a certain extent like universal concepts, being 
abstractions from reality. Reality, and hence the world of specific things, provides 
what is intuitive, what is particular and individual, the specific case both for the 
universality of concepts as well as for the universality of melodies, although these 
two universalities are opposed in a certain respect: concepts contain simply the very 
first forms abstracted from intuition, the outer shells that have been stripped off 
things, as it were, and are thus wholly authentic abstracta; music on the other hand 
provides the innermost kernel, prior to all form – the heart of things.” (WR, 291) 
Schopenhauer’s key claim is that Ideas and concepts are counterparts whose difference does 
not rest on different objects that relate, but different ways of looking at the same object and 
its relations.  
Following the same method of trying to make sense of the Schopenhauerian Ideas 
using the objective picture, commentators argue that we can construe the Ideas as perceiving 
the object’s ‘significance’, which is found in something other than its ‘individuality’. In 
aesthetic contemplation, they argue, we are not concerned with its ‘individual significance’, 
but its “universal significance”.27 This reading is not wrong, but, again, we should construe 
‘universal significance’ under aesthetic contemplation and avoid the objective picture. The 
Idea-target relation is not a concept-object or type-token relation, but an identity relationship 
between the will and its representation in a target of cognition, which we otherwise perceive 
as an object. By speaking about the universal significance of something, we are tempted to 
comprehend the Idea-target relation as ‘an object subsumed under a concept’ and perceive 
things through the PSR, which yields the meaningless objective picture.  
If we follow the above reading, then, something has aesthetic value by virtue of its 
relation to a universal thing called an ‘Idea’, which the object of cognition is distinct from 
by failing to correspond to it. The object of our aesthetic contemplation is irrelevant, for this 
reading. What matters is ‘Nature’, ‘God’, ‘the species’, or ‘the thing-in-itself’, because the 
Idea is distinct from any individual we perceive. We can take our pick from the previous, 
because nobody has perceived them, but we are still inclined to argue that one or another 
serves as the conceptual ground for the multiplicity of objects and individuals we perceive. 
 
                                               
27 See Wicks (2005, 98); (Vandenabeele 2011, 53) and Young (2005, 130-1). 
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Aesthetic contemplation under this reading shows the ‘intention’ or ‘effect’ of something 
other than the target of cognition. Notice also that this reading ascribes a causal-relationship 
between the target and its Idea. The ascription of causal relationships beyond their remit 
misleads our readings by yielding something meaningless. The reading I defend argues that 
aesthetic contemplation represents a difference in our cognition of the same thing premised 
on a change in us, not a difference in things without a correlative change in us.28  
Other readings argue it is paradoxical to claim that by aesthetically contemplating 
on an artwork we do not perceive the particular object that is its subject matter, but “a 
mysterious entity that eludes ordinary perception”29. The previous suggests that as we move 
from ordinary cognition (of objects and motives) into aesthetic contemplation we somehow 
lose sight of the object entirely and are now concerned with what the object does not quite 
live up to. This objection is correct, but only if we read it in a loose sense, because it risks 
overshooting its mark. How can it transition into our perceiving something else without the 
loss of reference? In aesthetic contemplation, the ‘individual target of our cognition’ is not 
lost; it does not come out of focus. What is lost or comes out of focus is our perceiving it as 
an object. Our focus is fully devoted to it, not to something else. The previous is evident in 
the gradual transition from the world filled with objects into the world of Ideas. At no point 
in the gradual transition does Schopenhauer contend that we lose sight or we no longer focus 
on what we previously perceived as an object. This gradual transition shows up most clearly 
in the following passage, which merits quoting in full: 
“…the apprehension of the relations that things have to one another takes place only 
indirectly in the service of the will. It therefore forms the transition to the purely 
objective knowledge that is entirely independent of the will; it is scientific knowledge, 
the latter being artistic knowledge. Thus, if many and varied relations of an object are 
immediately apprehended, its peculiar and proper nature then appears from these 
more and more distinctly, and is thus gradually constructed out of mere relations, 
although it itself is entirely different from them. With this method of apprehension, the 
subjection of the intellect to the will at the same time becomes more and more indirect 
and limited… The Idea is the root point of all these relations, and thus the complete 
and perfect phenomenon, or, as I have expressed it in the text, the adequate objectivity 
of the will at this stage of its phenomenal appearance… Hence, as I have said, the 
Ideas still do not reveal the being-in-itself of things, but only their objective character, 
and thus always only the phenomenon. And we should not understand even this 
character, if the inner essence of things were not otherwise known to us, at least obscurely 
and in feeling. Thus this essence itself cannot be understood from the Ideas, and in 
general not through any merely objective knowledge; therefore it would remain 
 
                                               
28 For more on this and how it differs from Kant’s aesthetic ‘ideas’ see Vandenabeele (2012B, 225-6). 
29 Gardiner (1968, 207). See also, Soll, (1998, 97-8). 
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eternally a secret, unless we had access to it from an entirely different side.” (WRII, 
363-4; some emphasis is mine) 
The concept is that which is ‘constructed out of mere relations’, whilst the Ideas reveal the 
‘essence’ or ‘character’ of that which appears in this relational light.30 We remember that 
‘essence’ or ‘character’ are meaningless without our projecting the first-person experience 
of ‘willing’ on them. We can summarise the previous by arguing that he makes the Ideas 
meaningful by projecting the will on concepts of reason; e.g., the ‘concept’ species becomes 
the ‘Idea’ when we transition from the pure subject of cognition (and so the willing stance) 
to the disinterested subject. In doing so, we no longer see construe the species as causally 
(or conceptually) related to the individual (or particular object) through which it is supposed 
to express itself, but as identical with the individual. We perceive an individual as constantly 
trying to perfect or to actualise itself.  
Some commentators suggest removing the Ideas from Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
due to their confusing status in his ontology.31 What is mistaken in such suggestions and the 
criticisms that underpin them is that their arguments begin from the premise that an ‘Idea’ 
is an entity or thing, which is what leads them to question their ontological status in the first 
place. We can settle this dispute about the ontological status of the Ideas by arguing that an 
Idea has the same ontological status as the object or the concept that is its counterpart in the 
objective picture. We do not cognise two distinct things called an ‘Idea’ and its ‘object’, but 
have two distinct cognitions of the same thing. Young rightly intimates that Schopenhauer 
does not construe the Ideas as things, but as a kind of perception of something: 
“‘Idea’ is, in his aesthetic theory, a mere façon de parler, a merely nominal object. 
The best way of putting his view is to say that what is special about the artist is not 
that he perceives the Idea instead of the individual, but rather perceives the individual 
as Idea.” (Young 2005, 131)  
Our cognition of an Idea is a cognition of ‘the individual’, not some ontological entity that 
is ‘somehow’ distinct, but which we ‘somehow’ perceive in ‘this’ individual. Our perception 
of things has shifted during aesthetic contemplation, but we do not lose the connection with 
the target of cognition. Young, however, overshoots the mark when he claims the following:  
“It is not something separate from the individual that the artist sees, but rather ‘the 
universal in the particular’ (WRII, 379; my emphasis).” (Young 2005, 131) 
Arguing that we perceive ‘the universal in the particular’ is not wrong, but this pushes us 
into an obscure position that makes the problem return through the backdoor. What sense 
can we make of perceiving ‘universals in particulars’ if that meaning is not conceptual? To 
be sure, cognising Ideas has conceptual implications, e.g., about our account of ‘objectivity’, 
but these must be initially suspended so we can arrive at the genuine meaning of the Idea 
 
                                               
30 For more on this ‘gradual transition’ see Koßler (2012, 201-3).  
31 Cf. Magee (1983, 238-240). 
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and the insights underpinning it. The Idea is not conceptual, but the counterpart of concepts 
as from another worldview. What we should inquire into is how we can ‘conceptualise’ the 
claim that in aesthetically contemplating on something we do not perceive an object with X 
properties, but a living, developing ‘thing’? Making a concept of something means making 
an object of it first and re-introducing the objective picture. If an Idea is a target’s will, then 
making a ‘concept’ of it entails defeating the purpose of perceiving it as the representation 
of willing.  
In sum, many criticisms aimed at Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation 
rest on the confusion over what he means by the ‘Idea’ of something. This confusion arises 
from trying to make cognition of Ideas conceptually tenable. The only thing conceptually 
tenable about it is that it does not defy all of Kant’s requirements for being an experience in 
general. It preserves what Schopenhauer saw as the backbone of a cognition: the subject-
object correlation. Cognition of an Idea struggles to be commensurate with the ordinary 
cognition of objects and motives. The PSR treats targets of cognition as objects for us to get 
our hands on and shape in accordance with our (or some independent) purpose; it treats them 
as vehicles for some purpose. In the revised sense of aesthetic contemplation I defend here, 
we perceive what the target itself wills to appear as to us. 
1.5 The Willing Stance and the ‘Disinterested Individual’   
In a similar fashion to the previous chapter, I will juxtapose ordinary ‘subjectivity’ with 
‘aesthetic’ subjectivity to give the subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation. Firstly, I 
will briefly summarise the objective correlate of aesthetic contemplation. The target of our 
ordinary, non-aesthetic cognition is perceived as ‘an object’, which is the affectively weaker 
version of a motive. The target of aesthetic contemplation is perceived as an Idea, however, 
whose meaning I fleshed out in terms of perceiving the target as ‘a willing thing’. This 
requires projection of the will on it using the double cognition or the will-body identity as a 
premise for this projection. Let us now look at and juxtapose the subjective correlate of non-
aesthetic cognition and aesthetic contemplation, respectively. 
We perceive something as an object, according to Schopenhauer, when we ‘seek for 
something to will’, but are hitherto weakly affected by the targets of cognition, which is not 
enough to drive us or to spark our will. The target of cognition is seen as an object when we 
assume the purposive and action-oriented stance on it; our aims are what ordinarily makes 
the target meaningful to us. Objects stand out (if they stand out at all) from the background 
as desirable or fit for purpose (or not) by their accordance or discordance with our will. The 
subjective correlate of cognition of an object is, thus, prima facie, self-interest. Accordingly, 
the needier we are, the more we search for something to will or for what we actually will, 
the more objects and object-relations we perceive as possible motives or actual motives for 
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our will. Self-interest seemingly ground the cognition of objects, i.e., of something as ‘fit to 
be utilised’ towards some end. The willing that is seemingly suspended or suppressed during 
aesthetic contemplation is egoism.32 I will contest this claim in the current chapter.   
When we perceive the world as filled with objects, object-relations etc., we take an 
interest in them or we are seeking something interesting to us. Yet, only some of them appear 
meaningful and grab our attention correlative to how they advance our purposes, whereas 
the others represent our need for meaning (or our searching for something to will) by their 
appearance as objects. They promise pleasure, or aid us in avoiding or getting rid of pain. 
Aesthetic contemplation, Schopenhauer argues, occurs in the absence of any relation to our 
will, however: 
“As soon as any relation between even that purely intuitive object and our own will, 
our own person, re-enters our consciousness, the magic is over: we fall back into 
cognition governed by the principle of sufficient reason, we no longer recognise the 
Idea but only the particular thing, the link in a chain to which we too belong.” (WR, 
222) 
The above suggests that self-interest is what opposes aesthetic contemplation, but, although 
this is true, the claim is incomplete and misleading for reasons that emerge if we take into 
account the impure subject of cognition. Recall, that the impure subject of cognition relates 
to the will in an indirect manner. Given the previous, we can argue that self-interest is neither 
the only interest opposing aesthetic contemplation, nor the only interest we should suspend 
to rise up to the subjective correlate of an Idea. Compare the above claims with the following 
in a passage from the supplementary essays, which are more precise in their description of 
what we suspend for the sake of aesthetic contemplation: 
“…we regard houses, ships, machines, and the like with the idea of their purpose and 
their suitability therefor; human beings with the idea of their relation to us, if they 
have any, and then of their relation to one another, whether in their present actions or 
according to their position and vocation, perhaps judging their fitness for it, and so 
on… In this way the consideration will gain in accuracy and extent, but remains the 
same as regards its quality and nature… In most cases and as a rule, everyone is 
abandoned to this method of consideration… But if, by way of exception, it happens 
that we experience a momentary enhancement of the intensity of our intuitive 
intelligence, we at once see things with entirely different eyes, for we now apprehend 
them no longer according to their relations, but according to what they are in and by 
themselves.” (WRII, 372) 
 
                                               
32 Schopenhauer construes egoism as the obsession with our own body and its continued existence or enhancement 
(cf. OBM, 190-1). 
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The above passage suggests that what is suspended is purposive cognition itself as opposed 
to our own purpose, which I construe are as our forgoing the willing stance. His conception 
of ‘interest’, then, is broader than ‘self-interest’, but logically includes the latter.  
Schopenhauer cannot coherently argue that only self-interest is what we suspend in 
aesthetic contemplation, because he later argues that aesthetic contemplation is linked to 
both morality (which ‘suspends egoism’) and to ascetic resignation (which ‘suspends all 
mainsprings [Triebfedern]’). Can the so-called ‘willing’ that is suspended then be willing in 
an extended sense, namely, purposive cognition or what I call the willing stance? Notice, 
however, that the previous cannot describe aesthetic contemplation, because it applies to 
ascetic resignation. We know that aesthetic contemplation can lead us to ascetic resignation, 
but not necessarily. Aesthetic contemplation can invoke two different responses, what he 
calls affirmation or negation of the will to life:  
“The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognises as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition. – The opposite of this, the negation of the will to life, is 
manifest when willing comes to an end with that cognition. The particular, known 
appearances no longer act as motives for willing, but instead, cognition of the essence 
of the world (which mirrors the will) – cognition that has arisen by grasping the Ideas 
– becomes a tranquilliser of the will and the will freely abolishes itself.” (WR, 311) 
In aesthetic contemplation the change in us can “be regarded as an act of self-denial” (WRII, 
367), but self-denial is different from the negation of the will to life of ascetic resignation. 
The ‘will’ we suspend in aesthetic contemplation is broader than egoism, but not as broad 
as to entail negation of the will to life. What we project on the target of cognition is broader 
than our personal will, but not broad enough to entail negation of all willing, i.e., as broad 
as ascetic resignation.33    
We require a distinction between aesthetic contemplation and ascetic resignation, 
which allows Schopenhauer sufficient conceptual room to link the two without confounding 
them. During our aesthetic contemplation of something, we suspend the willing stance34, for 
a moment, we do not suspend the cognition of a purpose or a willing in the extended sense, 
namely, as bearers of a meaningful cognition of the world. We project the will onto the target 
such that its own independent will becomes the aim of our attention and focus; we identify 
 
                                               
33 Ascetic resignation comes as one reaction (i.e. a negation) stemming from this broader sense of willing with its 
own target, i.e., life itself, as it appears through bodily vicissitudes. 
34 I use the willing and purposive stance interchangeably, because both concern our willing something (directly or 
indirectly). There may be room for a distinction between them, however. The willing stance refers to our personal 
will and is therefore the subjective correlate of ‘motives’, whereas the purposive stance refers to scientific inquiry 
and is the subjective correlate of ‘objects’ independent from personal willing. One yields ‘motives’ and the other 
yields ‘objects’. As we saw in the previous sections, objects are the kinds of things that permit willing, i.e., the 
affectively weaker counterparts of ‘motives’. 
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with the target in that moment. We perceive it as willing in its own right. Ascetic resignation 
suspends all willing including the individual target’s own, however. The latter is a response 
to a cognition whose target is life or living itself, not an individual thing or Idea (more on 
this in ensuing sections). In short, cognition of Ideas is relational. It represents a relationship 
between ‘the target’ and ‘us’. Whereas, ascetic resignation represents a relationship between 
us and life or living itself. The previous difference is subtle, but potentially can be helpful for 
untying an unyielding conceptual knot. 
When we become self-conscious during ordinary cognition that yields objects and 
motives we do so as willing something; we adopt a readiness to act. In short, there is a by-
fit relationship between the readiness to act and perception of an object or motive, which 
makes possible perception of the target as fit for a purpose independent from it and its own 
purpose. It permits the comparative reasoning that is characteristic of cognition that yields 
objects and concepts, which is distinct from the use of reason that yields Ideas. The ‘willing 
stance’ and its ‘object’ are inseparable correlates constitutive of a view of things which is a 
framework for comparative reasoning or reflection on something. The subjective correlate 
of the Idea and its particular use of reason differ from the previous, however.  
Aesthetic contemplation does not cognise the object as an object fit for the purpose 
of something other than itself, i.e., something external to it, which always leads to its 
purpose for some willing subject independent from the target. We do not cognise the house 
in accordance with its purpose for the owner, which might be to sell it, rent it or reside in it; 
or the builder which might be to construct it; or the resident which might be to reside in it 
and so on with any interest independent from the house’s own. Nevertheless, the previous 
introduces a conceptual problem, which we can summarise by the following question: what 
sense do we make of the proposition that we strive to perceive the houses’ own ‘interest’ or 
‘will’. In short: how can artefacts have independent interests? What he seemingly means is 
that we do not perceive the house as stone organised for our needs, but as representing the 
outcome of a struggle between “gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, these universal 
qualities of stone” (WR, 239).35 The ‘Idea’ of the house represents the perfect organisation 
of (or relations between) the many strivings that objectify as stones. In short, our interest is 
in what is possible with a bit of stone for the sake of the strivings it represents. We want to 
see just what a bit of stone can appear as if we remove as many of its limitations as we can 
without losing sight of the fact that we are interested wholly in the stone. We seek what ‘it 
strives to appear as to us’ after we recognise that it not only strives, but does so in opposition 
to other striving things that limit it. We want to perceive the ‘perfect organisation of stone’ 
possible for us in accordance with the limits of our intellect, but, according to Schopenhauer, 
not for our interest or the interest of an alternative spectator or legislator (i.e., Nature, God 
etc.). We are not aiming to perceive the perfect building for living in or selling and so on. 
 
                                               
35 Schopenhauer focuses mostly on “the struggle between gravity and rigidity” and claims that this is “the only 
aesthetic content of fine architecture” (WR, 239). Yet, he also makes a more general claim about the aesthetic 
appreciation or content of artefacts, i.e., that they “serve to express Ideas: only it is not the Idea of the artefact that 
speaks from them, but rather the Idea of the material that has been given this artificial form” (WR, 236). 
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Our (aesthetic) interest revises our perception of both ‘perfection’ and ‘perfect building’ by 
“leaving aside its utilitarian function” (WR, 239).  
In sum, aesthetic contemplation suspends everyone’s self-interest in the target except 
for the target’s interest and so that its will can consume our attention; this suspension of 
self-interest in the wider sense saturates our view of things. If its interest is not applicable 
to the target, because it is not a ‘human being’ (nor ‘egoism’ because it is not an ‘animal’), 
then we seek to perceive its striving, struggling, overpowering and so on. Accordingly, there 
is a conditional, not a bi-conditional, relationship between the willing stance and egoism. To 
suspend our purposive stance necessarily entails suspending egoism, but to suspend egoism 
does not necessarily entail suspending the purposive stance. We can at any moment project 
egoism onto an object that is distinct from the target and therefore claim an apparent altruism 
on our personal behalf. In other words, we can vicariously enjoy and participate in egoism 
while claiming to be personally selflessness in respect to the target. In so doing, we do not 
aesthetically contemplate on the target, but use it to will something for ourselves indirectly.  
This revised conception of aesthetic interest underpinning aesthetic contemplation 
is, I think, sustained by the will-body identity. The extended sense of willing Schopenhauer 
misleadingly calls ‘will-less’ or ‘disinterested’, is still a kind of willing and thereby interest 
we take in something. The sense of willing and interest is broader than can be ascribed to 
egoism. What kind of ‘interest’ can we have in something when we aim to perceive what it 
strives to become rather than what it appears as to us? The partial answer to the previous is 
that we suspend egoism, but this is not helpful because even if we suspend egoism we are 
not thereby exempt from vicariously experiencing it and the willing stance that underpins 
it. We can project our egoism onto Nature, God etc. as we identify to any other willing thing 
independent from the target of our aesthetic contemplation. What we have to explain is why, 
during aesthetic contemplation, the target is the centre of our attention while all else pales 
before it. Yet, we do not see it as satisfying our needs personal directly or indirectly.36 
Our ordinary interest in the object always yields cognition of something correlative 
to some will independent from the target, for Schopenhauer. We are ordinarily interested in 
a target of cognition in relation to the purpose it serves for us or another individual, which 
yields perception of an object or motive. Our seeking to perceive the target’s own purpose is 
the subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation. What drives this cognition in light of the 
fact that, for Schopenhauer, we have suspended the will or are ‘disinterested’? We find an 
answer to the previous in Daniel Came’s reading, who rightly argues that “to be disinterested 
does not mean to fail to be interested” (Came 2009, 95) and that, for Schopenhauer, 
“My attitude towards an object is disinterested, if and only if, in attending to it, I focus 
only on the object and not any relations that obtain between the object and anything 
apart from the object itself. Disinterestedness is therefore an attitude of reflective 
 
                                               
36 A ‘direct’ need is of course our seeing it as an motive, while an indirect one would be our seeing it as an object 
or as the product of something else, i.e., God or Nature, with which we identify and through which we nourish our 
egoism vicariously. 
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disengagement from all considerations of utility, which considers only what the object 
is ‘in itself’.” (Came 2009, 95)   
Came makes an equally important observation that Schopenhauer’s conception of 
‘disinterestedness’ is “reflective disengagement from all considerations of utility” (Came 
2009, 95), although we should ask what we can mean by ‘reflective’. Surely, ‘suspending 
considerations of utility’ does not only refer to the target’s “relation to our will” (Came 
2009, 96), i.e., how we seek to utilise it. It refers to any will that might consider the target’s 
utility independently from the target’s interest, driving, striving, will and so on. We suspend 
a consideration into how anyone or anything else would utilise it. Therefore, we need to go 
further than the suspension of egoism.   
Came is right that aesthetic contemplation suspends all considerations of utility, but, 
according to Schopenhauer, the object ‘in itself’ is meaningless for us. What meaning can 
we ascribe to a so-called ‘object in itself’ when to perceive it as an object means to take the 
willing stance on it and therefore bypass aesthetic contemplation? How can be interested in 
something seemingly ‘useless’? How do we make sense of the strange fact that something 
ostensibly “useless and unprofitable” (WRII, 388) interests us so much that we strive to 
preserve the objects we believe facilitate it (i.e., artworks)? Its interests to us, I have argued 
here, is different, because we do not perceive it as an object at all, but as the ‘objective’ 
outcome or the representation of willing, striving, overpowering and so on. It interests us 
because we have projected interest on it and are preoccupied with its interest. In other words, 
it interests us because we identify with it. Koßler is right in claiming that:   
“…the only way to perceive things not in relation to the [sic] own interest is to 
contemplate them as creating their relations to other things and to the perceiver by 
themselves.” (Koßler 2012, 200) 
Yet, we have to be clear that the interest is broader than our self-interest.  
If we want insight into the meaning of a representation or object, for Schopenhauer, 
including the ‘thing-in-itself’, which Kant mistakenly called ‘an object’, then we have to 
either ‘will something in it’, ‘look for something to will’, or project willing on it. The latter 
permits us to perceive it as the result of willing, striving etc. with which we then identify as 
we ordinarily do with our body when we will something: 
“… we ask if this world is nothing more than representation; in which case it would 
have to pass over us like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly phantasm, not worth our 
notice; or in fact whether it is something else, something more, and if so, what this 
could be… But none of this is the case: rather the subject of cognition, appearing as 
an individual, is given the solution to the riddle [Räthsel]: and this solution is will. 
This and this alone gives him the key to his own appearance, reveals to him the 
meaning and shows him the inner workings of his essence, his deeds, his movements.” 
(WR, 123-4) 
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When we ostensibly recognise the object’s absence of utility in aesthetic contemplation, but 
find that we are still interested in it, then we are projecting the will-body identity on it and 
so identify with it. We make it meaningful in a different manner that, accordingly, yields a 
different conception of ‘utility’. We do not ask how we can make it useful, but what would 
be useful to it and for it. The previous is not encapsulated by the ‘disengagement from all 
considerations of utility’, which leaves us with the problem Schopenhauer aims to avoid, 
namely, the meaningless of the ‘thing (or object) in itself’.  
Disinterestedness, for Schopenhauer, is suspending the kind of interest in it that leads 
us to perceiving something as an object. This requires more than suspending our individual 
will. Some philosophical commentators on his aesthetics overlook the previous, however. 
Denham, for example, argues that in aesthetic contemplation we are, 
“…liberated only from a specific species of will, leaving behind or transcending a 
certain ordinary species of activity, viz. the fulfilment of individual and egocentric 
aims and desires.” (Denham 2014, 176)  
She qualifies her claim by adding that Schopenhauer intends ‘silencing of the will’ in, 
“… a very specific and limited sense of that phrase: it is not all modes of willing but 
only, as it were, egocentric willing that is dissipated in aesthetic experience.” 
(Denham 2014, 179) 
We remember, however, that the ‘will’ Schopenhauer argues we suspend during aesthetic 
contemplation intends to capture the purposive or willing stance, which aims to utilise the 
target towards an end other than its own and yields cognition of an object. We can perceive 
an artwork as an object, but aesthetic contemplation and appreciation of an artwork yields 
more than perception of an object.37 Aesthetic contemplation has meaning if we perceive an 
Idea, which is no longer perceiving an object, but what the target of cognition wills (to appear 
as to us).  
In sum, cognising a target’s ‘individual will’ is the cornerstone of Schopenhauer’s 
account of ‘aesthetic contemplation’. To acquire an insight into what it means, I contended 
that we should take him at his word. Our priority should not be how he fits with Kant’s and-
or Plato’s doctrines on the Ideas, but how he differs from them and comes to his own. Plato’s 
metaphysics of the Forms and Kant’s limits of experience in general that rationalises Ideas 
can be misleading. I suggested an alternative approach to the Schopenhauerian Ideas. My 
approach presupposes aesthetic contemplation is the cognition of something premised on his 
correlation theory of cognition, which accords with Kant’s limits of possible experience, 
 
                                               
37 For Schopenhauer, an artwork is a targett of cognition that can be utilised towards some end like any other target 
of cognition; we can see it as an object if we assume the purposive or willing stance on it. He puts it in the following 
terms: “the goal of all the other arts is to arouse cognition of these Ideas through the presentation of particular 
things (artworks themselves are always such things) – something that is possible only given a corresponding 
alteration in the subject of cognition” (WR, 284). To perceive the artwork as aiming to facilitate cognition of an 
Idea, as opposed to its being something whose purpose is to be consumed by us, requires a necessary change in 
us, according to Schopenhauer.  
  77 
but it also shows why Ideas are more veracious than concepts. Aesthetic contemplation is 
not cognition of an object, an entity or a concept, but of an Idea. To make Ideas meaningful, 
we project willing (i.e. the will-body identity we experience in willing something) onto the 
target of cognition. This projection makes possible an entirely different world-view. Thus, 
it changes the nature of our perception without changing the target of perception. It makes 
us identify with a target and drives us aim to perceive its will, which accounts for the reality 
or objectivity ascribed to the Ideas in the Platonic sense. In aesthetic contemplation, then, 
we are ‘disinterested’ in the sense of being interested in its ‘will’ rather than in acting upon 
it for a ‘will’ independent from it. The Idea is not (and cannot possibly) be separated from 
the target, or its subjective correlate, which is suspension of the purposive or willing stance 
and the introduction of a new, ‘disinterested’ stance. We should reject the conception of 
Schopenhauerian Ideas as ‘things’. They are so-called ‘adequate objectivations of the will’, 
or as I suggest in trying to offer a less cryptic insight: they are the ‘ideal outcome or result’ 
of the target’s willing, striving, overpowering and so on.   
1.6 Aesthetic Contemplation from the Viewpoint of the 
Artist and the Spectator 
Schopenhauer’s views on aesthetic contemplation construe the Idea and the disinterested 
subject as correlates of the same world-view. Yet, there is also the individual who facilitates 
the aesthetic experience for others using a special class of objects we call ‘artworks’, i.e., 
the artist. Schopenhauer construes the artist as someone with the specific aim of facilitating 
aesthetic contemplation. Passages like the following suggest that all artists aim to arouse 
cognition of the Ideas:  
“…the goal of all the other arts is to arouse cognition of these Ideas through the 
presentation of particular things [Dinge] (artworks themselves are always such things) 
– something that is possible only given a corresponding alteration in the subject of 
cognition.” (WR, 284) 
Likewise, consider his conclusion about music in relation to other artistic mediums and its 
implications over the artist’s aim: 
“Therefore, unlike the other arts, music is in no way a copy of the Ideas; instead, it is 
a copy of the will itself, whose objecthood the Ideas are as well...” (WR, 285) 
Nevertheless, I think we should avoid the theoretical trap of claiming that all artists have 
one aim, which is not only difficult to verify, but likewise misleading over the nature of an 
artwork or artefact and its status as an ‘object’ or ‘thing’.  
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Artists can have different aims with respect to their artworks, which are not reducible 
to the aim of facilitating aesthetic contemplation, i.e., cognition of Ideas. Schopenhauer also 
makes the claim that an artwork is a ‘thing’. This gives him enough room to permit the claim 
that not all artists aim to facilitate cognition of the Ideas. Even if we accept the claim that 
artists aim to facilitate cognition of the Ideas, this is not enough to support the assumption 
that artworks are copies of the Ideas (more on this below). Kossler also rightly clarifies that, 
“…the artist cannot communicate the Idea simply by replicating it in the work of art. 
Or, in other words, what the artist produces voluntarily in time, space and matter 
cannot be an actual reproduction of the Idea. Instead works of art are able to call forth 
aesthetic contemplation in us or to get the Idea to come to us more easily.” (Kossler 
2012, 203) 
Artists are individuals that produce objects we call ‘artworks’. We can construe the previous 
as ‘creatively distorted’ versions of their ordinary counterparts; sometimes this creativity 
can be a matter of context, i.e., pulling the object out of one context and putting it in another, 
which alters the way we perceive it. These creative distortions aim at something, however. 
They aim to offer another perspective on the target or the artwork’s subject matter. Nothing 
about the previous tells us what use is made of the creativity, however. Therefore, the ends 
towards which an artist puts his creative distortions and changes in perspective can be as 
varied as he pleases.  
For clarity, we should construe the artist in Schopenhauer’s sense as an ‘aesthetically 
motivated (or inspired)’ artist, which we can also call the ‘aesthetic artist’ for brevity. I will 
argue here that Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation shows what is ‘aesthetic’ 
about an artist’s activities and works, not what is ‘artistic’. The correlate of the Idea is the 
‘disinterested’ individual and so the aesthetic artist is not only disinterested, but also enters 
into a relationship with her audience when she aims to incite aesthetic contemplation in 
them using her artwork. The aesthetic artist take an interest in her audience as much as (and 
in certain cases more than) she does in ensuring the ‘Idea’ is copied in the artwork. She aims 
to create an artwork with her audience in mind.  
Schopenhauer construes aesthetic artists as aiming to facilitate the world-view of the 
disinterested subject for others using her artwork. He is implicitly aware that artists produce 
objects called artworks or artefacts, but also aware that the artist intends to create more than 
an object. Artworks have as many aims as the individuals who not only use their imagination 
and reason to produce them, but also the audiences that enjoy them. This accords with his 
correlation theory of cognition whereby a ‘thing’ can have as many aims as a spectator or a 
creator would project on it. Reason (or so-called reflectiveness) and imagination (creativity) 
are essential components of the arts. Some artists use them to distort the target of perception 
for their sake. Consequently, their artwork is not aesthetically inspired.  
We have already distinguished artists tout court from ‘aesthetically inspired artists’, 
or the aesthetic artist, for brevity. We can also distinguish the spectator tout court from the 
‘aesthetically interested’ spectator or ‘disinterested’ spectator. In short, we can distinguish 
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between two aims that fit both the production and appreciation of an artwork: an aesthetic 
and a non-aesthetic aim.  
All artists use a distinct class of objects (i.e., artworks) to tweak our perception of 
something and thereby show us new and-or different ways of thinking about or perceiving 
something. Aesthetic artists are interested in showing us that there is a way of seeing a target 
that reveals what it frustratingly strives to appear as or to become. If an aesthetic artist is to 
succeed in facilitating cognition of an Idea in her spectator, then she has to do more than 
aesthetically contemplate on the subject matter and copy that onto the artwork. Let us flesh 
out and defend the previous proposition. 
In his discussion of genius Schopenhauer considers the “disposition” (cf. WR, 220) 
required not only for aesthetic contemplation, but also the works it inspires. In the previous, 
we find a subtle distinction between ‘creativity’ and ‘inspiration’. What the artist requires 
to aesthetically contemplate on something is distinct from what she later uses to facilitate 
aesthetic contemplation.38 He praises aesthetic artists for their ability to facilitate aesthetic 
contemplation using their artworks, but he likewise claims that they do so because they are 
capable of something that is not required for aesthetic contemplation itself, but for creativity 
or for producing an artwork: 
“…sustaining this mode of cognition much longer and to a much higher degree, 
allowing him to maintain the clarity of mind needed to repeat what he has thus 
cognised in an intentional work, this repetition being the work of art itself. In the work 
of art he communicates the Idea he has grasped to others.” (WR, 218; my emphasis) 
Aesthetic artists effortlessly grasp the Ideas, because, in doing so, they suspend the willing 
stance. To facilitate cognition of the Idea for others requires effort, however, and so the artist 
has to assume the purposive stance once again to realise it.  
Schopenhauer seemingly struggled to represent the above ‘effort’ in his discussion of 
the artist and genius. The distinction is vague and can risk confounding the aesthetic artist 
with the artist tout court. This is because the effort encapsulates persons apt in their creative 
distortions of a target of cognition irrespective of their aim with those creative distortions. 
An aesthetic artist is supposedly acting intentionally in her creation of an artwork. This 
intentional activity or effort means she wills something and so she is not just projecting the 
will onto things. Accordingly, there is a difference between the ‘intentional activity’, which 
is what artists tout court engage in irrespective of their aims, and the specific ‘intentional 
activity’ of aesthetic artists who aim to incite aesthetic contemplation in their audience. The 
previous distinction demonstrates what is novel about Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and its 
potential contribution to the philosophy of art.  
Unfortunately, Schopenhauer praises an artist for her creativity itself and this is apt 
to misleads us, or is at least unhelpful in demonstrating the difference between the creativity 
of an aesthetic artist and that of other artists. His praises ostensibly aim at what is required 
 
                                               
38 For a very useful discussion on this point, see (Kossler 2012, 201-3). 
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to facilitate aesthetic contemplation, which he construes as ‘imagination’. Yet, he is silent 
over the fact that imagination and creativity it permits are common to all artists irrespective 
of their artwork’s aim: 
“Moreover, actual objects are almost always very deficient exemplars of the Idea 
presented in them: hence the genius needs imagination in order to see in things not 
what nature actually created, but rather what it was trying unsuccessfully to create, a 
failure due to that struggle between its forms that we discussed in the previous Book.” 
(WR, 210; my emphasis) 
The above does not tell us why we should praise the aesthetic artist any more than another 
artist who uses her imagination, but has a different aim. This is because he directs his praises 
at something artists possess irrespective of their aim, namely, imagination or creativity. We 
know aesthetic artists require imagination to see things as they are ‘striving to become’ 
rather than as they appear to us now, which we discussesed in the previous section. We know 
also that imagination is a core component of projecting the first-person experience of willing 
on a target of cognition. Yet, imagination is likewise required by any artist and person who 
creatively distorts things to produce something whose aim is not cognition of an Idea. Non-
aesthetic artists also use imagination to distort the target. Thus, the products of imagination 
do not necessarily stem from ‘aesthetic’ interests, i.e., ‘disinterestedness’. Imagination need 
not involve a projection of willing on the target of cognition, that is, disinterestedness need 
not drive our imagination.  
Schopenhauer argues that the ability to facilitate aesthetic contemplation is 
“acquired, it is the technical aspect of art” (WR, 219; my emphasis), but this requires 
explanation since, this technical aspect is characteristic of all artists irrespective of whether 
or not their aim is aesthetic or non-aesthetic. In other words, why are we obligated to esteem 
aesthetic artists more than non-aesthetic artists if the reasons for our esteem apply to both 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic artists? Although Schopenhauer does not do enough to elucidate 
the previous, I think there are ways to find an answer consistent with his propositions or at 
least passages that flirt with an answer.  
We can begin by drawing a distinction between an aesthetic artist’s ability to 
facilitate aesthetic contemplation for her audience and her audience’s ability to contemplate 
aesthetically. We can find a clue about why an aesthetic artist merits more esteem than other 
artists in Schopenhauer’s arguments about the audiece’s burden with respect to aesthetic 
appreciation. Schopenhauer places a burden on her audience for aesthetic contemplation by 
claiming that it is only possible following “a corresponding alteration in the subject of 
cognition” (WR, 284). The aesthetic artist who wants to facilitate cognition of the Ideas, 
then, has to take this burden himself because his aim is to facilitate aesthetic contemplation. 
He has to affect her audience’s subjective correlate such that they can rise up to the cognition 
of an Idea. In other words, he has to be apt at leading audiences to suspend the purposive or 
willing stance, without their losing interest in the artwork. Accordingly, he has to lead them 
to give up their personal interest, but also suspend their impersonal interest. This is because 
an impersonal interest permits the vicarious enjoyment of one’s personal interest. In short, 
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the aesthetic artist aims for ‘disinterestedness’, i.e., the subjective correlate of aesthetic 
contemplation, as much as (and sometimes more than) she aims to ‘copy’ the Ideas in her 
artwork. Conversely, non-aesthetic artists rely on something the audience has in abundance 
and by default: the willing stance and so their self-interest. Non-aesthetic artists only have 
to distort something in such a way that it reflects someone’s personal or impersonal interest, 
whereas aesthetic artists have to distort it in such a way that it leads them to suspend both.  
Schopenhauer can use the above differences in burden and demand as reasons for 
praising or esteeming more highly aesthetic artists. Nevertheless, though the aesthetic artists 
have more to deliberate on in producing artworks, we should reject the claim that the burden 
of aesthetic contemplation resides wholly on the audience. If it is true, then it would entail 
that aesthetic artists are engaged in a self-defeating enterprise. Why would an artist bother 
creating artworks that facilitate cognition of an Idea if that cognition was wholly premised 
on the audience’s willingness or ability? It is equally self-defeating for an aesthetic artist to 
address herself to audiences seeking to perceive in something what they desire or perceive 
what indirectly relates to their desires. What we require is a middle ground between the 
efforts of an aesthetic artist and those of her audience. Schopenhauer’s supplementary 
essays echoe this middle ground: 
“Thus the work of art so greatly facilitates the apprehension of the Ideas in which 
aesthetic enjoyment consists; and this is due not merely to the fact that art presents 
things more clearly and characteristically by emphasising the essential and 
eliminating the inessential, but just as much to the fact that the absolute silence of the 
will, required for the purely objective apprehension of the true nature of things, is 
attained with the greatest certainty.” (WRII, 370; some emphasis is mine) 
To render the audience ‘disinterested’ is constitutive of the aesthetic artist’s aim and should 
be reflected in her artwork. Likewise, given his correlation theory of cognition, this aim 
must be complemented by the audience having the capacity and willingness to suspend 
personal and impersonal interests.  
In sum, the above suggests three central propositions. First, an aesthetic artist aims 
to create ‘things’ or ‘objects’ (i.e., artworks and-or artefacts) that more adequately represent 
the Ideas than do their ‘ordinary’ counterparts. Second, aesthetic artists can do so because 
they can sustain aesthetic contemplation of something longer than other people can. Third, 
aesthetic artists achieve the previous under the constraints of their chosen artistic medium 
and do so by virtue of their considerable training and mastery in this medium, which requires 
effort, intentional activity and thus ‘willing’. Additionally, creativity is constitutive of all 
artists irrespective of their aim. I will nuance these propositions slightly before moving on.  
There is a difference between what is required to have some experience and what is 
required to facilitate that experience in others. Schopenhauer is aware of this distinction and 
argues that aesthetic artists require something other than cognition of an Idea to achieve 
their aims. They require a willful activity of imagination and reflectiveness. Yet, the former 
are common to all artists. An artist’s skills and requirements do not distinguish artists from 
one another. The aim of their artwork serves as the basis for the previous distinction. The 
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requirements and achievements of creativity differ from those of inspiration. Accordingly, 
a tripartite distinction emerges from the above considerations. Firstly, all artists are creative, 
but not all artists are inspired. Correspondingly, not all inspired artists are aesthetically 
inspired. There is a difference between creativity, inspiration and aesthetic contemplation.  
Schopenhauer was privy to the above tripartite distinction, but he did not do enough 
to flesh out its significance to the distinction between art and aesthetics. For example, he 
describes ‘imagination’ as an artist’s ‘instrument’, which suggests that the artist can put it 
to use towards alternative ends: 
“But if our perception were always tied to the real presence of things, its material 
would be entirely under the dominion of chance, which rarely produces things at the 
right time, seldom arranges them appropriately, and often presents them to us in very 
defective copies. For this reason imagination is needed, in order to complete, arrange, 
amplify, fix, retain, and repeat at pleasure all the significant pictures of life, according 
as the aims of a profoundly penetrating knowledge and of the significant work by 
which it is to be communicated may require. On this rests the high value of 
imagination as an indispensable instrument of genius.” (WRII, 378-9) 
The aesthetic artwork aims to facilitate aesthetic contemplation, but this does not necessarily 
entail that an artwork is the exact copy or imitation of the artist’s aesthetic contemplation of 
something. She does not recreate her experiences without considering her audience’s 
viewpoint. In short, the artwork is not a copy of what the artist herself perceives; or, contrary 
to the proposition Schopenhauer defends, the artist would not require the subjective change 
necessary for aesthetic contemplation. Instead, the aesthetic artist would assume all people 
see, think and feel exactly what she sees, thinks and feels. His correlation theory of cognition 
and account of the individual differences in character cannot support the previous claim.  
What the aesthetic artist requires from the target of her cognition such that it incites 
aesthetic contemplation in her is not the same as what her audience will require. She must 
account for their subjective correlate when she produces an artwork and not focus on her 
own. She must account for their need to suspend the willing stance so that they can perceive 
a ‘willing thing’, not an object or a motive. She must not project herself onto them. She has 
to tailor her artwork to them, many of whom will come from different lifestyles, concerns 
and interests. Hence, in every artwork aiming at aesthetic contemplation we should find the 
artist’s attempts to seduce39, entice, invite, overwhelm or force her audience away from the 
purposive stance that stifles their aesthetic contemplation. She does it through her awareness 
of her audiences’ common inclinations, or through her finger on the zeitgeist’s pulse, so to 
speak. Schopenhauer’s candidate for this ability of aesthetic artists, which becomes clearer 
 
                                               
39 My use of the concept ‘seduction’ is broad: I mean to refer to the behaviour that leads us away from our interest, 
or from what is ordinary or proper, towards an end we may not (initially) agree with because of those interests and 
concerns. In this sense, the artist has the difficult task of convincing us we are, in a sense, ‘wrong’ in perceiving 
something how we ordinarily do. 
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past the misleading talk about perceiving universals in particulars, is ‘reflectiveness’. The 
artist reproduces her experiences in reflection and channels them via an artistic medium: 
“It is this reflectiveness that enables the painter to reproduce faithfully on canvas the 
nature he has before his eyes, and the poet accurately to call up again by means of 
abstract concepts the perceptive present by expressing it, and thus bringing it to 
distinct consciousness; likewise to express in words everything that others merely 
feel.” (WRII, 382) 
The aesthetic artist then uses her chosen medium to affect his audience and reproduce, or try 
to reproduce, her first-person experience in them, not to copy her first-person experience 
through her artistic medium. Schopenhauer should have been clearer about what role 
considerations of another’s perspective play in the aesthetic artist’s creative activity. The 
artist’s works are not diary entries. They are her struggle to reflect to others what she 
perceives conscious of the fact that other people differ from her. The combination we will 
find reflected in an aesthetic artist’s artwork is between the artist’s experience, the artistic 
medium through which she communicates it and her audience’s perspective on that 
experience; she has to consider all three. This means the reflectiveness of aesthetic artists is 
strikingly richer in cognitive content and value than Schopenhauer demonstrated.  
A further conceptual problem arises about Schopenhauer’s use of reflectiveness, 
however. It fails to track and thereby distinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic aims. Similar 
to imagination, reflectiveness is a facet of artists irrespective of their aim. For example, 
propaganda can demonstrate the use of both imagination and reflectiveness. Accordingly, 
imagination and reflectiveness are not aim-specific enough to show that disinterestedness 
drives the artist who employs them. We should thereby distinguish between aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic uses of reflectiveness and imagination. The aesthetic use is for reproducing 
cognition of the Ideas in others through artworks. Other artists can use them towards 
different ends, e.g., cognition of an object or motive. The artist requires a distinct use of 
imagination and reflection to provide her audience with an impression of the target of 
cognition without copying the ‘object’ or ‘impression’. It is unfortunate that Schopenhauer 
did not sufficiently dwell on these distinctions, but the foundations for them are present in 
his philosophy and correlation theory of cognition.  
Furthermore, it is misleading to suggest an artist is in the business of projecting her 
own experience. Yet, it is also right to suggest that there is a constant tension in the aesthetic 
artist between her urge to project herself and her urge to maintain a grasp on her spectator’s 
sentiments and dispositions such that her work more effectively addresses them and their 
viewpoint. Likewise, we should distinguish artists who address their spectator’s needs to 
‘gain their favor’ from the artists who do so to ‘facilitate aesthetic contemplation’. In other 
words, we can distinguish the ‘aesthetic experience’ from ‘popularity’. An aesthetic artist 
must use her audiences’ needs to lead them to suspend the urge to take the willing stance in 
relation to something. Thus, she must respect the necessary subjective change required for 
someone to aesthetically appreciate something; it is a change that may be easy for her, but 
not necessarily for others. She can use ‘beauty’ to seduce entice, invite etc. her audience into 
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aesthetic contemplation, or, she can use ‘sublimity’ to shock, overwhelm, force them etc. into 
it (more on the beautiful and the sublime in the next section). 
We mentioned the artist’s relationship to aesthetic contemplation, but we should 
complement it with some remarks on the aesthetic appreciation of works as juxtaposed to 
other forms of appreciation. We can appreciate any target of cognition for different reasons 
and in different ways. We can also utilise it for different reasons and in different ways. 
Schopenhauer focuses on the ‘aesthetic’ appreciation of an artwork in juxtaposition to ‘other 
kinds’ of appreciation. Other kinds of appreciation do not require the world-view that 
underpins aesthetic contemplation. They do not perceive the target as the representation of 
‘willing, striving, and so on’. He focuses exclusively on aesthetic appreciation, but he does 
not give us a reason why non-aesthetic appreciations cannot enhance an overall experience 
or enjoyment of the arts. Our overall experience in an art exhibition can have both aesthetic 
and non-aesthetic moments. Aesthetic moments should reflect their distinctness or their 
difference from non-aesthetic moments, in retrospect or reflection at least, but they should 
not distract from the overall experience. For example, there is a difference between having 
a ‘good time’ at an art exhibition and having an aesthetic experience while we are there, but 
the previous should not diminish the overall value of non-aesthetic moments for the whole 
experience. The approach to the arts and their appreciation he advances ignores the fact that 
the aesthetic experience may not be as special or unique as implied by the romantic language 
he uses to describe it. Aesthetic contemplation does not “obliterate”40 or transcend all other 
experiences. We transition from aesthetic to non-aesthetic moments, sometimes effortlessly. 
An aesthetic moment is in the trenches with other moments, however. It can mix with them 
in such a way as to lead us to forget what it is that made it aesthetic, just as we can distinguish 
red from blue, while mixing them gives us purple. If we do not reflect on purple and its 
composition, then we do not notice the mixture of blue and red. In sum, if the aesthetic part 
of our whole experience is its own kind, then it should be distinguishable from another part 
even though the two sometimes mix in the impression we have of a whole experience.  
Schopenhauer distinguishes aesthetic from non-aesthetic experiences by arguing that 
during our aesthetic contemplation we perceive the target as the representation of ‘willing, 
striving and so on’. An overall engagement with artworks can consist of aesthetic and non-
aesthetic moments; it must do so if the artwork is to be preserved, curated and-or traded. 
The previous likewise motivates an artist to evaluate highly her audience’s viewpoint. The 
effort she puts into understanding her audience to incite aesthetic contemplation plays a 
crucial role in the overall value, enjoyment and preservation of artworks. However, we 
should distinguish the willing stance on an artwork that makes it a valuable object, from the 
aesthetic contemplation of it and its equivalent or corresponding value, namely, the aesthetic 
value of an artwork. Schopenhauer did not dwell on this distinction or adequately bring out. 
I will try to flesh it out below by staying as faithful as possible to his conceptual tools.  
 
                                               
40 Soll (1998, 99) wrongly attributes this conception of the aesthetic experience to Schopenhauer. 
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Perceiving the artwork as an object renders us unable to appreciate it aesthetically. 
Even if we know object O has property X and X is ‘aesthetic’, by our perceiving it as an 
object with property X, we are no longer aesthetically contemplating on it. The same is the 
case if we argue that O has ‘aesthetic value’ Z. The concept of something’s ‘aesthetic value 
or property’ misleads us, because to have this concept in the first place, our approach to the 
target of cognition must move from the aesthetic to the conceptual. Aesthetic contemplation 
is incommensurate with ordinary, non-aesthetic reflection or cognition. We are fully under 
the PSR and the objective picture when we treat things as objects or concepts. Accordingly, 
there is a difference between the concept of ‘aesthetic value’ or ‘aesthetic property’ and the 
‘aesthetic value’ or viewpoint on something. Let us flesh this out. 
The confusion between aesthetic appreciation of an artwork and reflection over its 
‘value’ is very common with philosophers who conflate an object’s value as such with its 
‘aesthetic’ value. Philosophers are guilty of reflecting on aesthetics by approaching artworks 
or treating their subject matter as an object of thought, or a concept that requires clarification, 
definition and analysis. This is a mistake Schopenhauer was prone to making following his 
eagerness to show the ‘universality’ and ‘objectivity’ obtained by aesthetic contemplation 
especially as he compares them to that obtained by concepts. In doing so, he forgets the 
central proposition that aesthetic contemplation revises our world-view entirely. In aesthetic 
contemplation, we do not perceive objects with properties, but the representations of willing, 
striving and so on. Approaching the arts through concepts leads us to ‘reflect on’ rather than 
‘contemplate on’ something. It leads us to treating artworks as objects with a set of properties 
and construing their aesthetic value as a property. Reflectiveness is instrumental to aesthetic 
artists, but it does not play the same role in aesthetic contemplation as it does in other forms 
of reflection. Reflectiveness is what makes an artist’s activity ‘artistic’, but not ‘aesthetic’. 
Accordingly, aesthetic value is not something objects possesses among other possessions, 
it represents an entirely different way we approach a target of cognition. 
Construing the artwork as an object with a set of properties means we fail to track 
the difference between having an aesthetic experience and talking about it, or conceptually 
analysing it. Philosophers talk about and analyse their aesthetic experiences, but seemingly 
struggle to demonstrate what is aesthetic about that experience. They place so much weight 
on analysis that they risk losing the target of that analysis. In the case under discussion, we 
lose the target by treating it as an object with a set of properties. We do not recognise that 
the aesthetic experience itself is distinct from its concept. Our reflection over an aesthetic 
experience risks reintroducing the meaningless objective picture Schopenhauer to it. 
Schopenhauer laid the foundations for avoiding the vacuity that gnaws at an analysis 
of aesthetics. He did so by claiming that what makes a world of objects meaningful is the 
will and that willing is different from (purely) perceiving or (purely) conceiving. The 
aesthetic value of the arts is not comprehensible if we approach them through what applies 
to objects and their properties. What makes an inquiry and analysis of aesthetics meaningful, 
for him, is treating its subject matter as the representation of ‘willing, striving and so on’. 
Analysing ‘aesthetic properties’ of something entails construing the target as an object, 
which undermines what is aesthetic about it at its root. We are no longer aesthetically 
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contemplating on it and so we lose its ‘Idea’; this is similar to losing sand through a sieve 
leaving us with useless rocks and pebbles.  
A distinction and corresponding example between a wine maker and trader can prove 
useful to elucidating the insight I am trying to highlight. The maker and trader can be one 
person or they can be a team of people. Let us assume they are one person. The wine maker 
(and trader) labels her wine as having some aesthetic value ‘X’. She argues that she 
determined X by the wine’s ability to incite aesthetic contemplation in other people by 
juxtaposition to other wines. I assume that for multiple wines to have varying values, then 
we are obliged to assume she compares between them in relation to a rule or standard. For 
example, wine W¹ has Y set of properties, while W² either lacks Y or has Y* instead. W¹ 
has aesthetic value X and X is the set of properties Y; X is missing in W² (because, let us 
say, W² has properties Y* = Y + A, or properties Y* = Y – B, which means that W² does 
not meet X). As a trader, she is advised to label and analyse her wines in this way for brevity 
and haste in mobility, i.e., for ‘practical’ purposes pertaining to trade. How can she 
distinguish their value in this way, however? How can she claim that this wine is more apt 
for inciting aesthetic contemplation than that one? What is implied by the ascription of 
‘aesthetic value’ X to W¹, or by arguing W¹ has property X, is either that she has tasted it 
and is using her memory; or she has taken a survey of others’ tastes and she is using the 
survey as her yardstick for her subsequent evaluation and the labelling process. This has led 
her to conclude that W¹ is better for facilitating aesthetic contemplation than W². She has 
compared them and given W¹ a label referring to its aptness for facilitating aesthetic 
contemplation. This labeling process leads to a rank order of wines, each with its own 
properties determined comparatively. Accordingly, the value of each wine is determined in 
relation to their (comparative) aptness for facilitating aesthetic contemplation. Notice, 
however, that she could not possibly ascribe equal value to each wine; surely, not all of them 
are or will be as successful comparatively and certainly not for all people at all times. 
Different people will taste and evaluate her work from different perspectives and interests. 
Given that she aims to facilitate aesthetic contemplation for others, she is impelled to put 
aside her own evaluation and place emphasis on her audiences’ evaluations.  
The above unwittingly introduces her audiences’ individualities and with it their self-
interest. Her method wrongly assumes that audiences are inherently ‘disinterested’ in their 
evaluations and feedback. Even if each wine has succeeded in bringing about the aesthetic 
experience in her or her audience at one point as represented by the survey (which, we also 
assume was rightly conducted and its conclusions rest on adequate premises), she differs 
from her audience and they differ from each other. Another audience may evaluate her wine 
in a ‘general’ rather than ‘aesthetic’ manner and so undermine the aim to facilitate aesthetic 
contemplation. In short, the aesthetic experience is fragile. 
The emphasis on her audience’s feedback over the success or failure of the aesthetic 
experience permits an evaluation premised on personal or impersonal interest, rather than 
disinterestedness. The previous, in turn, permits the entry of something corrosive to the crux 
of the aesthetic experience: cognition of an Idea. The point of aesthetics is to suspend the 
willing stance. Consequently, there is an antinomy between the aesthetic and the purposive 
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activities of artists, i.e., between the aesthetic artist’s aim to incite aesthetic contemplation 
and the willful activity (reflectiveness and imagination) she has to engage in to realise her 
aim. The two confront one another at the intersection between artistic inspiration, artistic 
creativity and what we can call ‘the market of the arts’, for brevity. An artist finds herself 
within the social sphere when she enters the market of the arts. She shares her works with 
others and risks their aesthetic integrity.  
In trading an artwork our wine maker is not approaching it nor appreciating it 
aesthetically. She is selling a valuable object to someone interested in purchasing ‘valuable 
objects’. We see ‘aesthetic’ value as the token of its general value when we trade it. We 
construe it as an object and its value as one of its properties. We confuse the ‘general’ value 
for the ‘aesthetic’ value of something and thus fail to track the difference between a general 
and an aesthetic evaluation of something. We can call the ‘general value (or evaluation)’ of 
something its monetary value (or evaluation) for clarity, brevity and to reflect the market of 
the arts.  
In other words, aesthetic contemplation has its own kind of value and method of 
evaluation, which treats targets of cognition as Ideas. Whereas, monetary value treats targets 
as objects. If we allow ‘aesthetic value’ to be subsumed under a ‘general value’, which 
requires comparing things and seeing something as an object, then we stray from aesthetic 
contemplation and therefrom the aesthetic experience. We treat ‘aesthetic value’ hitherto as 
a token of the ‘general value’ of something. The proposition that aesthetic value has 
something in common with or can be subsumed under ‘general value’ is not wrong or false. 
My aim is not to debunk the monetary value of artworks, or show that it is impossible to 
analyse aesthetic value in monetary terms. Rather, I aim to show that there is an antinomy 
between two methods of evaluating something, which stems from the aesthetic artists aim 
to incite aesthetic contemplation in others and what she actually does to realise that aim. If 
we champion a general evaluation of artworks, then we fail to track what is specific about 
aesthetics and its own method of evaluating things; we fail to notice that generalisations of 
this nature corrode aesthetics and aesthetic value. 
In sum, the aesthetic artist is constrained by her aim to facilitate cognition of the 
Ideas for others through her artwork and the actions this aim sanctions. In treating artworks 
as a commodity, as she must in order to achieve her aim of communicating her Idea to others, 
she risks others construing it as an object, which aptly demonstrates this antimony. There is 
an unyielding difficulty in demonstrating this insight, but I will try to summarise it as best I 
can through the following propositions: 
1. The target of aesthetic contemplation is an Idea, not an object (or motive etc.).  
2. Ideas are (ideal) representations of willing, striving etc., not objects or concepts. 
3. An aesthetic artist aims to show her audience the target’s Idea using her artistic 
medium.  
4. The aesthetic value of something is not determined comparatively because we can 
only compare what we perceive through the PSR (i.e., what is an object in the fullest 
sense, including motives).  
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5. It is misleading to say that something has more aesthetic value than something else. 
Schopenhauer is non-committal over the comparative ‘artistic’ value of something, 
but has to argue there is no such thing as the comparative ‘aesthetic’ value of 
something.  
6. Everything has aesthetic value because everything is willing, striving and so on. In 
other words, everything we can aesthetically contemplate on is an Idea.  
7. Only aesthetically contemplating on something reveals its aesthetic value, or tracks 
what is aesthetic about our evaluation. 
It is important to note that artworks are what artists and-or their audiences will it to be when 
they engage with it, which is not and certainly need not be ‘aesthetic’ at all times. Let me 
try to elaborate before we move on.  
There is an antinomy between aesthetic and practical value, for Schopenhauer, which 
can have ruinous consequences for aesthetic contemplation and aesthetic appreciation. The 
melancholy tone of his expression when he offers implicit examples of this antinomy is not 
accidental, but goes to the core of his aesthetics. The fragility of the cognition underpinning 
aesthetic contemplation when juxtaposed to other kinds of cognition is a central feature of 
his aesthetics: 
“To be useless and unprofitable is one of the characteristics of the works of genius; it 
is their patent of nobility. All other human works exist only for the maintenance or 
relief of our existence; only those here discussed do not; they alone exist for their own 
sake, and are to be regarded in this sense as the flower or the net profit of existence. 
Our heart is therefore gladdened at the enjoyment of them, for we rise out of the heavy 
earthly atmosphere of need and want. Moreover, analogous to this, we rarely see the 
beautiful united with the useful. Tall and fine trees bear no fruit; fruit trees are small, 
ugly, and stunted. The double garden rose is not fruitful, but the small, wild, almost 
scentless rose is. The most beautiful buildings are not the useful ones; a temple is not 
a dwelling-house. A person of high, rare mental gifts, compelled to attend to a merely 
useful piece of business for which the most ordinary person would be fitted, is like a 
valuable vase decorated with the most beautiful painting, which is used as a kitchen-
pot; and to compare useful men with men of genius is like comparing bricks with 
diamonds.” (WRII, 388; my emphasis) 
As we will notice in our subsequent analysis of Schopenhauer’s account of beauty and the 
sublime, his psychological observations of our participation in aesthetics are likewise full of 
insight. The purposive stance with respect to an artwork changes our appreciation of it. 
Someone who by a stroke of bad luck is bound to only have an aesthetic world-view, which 
is incommensurate with common and social experience, would ask the wine trader, “did you 
ask this wine if it wanted to be sold?” When we approach something aesthetically we do so 
as if it wills in its own right; it has an independent value and purpose. In aesthetically 
contemplating on it, we perceive and enable its will, but if we are bound to only approaching 
the world in this way, then we veer towards insanity or poor psychological health, which 
Schopenhauer was aware of and demonstrated in his discussion of genius:  
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“Finally, they are inclined to monologues and in general can exhibit many weaknesses 
that actually verge on madness. It has been frequently noted that genius and madness 
are two sides of the same coin and blend into each other, and poetic enthusiasm has 
even been called a type of madness: Horace calls it ‘amiable madness’ (Odes, III, 4), 
and Wieland ‘sweet madness’ at the beginning of Oberon. Even Aristotle, according 
to a passage in Seneca (On Tranquility of the Mind, 15, 16) said: ‘There is no great 
genius without an admixture of madness.’ … Indeed, I do not want to fail to mention 
that I have known people of decisive although certainly not outstanding intellectual 
superiority who at the same time betrayed a faint tinge of insanity.” (WR, 213-214) 
A genius perceives as willing what we ordinarily perceive as an object fit for some purpose 
or as having a function. They perceive a beautiful flower dancing in the wind where we see 
something we can pull from the ground to give to our beloved to compensate for having 
forgotten her birthday.  
I hope the above assessment has been useful to demonstrate a key difference between 
aesthetic evaluation and a general evaluation; also, how easy it is to confound the two given 
our best intentions to the contrary. I argued the aesthetic artist aims to facilitate aesthetic 
contemplation using her artwork. She aims to show us that what we ordinarily perceive as 
an object fit for purpose we can likewise see as the representation of a willing, striving and 
so on. Ultimately, she aims to show the target’s individual purpose, which is not to serve or 
be subordinate to our purpose or someone else’s. In this view, an artwork is not just an object 
that serves the purpose of facilitating aesthetic contemplation, but, should also be treated as 
a window into an Idea, which, for Schopenhauer, is akin to a, 
“…living and developing organism endowed with generative powers, an organism 
that can produce things that were not already packaged up inside it” (WR, 261) 
Treating an artwork as an object whose purpose is to facilitate aesthetic contemplation for 
others is a temptation that can be corrosive to aesthetic contemplation. Next, I will assess 
his views on beauty, the sublime and the so-called felt consciousness.  
1.7 The Beautiful, the Sublime and the ‘Felt 
Consciousness’ 
We can approach Schopenhauer’s propositions on the role that beauty and the sublime play 
in aesthetics using the following questions: which objects of our cognition are such that they 
incite us to project willing on them? Why do some objects stand out differently than others? 
Furthermore, why do they seem more apt than others for cognition of an Idea? Why do they 
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more readily facilitate or compel41 aesthetic contemplation? I am to demonstrate the basis 
on which some targets of cognition seduce or entice us, while others tear or overwhelm us to 
give up our willing stance and take a disinterested stance on them.  
Beauty and the sublime (or sublimity) are properties of objects compelling aesthetic 
contemplation. According to Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition, these 
properties would amount to nothing without the subjective change in us that brings them to 
the foreground of our cognition. Without this change, the particular object would fail to 
incite aesthetic contemplation and so it would not appear as beautiful or sublime. In this 
chapter, I will focus on assessing two conflicting propositions inherent to Schopenhauer 
views on beauty and sublimity. The propositions I have in mind are the following:  
A) Aesthetic contemplation is our devoting our focus entirely to the target of cognition 
and “in such moments our needs are as alien to us as they are to the objects” (WR, 
223). 
B) Aesthetic contemplation is “highly gratifying [erfreulich]” (WR, 224) and produces 
an aesthetic pleasure, which he also describes as ‘delight’ [Freude], ‘enjoyment’ 
[Ergötzen] or ‘pleasure’ [Wohlgefalle]. 
The above reveals a conceptual knot, which we can summarise via the following question: 
how can something bearing no identifiable relationship to our needs (or aims) please us 
(delight us etc.)? Aesthetic pleasure is a bodily sensation, but, recall, that the body is the 
identical object of the will. If something pleases us (or delights us etc.), and pleasure is a 
bodily phenomenon, then the will somehow relates to ‘aesthetic’ pleasure (or delight). If the 
will relates to aesthetic pleasure, however, then so do our needs. If our needs relate to 
aesthetic pleasure, then, we have reintroduced the willing or purposive stance and thus lost 
the disinterestedness of aesthetic contemplation. There is a conceptual knot in his account 
of aesthetic pleasure, which risks undermining his account of aesthetic contemplation.  
My focus here will be on the psychological coherence of Schopenhauer’s views on 
aesthetic pleasure. I will assess this coherence within the limits of his correlation theory of 
cognition. I will argue that what explains our aesthetic pleasure is not disinterestedness or 
the Ideas, but something else. My reason is that both presuppose absence of self-
consciousness. Without self-consciousness, we cannot be conscious of our feelings and thus, 
in aesthetic contemplation, our focus is completely on the target. Our focus is entirely on 
something seen as outside of us with which we identify and so perceive as a representation 
of willing, striving and so on. We attribute the feelings we experience during our aesthetic 
contemplation to the target of cognition, rather than to ourselves. A psychologically tenable 
explanation of aesthetic pleasure that works within the limits of his philosophy should begin 
with this inherent juxtaposition between the willing stance and the disinterestedness that 
 
                                               
41 I struggled to find an appropriate word to use for how the beautiful object affects us. I settled for words that 
Schopenhauer himself used in describing the effect of a beautiful object: “But one thing is more beautiful than 
another when it facilitates that purely objective contemplation, meeting it halfway and indeed compelling it to take 
place, in which case we call the thing very beautiful.” (WR, 235; my emphasis).  
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characterises aesthetic contemplation. This is because pleasure in something requires our 
assuming the willing stance, i.e., our having an aim or goal aside from identifying with the 
target of our cognition by projecting willing on it (more on this below). Therefore, ‘pleasure’ 
relates the target to our will. The same is true for ‘aesthetic’ pleasure.  
I will argue that aesthetic pleasure represents the movement from the willing stance 
into the disinterestedness of aesthetic contemplation; it represents what happens as we make 
ourselves disinterested. This movement explains the unusual feeling he calls ‘aesthetic 
pleasure’. Aesthetic contemplation pleases us by virtue of its contrast to or against the 
backdrop of the willing (or purposive) stance. The pleasure felt upon our entry into aesthetic 
contemplation is easier to notice retrospectively or in reflection than it is during aesthetic 
contemplation itself. Aesthetic contemplation leads us to focus wholly on the target, which 
happens at the expense of the self-consciousness we require to recognise its relationship to 
our will and, in turn, our experience of pleasure and pain. We notice aesthetic pleasure when 
we reflect on our aesthetic contemplation of something more readily than we do while we 
are aesthetically contemplating. However, we should not confuse our reflecting on aesthetic 
contemplation with our aesthetically contemplating on something. Reflection can mislead 
us as to what exactly pleases us about entering into aesthetic contemplation since it permits 
confounding the purposive stance with disinterestedness. There is reflection (or reason) in 
aesthetic contemplation, but what drives it is different from what often and ordinarily drives 
our reflection, i.e., the willing stance. We may recognise pleasure more easily in retrospect 
or in reflection, because the willing stance we assume in reflection is what characterises 
self-consciousness, which relates the target of cognition to our will and makes possible our 
feelings of pleasure and pain. Moreover, what explains aesthetic pleasure is not synonymous 
with what incites it (more on this below). 
We can begin to make sense of aesthetic pleasure by distinguishing what facilitates 
our aesthetic contemplation from aesthetic contemplation itself. The beautiful, the sublime 
and the aesthetic pleasure that follow their recognition precede aesthetic contemplation 
itself, which is not apparent when we reflect on aesthetic contemplation. When we reflect on 
aesthetic contemplation of something, we perceive no difference between our cognition of 
an Idea and its target causing pleasure. When reflecting over our experiences, we can miss 
the subtle change in the subjective correlate of that reflection, which comes hand-in-glove 
with it, because we treat the whole experience as an object and so adopt the willing stance 
in relation to it. In the current instance, we treat our ‘aesthetic contemplation’ as the object 
that caused our pleasure, which is wrong. The difference between reflecting on aesthetic 
contemplation and aesthetically contemplating on something is fundamental. In aesthetic 
contemplation, we have suspended the relationship to our will or have projected willing onto 
the target, so we cannot experience pleasure during it because we are not self-conscious. 
What, then, pleases us about aesthetic contemplation and the aesthetic experience? How can 
focusing entirely on something be pleasing without, minimally, a) our being self-conscious 
and b) its relating to our needs? This is the impasse that requires explanation. 
We can summarise the above impasse using the following questions: how can we 
experience ‘pleasure’ after we suspend self-consciousness, i.e., when we do not identify 
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with our urges and needs, which is a precondition of feelings of pleasure and pain. How and 
why does focusing wholly on the target of cognition—which we perceive as distinct from 
us and outside of us—please us? 
To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that the impasse undermines the proposition 
that ‘aesthetic contemplation pleases us’, but that we need to explain how and why it should 
do so. I will argue that aesthetic contemplation itself is not (and cannot possibly be) pleasing 
of its own accord. The question is, why and how it can be pleasing given that we do not focus 
on or identify with ourselves, but suspend the precondition for this focus and the pleasure it 
makes possible, i.e., the willing stance. I will defend the proposition that we find aesthetic 
contemplation pleasing against the backdrop or by virtue of its contrast to the willing stance. 
To show this, I will juxtapose ordinary pleasure to its beautiful and sublime counterparts. 
Accordingly, I hope to remain consistent with Schopenhauer’s claim that “opposites shed 
light on each other” (WR, 232), in this case, opposite forms of pleasure will hopefully shed 
light on each other.   
Something about some objects of cognition compel us to perceive them differently 
in a fundamental sense, i.e., not as objects. Schopenhauer comprehends cognition of an 
object as arising from our approaching something as “suitable for the service of the will, as 
well as for science” (WR, 219), which is what I called the willing or purposive stance. This 
‘something’ that compels us to aesthetic contemplation leads us to dub objects as beautiful 
or sublime, which, thus, implies that beauty and sublimity are, in fact, properties of objects. 
I will aim to convince the reader that what explains pleasure in aesthetic contemplation is 
not aesthetic contemplation itself, but its relationship to the purposive or willing stance. This 
proposition is contentious, but I believe we have to ascribe to it to render aesthetic pleasure 
intelligible and coherent with the rest of his philosophy. I will begin with a consideration 
into pleasure in the beautiful, before moving on to the sublime.  
Some targets of cognition are fitter for aesthetic contemplation than others and we 
dub them beautiful or sublime to the degree that they accord with this fitness in their distinct 
ways; or, as Schopenhauer claims, they meet us “halfway” (WR, 225) to it. The beautiful and 
sublime, then, are cognitions of something that incite us to forgo the willing (or purposive) 
stance in their distinct ways. There is, however, a further strain in our ability to distinguish 
beauty from sublimity because of his seeing only a distinction in degree between them, as 
Vandenabeele aptly recognises: 
“How can Schopenhauer distinguish qualitatively between the beautiful and the 
sublime? This question has become more urgent due to the just signalled [sic] 
problems concerning the freedom of the intellect and the aesthetic self.” 
(Vandenabeele 2003, 93) 
I will contribute to the above consideration by suggesting that we should start by clarifying 
and making coherent his views on ‘aesthetic pleasure’. I will begin by scrutinising the object 
we see as beautiful and its subjective correlate in juxtaposition to that we see as desirable. I 
distinguish the ‘desirable’ from the ‘beautiful’ in Schopenhauer’s sense whilst aiming to 
show why the beautiful object is not the same as its Idea. I will argue that we find and call 
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beautiful that which leads us to cognise its Idea, not the Idea itself.  Cognition of its Idea 
helps us distinguish beauty from desirability and their corresponding pleasures.  
Cognition of the beautiful, as any cognition of something given Schopenhauer’s 
theory, has both a subjective and an objective correlate as implied by the following passage: 
“By virtue of the demonstrated intellectual nature of perception, the sight of beautiful 
objects, a beautiful view for example, is also a phenomenon of the brain. Therefore its 
purity and perfection depend not merely on the object, but also on the quality and 
constitution of the brain, that is on its form and sise, the fineness of its texture, and 
the stimulation of its activity through the energy of the pulse of the brain-arteries.” 
(WRII, 24) 
Let us begin with the objective correlate before proceeding to the subjective correlate of the 
beautiful. Schopenhauer characterises the objective correlate of beauty as those objects that, 
“…turn readily into representatives of their Ideas by virtue of their intricate and at the 
same time clear and determinate form, which constitutes beauty in the objective 
sense.” (WR, 225) 
There are two conflicting claims about beauty, however. Firstly, the objective correlate of 
beauty is the object that by virtue of its properties42 is more apt for facilitating cognition of 
its Idea than other objects.43 The ‘beautiful’ object is more effective (than its counterparts) 
at inciting aesthetic contemplation as opposed to stimulating our desire. Secondly, beauty 
itself is the cognition of something’s Idea, therefore, every thing on which we aesthetically 
contemplate is beautiful:  
“Since on the one hand, every existing thing can be considered purely objectively and 
apart from all relation, and since on the other hand, the will appears in every thing on 
some level of its objecthood, making the thing an expression of an Idea; so it follows 
that everything is beautiful.” (WR, 234) 
Notice the two mutually exclusive propositions about the objective and subjective correlates 
of beauty, or the relation between aesthetic contemplation and the perception of something 
beautiful: 
 
1.  Everything is beautiful because what we find beautiful is the target of our 
aesthetic contemplation, i.e., the target’s Idea. 
2. Some things are more beautiful than others because they adhere to the so-called 
objective ‘properties’ of beauty.  
 
                                               
42 Schopenhauer contentiously lists these properties as, “the very clear, pure and determinate relation between its 
parts (a relation that is saturated with significance); it reveals its Idea perfectly because it completely unites all the 
possible expressions of its species” (WR, 235). 
43 I call it an object because we are discussing the limits of ordinary cognition before we enter into aesthetic 
contemplation of something wherein the object becomes an Idea. 
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The above claims may not be false even if they seem incoherent when presented in this way. 
Nevertheless, we require considerable effort to understand how every object can be beautiful, 
while at the same time we find some objects are more beautiful than others.  
We can make the above propositions intelligible and coherent using his theory of the 
individual differences in willing. For Schopenhauer, some of us are more apt at using our 
reason and imagination towards perceiving an Idea, or are more prone to disinterestedness 
than others. Some enter into aesthetic contemplation more easily than others, who will likely 
require the object to facilitate and promote it, as Schopenhauer suggests in the following 
passage: 
“An artist’s inner mental strength can achieve this much entirely on its own: but the 
purely objective frame of mind can be facilitated and promoted from the outside by 
the right sort of objects, by the richness of beautiful nature that invites intuition of 
them, and indeed does so insistently.” (WR, 221) 
I will focus on something more pressing in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics than these concerns, 
but I refer to them here only to point to the considerable room for debate that is available to 
us on the topic of aesthetic properties of objects. I construe ‘aesthetic pleasure’ as a more 
pressing issue for his philosophy, however. This is because it complicates his conception of 
the will and has further implications for his ethical views.  
We remember that cognising the Idea is possible if we perceive the target as willing, 
striving etc. By extension, a beautiful object, whether it is natural or an artwork, and because 
it is more apt to bring about aesthetic contemplation is closer to what it strives or wills to be 
than other objects of its species or kind.44 This exhausts the objective correlate of beauty. 
The subjective correlate, however, is more difficult to elucidate and it is where we find the 
impasse.  
The subjective correlate of beauty is our finding it hard to will something in the object 
or through it (as required for motivation) or we find it hard to perceive it as an object in the 
first place (as required for scientific inquiry). Cognition of something beautiful correlates to 
a readiness or aptness to forgo the willing and purposive stance on it. Schopenhauer argues 
that the previous is a capacity we all share:  
“Yet this capacity must reside in all people to a different and lesser degree; otherwise, 
they would be no more able to enjoy works of art than to produce them, and would 
be absolutely insensitive to beauty and sublimity – in fact these words would be 
meaningless for them. We must therefore assume that this faculty is present in 
everyone (unless perhaps there are some who are entirely incapable of aesthetic 
 
                                               
44 When we speak of the artwork then it is its subject matter (what the artwork is about or refers to) that is closer 
to what it strives to be in and of itself.  
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pleasure), and that everyone can have cognition of the Ideas of things in the particular 
things and in so doing momentarily put aside their own personality.” (WR, 218) 
This capacity makes possible our ‘aesthetic pleasure’. The beautiful thing takes our attention 
away from our own purpose but, according to Schopenhauer, it also takes it away from the 
purposive stance that makes targets of cognition appear as an object ‘fit to be utilised’ by an 
independent, external interest in the first place. It can start with taking away our own interest 
before it takes away the willing stance itself, but we cannot will something without assuming 
the willing stance that makes the target of cognition appear as an object fit to be utilised in 
the first place. Aesthetic contemplation of something forgoes the willing stance and renders 
our cognition ‘pure’, i.e., without any interest in the target as from another perspective than 
its own. Schopenhauer puts it in the following way: 
“…the purely objective frame of mind can be facilitated and promoted from the 
outside by the right sort of objects, by the richness of beautiful nature that invites 
intuition of them, and indeed does so insistently. Whenever nature suddenly rises to 
meet our gaze, it almost always succeeds, if only for a few moments, in snatching us 
away from subjectivity, from our slavery to the will, and transporting us into the state 
of pure cognition.” (WR, 221; my emphasis) 
I emphasise ‘purely’ objective, because aesthetic contemplation, in Schopenhauer’s sense, 
forgoes the mode of cognition underpinning motivation and scientific inquiry; it forgoes, 
“…the mode of cognition bound up with the principle of sufficient reason, which is 
the only mode suitable for the service of the will, as well as for science.” (WR, 219; 
my emphasis)  
Beauty brings about a kind of pleasure in us we can call ‘aesthetic pleasure’ by ‘snatching 
us away from’ the purposive stance (not just our own self). What we find beautiful is the 
object’s aptness for ‘snatching us away from’ the purposive stance.  
Nevertheless, ‘snatching us away’ can be misleading when we try to make sense of 
the “obliging character [dieses Entgegenkommen]” (WR, 225) of beauty and Schopenhauer’s 
keen psychological observations on it. It would be clearer if we described the phenomenon 
as ‘seducing’45 or as ‘enticing’ us away, which complements what he construed as the “act 
of self-deception” (WR, 222) that is inherent to aesthetic contemplation incited by beauty:  
“Finally, it is also the blessing of a will-less intuition that, through an act of self-
deception, it casts such a wonderful spell over things in the past or far away, 
presenting them to us in a so much rosier light.” (WR, 222) 
This self-deception is distinct from the “figments of the imagination” whose subjective 
correlate is the “day-dreamer” (WR, 210). Daydreams are not products of aesthetic 
 
                                               
45 Here we should not read seduction in the sexual sense, but in the broader sense of inviting us away from our 
own interests and concerns into some other interest or concern. 
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contemplation, since they stem from the purposive stance. Equally, the pleasure we get from 
daydreams is distinct from the pleasure in beauty, though both require imagination and even 
a degree of self-deception, albeit based on differing subjective correlates.  
The pleasures of a daydream result from the imagined object’s relation to some 
independent purpose or interest, usually our personal interest. While daydreaming, we 
imagine only what accords with an interest independent from that of the object of cognition. 
We focus on some of its features or properties, ignoring others that could give us an entirely 
different perception of it. Our perceiving and conceiving it as an object with properties is 
representative of the use that we make of our imagination and reflection in daydreams. We 
usually shed light on features that please us (or those features relating to our will) while 
ignoring those that displease us (or those that do not relate to our will); we focus on those 
features that are useful to us or someone else over those that are not. The pleasure in beauty 
does not discriminate in the same way, i.e., by highlighting features relevant to us at the 
expense of other features that are not. The beautiful object pleases us independently from 
our effort to make it pleasing. We savor it whole without addition or subtraction, so to speak. 
Its radiance and presence overwhelms us without stimulating us. We do not feel the urge to 
change it to make it bearable or useful to us. A figment of imagination does not seduce or 
entice us into cognition of an Idea, nor does it lead us to savor the target of cognition wholly. 
Daydreaming urges us to shape and make it fit into something stimulating or even pleasing 
to us.46  
The feeling we experience in the presence of something beautiful is as of something 
obliging to us independent from our effort to render it so. Aesthetic pleasure in beauty is 
inherently receptive, according to Schopenhauer, even if, as we will see, it is inseparable 
from a frustrated or thwarted personal effort. The personal effort is unrelated to the aesthetic 
experience itself in terms of its content, however, and it can be of any kind or extent and 
have anything whatsoever as its object or motive. This peculiar link to our thwarted effort 
explains why beauty is pleasing to us. Let me elaborate. 
Before moving on, I will distinguish the self-deception of aesthetic contemplation 
from the self-deception of a figment of imagination. The latter is driven by our personal 
needs. The former work against the backdrop of our needs, specifically the thwarting of our 
will. This is, I think, the best way to construe Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic pleasure 
in relation to his philosophy of the will.  
 
                                               
46 We should note that if we strove to cognise the target’s Idea for bringing about pleasure in beauty; or if we 
purposefully strove to make it beautiful such that we can bring enjoy the unique pleasure in beauty, then we would 
grasp only a figment of our imagination. What drives us here is the desire for pleasure through the target, not the 
urge to perceive its perfection, which is what makes something show its beauty to us and therefrom incite aesthetic 
pleasure as we contemplate it aesthetically. We do not make something beautiful, for Schopenhauer. We bring out 
its beauty by contemplating on it. An aesthetic artist can only recreate this beauty by first taking into account the 
need for her audience to aesthetically contemplate on it, i.e., to have the same urge to perceive its perfection as the 
artist does. Beauty invites us into cognition of an object’s perfection.  
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The figments of imagination distort the target to reflect our personal interest in it. For 
example, the sexually interested person will sexualise the object by focusing on and being 
activated or stimulated by the particular features he finds sexually appealing (or the features 
suggestive of enabling sexual behaviour) at the expense of other features. This is likewise 
true of those driven by other interests and agendas, e.g., a political agenda will lead someone 
to politicise the object. The distortion of objects that please us because they fit with what we 
seek or need have our personal interest or an interest independent from the target’s as their 
subjective correlate. Whereas aesthetic contemplation incited by beauty is by comparison 
receptive, effortless or passive in respect to the target as it is without addition or subtraction; 
in the absence of any effort on our part to render it ‘something’ or to render it ‘beautiful’—
which for Schopenhauer is a contradiction in terms. The Idea reflects the target itself (or this 
is what motivates aesthetic contemplation on something), it does not reflect our (or someone 
else’s) needs. In aesthetic contemplation, we identify with the target instead of striving to 
find something in it that accords with some interest independent from it, even if our interest 
was so-called ‘aesthetic’. A beautiful object makes this identification easier by appearing 
both obliging and useless.  
Our personal needs do not drive aesthetic contemplation, but rather contrast it. Both 
aesthetic contemplation and daydreaming provide an escape from the inherent frustrations 
with our personal needs and purpose in different ways. The self-deception of daydreaming 
distorts a target of cognition for our sake, thus giving us an outlet for our frustrations that 
accord with our needs. This is a kind of escape from reality driven by a personal need which 
is then reflected in what we imagine; in this case, we do not escape the pressure exerted by 
our needs, but use our imagination to change the state of affairs in the world that do not fit 
with those needs. We exchange the target of our needs from something real, which requires 
effort to obtain, with something imagined that requires comparatively less effort, but that is 
also less effective in fulfilling those needs. Accordingly, the self-deception of daydreaming 
consists of our escaping from our current state of affairs for the sake of a more pleasant and 
satisfying views on things, which accord with our needs. In this instance, ‘what we will’ 
drives our imagination, which is not what happens in aesthetic contemplation.  
The self-deception of aesthetic contemplation is not an escape from our state of 
affairs. It is a break with our narrow view of things underpinned by our needs, which are 
limited to objectifying a target into something permitting use for our needs, and which gives 
us one version or perspective on that state of affairs. Both achieve the same result of 
distracting us amid our frustrations, but their means of doing so differ. Equally, both produce 
pleasure amid our frustrations, but their means of doing so differ. In daydreaming, we use 
imagination towards satisfaction for a specific need. In aesthetic contemplation, on the other 
hand, we use imagination towards a different end than satisfaction of a need. Nevertheless, 
aesthetic contemplation offers the same result, i.e., pleasure amid our frustrations. Can the 
‘distraction’ from our frustrations explain how beauty can be pleasing to us? Schopenhauer’s 
negative conception of pleasure accords with this explanation, but let us further elaborate 
on the differences between these two distractions before moving on. I will call one of these 
the ‘ordinary’ pleasure in something and the other ‘aesthetic’ pleasure. 
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Ordinary pleasure for Schopenhauer presupposes (or is preceded by) a lack, i.e., 
suffering (more on this below). The basis of this pleasure is the promise that acting in one 
way or another will remove a suffering, which drives us to pursue a target of will (or perceive 
a motive for action): 
“All willing springs from need, and thus from lack, and thus from suffering. 
Fulfillment brings this to an end; but for every wish that is fulfilled, at least ten are 
left denied: moreover, desire [Begehren] lasts a long time and demands go on forever; 
fulfillment is brief and sparsely meted out.” (WR, 219) 
In ordinary pleasure, a pleasurable sensation arises from willful action following perception 
of a motive; the latter, we recall, is the more affective counterpart of an object. Aesthetic 
contemplation, however, starts when we suspend the purposive stance that makes possible 
willful action. The pleasure we feel in aesthetic contemplation is not explicable by effort of 
this sort. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer’s account of pleasure does not permit us to experience 
(or at least demonstrate how we can have) pleasure if we do not will something. We cannot 
feel pleasure if this ‘lack’, which is a condition of pleasure, is not ‘a lack of something’. It 
cannot possibly be a lack of something, because we do not will anything in the target during 
aesthetic contemplation, however. How, then, can we feel pleasure without the inclination 
or movement of our will in relation to the target? Even if we grant that something beautiful 
brings about a kind of pleasure as a fact that requires explanation, this pleasure must bear 
some relation to our will (i.e., relate to something lacking).  
It is true, at least in relation to his claims, that aesthetic pleasure in beauty cannot 
arise from our having attained what we will, because the purposive stance is suspended the 
moment the beautiful thing has succeeded in seducing or enticing us. Something about its 
‘enticing’ us away from our purpose is pleasurable to us, however. This pleasure is different 
from other pleasures and the best we can make of this difference is that we feel it at the 
absence of attaining what we will or being conscious of it. In other words, our not making it 
pleasing to us is what pleases us. If all pleasure relates to a lack, then aesthetic pleasure also 
relates to a lack. Its relation to a lack, however, must be different from one that yields the 
kind of pleasure following cognition of an object or following the pursuit of a motive. Our 
lack and the suffering that underpins it presupposes willing and thus, by extension, aesthetic 
pleasure must likewise relate to the will and suffering in some way. The suffering he forbids 
for aesthetic pleasure is that which leads us to overcome it by attaining what we will. We 
can overcome our suffering in different ways, however. We can overcome it by devoting 
our attention and thus focusing entirely on the target of our cognition and by fulfilling some 
motive or by attaining the object of a need. We can overcome it by a kind of self-deception 
and so by ‘ignoring’ or ‘forgetting’ ourselves and our needs.  
Aesthetic pleasure arises from a change of focus from what we will to something 
else. Removal of the object of our will from our attention explains aesthetic pleasure. This 
is not the same as the enjoyment of an imagined attainment of the object of our will as with 
daydreaming. Daydreaming is pleasing to us by our attaining what we want, in imagination; 
whereas the pleasure of beauty that drives us into aesthetic contemplation comes from our 
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not having to attain it. We experience aesthetic pleasure via a psychological denial of sorts. 
We shift our focus from the suffering inherent to a purposive attitude on something and this 
pleases us by its contrast to the purposive stance underpinning our suffering or frustration. 
It is a momentary denial based on our conscious attention and its redirection. In other words, 
we feel pleasure resulting from our not focusing on suffering; i.e., it is akin to a narcotic. It 
is pleasing through relief. This preoccupation with something other than our needs alleviates 
us through a shift of focus from our suffering to something unrelated to it. By entering into 
aesthetic contemplation, we do not deal with the cause of our suffering. We take our focus 
away from the medium through which the cause operates, i.e., the willing stance. Put another 
way, the absence of self-consciousness that characterises aesthetic contemplation alleviates 
us by a shift of attention. Therefore, aesthetic pleasure is explicable as against the backdrop 
of suffering by offering us the kind of solution to it that suspends it from focus or redirects 
our attention to other things.47 Aesthetic pleasure bears a relation to the will, but an indirect 
relation, i.e., not the kind of relation that yields objects and motives. Accordingly, for beauty 
to please us aesthetically, we require a thwarted or a frustrated will, but not to willfully 
overcome this thwarting and frustration. 
In entering aesthetic contemplation, we shift our focus from the suffering inherent to 
our taking a purposive stance on something and devote our attention wholly to something 
else, i.e., something with which we now identify after we have projected willing on it. It is 
a shift of focus due to the object which incites it that pleases us, not aesthetic contemplation 
itself. We do not recognise anything happening in our body as we aesthetically contemplate 
on something because we temporarily suspend self-consciousness and focus wholly on the 
target of cognition. Consequently, it is misleading to claim that aesthetic contemplation itself 
is what pleases us. The entry into aesthetic contemplation pleases us, because we move 
away from the subjective correlate underpinning suffering and willing. In sum, we should 
distinguish what we feel when we aesthetically contemplate on something from how it feels 
when some object seduces, entices, forces or overwhelmes us into aesthetic contemplation. 
The pleasure dissipates quickly after entry into aesthetic contemplation because the 
latter presupposes suspension of the willing stance. The ‘things’ that please us and incite 
aesthetic contemplation we deem beautiful, but they are pleasing because they relieve us, 
not because we aesthetically contemplate them. The pleasure is like relief from a burden. 
There is no pleasure in aesthetic contemplation itself, because we are not willing anything 
related to our needs, nor do we take the purposive stance required for the recognition of 
something that promises pleasure. Yet, entry into aesthetic contemplation (or the subsequent 
reflection over it) can be pleasing, but it is so against the backdrop of our willing or because 
 
                                               
47 There are reasons to reject my reading here on the grounds of textual evidence. Schopenhauer seems to conceive 
of the happiness that we experience freed from the will, and if we are to construe happiness as a kind of pleasure, 
then I am not permitted to hold that aesthetic pleasure works against the backdrop of suffering. This is because, he 
contends in a later passage: “… pure cognition free from the will, which is in point of fact the only real happiness 
that is not preceded by suffering or need or necessarily followed by remorse, suffering, emptiness or weariness: 
but this happiness can fill only isolated moments, not the whole of life.” (WR, 347; my emphasis). I suppose this 
claim permits considerable debate, but I leave it to the side for now. 
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it indirectly relates to our will.  The escape or diversion aesthetic contemplation provides (or 
provided) from our frustrations or suffering is why it pleases us. We no longer worry. In the 
presence of beauty, albeit for a moment, we forget about the ‘due diligence’ we are obligated 
to do for the potential merger which can reshape the economic fabric of a whole nation. We 
are nervous as we think about the possible outcome of our efforts, but, as we turn our 
attention to van Gogh’s ‘The Starry Night’, it is as if the outcome sinks away from our 
awareness and the perfect depiction of the evening’s mood through a master’s use of color 
and brush strokes fills our attention. This change in attention pleases against the backdrop 
of (or by contrast to) our nervousness over something else that is unrelated; this pleasure is 
aesthetic because what causes it is obliging to us without effort on our part. It is aesthetic 
because it happens by virtue of suspending our effort. We forget our needs for a moment, 
we redirect our attention away from ourselves onto the target of cognition and this pleases 
us.  
My contribution to the philosophical commentary and debate48 on Schopenhauer’s 
account of ‘aesthetic pleasure’ is to make his claims consistent with his philosophy of the 
will, albeit at the expense of taking away a romantic element of aesthetic pleasure, i.e., as 
offering us some real salvation from our ordinary, willful lives. Likewise, I strove to make 
his account psychologically tenable. Beauty offers us an alternative source of pleasure 
premised on the momentary break from our focusing on our aims or what interests us about 
the target, which presupposes our assuming the purposive stance on it.  
Schopenhauer’s own psychological observations support my suggestion. Notice, for 
example, how he describes the purely objective state of mind and its usefulness to his life: 
“Every state or condition, every person, every scene of life, needs to be apprehended 
only purely objectively, and made the object of a description or sketch, whether with 
brush or with words, in order to appear interesting, delightful, and enviable. However, 
if one is in it, if one is oneself it, then (as is often said) may the devil endure it … 
There was a period in the years of my youth when I was constantly at pains to see 
myself and my actions from outside, and to picture them to myself; probably in order 
to make them enjoyable to me.” (WRII, 372; my emphasis) 
Compare the above with the following about how this state of mind is pleasing to us, but 
now he construes the pleasure as not concerning us: 
“Everything is beautiful only so long as it does not concern us. (Here it is not a case 
of the passion of love, but of aesthetic enjoyment.) Life is never beautiful, but only 
the pictures of it, namely in the transfiguring mirror of art or of poetry, particularly in 
youth, when we do not yet know it.” (WRII, 374; some emphasis is mine) 
Our personal suffering underpins the pleasure we feel when we perceive beauty. Aesthetic 
contemplation distracts us from our suffering and this distraction pleases us. The suffering 
 
                                               
48 For more on this debate see Denham (2014). 
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can be indirectly related to our will through some ‘default’ aim or purpose, e.g., the lot of 
‘humanity’ or ‘life itself’, which our lot and our life logically relate to. In sum, what explains 
ordinary pleasure is overcoming suffering by willful action; whereas aesthetic pleasure is 
our overcoming suffering indirectly. Aesthetic pleasure operates against the backdrop of our 
suffering by suspending or by distracting us from our urge to act and the attention to our 
suffering that corresponds to this urge.   
A benefit of this conception of aesthetic pleasure is that the frustration we are 
distracted from can be of any kind and extent. Schopenhauer is not as optimistic about 
aesthetic pleasure as I suggest, however, because he contends that we need more than just 
frustration to rise above our personal urges to contemplate the perfection of something else:  
“Therefore everyone who reads the poem or contemplates the work of art must of 
course contribute from his own resources towards bringing that wisdom to light. 
Consequently, he grasps only so much of the work as his capacity and culture allow, 
just as every sailor in a deep sea lets down the sounding-lead as far as the length of 
its line will reach.” (WRII, 407) 
Even so, we can refine his claim by distinguishing what pleases us about aesthetic 
contemplation from what is required for aesthetic contemplation. Aesthetic pleasure is still 
an embodied phenomenon, and due to the will-body identity, is determined by our willing 
or proceeds from some bodily change and thus a relation to the will. I argued that aesthetic 
pleasure arises in response to (or in contrast to or against the backdrop of) our own will. It 
responds differently do the lack that underpins our suffering than a response that yields 
objects or motives. We are aesthetically pleased because the shift of focus from our will 
onto another’s willing, striving etc. and its perfection. I should add that we do not perceive 
the target’s particular desire or striving at any given moment, but we perceive what it strives 
to be or become, i.e., its ideal.49 We acquire an image of its perfection, which Schopenhauer 
obscurely associates with peering into its ‘essence’. Peering into its essence pleases us 
because it distracts us from something unrelated to its essence. The suffering it distracts us 
from can be anything whatsoever; it can be as broad as the urge to act itself. Given that it is 
this broad and open, we find it difficult to notice the source of its pleasure; it seems as if our 
peering into the target’s essence (or our seeing its perfection) is what pleases us independent 
from all other considerations. This is misleading and does not explain aesthetic pleasure, 
however.  
Further observations that Schopenhauer makes about aesthetic contemplation are 
supportive of the above conception of aesthetic pleasure as inherently related to distraction 
from a personal urge or aim driven by our frustrations in relation to them. The momentary 
shift of focus from the object of an aim is akin to a pleasurable denial or self-deception, but 
it can only be pleasurable if, to some extent, we are suffering. Schopenhauer’s psychological 
 
                                               
49 I am thankful to Bart Vandenabeele for pressing me to clarify this claim. 
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observations champion aesthetic pleasure as a kind of therapy for the suffering we feel from 
our urges and aims50,   
“We can avoid all the suffering that comes from objects in the present just as well as 
we can avoid it from those that are remote as soon as we raise ourselves to viewing 
them in a purely objective way, thus creating the illusion that these objects alone are 
present and we are not: then, as pure subject of cognition, we are rid of our suffering 
selves and fully one with the objects, and in such moments our needs are as alien to 
us as they are to the objects.” (WR, 223; my emphasis) 
The above alienation from our needs, arising from an “illusion” (ibid.) or an “act of self-
deception” (WR, 222), brings about a pleasure based on (and thus presupposing) suffering. 
In the supplementary essays, he makes a similar observation about the therapeutic value of 
aesthetic contemplation: 
“There was a period in the years of my youth when I was constantly at pains to see 
myself and my actions from outside, and to picture them to myself; probably in order 
to make them enjoyable to me.” (WRII, 372; my emphasis) 
Notice that his being ‘at pains’ to see them from the outside to make them ‘enjoyable’ 
implies he was motivated by the suffering associated with seeing ‘himself’ (from within). 
Consider also his observations on the ‘essence’ of song as constituting a tension between 
the extreme or ‘stressful’ willing and the serene or ‘peaceful’ will-less cognition, the latter 
which is presumably pleasing. He describes the effects of aesthetic contemplation in the 
following way. We should especially notice his claim about their constituting a ‘contrast’, 
which I argue is the basis of aesthetic pleasure or it is what explains this pleasure:  
“It is the subject of the will, i.e. one’s own willing, that fills the consciousness of the 
singer, often as a liberated, satisfied willing (joy), but even more often as a frustrated 
willing (sorrow), always as affect, passion, as an excited state of mind. Besides this 
however and together with it, the sight of nature around him makes the singer aware 
of himself as the subject of pure, will-less cognition, whose imperturbable, blissful 
peace now forms a contrast with the pressure of ever-restricted, always needy willing: 
the sensation of this contrast, of this back-and-forth, is what the song as a whole really 
expresses and what in general constitutes the lyrical state. In this state, pure cognition 
draw towards us, as it were, to deliver us from willing and the stress of willing: we 
follow, but only for a moment: we are always torn back again from peaceful 
contemplation by willing, by the memory of our personal aims.” (WR, 276-7; my 
emphasis) 
The “sensation of this contrast” (ibid.), I believe, characterises the aesthetic pleasure we 
experience in beauty. Aesthetic pleasure presupposes suffering and by extension relates to 
 
                                               
50 Soll is right to read Schopenhauer’s views on aesthetic pleasure as a kind of “palliative” (cf. Soll 1998: 83). 
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our will in a manner that we often overlook. Nevertheless, how aesthetic pleasure reates to 
willing is not ordinary. It is the pleasure—or more correctly, the relief—that comes with 
psychological denial, or with our shifting our focus or conscious attention away from the 
root of our suffering and our devoting it to something else, in this case, the target of our 
cognition. What explains the pleasurable sensation is that looking away from our suffering 
distracts us from its effect on us.  
Following the above maneuvers and observations about aesthetic pleasure and its 
relation to ordinary life, he construes the effects of the beautiful and its correlate pleasure 
as,  
“…the liberation of cognition from service to the will, forgetting oneself as an 
individual, and the elevation of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject 
of cognition, independent of all relations.” (WR, 223) 
For Schopenhauer, we must suffer from ourselves, from our life and our projects, or from 
the urge for a project, or to think of the world as being the instrument of some project, before 
we can feel pleasure of the aesthetic variety. The beautiful object is like a Siren who gently, 
seductively, sweetly and enticingly calls us to abandon our efforts for a brief moment and 
so that we can glimpse into (her) perfection. This perfection is not that corresponding to our 
own effort, but the effort as it appears (in its perfection) through another, that is, through her. 
To our surprise, we realise that she—the Siren that is the object seen in its beauty—motions 
to us that the target of our cognition is perfect as it is—perfect precisely without our effort. 
We recognise that what made it imperfect in the first place is our intervention into its efforts 
for our own purpose or interest. We are pleased to see that it is perfect independent from our 
effort to render it so. Our effortlessness is pleasing in its own right and of its own accord. 
Aesthetic pleasure comes from the realisation that we need not exert any effort at all. Yet, 
the pleasure is nothing without our bodily demands, pressures and urges. Beauty incites a 
pleasurable feeling that follows the redirection of our focus away from the urge to exert an 
effort on something. Thus, pace Soll, aesthetic pleasure is best associated with a kind of 
relief or palliative.  
Let us now consider the sublime starting first with illustrating the difference between 
‘pleasure in beauty’ and ‘pleasure in sublimity’. The beautiful and sublime in Schopenhauer 
have the same effect on us by inciting aesthetic contemplation, which he describes in the 
following terms:  
“…the feeling of the sublime is the same as the feeling of the beautiful in its most 
important respect, namely pure cognition free from the will and the cognition that 
necessarily appears along with this, of the Ideas that stand outside of all relations 
determined by the principle of sufficient reason.” (WR, 226-7) 
Unfortunately, he does not dwell enough on the difference between pleasure in beauty and 
that in sublimity to flesh out their difference in feeling. The difference he refers to, however, 
is how the sublime object appears to us: 
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“The feeling of the sublime is distinct from the feeling of the beautiful only by virtue 
of an additional element, namely an elevation above the relationship – recognised as 
hostile – between the object contemplated and the will in general.” (WR, 227; my 
emphasis) 
I focus on the phrase ‘recognised as hostile’, which is his attempt to characterise the hostility 
of sublime objects in juxtaposition to the obligingness of beauty. According to this passage, 
the sublime differs by virtue of its elevating us into aesthetic contemplation by the target’s 
hostility or grandeur in relation to human willing. I will further assess what he means by the 
hostility of the sublime object to better illustrate the difference between the beautiful and the 
sublime. This, I believe, will offer us an insight into their differences in feeling and their 
corresponding aesthetic pleasure.  
We can clarify Schopenhauer’s views on sublimity by juxtaposing ‘sublime’ 
hostility to ‘ordinary’ hostility. The following quote helps us lay out this juxtaposition and 
his conception of it: 
“As soon as any relation between even that purely intuitive object and our own will, 
our own person, re-enters our consciousness, the magic is over: we fall back into 
cognition governed by the principle of sufficient reason, we no longer recognise the 
Idea but only the particular thing, the link in a chain to which we too belong, and we 
are once again given over to all our misery.” (WR, 222) 
We notice in the above quote a tension between self-consciousness and cognition of other 
things, i.e., something deemed as external and distinct from us. Cognition of other things 
characterises objectivity and yields the objective picture we referred to previously. This 
cognition leads to aesthetic contemplation if we project willing on the target of cognition, 
which allows us to perceive it as a willing thing or an ‘Idea’ in Schopenhauer’s sense. We 
can call the latter its aesthetic objectivity.51 Self-consciousness, however, moves in another 
direction. In becoming self-conscious, we no longer focus solely on the target of cognition, 
but rather distort it to fit an aim or purpose distinct or independent from it. This shift of 
focus from an external target to ourselves occurs as we take a purposive stance on the target 
and perceive it as (at least) an object. We subordinate the object to our will, our frustrations, 
desires and hopes, but not necessarily so, since we can subordinate it to another will and so 
vicariously enjoy egoism. Ordinary hostility commits us to cognising it as threatening to us, 
directly or indirectly (or vicariously).  
Sublime hostility is different. It begins with our assuming the purposive stance and 
so something we are logically included in, but is broader than we are or broader than our 
individuality. It begins with humanity as represented in the limitations of our body. The 
 
                                               
51 Schopenhauer has not clearly worked out the distinction between aesthetic and ordinary objectivity, just as I 
have not been able to work it out fully on his terms. I will put this forward as a matter for debate. In any case, I 
will argue that he praises aesthetic objectivity for being complete and permits us to make sense of his ethics and 
ascetic resignation.  
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sublime object is threatening to any human being or humanity itself, and only threatening 
to us by logical extension. For the sublime tension to start, then, we require a perspective 
on things that is broader than our individuality, which we can construe as objective in the 
limited sense. It is the kind of objectivity scientists have when they begin their study and 
investigation into a human body from this body X (or some group of bodies Y) and X’s (or 
Y’s) limitations. It begins with, for example, perception of a human being’s body and its 
operations as opposed to George’s body. In short, scientists often construe George’s body 
(or a collection of individual bodies) as representative of a ‘human body’. However, they 
have to acknowledge the limitations of their viewpoint, i.e., that George’s body is logically 
included in the concept of a human body as a token of its type, not as representing the type. 
Consequently, and according to Schopenhauer’s view, the sublime can only begin if we 
construe our limitations as exemplified in our body and its efforts not as our own, but as the 
same as those of any other human being. Alternatively, we at least conceive it as partially 
representing the limitations of any ‘human being or body’. The sublime begins with self-
conscious recognition of the limitations of a human body and thus human willing; only by 
logical extension does this include our individual limitations.  
For us to begin experiencing the sublime tension, according to Schopenhauer, we 
must cognise the target in light of human nature, human interests and-or humanity as this is 
represented in the limitations of our body and efforts. The major premise is that when we 
are self-conscious we redirect our focus away from the object back to our individual will or 
body. Such self-conscious moments—especially when the target appears hostile—often lead 
to personal anxiety. There are instances, however, where we become self-conscious after an 
encounter with a hostile target of cognition, which does not lead to us personal anxiety (cf. 
WR, 226), but to the sublime tension. Some objects can bring us anxiety whereas others bring 
about the sublime tension. How does Schopenhauer distinguish them? Their difference, he 
claims, lies in the perspective from which we approach a hostile target. We perceive it either 
in light of our individual interest whereby we deem it dangerous to us, or in light of human 
interests as reflected in our body and its limitations. The latter makes possible the sublime 
tension. Thus, the sublime tension begins by our assuming the perspective of humanity or a 
‘human being’, which is the subjective correlate of the sublime experience. The objective 
correlate of the sublime is an object perceived as more hostile than human beings are capable 
of overcoming or larger than human beings can utilise or conceptualise.  
As with beauty, some objects are fitter than others to incite the sublime tension in us, 
but the tension itself is based as much on the stance we take in relation it as on its effect on 
us. Schopenhauer breaks with beauty in his discussion of the sublime, however, because we 
require more to experience the sublime tension than for beauty. Beauty does not require us 
to perceive the target as from the perspective of humanity. Similarly, the beautiful object 
permits self-deception, whereas the sublime object is preceded by “perceiving and 
acknowledging” (WR, 225) the target’s hostile relation to human willing. Our limitations do 
not deceive us when we experience the sublime. He puts it in the following terms:  
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“This elevation must not only be achieved consciously, it must also be sustained and 
is therefore accompanied by a constant recollection of the will, although not of a 
particular, individual willing, such as fear or desire, but rather of human willing in 
general, to the extent that it is universally expressed through its objecthood, the human 
body. If a real, particular act of will were to enter consciousness through some actual 
personal distress or danger from the object, then the individual will that was actually 
moved in this way would quickly gain the upper hand, the tranquility of 
contemplation would be rendered impossible, and the impression of the sublime 
would be lost, since it would give way to anxiety, in which the individual’s attempts 
to save himself would supersede any other thought.” (WR, 226; my emphasis) 
The subjective correlate to the sublime is humanity and not our individual will. Cancer can 
be an example of something hostile to humanity by showing the limitations of our immune 
system. It can cause anxiety in us. We can worry about its growth within us. It can also lead 
us to the sublime tension and incite aesthetic contemplation following the sublime tension 
as opposed to anxiety. It can make us anxious because we (or someone close to us) may 
contract it. It incites the sublime tension in us only after we recognise our collective efforts 
have hitherto been unable to prevent its power over human beings. What is sublime about 
cancer is that it is threatening to us and we recognise our collective limitations in relation to 
it. Accordingly, there are two ways we can resign to the possibility of cancer, and each one, 
according to Schopenhauer, suggests a different feeling and corresponding use of reflection 
and imagination. Firstly, we can resign to the possibility of its growing within us and get on 
with our day by shifting our attention to aiming to secure our children’s future, rather than 
worry about what might happen to us. Secondly, we can resign—or “surrender” (WR: 226), 
as he puts it—to its possibility in another way, i.e., by aesthetic contemplation and the felt 
consciousness it is premised on.  
In sum, assuming the perspective of humanity on the target of our cognition is a 
precondition of the sublime tension. The presence of something threatening to our body, 
which we conceive as representing the limitations of all human bodies, not exclusively our 
individual limitations, prompts the sublime tension. Therefore, the ‘sublime tension’ differs 
from ‘anxiety’ by the stance we take on the target of our cognition. Something that renders 
us anxious can also incite the sublime tension provided we shift our perspective on it, which 
is what his so-called sublime character is so apt at doing.52 
Schopenhauer construes the difference between the beautiful and the sublime objects 
that incite aesthetic contemplation in the following way:  
 
                                               
52 The passage I have in mind is one describing the sublime character’s transformation of ordinary experiences of 
hostility and enmity. Schopenhauer argues: “Consequently, such a character will regard human beings purely 
objectively, and not in terms of whatever relations they might have to his will: for instance, he will observe their 
failings, even their hatred and injustice towards him, but without being himself moved to hatred; he will look upon 
their happiness without feeling envy; he will recognise their good qualities without wanting to be more closely 
associated with them; he will perceive the beauty of women without desiring them. His personal happiness and 
unhappiness will not affect him strongly, rather he will be such as Hamlet described Horatio” (WR, 231).  
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“Whether the state of pure, will-less cognition that is presupposed and required by all 
aesthetic contemplation came about as if on its own and without resistance, invited and 
drawn forward by the object, with the will simply disappearing from consciousness; 
or whether this state was first achieved only through a free and conscious elevation 
above the will – and the contemplated object has an unfavourable and hostile relation 
to this will, which would annul contemplation if we gave ourselves over to it; – this 
is the difference between the beautiful and the sublime.” (WR, 233; my emphasis) 
The sublime object elevates us into aesthetic contemplation following our resistance to the 
tension it incites in us. This resistance does lapse into anxiety, which drives us to eject 
ourselves from the situation (or to change our thoughts over it) by focusing on something, 
i.e., a pressing, unrelated task. Our resistance to it follows a direct confrontation with the 
object, albeit in a different manner. We settle the sublime tension through aesthetic 
contemplation, but an intermediate step is missing here. How do we move from identifying 
with humanity—and so by logical extension identifying with ourselves—in our relation to 
the target of our cognition, to identifying with something other than us? What underpins this 
leap in identification? My contention is that Schopenhauer aims to have his concept of the 
‘felt consciousness’ account for this leap.  
Given the different feeling, object and subjective correlate that precedes the sublime 
tension, it follows that the aesthetic pleasure of the sublime is likewise different. What does 
this difference hinge on? We experience an aesthetic pleasure in the sublime following a 
settling of the sublime tension during aesthetic contemplation. As we saw with beauty, the 
movement into aesthetic contemplation is what we find pleasing to us against the backdrop 
of our suffering and thus thwarted willing. The aesthetic pleasure in beauty is a pleasurable 
relief; it gives us an alternative satisfaction to those efforts through the change of focus from 
ourselves to the target. This resembles that relief we experience when we realise things are 
obliging to us without our effort to make them obliging. There is a similar relief felt when 
we settle the sublime tension by entering into aesthetic contemplation through the ‘felt 
consciousness’, but it is different from the relief we experience in the presence of beauty. I 
will flesh out this difference before I assess how the ‘felt consciousness’ features in our 
identifying with humanity to identifying with the (hostile) target of cognition as required 
for aesthetic contemplation.  
The relief of the sublime tension is not against the backdrop of (or by contrast to) 
our personal concerns. Escaping from personal hostility is not what concerns the sublime 
experience. Furthermore, unlike beauty, the relief does not result from removing what we 
find burdensome, but resembles a feeling that follows after we have escaped from danger 
or threat. The sublime object is more hostile than we can possibly overcome, or grander than 
we can possibly conceptualise (or utilise) following a collective effort. This invokes an 
unsettling feeling in us distinct from that generated by a thwarted individual effort. There is 
a sense of ‘hopelessness’ with respect to our actions in the sublime not captured by the 
feeling associated with beauty, according to Schopenhauer’s view. Although, the fact that 
our individual efforts are logically included in the collective efforts and limitations of 
humanity explains why we feel anything in the first place. What distinguishes anxiety from 
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a sublime tension is not that we feel unsettled tout court, because both are unsettling. Rather, 
it is unsettling because it shows us a limitation, which can lapse into anxiety if it reflects us 
personally.  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition allows us to distinguish pleasure in 
the sublime from that in beauty through not only their respective objects, but also the stance 
we take in correlation to them. He begins by characterising the object prior to aesthetic 
contemplation as either obliging or hostile, enticing or forceful. The sublime aesthetic 
pleasure is a kind of relief on the spectrum of what we feel when we escape a dangerous 
situation53, as Vandenabeele puts it: 
“The sublime delight is negative pleasure, “the sensation which accompanies the 
removal of pain or danger.” It is pleasure, one can say, that is connected with the 
removal of pain or the escape from danger or threat.” (Vandenabeele 2003, 95) 
The difference between escaping a danger through our efforts and feeling aesthetic pleasure 
following a settled sublime tension is that we do not willfully divert a hostile object; instead, 
we rise to aesthetic contemplation and neutralise its effect on us. We do not move out of the 
way of the object, so to speak, but rise up to meet it by our focusing entirely on it and nothing 
else. The sublime incites aesthetic contemplation through its characteristic shift of focus 
from ourselves (as threatened, feeble and limited humans) to aesthetic contemplation of it. 
Put metaphorically, we pull the rug from underneath this tension. We remove its subjective 
correlate, and, in a sense, we welcome death (at least in effigy) armed with the recognition 
that we are more than this body and its limitations. In such moments, we recognise that even 
the hostile object is, as we are, an objectivation of the will, i.e., it too wills something. What 
makes us special is our ability to recognise this whereas the hostile object obviously does 
not and is seemingly unable to withdraw its effort and hostility toward us. Human beings 
alone have the “felt consciousness” (WR, 230) that there is no fundamental difference 
between us and other things in life: we are all the will to life and can identify with all targets 
of our cognition in such way that is not open to other (blindly) willing things.  
In sum, I propose that we can explain what is pleasing about aesthetic contemplation, 
in Schopenhauer’s sense, by analysing what he calls the ‘contrast’ (cf. WR, 221 & 227) 
between the purposive and aesthetic stance on a target of cognition. The pleasures in beauty 
and sublimity do not reside on aesthetic contemplation itself, but on how this contrasts (and 
so relates to) ordinary cognition of an object as from the purposive stance, whether that 
stance is personal or impersonal, individual or human. We recognised this contrast in the 
beautiful through thwarted personal efforts or frustrations, but also in the sublime through 
 
                                               
53 Schopenhauer’s claim can undermine this characterisation of the sublime pleasure as a kind of relief from danger 
in his discussion of tragedy. The pleasure in tragedy, he contends, belongs to “that of the sublime; it is, in fact, the 
highest degree of this feeling” (WRII, 433). He proceeds to propose that this pleasure is, “analogous to that of the 
dynamically sublime, since, like this, it raises us above the will and its interest, and puts us in such a mood that we 
find pleasure in the sight of what directly opposes the will” (ibid.). More on tragedy and the opposition to the will 
in the closing section.  
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the limitations of humanity as reflected in our body. Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic 
pleasure takes the previous contrast as an explanatory feature not of our pleasure in aesthetic 
contemplation itself, but in the objects that ‘entice’ or ‘elevate’ us into it. Schopenhauer’s 
description of the genius’ views on life, happiness and suffering supports my proposition:  
“The pleasure of all beautiful things, the consolation that art affords, the enthusiasm 
that allows the artist to forget the difficulties of life, this one advantage the genius 
possesses over other people and the only thing that compensates him for his suffering 
(which is increased in proportion to his clarity of consciousness) and also for his 
desolate solitude among a race so different from him, – all this is due to the fact that, 
as we will continue to show, the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is a constant 
suffering, partly miserable, partly horrible; on the other hand, the same thing as 
representation alone, purely intuited, or repeated in art, free from pain, affords a 
meaningful spectacle.” (WR, 295; my emphasis) 
Notice the psychological underpinnings and prerequisites of a genius’ view of the world: it 
allows him to ‘forget’ and to be ‘compensated for his suffering’. These descriptions are not 
idiosyncratic, but point to the value for life of aesthetic contemplation, which, I suspect, 
inspired Nietzsche’s propositions and criticisms of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. Yet, we 
should distinguish the value of aesthetic contemplation itself from its value for life or living. 
Aesthetic contemplation, as far as Schopenhauer’s account permits, has its own conception 
of value that breaks with the purposive stance. Furthermore, he was seemingly aware of the 
previous distinction since he later claims that, from this perspective on the world, some of 
us self-consciously affirm and others negate the will to life (more on this below).  
Schopenhauer unhelpfully construes the sublime as “unsettling” (WR, 230) and its 
distinctive pleasure as “settled” (ibid). The movement from an unsettling feeling to feeling 
settled by an entry into aesthetic contemplation is supposed to characterise “aesthetic 
delight” (WR, 224). We can find a useful conception of the previous in Vandenabeele (2003, 
94-95) who suggests that we can construe aesthetic pleasure in the sublime à la Burke, 
namely, as a form of “delight” (Vandenabeele 2003, 95). We should distinguish ‘delight’ 
from ‘aesthetic delight’, however. My reasons are that, whether or not he is wrong for doing 
so, Schopenhauer associates the sublime feeling with what he calls a ‘tragic mood’ (cf. WR, 
228) or with ‘seriousness’, which does not permit strict association with enjoyment. It seems 
psychologically untenable to associate something dangerous or threatening, which elevates 
us into aesthetic contemplation, with a ‘delightful’ feeling implying enjoyment. The 
previous does not mean that aesthetic contemplation is not delightful, but that we need to 
explain in virtue of what we find what is threatening also ‘delightful’. The sublime tension 
itself cannot be delightful. What seems delightful to us is aesthetic contemplation as from 
the purposive stance and thus in reflection. Let me elaborate. 
Recall that the sublime tension incites aesthetic contemplation and so is distinct from 
it. There is a difference between our description of the sublime tension and our description 
of what it incites in us, i.e., aesthetic contemplation. Aesthetic contemplation is delightful 
in reflection, which entails our assuming a different stance and we are now taking about the 
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whole experience rather than its aesthetic features. We treat the whole experience as a thing, 
an object or concept, which we analyse and evaluate. To describe what we feel ‘when we 
reflect on aesthetic contemplation’ as synonymous to what we feel ‘when we are uplifted 
into aesthetic contemplation by something else’ can be misleading. What we feel when we 
‘reflect’ on aesthetic contemplation is distinct from what aesthetic contemplation ‘feels 
like’. Accordingly, aesthetic contemplation, our reflecting on it and the sublime tension that 
incites aesthetic contemplation in us are distinct experiences and feelings. We may find 
aesthetic contemplation delightful when we reflect on it, but we do experience the same 
delight in the midst of it, nor experience delight in the presence of a sublime object and the 
sublime tension. We do not experience delight in the presence of objects inciting aesthetic 
contemplation, but we can find delightful our entry into aesthetic contemplation from the 
effect of a hostile object on us. 
There is a tripartite distinction between the sublime feeling itself, our reflective 
evaluation of it and aesthetic contemplation. First then, there is what it feels like to move 
from feeling unsettled by what seems threatening or hostile to humanity into being settled 
into aesthetic contemplation. We attain this through recognition of an identity between ‘us’ 
and ‘the target’ as willing things, i.e., projection of willing or the felt consciousness. This 
leads us to devote our focus to the target of cognition and so perceive its Idea. Second, there 
is our evaluation of aesthetic contemplation in reflection, which makes the experience 
‘delightful’. It is delightful in virtue of how we evaluate it as from a different perspective, 
however. In reflecting on aesthetic contemplation, we assume an entirely different stance 
on the target. In doing so, we are not concerned with the sublime anymore, but with the 
whole experience and what it signifies for us. The latter feeling does not describe what the 
sublime consists in. Thus, there is a difference between the experience itself (i.e., how to 
characterise it) and what we make of the experience after or before the fact, which is in 
reflection and from a different perspective entirely.54 It is not false to claim that we find the 
whole experience (i.e., our movement from cognition of some hostile object, to experiencing 
the sublime tension, and then enter into aesthetic contemplation) delightful, but I do not think 
we acquire insight into aesthetic pleasure in this way. Our entry into aesthetic contemplation 
is seen best as a relief that accompanies an escape from danger.  
It is likewise misleading, at least for comprehending Schopenhauer’s account of the 
sublime, to associate it too closely with the aesthetic pleasure in beauty. Beauty is 
pleasurable through providing an alternative satisfaction to a thwarted or frustrated personal 
effort. The previous is not what contrasts the sublime, however. We feel the sublime in the 
absence of our personal perspective from the outset. We try to maintain the perspective of 
humanity and its limitations, which is the subjective correlate of the sublime tension and its 
 
                                               
54 This distinction is also, I think rightly, recognised and employed by Denham (2014) who defines it as “it is one 
thing to describe an experience type; it is another to justify its power and significance” (Denham 2014, 176). In 
the same paper, she qualifies the previous as the difference between ‘what an experience consists in’ and ‘our 
evaluation of it’ (cf. Denham 2014, 188).    
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precondition. Schopenhauer was privy to this, but he did not do enough to elucidate it, as is 
noticeable in the following passage:  
“Our dependency, our struggle with hostile nature, our will which is broken in this 
struggle, these now come vividly before our eyes: but as long as our personal troubles 
do not gain the upper hand and we remain in a state of aesthetic contemplation, the 
pure subject of cognition peers through that struggle of nature, through that image of 
the broken will, and calmly, in a manner both unperturbed and unconcerned grasps 
the Ideas in those very objects that are threatening and terrible to the will. The feeling 
of the sublime lies in precisely this contrast.” (WR, 229; my emphasis) 
We struggle to keep our personal satisfaction out of consciousness. We severed our personal 
satisfaction at the outset to experience a ‘sublime tension’ rather than ‘anxiety’ in the 
presence of something hostile or dangerous. Schopenhauer puts it in the following way: 
“This elevation must not only be achieved consciously, it must also be sustained and 
is therefore accompanied by a constant recollection of the will, although not of a 
particular, individual willing, such as fear or desire, but rather of human willing in 
general, to the extent that it is universally expressed through its objecthood, the 
human body. If a real, particular act of will were to enter consciousness through some 
actual personal distress or danger from the object, then the individual will that was 
actually moved in this way would quickly gain the upper hand, the tranquility of 
contemplation would be rendered impossible, and the impression of the sublime 
would be lost, since it would give way to anxiety, in which the individual’s attempts 
to save himself would supersede any other thought.” (WR, 226)  
Unlike beauty, our personal concerns do not contrast the sublime because they would lapse 
us into anxiety and therefore bypass the sublime experience entirely by failing to incite a 
sublime tension. Our anxiety would mean that we assumed the purposive stance towards the 
hostile target and would resolve it differently than by entry into aesthetic contemplation. 
For example, we can resolve to avoid cancer by adopting a healthier lifestyle, or we can 
resolve to focus on something that we believe is more pressing in this moment than the 
possibility of cancer at another moment. The difference between anxiety and the sublime 
tension permits him to argue that the sublime is not therapeutic. Furthermore, it does not 
rest on an “act of self-deception” (WR, 222), which we saw with beauty. There is no self-
deception in cognising something more powerful than humanity (which the limitations of 
our body reflects) that ‘threatens’ or is ‘hostile to’ its existence. The pleasure of beauty is 
distinct from the sublime in the previous sense, but both are a kind of relief and diversion. 
Beauty pleases us by diverting us from frustration. The sublime pleases us by diverting us 
from the painful recognition of our ‘human’ limitations. 
The sublime tension can at any moment lapse into anxiety and lose the sublime 
impression without entering into aesthetic contemplation, but aesthetic contemplation arises 
from this tension like the first shoot from a seed. It does so after we identify with something 
larger than humanity and larger than the object that threatens our human existence, i.e., the 
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will to life. I think the previous captures what Schopenhauer means by the felt consciousness. 
The sublime tension represents what it feels like to overcome our human limitations by 
redirecting our focus from ourselves to the target of our cognition. The sublime tension rises 
to the point where we dissociate from humanity entirely and assume a new subjective 
correlate, i.e., disinterestedness. We now identify with the target of our cognition, which 
changes the relation we had to the object underpinning its appearance as hostile. We move 
from ‘object’ to ‘Idea’ through the ‘felt consciousness’, namely, via a subjective change in 
us. The previous change pleases us.  
The aesthetic contemplation caused by the sublime experience presupposes a 
different act of identification and thus a different kind of self-consciousness, i.e., we identify 
with something other than our body and ourselves. This forces us to abandon purposive 
cognition for aesthetic contemplation. The sublime tension, then, requires effort to identify 
with humanity and thus perceive an object in lieu of humanity’s concerns, interests and 
limitations.55 We hold onto this identification with humanity, which spawns the sublime 
tension that settles by our entry into aesthetic contemplation. The subjective correlate to the 
sublime tension is not disinterestedness, but humanity as represented by our body and its 
limitations. Likewise, the objective correlate of the sublime is not an Idea, but an object we 
deem threatening or disproportionately larger than humanity. Consequently, the Ideas are 
not the objective correlates of beauty and sublimity; they are objects that are closer to 
representing their Ideas and so meet us halfway to aesthetic contemplation, whose objective 
correlate alone is the Idea.   
There is an obscure and problematic claim in Schopenhauer’s account of the sublime, 
which I will assess before moving on, namely, that the, 
  “…state of pure cognition is gained only by means of a conscious and violent tearing 
free from relationships between the same object and the will…” (WR, 226; my 
emphasis) 
We can recognise this obscurity when we compare the beautiful and the sublime means of 
entering into aesthetic contemplation. The beautiful renders us receptive and represents an 
effortless and passive transition from purposive cognition to aesthetic contemplation. The 
sublime is an active and violent transition implying effort, however. Guyer (1996, 114-7) 
and Vandenabeele (2003, 91-3) point out that this implies a different, more intellectual 
conception of effort56 in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will, which suggests a different 
 
                                               
55 Though Schopenhauer seems to favor a discussion of the human embodied existence as opposed to any other in 
his explanation, it seems plausible and unproblematic to extend it further. The embodied existence in relation to 
which an object or circumstance is deemed to be threatening can represent any embodied existence, whether it is 
human or phytoplankton. The sublime can be the Idea of an object threatening to all willing. Schopenhauer seems 
to prefer identifying the will that is threatened with human willing as opposed to all willing, presumably, because 
he aims to associate it with the genre of ‘tragedy’. It is still peculiar that he focused on human willing, but I suppose 
it is easier for us (i.e. his readers) to consider things from the perspective of our species and its interests than from 
the perspective of another species. 
56 In the following chapters, I will call this a mainspring of action: a willing like any other generating specific 
bodily vicissitudes and actions. Finally, it can even represent a character, i.e. the ascetic character.  
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conception of willing. I will assess what this kind of effort might be when I discuss ascetic 
resignation, but some preliminary remarks merit their place here to demonstrate the link 
between his aesthetics and ethics. 
The effort Schopenhauer speaks of must be embodied and, thus, given the will-body 
identity it must also be a kind of willing. Our urges and needs announce themselves 
immediately (cf. WR, 134) or have the “right of prior occupancy” (OBM, 204). The sublime 
tension, however, presupposes that we assume the perspective of humanity, first. Some 
degree of effort is required to overcome or to suppress our initial urges and needs to perceive 
things as from the perspective of humanity. Furthermore, we can perceive things from some 
perspective other than our own, which suggests a partial overcoming of personal concerns, 
urges and needs. The perspective on things Schopenhauer has in mind is ‘objective’, i.e., 
the scientific or philosophical viewpoint on something; this perspective seemingly enables 
the sublime tension.57 The effort he refers to is a struggle against our personal needs. Thus, 
the effort to maintain an impersonal perspective on the hostile target is required to avoid our 
lapsing into anxiety. We experience the sublime following a conscious effort to sustain the 
perspective of humanity. Yet, aesthetic contemplation itself is effortless. The metaphor that 
suggests itself is a wave that rises to its peak and falls back into the calm, tranquil ocean. In 
experiencing the sublime tension, we are like the wave that rises as high as possible before 
then falling into the tranquil, endless ocean of aesthetic contemplation. We ameliorate the 
sublime tension through the felt consciousness that throws us into aesthetic contemplation. 
We notice the significance of the sublime experience to his ethics emerging from the 
previous assessment. This conscious effort against our needs and urges leads us to identify 
with something other than ourselves. 
The above is a willful effort in the fullest sense, however, as Neill rightly points out: 
“… the subject must deliberately – by an act of will – in some sense disregard the 
perceived (if only as potential) threat. To describe this in terms of the subject’s 
“forcibly tear[ing] himself from his will,” as Schopenhauer does at one point, is 
misleading, for disregarding the threatening aspect of the object cannot in itself 
produce will - lessness.” (Neill 2012, 209)  
The effort appears cognitive, but it is also embodied. First, it is an effort to suspend action 
or having to take action on something, but this does not mean that we suspend the willing 
stance. We struggle with our personal needs, which colour the object. Second, this effort is 
cognitive in the sense that we do not only suspend personal action. We adopt the perspective 
of humanity, which gives a different, more impersonal relationship to the object. We 
conceive of ourselves as representing humanity and perceive the object therefrom. Thus, the 
effort to focus on and relate to something as from the perspective of humanity is an embodied 
effort that suppresses or suspends our individual urges and needs. Presumably, we cannot 
 
                                               
57 However, we should add a caveat that such a perspective can arise from ascetic practices premised on religious 
precepts as well as scientific and philosophical precepts.  
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do the previous deliberately to experience the sublime tension, but we cannot experience the 
sublime tension without this effort.  
Neill is also right to construe the above phase in the sublime tension as a “condition 
of (its) possibility” (Neill 2009, 208). The phase he describes is the sublime experience, 
however, not aesthetic contemplation. We should distinguish the sublime tension from that 
which it settles into, i.e., aesthetic contemplation. Perceiving something as sublime, that is, 
as having a hostile relationship to human willing incites aesthetic contemplation, whose 
subjective correlate is disinterestedness as opposed to human interests. The perspective of 
humanity underpins a sublime tension and its resolution through the felt consciousness, 
which reflects a new identification and thus a subjective change in us. It forces us to abandon 
all ‘willful’ cognition by projecting willing onto the target. I have tried to clarify this new 
identification with the target as our projecting willing onto it, which permits us to see it as 
willing, striving etc. (e.g., cognition of an Idea). For Schopenhauer, we project willing on 
the world so that we can construe it as permeated by willing, striving and so on. Remarkably, 
his claim is that the world itself is ‘willing’.58  
If we struggle and succeed in maintaining the cognition of the threatening or 
disproportionately large object as from the perspective of humanity, then we will feel a 
‘sublime tension’ rise up from the recognition of humanity’s relative insignificance, which 
we resolve through a new self-consciousness that surpasses both our individual perspective 
and that of humanity. Schopenhauer describes this new kind of self-consciousness in the 
following manner: 
“…rising up against such a spectre of our own nothingness, against such a slanderous 
impossibility, is our immediate consciousness that all these worlds really exist only 
in our representation, only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure cognition, 
which is what we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget our individuality, and 
which is the necessary, the conditioning bearer and support of all worlds and all 
times.” (WR, 230) 
It is in the sense of ‘larger than humanity’ that we should comprehend this immediate 
consciousness, which rises up against ‘our own nothingness’. The ‘our’ denotes the human. 
We ‘forget our individuality’ as a precondition to the sublime experience. Anxiety drives us 
 
                                               
58 Schopenhauer’s metaphysics sounds similar to Spinoza’s pantheism. He refers to Spinoza explicitly when he 
argues for projecting the will on objects to make the changes and-or movements we cognise in them meaningful: 
“Spinoza says (Letter 62) that if a stone thrown flying through the air were conscious it would think it was flying 
of its own will. I only add that the stone would be right. Projectile thrust plays the same role for it that motive does 
for me; and what in the case of the stone appears as cohesion, gravity, persistence in the assumed state is, in its 
inner essence, just what I recognise in myself as will, and what the stone would also recognise as will if it were to 
attain cognition too. In this passage Spinoza focuses on the necessity with which the stone flies and rightly wants 
to apply it to the necessity in a person’s individual act of will. I, on the other hand, think that the inner essence 
presupposed by all real necessity (i.e. effects of causes) is what gives necessity its meaning and validity in the first 
place. It is called character in the case of people and quality in the case of stones, but it is the same in both. Where 
it is known immediately it is called will; it has its weakest degree of manifestation, of objecthood, in stones, and 
its strongest in humans.” (WR, 151; my emphasis). 
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to avoid the sublime and therefore nip in the bud the ‘felt consciousness’ that can stem from 
it and lead us to aesthetic contemplation. With anxiety, we shift our focus toward our 
personal needs.  
The felt consciousness that precedes our rising up to aesthetic contemplation via the 
sublime tension refers to a new kind of self-consciousness, wherein we find, I believe, the 
bridge to his views on ethics and ascetic resignation. Self-cognition of the will, ethics and 
asceticism follow from aesthetic contemplation. The felt consciousness allows us to identify 
with more than our individual self or with a ‘self’ seen as distinct and separate from a target 
of cognition. We identify with life itself or the will to life, as Schopenhauer calls it. The felt 
consciousness, for him, is a kind of unio mystica with willing itself, which, in turn, opens 
the door to aesthetic contemplation and cognition of an Idea. The response to the tension 
between a human being and some hostile (or immense) object or circumstance that threatens 
all human beings (which has the status of a ‘motive’), provided we do not lapse into anxiety, 
finds its pinnacle in, 
“…the felt consciousness that we are, in some sense (that only philosophy makes 
clear), one with the world, and thus not brought down, but rather elevated, by its 
immensity.” (WR, 230) 
The sublime facilitates a different and new act of identification not limited to our 
individuality, nor to an extended conception of that individuality, i.e., humanity. We find 
ourselves no longer preoccupied with, nor limited to, the preservation and enhancement of 
our body and-or species. We identify with living itself or the will to life, and put ourselves 
in a position to respond to something as from this perspective. The sublime tension we feel 
in recognising the insurmountable threats to human existence and the inevitable nothingness 
of this existence motivates us to dissociate from humanity and the willing stance. From this 
identification arises a response Schopenhauer describes as the negation of the will to life, 
but, as we will see below, this identification can also give rise to affirmation of the will to 
life. The previous is where I believe we find the toughest conceptual knot in his philosophy.  
1.8 Motives and ‘Mainsprings’  
“Cognition is the medium of motives, and its influence – not on the will itself, but on 
the emergence of the will into actions” (WR, 323; my emphasis) 
So far, I have argued that Schopenhauer uses his correlation theory of cognition and will-
body identity to underpin his account of the aesthetic experience, which rests on what I have 
called the projection of willing onto the target of our cognition. The projection of willing 
qualitatively changes our perception of the target. It is no longer perceived as an object—
which permits willful action and scientific inquiry—but as the representation of willing, 
 116 
striving etc. in its own right. I argue in the current chapter that there is an implicit distinction 
between the motives and the mainsprings of an action, which, I believe, forms the bedrock 
of his ethics. My aim is to demonstrate how he transitions from his aesthetics to his ethics 
and the role the will-body identity and projection of willing play in this transition. He does 
so, I argue, using a unique and rich account of motivation, which we can elucidate by using 
the correlation theory of cognition, the will-body identity and the projection of willing.  
We saw previously that aesthetic contemplation is a cognition of something not as it 
relates to our will, nor as it relates to some will independent from the target. We do not 
perceive the target as an object among objects, but as an Idea, which I argued is, at least, 
our trying to cognise it as the representation of willing, striving and so on. The change in 
cognition that typifies aesthetic contemplation is, I believe, central to Schopenhauer’s 
ethics, specifically, the moral value he ascribes to compassion and the value of ascetic 
resignation. Recall that the central insight of his account of aesthetic contemplation is the 
disinterestedness of the aesthetic contemplator and the so-called ‘felt-consciousness’. The 
latter, I argued, represents a new kind of self-consciousness and so a new identification. We 
recall that self-consciousness is the same as adopting the willing stance, or, put simply, we 
become self-conscious when ‘we will something’. In aesthetically contemplating on 
something, we recognise that we can and do use cognition to identify with something other 
than ourselves, i.e., our body. To do this, however, we have to first assume the stance of 
‘disinterested’ subjects of cognition, or project willing on the target of cognition. I will argue 
that, for him, we are able to do more than just passively identify with the targets of our 
cognition, but act based on this new identification. We can act for the sake of something 
other than our body and so contrary to our immediate self-interest by assuming the stance 
of disinterested subjects of cognition. This insight is central for a detailed account of his 
views on selflessness (Uneigennützigkeit), compassion (Mitleid) and ascetic resignation. For 
now, I will distinguish between mainsprings and motives and attempt to show what this 
distinction hinges on.  
First, let us assess what Schopenhauer construes as the motive (Motiv) of an action. 
A motive is an intuitive or abstract representation that moves with the will; it is a cognition 
that impels us to (re)act because it fits with our aims or needs. Recall that this requires us to 
take the willing stance, so we, at least, perceive the target of cognition as an object, i.e., as 
the kind of thing that permits action upon it or to use it towards some (independent) end. A 
motive requires us to perceive the world as filled with objects and object-relations, i.e., the 
objective picture. For example, the perception of a cup standing out from the background 
moves me by either making me deliberate over whether I want to make more tea or have 
some water instead. Correspondingly, it can move me immediately to reach for the tea 
following my perception of it. The object becomes a motive the moment we see it as 
something we can possibly act upon; it partakes in our deliberation process or it immediately 
impels us to action without the mediation of reflection and the deliberation process. In both 
cases, the cognition of something moves us and, it is crucial to add that we cannot possibly 
move towards or away from nothing: 
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“Every will is the will to something, it has an object, a goal of its willing…” (WR, 
187) 
 
“If a human being wills, then he wills something: his act of will is in every case 
directed towards an object and can be conceived only in relation to one.” (FW, 40) 
Willing, for human beings, requires the ‘cognition of something’. Actions follow cognition 
of something. The cognition is a motive for action when a target—whether it is abstract or 
intuitive—results in action. A target of cognition becomes a ‘motive’ when we see it as a 
possible avenue for action and when it leads to an action.  
Schopenhauer’s conception of motivation is not limited to motives, however. He 
distinguishes between different kinds of motives by introducing another concept. In the 
Anglophone commentary on his philosophy, we translate this new concept as the ‘incentive’ 
of an action. Schopenhauer often uses the word Triebfeder, but also uses other words to refer 
to it. He uses extensively ‘Triebfeder’ in ‘The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics’ where 
he gives it a substantive status in his action-theory. I will suggest that its popular translation 
as ‘incentive’, as we find in, for example, Cartwright and Erdmann (2010), Janaway (2009) 
and Payne (1995), is misleading, because it overlooks a distinction between cognition and 
the will central to his philosophy. Motives and ‘incentives’ are, for the most part, translated 
and interpreted as synonyms, which has led many to confound two philosophically rich 
concepts that can help unravel crucial insights. We find this confounding in Taylor’s (1999) 
arguments against his reading of Schopenhauer’s views on compassion and in Cartwright’s 
reading of compassion in Schopenhauer (cf. 1984, 93-4; 1988, 561; 1999, 268-270).  
A motive is a cognition and thus it is a product of the intellect, which represents the 
target as a possible avenue for action. We contrast the previous to an ‘object’, which is 
something upon which we can act, but it is not yet a motive. Minimally then, we perceive 
the target as an object among objects and so assume a purposive stance on it before we 
perceive it as a motive for action. The motive is that towards which we aim our actions. The 
same is not the case for Triefeder, which we can likewise translate as the ‘impulse’, ‘driving 
force’, or ‘mainspring’ of an action. We can define this as the ‘ground’ of our actions, which 
explains the object’s effectiveness on us, i.e., what makes it something that motivates. We 
have plural or many mainsprings because the same object X can motivate us in different 
ways. The key claim is that if a cognition is a motive or has what I will call ‘motivational 
efficacy’, then this presupposes we aim for or take an interest in (at least a part of) it. As we 
saw previously, however, we can take various kinds of interests in something.  
A target’s effectiveness is not something it possesses in itself independent from our 
will, because different individuals can be motivated in different ways by different things. 
Equally, different individuals can be motivated in different ways by the same thing, whereas 
the same individual can be motivated differently by the same thing at different times. 
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition upholds the claim that there is a by-fit 
relationship between the will (need, aim etc.) and cognition of something seen as a motive. 
Even if we presuppose that two different agents can possess the same cognition, their 
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responses to it can and often do differ, which means that how it appears to them will likewise 
differ. Their difference cannot possibly reside on the object of cognition (i.e., an apple), but 
on their different wills. The effectiveness of a cognition, which makes it a motive, finds its 
ground in the will or interest, i.e., some need, project or aim. The driving force or mainspring 
of the action is its ground, i.e., what explains the efficacy of the object that moved us. The 
motive is the object upon which we (re)act. The mainspring of our action is the will. Why 
does he introduce Triebfeder when ‘will’ seems to suffice? I will argue that Schopenhauer 
used his correlation theory of cognition to distinguish between different aspects of the will, 
or different kinds of willing. Mainsprings (Triebfedern) serve to highlight this distinction.  
A key feature of the mainsprings of our actions is that although they precede actions 
and thus serve as their ground, they nonetheless become recognisable and open to reflection 
after the action has taken place.59 For example, my motive may be to help George, but what 
drives my action is my care for him, or conversely, that I want to gain his favor and hold 
my action as credit. In both instances we notice that something different represents my 
action; the appropriate concept for this difference is lacking here. We can call it disposition, 
attitude, stance or an evaluation of George, but we are essentially missing something in each 
one. Schopenhauer settles for ‘mainspring’ [Triebfeder]. What we try to capture is that both 
are representative of different general aims, wills or constituents of our character. Notice, 
however, that neither of these ‘aims’ are suggested by the mere cognition of George’s plight, 
which is the motive of my action. They represent different interests I have and thus refer to 
my will, rather than the object deemed as separate or distinct from me and upon which I act. 
Nonetheless, we can self-consciously recognise what we aim for only a posteriori, or using 
an action (or affect) we have undertaken as our reference point. Schopenhauer’s distinction 
between a deed and a wish likewise emphasises the previous: 
“The only matter for self-consciousness is the act of will, together with its absolute 
mastery over members of the body, which is really meant by ‘what I will’. And it is 
only the use of this mastery, i.e. the deed, that first stamps it, even for self-
consciousness, as an act of will. For as long as it is in process of becoming it is called 
a wish, when ready, a decision; but its being this is proven to self-consciousness only 
by the deed: for until that it is alterable… [An agent] can wish opposed things, but 
will only one of them: and even to self-consciousness only the deed first reveals which 
one it is.” (FW, 42) 
Either valuing George as an individual in his own right drives me or I aim to exploit him as 
I would any other object. Only the action demonstrates the more prominent constituent of 
my character or will. Another distinction he draws is between what ‘I’ think I can do and 
what I genuinely will. Only what I do (or have done) represents my will: 
 
                                               
59 He puts it in the following manner: “This specially and individually determined constitution of the will, because 
of which the reaction to the same motives is a different one in each human being, makes up what we call his 
character, and indeed, since it is known not a priori but through experience, his empirical character” (FW, 68). 
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“In each one of us, even the best of human beings, there rise up impure, mean, wicked 
thoughts and wishes either from external occasion, from aroused affect or from 
internal annoyance: but he is not morally responsible for these and should not let them 
weigh on his conscience. For they display merely what the human being in general, 
not what he who is thinking them, would be capable of doing.” (OBM, 168) 
For Schopenhauer then, we are not what we think, but what we do. We recognise who or 
what we are (i.e., gain self-knowledge) by reflecting over what we have done, not by what 
we wished or thought about doing. By reflecting on our actions and their motives and thus 
unifying them through the faculty of reason, we can acquire a picture of the fundamental 
mainsprings of our actions. I can be moved by perception of George as someone who has 
his own will with whom I identify or as someone I can exploit for my (or someone else’s) 
ends. The previous represents different stances on George; they are disinterestedness or the 
purposive stance. Moreover, how George appears is different given the stance we take on 
him: either as ‘willing’ or as an ‘object among objects’, as no different to anything or anyone 
else. 
We find the same distinction between Motiv and Triebfeder also in correlate concepts, 
which Schopenhauer uses such as Instinkt (instinct), Trieb (drive) and Antrieb (impulse). 
Each one refers to the ‘will’ independent from cognition, but they play a substantial role in 
making a cognition motivating or effective. They also play a substantial role in explaining 
the effectiveness of a cognition as conditions for the possibility of this effectiveness. Thus, 
we should not confuse mainsprings for motives, which are the recognisable instantiations 
of the fomer in the objects of our cognition: 
“…the motive also acts only on the assumption of an inner impulse, that is to say, of 
a definite disposition or quality of the will, called its character. The motive in each 
case gives this only a decided direction; individualises it for the concrete case” (WRII, 
342). 
 
“…only on the presupposition that such a will is present and, in the particular case, 
that it is of a certain constitution, do the causes directed towards it, here called 
motives, have an effect” (FW, 68) 
Triebfeder then concerns the will not the cognition that fits with what we will. We can only 
recognise what we will (i.e., make the will a target of our cognition or reflection) using our 
actions and their motives as the basis for this recognition or self-cognition. Self-knowledge 
requires us to ‘make an object’ of ourselves, i.e., to perceive ourselves as something distinct 
and separate from us. To recognise that our action is an instantiation of willing, as opposed 
to a mechanical response to an object, it is, I believe, preferable to translate Triebfeder as a 
‘driving force’, ‘impulse’ or ‘mainspring’60 of an action and not its ‘incentive’.  
 
                                               
60 I will use all three interchangeably to refer to the same thing: the constituent of our character that lends efficacy 
to our cognitions.  
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I will elaborate on the above distinction before I move on. A ‘mainspring’ is distinct 
from a ‘motive’ in that the former is a rational categorisation of the different interests that 
we take in the targets of our cognition; these interests arise in particular cases as (abstract 
or intuitive) motives for action. The logical difference between them is that one is broader 
in scope than the other. Since our motives are instantiations of our mainsprings as reflected 
in the objects of our cognition, the latter are broader in scope.61 The mainspring of our action 
explains why we acted or responded to cognition X and not Y, but likewise why we respond 
in manner Xa and not Xb, where both are equally possible. We can say that a mainspring is 
a condition for the possibility of an action (or an affection) correlative to the cognition of 
something (an object). We can have epistemic access to our mainsprings, i.e., by reflecting 
on our actions and their motives. Our mainsprings are constructs of the faculty of reason 
following the will-body identity and the intellect-will distinction. We do not have immediate 
epistemic access to a mainspring, but we identify with it if and only if we (re)act to something. 
Therefore, it is only possible to acquire self-knowledge and a recognition of our mainsprings 
by assessing what motivated us to act and we use that as a model. We have no cognition of 
our ‘mainsprings’, ‘impulses’ or ‘driving forces’, but only of their expression in an action. 
Using the will-body identity, we can reconstruct a picture of our mainsprings and how they 
hang together, which Schopenhauer calls our ‘empirical character’. We can call this our 
‘self-image’ for brevity. Accordingly, our self-image is a construct based on our actions and 
motives, which we unify using the faculty of reason like pieces of a puzzle or picture.62  
In addition, it is important to bear in mind that motives are objects in the world, e.g. 
an apple or George’s dilemma. The mainspring of an action captures why, if at all, object X 
and not Y motivated us. A mainspring does not relate to an object as a motive does. The 
mainspring is the cognition of the will via its effects on objects, i.e., he also calls this self-
cognition. Mainsprings are how the will expresses itself through its identical object, i.e., the 
body. Unlike a motive, mainsprings are inferences from the cognition of an object (including 
one’s action and motives) to the particular quality of the will underpinning it.  
Determining our mainsprings requires the will-body identity and thus a different 
stance on our (or someone else’s) actions than the willing stance. We act in the first place 
because of a mainspring, but we do not always have self-conscious access to the fact that, 
in this moment, our action expresses mainspring X and not Y. At any moment, we know 
what motives lead us to act, but not the mainsprings of those motives. We encounter motives 
 
                                               
61 There is equally an epistemic difference between the two that I hope will become clearer as we proceed. 
62 The relevant passage for the previous is the following: “I do not have cognition of my will as a whole, in its 
unity, in perfect accordance with its essence; rather I cognise it only in its individual acts” (WR, 126). The passage 
continues by claiming he has, “presented the identity of the will and the body only provisionally; but this identity… 
can only be established by raising immediate consciousness, concrete cognition, to rational knowledge or 
transferring it to abstract cognition. On the other hand, by its nature it can never be demonstrated, i.e. derived as 
mediate cognition from some other immediate source, precisely because it is itself the most immediate cognition 
there is; if we do not grasp it as such and keep hold of it we will wait in vain to get it back again somehow in a 
mediate way, as derived cognition” (WR, 127). 
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prior to or instantaneously with our responses to something. To know the mainsprings of an 
action requires us to contemplate on our or someone else’s actions. It is for this reason that 
we do not have the same epistemic relationship to our mainsprings that we do to motives, 
even though we identify with them upon an (re)action.63 We can reflect on and recognise 
our mainsprings only after the action (or the bodily response) has taken place; prior to that, 
we identify with them and (re)act. We live our mainsprings, so they precede our recognition. 
To recognise them, we must take a different stance on our actions. Therefore, our character 
is distinct from our will by being ‘us’ seen as from another perspective. Our character is not 
a direct cognition of the will, but its construct or representation according to the faculty of 
reason that unifies a picture consisting of our motives and actions based on the will-body 
identity.     
 Schopenhauer warns us to be cautious of an error often made in the inference from 
the motive and the action to the mainspring. The inference should be in accordance with the 
limits of cognition in general; otherwise, we would have to concede that the inference is no 
more than a meaningless product of pure reason. The previous are the limits of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, which Schopenhauer defends while slightly altering and finally 
summarising under the PSR. Exceeding the limits of possible cognition can lead us to false 
inferences and self-deception, according to Schopenhauer. For example, we can act out of 
an apparently altruistic motive, e.g., helping George, whilst the mainspring of our action is, 
in fact, egoism. He gives us the example of someone who performs ‘good’ deeds in life by 
complying or abiding by a moral code grounded on a creationist world-view (OBM, 195). 
The mainspring of her action, and thus her compliance with the moral code, stems from the 
prospect of personal salvation and eternal life in heaven. The prospect of heavenly life is 
what lends efficacy to the moral code and thereby leads her to comply with that code; her 
actions and reasons are egoistic. This is not immediately recognisable to her or third-person 
observers of her actions. She reasons that her love of God drives her actions, without 
noticing that her love rests on her personal prospects of salvation. If we gave her a thought-
experiment or even a fact that undermined or removed the possibility of her salvation and 
heavenly afterlife, then she would change her reasons and actions. Consequently, the limits 
of cognition forbid positive statements about what something is in itself and so independent 
from our cognition, that is, the being in itself of something as distinct from its being known 
(cf. WRII, 198). If she adhered to those limits in her reasons and actions, then the efficacy 
of the moral code and her compliance with it would be undermined. She would no longer 
be as driven to comply with it as before or her grounds for compliance would diminish. This 
shows that she was not altruistically driven: she did not care for the recipient’s wellbeing, 
but indirectly for her own.  
Notice, however, that the act of helping someone in the above example is the same 
irrespective of its mainspring. The action is the same irrespective of whether she helped him 
 
                                               
63 To put the previous simply: we do not always know what we are doing. We can act habitually or spontaneously, 
or unreflectively, but, in all cases, it is we who are acting based on some aim or end.  
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out of compliance to a moral code or because she cared for him for his sake. This shows the 
elusiveness of the distinction between the motive and the mainspring of an action. We can 
act to help another while driven by a personal benefit in heaven, i.e., we trade a short-term 
interest for a long-term gain. To explain our care for the recipient we require an insight inno 
aesthetic contemplation: that what we see as an object for the will is also the representation 
of willing, striving etc in its own right. We need to be able to identify with something other 
than ourselves. Thus, for Schopenhauer, we cannot possibly have compassion for him unless 
we assume the disinterestedness stance in relation to him, i.e., unless we see him as ‘willing’ 
in his own right (more on this below).  
According to Schopenhauer, the egoistic agent will always find another opportunity, 
reason and world-view that allows her to express her egoism. She can change the target of 
her egoism, or she may be less inclined to hide her egoism behind world-views that permit 
her to help George for her sake while claiming that she does it because she cares for him. 
We can encourage her to be honest about herself, but we cannot change her.  
In sum, different mainsprings can drive our actions even if the actions themselves 
appear the same. However, without an action, we cannot possibly know what anyone wills 
and so know the constituents of their character that are the mainsprings. Actions do not make 
mainsprings transparent, but without an action on (or so a response to) something we cannot 
possibly have a reference point from which to construct the self-image that is necessary for 
grounding and fleshing out the concept of character and of a mainspring.64  
The following questions, which I will take up in the next section, will nuance the 
distinction between mainsprings and motives. How, in Schopenhauer’s sense, does a target 
of cognition move us? We know that we respond to something when we take an interest in 
it, but what do we take an interest in and why? Furthermore, what are the different kinds of 
interest we take in something? What part of the cognition has relevance for us and so makes 
it a motive or that motivates us in the first place and for what reason?  
1.9 Wellbeing, Woe and the Pleasure in Willing 
Something 
“Now the essence of a human being consists in the fact that his will strives, is 
satisfied, and strives anew, and so on and on, and in fact his happiness and wellbeing 
 
                                               
64 It is important to bear in mind that Schopenhauer is describing and distinguishing two parts of our experiences 
that ordinarily come together under the so-called act of will. We never encounter an action or affect without a 
mainspring, nor do we encounter an action without an object or object-relation that triggered it. The real separation 
of the two is impossible for cognitive beings like us. His distinction and analysis of their differences is conceptual 
and an attempt to advance self-knowledge or offer an insight into the grounds of our actions. The will and intellect 
are intertwined and co-operative in our daily lives. 
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are nothing more than the rapid progress of this transition from desire to satisfaction 
and from this to a new desire, since the absence of satisfaction is suffering and the 
absence of a new desire is empty longing, languor, boredom” (WR, 287) 
Schopenhauer’s concept of the mainspring of our actions as distinct from our motives is a 
product of our reason grounded on the will-body identity and the aesthetic contemplation it 
enables. We have different mainsprings because we take different kinds of interest in things. 
Let us assess an example of how our ‘interest’ cannot be reduced to self-interest.  
When we ask an agent, ‘why did you drink that glass of orange juice?’ She might 
answer, ‘because I was thirsty’ or ‘because I desired it over an alcoholic beverage or water’. 
We may ask about other actions, too, for example, ‘why did you help George?’ She might 
answer ‘because I wanted to’ or ‘because I care about him’. In a way, all answers to such 
question are the same, i.e., that her actions’ ultimate ground is her will (some desire, want 
etc. which she posseses). What explains her actions is the ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’, i.e., the change 
in her, not the ‘object’ (or ‘target’ of her actions) independent from her. The object we react 
to and our thirst constitute a by-fit relationship, which Schopenhauer summarises using his 
correlation theory of cognition. He explains what we mean when we claim that we ‘do what 
we will’, or ‘drink because we are thirsty’, or ‘choose orange juice rather than alcohol or 
water because we desire orange juice’, in the following manner: 
“If a human being wills, then he wills something: his act of will is in every case 
directed towards an object and can be conceived only in relation to one. So what does 
it mean to will something? It means: the act of will, which itself is at first only an 
object of self-consciousness, arises on the occasion of something that belongs to 
consciousness of other things, thus something that is an object for the cognitive 
faculty, an object that, in this relation, is called a motive and at the same time is the 
material of the act of will, in the sense that the act of will is directed towards it, i.e. 
aims at some alteration in it, or reacts to it. The whole being of the act of will consists 
in this reaction.” (FW, 40) 
In this relation of willing to the motive (i.e., the object), Schopenhauer finds room for the 
concept of a mainspring. The ‘I will’ of self-consciousness is vacuous and tells us what we 
already know, i.e., that we identify with ourselves and this identity is expressed in an act of 
will in response to some target of cognition. The target of the will and corresponding action 
taken together are more informative than the ‘I will or I want’ responses to our inquiry into 
what drives an action. The ground of why we did what we did is seemingly the exclamation 
that we will something itself without any supplementary explanation or reason. We seem to 
be content with claiming that we do something because we want it or we desire it, but no 
further information about the relationship between our desire, our action and the motive is 
given by the previous. Our inquiry ends with the claim that we want something because we 
want it, which tells us nothing about its desirability independent from our wants, but it does 
imply it. There is, for Schopenhauer, more to an action than that we identify with it by way 
of some desire or will.  
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It is true that it is us who desires some X and that it is not X itself that is desirable 
independent from us, i.e., from its subjective correlate. Nothing is desirable in itself, for him, 
and, moreover, this claim is meaningless. Something is only desirable in relation to some 
desire (of which there are others) and this desire is of some agent (of which there are others, 
with different desires). For example, water is desirable to someone thirsty, food to someone 
hungry. In sum, the desirability of objects leaves two mutually exclusive propositions: 
1) Our desiring it.  
2) Its being desirable in itself. 
They are mutually exclusive because there would be no meaningful concept of ‘our’ (or a 
‘sense of self’) unless there was at least some desirable object that was not desirable in itself. 
A condition of individuality and selfhood is that there are at least some differences in desire. 
In ordinary discourse, however, these two propositions seemingly describe the same thing 
in different ways, which is recognisable when we question agents about the grounds or the 
reasons for their actions. Schopenhauer recognises a difference between them, however, 
which underpins his conception of the will and its mainsprings. This difference is that our 
being someone who desires it rather than the object itself being desirable in itself is useful 
for preserving a fundamental distinction. That distinction is between ‘how our will relates 
to something’ (which makes it appear as it does) and ‘what that thing is in itself independent 
from us’. What motivates us about objects always bears some relation to our will. The 
proposition that something motivates us purely for itself, or in virtue of itself, if we mean this 
in the literal sense that whenever we perceive it we drop all other interests and concerns for 
its pursuit, then, this is a dubious proposition. The target of cognition appears as a motive 
when we will something in it or when we will it to be something for us. The same target of 
cognition can appear as though it represents willing, striving etc. when we no longer will 
something in it or will it ‘to be something’ for us.  
Aesthetic contemplation supports the above. Disinterestedness is a kind of interest 
we take in the target, i.e., an interest in its striving or its ideal representation (i.e., its Idea). 
Equally, aesthetic pleasure is still a kind of pleasure; suffering precedes it. Furthermore, 
desiring something as from the perspective of disinterested subjects is not the same as 
desiring the ‘object’ for itself or in itself, which is meaningless. The concept of an ‘object in 
itself’ or disinterestedness in the sense of ‘not interested’, or the desirable ‘in itself’ 
irrespective of our desire, are all nonsensical concepts. When we aesthetically contemplate 
on something, it seizes to be an object because we changed our interest in it. Our motives 
change when we perceive something differently, but it does not necessarily change so much 
that it allows us to argue that nothing motivates or interests us. In sum, nothing is desirable 
in itself; things are desirable only in virtue of someone’s desire. This paints what might seem 
as a relativistic picture, but I think this is a misleading characterisation. We may construe it 
as correlativity, because although how something appears changes in accordance with our 
interest, the thing itself does not: it remains the same throughout by its reference.  
To make sense of the concept of a mainspring, however, we should consider what is 
implicit to his claims about how urges relate to one another. His propositions imply that a 
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thirsty person cannot fail to experience water as a motive (i.e., as drinkable) along with the 
urge to drink it, irrespective of whether or not that urge is acted upon. Drinking water takes 
the foreground of his attention and only another urge (i.e., will) can supersede it. He may 
forgo his urge to drink to help someone who is in danger, but not fail to experience the urge. 
Urges relate to one another only and their relation is reflected in how motives relate and in 
how they affect us. The relations between urges differ from the relations between the urge 
and its corresponding motive (or object), however. How motives relate is not synonymous 
to how our urges relate, even though the former are reflections of the latter in the objects of 
our cognition. Furthermore, we cannot apply causality to relations between urges, because 
affection (or sensation) is a precondition for the application of causality that yields cognition 
of an object. Relations between our urges are predominantly preconscious, i.e., they precede 
our experience of an object and motive. Moreover, we err in attempting to comprehend how 
urges relate in terms of how objects (or motives) relate to one another, i.e., causally, because 
our urges precede and enable the application of causality.    
I omit that my contentions will considerably stretch Schopenhauer’s distinctions; my 
reasons for doing so will become apparent as we proceed. I will voice some of them now so 
we have a way into what follows. I think stretching him like this will help us better to make 
sense of the transition from his aesthetics to his ethics. 
Schopenhauer’s views on motivation propose the following insight: our urges do not 
relate causally. The claim that an object’s being desirable in itself is nonsensical supplements 
the previous insight. I will work with the example of ‘wanting orange juice’ to make sense 
of the previous and demonstrate what this different relationship might be. Let us begin by 
making the bold claim that we do not want to the drink orange juice because it is desirable 
itself. If orange juice itself were desirable, then we would want it every time we perceived 
it, irrespective of the circumstances. We want orange juice because of the fluctuations of our 
urges underpinned by the given ground of our character, as Schopenhauer calls it. Our urge 
to drink orange juice inseparably relates to our thirst, which is context-dependent and thus 
subject to fluctuations based on its relationship to other urges. Sometimes we are not very 
thirsty or have had so much orange juice that its mere mention disgusts us. Sometimes the 
motive to save someone’s life supersedes our thirst. What is common in these instances is 
that we do not want the orange juice because of itself, but because of some correlative change 
in us, which we often fail to track in ordinary discourse. A change of state in us precedes an 
action we take upon something, but this change of state also partially explains why and how 
something motivates us. If some change of state in us ensured that something motivates us, 
then it represents our aim for a further change. For example, thirst precedes the urge to drink 
a glass of orange juice and its aim is satiety or, as he might say in a typically dramatic tone, 
the end of the suffering that is thirst. What, for him, are ‘thirst’ and ‘satiety’? This is where 
his new terminology, namely, wellbeing (Wohl) and woe (Wehe), begins to do some work. 
Whatever is a motive relates to wellbeing and woe. They characterise our will’s 
relation to some target of cognition that motivates us. Something motivates us if it (promises 
to) bring about change Y in us, but it also presupposes that change X in us has occurred such 
that the promise of X’s transition into Y is effective or motivating. He construes the previous 
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states as wellbeing and woe. He associates one’s feelings, emotions, reflective choices and 
actions with their relationship to wellbeing and woe: 
“What moves the will is solely wellbeing and woe as such, and taken in the widest 
sense of the word; just as conversely wellbeing and woe means ‘in accordance with a 
will, or against it’. Thus every motive must have a relation to wellbeing and woe.” 
(OBM, 198) 
Wellbeing corresponds to what accords with our will and woe corresponds to what discords 
with it. A ‘will to something’ makes meaningful wellbeing and woe.65 He leaves open how 
the ‘will’ and ‘something’ substantiate. Following projection of willing, we can identify 
with many different things and thus have different wills and corresponding motives, which 
means how wellbeing and woe relate to them in each case will differ.  
There is a perplexity inherent to the above, which we recognise more clearly after 
we illustrate his battery of mainsprings, but I will try to bring forward some very preliminary 
remarks here. If wellbeing is a state that corresponds to the success of our willing, or to 
circumstances deemed to be in accordance with a will, then how do we apprehend the ascetic 
mainspring’s aim to bring about an agent’s own woe, or even malice’s aim to bring about 
another’s woe irrespective of one’s own wellbeing. Before a more elaborate assessment of 
the various mainsprings, a comment merits its place to nuance our discussion of wellbeing 
and woe. Schopenhauer construes these two terms as having an extended application, but 
he fell short of demonstrating this application to us. In other words, what wellbeing and woe 
mean for ‘egoism’ (or to an egoist) is different from what they mean for another mainspring, 
i.e., ‘compassion’ (or to the compassionate). The circumstances making us feel wellbeing 
and woe differ for compassion as juxtaposed to egoism. To make better sense of the previous 
difference, he should have introduced another distinction, namely, between the ‘successful 
application of the will’ (willing as such, i.e., successfully willing something) and the 
‘successful attainment of our aims’ or ‘hitting the target with our action’ (i.e. successfully 
realising an end based on a particular mainspring). The former is broader than the latter. 
When we hit the target with an action we experience wellbeing if the action is successful in 
generating the particular outcome we aimed for; we feel woe when we fail to do so. The 
successful application of the will itself incites wellbeing by the circumstances being such 
that we can act in the first place, i.e., by whether or not we perceived a motive in the first 
 
                                               
65 Schopenhauer defends this claim by arguing that every one of our choices and actions rests on the will, “I can 
do what I will: I can, if I will, give all that I have to the poor and so become one of them myself – if I will ! But I 
cannot will it, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to. By contrast, 
if I had another character, and indeed to the extent that I was a saint, then I would be able to will it; but then I 
would not be able to avoid willing it, and so would have to do it” (FW, 74). ‘Character’ refers to what the will 
appears as through the will-body identity. It refers to the empirical representation of the will, and thus a difference 
in character is another way of saying a difference in will, which is, in turn, a difference in the whole body and its 
corresponding urges. He further adds, “all these affections consists in their entering self-consciousness as 
something in accordance with the will or as something contrary to it” (FW, 39). 
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place irrespective of whether or not we acted upon it successfuly. Thus, there are two types 
of wellbeing (and woe) concurrent with our actions.  
For brevity, then, we can distinguish willing itself from a mainspring of an action or 
a constituent of the will. This distinction is subtle, but we recognise it when we notice that 
wellbeing can correspond to any successful action independent from its aim or its realisation. 
We experience wellbeing in the very attempt to attain something independently from our 
successfully attaining it. Both successful execution of an action and successful attainment 
or realisation of its aim produce wellbeing (and woe). We experience them in willing itself, 
not only from realising the aim or from hitting the target with an action.66 We experience an 
urge to act or do something that is inherent to our urges and their discharge in goal-oriented 
activities, which brings us some ‘relief from suffering (boredom, lagour etc.)’ or wellbeing.  
Let me elaborate on the above somewhat. To make this distinction psychologically 
tenable we can assess the illusions of satisfaction we are prone to when we find satisfaction 
difficult, which we touched upon briefly in the analysis of daydreams. Consider, e.g, a tired, 
thirsty traveler finding himself in the desert. He may know about optical illusions and 
mirages, but he knows nothing more than what he perceives about the topography he is in. 
The intensity of his thirst coupled with his lack of knowledge of the topography invokes an 
optical illusion of an oasis. He charges after it, focusing on the possibility of drinking and 
experiences wellbeing. We can explain this feeling as we explained aesthetic pleasure, i.e., 
as an alleviant. He feels it against the backdrop of his thirst (woe) and it works by redirecting 
his focus or conscious attention and efforts in the fixed direction of the oasis. This activity 
takes his attention away from his thirst into the motive whose successful outcome in action 
promises satiety. The successful exercise of our will brings with it a wellbeing independent 
from any specific aim, but we must not confuse this by-product of successfully acting with 
our realising the aim of our action. The latter stems from one of the mainspring, while the 
former has to do with willing itself and thus is inherent to any mainspring.  
The mainsprings are preoccupied with the success and failure of some particular aim, 
not with doing something, anything whatsoever. At least, that is how we can distinguish 
different mainsprings over and beyond their broadly satisfying the urge to act. The urge to 
act concerns willing itself. It is necessary for the possibility of having aims in the first place 
and explains why we can have different aims or why willing can enable different patterns 
of activity. Thus, a mainspring is a particular direction through which the basic ‘urge to act 
or do something’ (willing itself or the will to life) finds its expression.  
Each mainspring corresponds to some aim and has a by-fit relationship with a target 
of cognition.67 Willing itself makes possible having some aim and having conflicting aims. 
In short, we have an inherent urge to act and attain pleasure from acting itself independent 
 
                                               
66 This is a conclusion of Schopenhauer’s account often overlooked by the philosophical literature, but not by 
Nietzsche who made a great deal of the claim that there is pleasure in willing itself, even if it is grounded on pain 
or suffering (cf. GM III, 28). It seems that in some respects Nietzsche was a better reader and student of 
Schopenhauer and his philosophy than Schopenhauer himself.  
67 More on this below where I offer a potential definition of a mainspring in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.  
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from its direction or target. This urge to act underpins or accompanies our motives. It makes 
sense of what he means by affirmation of the will, which he describes in the following way:  
“The affirmation of the will is the constant willing itself, undisturbed by any cognition, 
as it fills the lives of human beings in general…The basic theme of all the various 
acts of will is the satisfaction of needs that are inseparable from the healthy existence 
of the body, are already expressed in it, and can be reduced to the preservation of the 
individual and the propagation of the species. But indirectly, this enables a great 
variety of motives to gain control over the will and to produce the most diverse acts 
of will. Each of these is only a specimen or example of the will that appears here in 
general: what sort of specimen this is, what form the motive might take and impart to 
the satisfaction of needs – this is not essential. That willing in general occurs, and its 
degree of intensity, these are the issues here…For most human beings, this is what 
life is all about: they will, they know what they will, and they strive after it with 
enough success to protect them from despair and enough failure to keep them from 
boredom and its effects. A certain cheerfulness or at least composure emerges from 
this, which is not really changed by wealth or poverty:” (WR, 353; my emphasis) 
The ‘cheerfulness’ or ‘composure’ he refers to above I associate with the wellbeing we feel 
when we succeed in willing or doing something. Affirmation of the will (or willing itself) 
explains conflicting aims, because they all satisfy this original and unyielding urge to act, 
albeit they do so in different ways. 
Let us consider some objections to the above propositions. One objection we can put 
forward is that some cognition can only be ‘in accordance’ or ‘in discordance’ with our will, 
which implies that it is the ‘object’ that imparts efficacy on us or moves us, not our imparting 
efficacy on it or our perceiving it as efficacious due to our constitution. This grasps one side 
of the subject-object correlation (or will-motive correlation), however. Furthermore, it does 
not explain this efficacy or tell us why something X is efficacious while Y is not. It merely 
lists what is efficacious and what is not and it treats that efficacy as self-standing or 
independent from our contribution to it and the conditions under which we contribute to it. 
The following passage reveals his strategy for explaining the motivational efficacy of our 
cognitions: 
“Only motives can affect the will externally. But they can never alter the will itself, 
because their power is based on the presupposition that the will is precisely what it is. 
All that they can do is to alter the direction of its striving, i.e. get the will to use a 
different path to search for the thing that it invariably seeks” (WR, 321) 
A motive’s ‘power’, seemingly meaning its motivational efficacy, presupposes a definitive 
aim (or will). We should construe the phrase ‘alter the will’ in this passage as altering the 
aim, not changing the motive (i.e., the object). Let us consider an example to illustrate this 
point. If we aim ‘to own a television’, all that a motive or cognition can provide is the means 
of doing so. It gives us the objects or object-relations that must pertain to realise our aim to 
‘own a television’. It can determine whether I can purchase it, or ask a friend for a disposable 
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one, or steal one. Nevertheless, the cognition alone cannot possibly change my will to own a 
television. If the aim to do something is set, that is, if it is an act of will, then, his correlation 
theory of cognition suggests that only another aim can change it, not another object. Where 
it seems to us that another object changed our will, this object correlates to another aim that 
we possess and that the latter took precedence or superseded it. For example, assuming that 
we realise we cannot purchase a television and our friend does not have a spare one, we may 
be motivated to steal it. We can supersede the motive to steal by a motive to provide for our 
family or to preserve our freedom under the law. What seems like our letting go of an aim 
and constituent of our will is one aim superseding another, however.  
It is crucial to remember that aims (or mainsprings) relate differently to one another 
than they relate to their objects (or motives), but also to how objects relate to one another. 
An object enables us to express and thus realise our aims. Objects have a wholly subordinate 
or passive role. This is what Schopenhauer seems to capture when he argues that “external 
influence can never get the will to will something genuinely different from what it has willed 
before” (WR, 321). The experience of a change in our will presupposes another direction of 
the will that supersedes it in priority or ‘power’. Therefore, the change in will cannot come 
from the objects of cognition. Objects occasion these changes, but do not determine them.68 
Changes to our willing happen from within and are reflected on the objects of our cognition. 
The fact that different agents do not respond to an object O in the same way supports 
Schopenhauer’s claim that our will imparts efficacy on O, rather than O being efficacious 
in and of itself. Likewise, an agent A does not respond to O in the same manner at all times. 
If O’s efficacy derives from O itself, then different agents would respond to O in the same 
manner irrespective of time and place. It is true that O causes a response in us, but we should 
recall that the stance we assume in applying causality is the impure subject cognition. Thus, 
causality is not a pure explanation of events, but presupposes a subjective correlate and thus 
a reference point: the willing subject who perceives a world as enabling his will. Without O 
we cannot possibly respond to anything, because the avenue for action that cognition of an 
object enables would be lacking. However, what explains our responding to O instead of O* 
has to do with us, not O. This is left out from our causal account of the relationship between 
O and A, because its so-called explanation starts and ends with how A and O relate. Thus, 
to make sense of individual differences in responses to something, but also the motivational 
efficacy of O at different times for A, we must commit to the claim that only the will imparts 
motivational efficacy, which leads us to perceive any O as a motive M. If we notice a change 
in the motivational efficacy of O at some time, then O has not changed; we have, instead. 
Alternatively, we can argue a change in the structure of our mainsprings has occurred at the 
interval between the current motivational efficacy of O and its previous lack.69   
 
                                               
68 Even this change in us Schopenhauer is suspicious of, as we will see below.   
69 For more on this point see Kossler (2008).  
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What, then, are wellbeing and woe apart from their explaining the mainspring of an 
action? They have their own objective and subjective correlates.70 In self-consciousness, we 
experience them as inclinations for or against something. In consciousness of other things, 
they are bodily states corresponding to electro-chemical variations caused by our body being 
in the presence of some objects at some particular time and in relation to certain conditions. 
We recognise them via our first-person experience of willing something, which determines 
their identical and intentional object. Their identical object is the bodily state corresponding 
to our acts of will (affects, urges, actions etc.), whereas their intentional object is the target. 
We should not confuse the intentional object for what caused us to act or incited an action, 
however. Schopenhauer did not distinguish ‘intentional’ from ‘causal’ objects. Nonetheless, 
his example of the ways people can be led astray by superstition implies it: 
“Even if the will has already taken its definite and unalterable course in the form of a 
character, and willing itself infallibly occurs on the occasion of a motive, error can 
falsify its expressions. This is because delusive motives similar to the real ones can 
slip in and suppress them; so for instance when superstition imposes imaginary 
motives that compel someone to adopt a course of action entirely opposed to what his 
will would otherwise adopt under the circumstances: Agamemnon kills his daughter, 
a miser distributes alms out of pure egoism in the hope of one day being paid back a 
hundredfold, etc.” (WR, 177)  
Reason permits agents to act deliberately, but likewise to act on something not immediately 
or directly present in the circumstances. The causal object we can construe as a trigger or a 
spark of the action, but we should distinguish it from its destination, endpoint or aim. This 
distinction is similar to that between the efficient and the final cause laid out by Aristotle71, 
but the concept of cause when we are discussing Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will and 
the correlation theory of cognition can be misleading, because the will’s relationship to its 
object is not causal. The will’s relationship to the object of cognition is a by-fit relationship, 
whereas the object’s relationship to the immediate object that is our body is causal, because 
our body is our will seen as from the perspective of the impure subject of congition.  
We should thus distinguish between two parts of any motive, which Schopenhauer did 
not do so explicitly. Firstly, there is what causes our body to move or act, which is only seen 
as a cause from the perspective of the impure subject of cognition and thus is limited to the 
objective picture. Secondly, there is what we are moving towards, i.e., the aim or target of a 
bodily movement, which occasions when we will something (directly or indirectly), which 
is the intentional object. The latter can be part of what caused our body to move or (re)act, 
 
                                               
70 Finally, he argues that all objects of our experience are both representation and will, whether or not they move 
us. I have left this step and its discussion for consideration in relation to his metaphysics. My aim here is to give 
an epistemological account of the driving forces or mainsprings of our actions in preparation for an understanding 
of his account of compassion and morality.   
71 Aristotle (1999: Bk. V, Ch. 2). 
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but not necessarily. The cause is always in the current circumstances we find ourselves in, 
but the circumstances we are in are not necessarily the target of our will. In short, we do not 
always aim for what causes us to react. Consider, for example, how we feel when we hear 
a story from a friend about a date he went on with his girlfriend, which makes us miss our 
partner. The cause of our response is our friend’s story, the target is our partner who is not 
directly involved in the story.72 What permits us to think of our partner and so react to our 
friend’s story through a change in state is presumably the abstract concept of ‘girlfriend’ or 
‘date’, which, in turn, became a motive for us. The abstract concept created a bridge between 
his story about his girlfriend and our partner, which is the target of our will. Unlike motives, 
wellbeing and woe are not objects causing changes in us, or targets of the will. The ‘cause’ 
and ‘target’ are objects in the world we see as separate or distinct from us.73 Wellbeing and 
woe are inherent to us. They represent how we relate to causal and intentional objects.  
Wellbeing and woe are not objects or representations the way an external object is a 
representation, e.g., a stone, but are modifications of our will. We can say they are identical 
objects or represent changes in the identical object of the will, i.e., our body. Schopenhauer 
puts it as follows, although the terms he uses in this passage are ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’, 
“But it is quite wrong to call pain and pleasure representations: they are nothing of 
the sort, but rather immediate affections of the will in its appearance, the body: a 
forced, momentary willing or not-willing of the impression the body is undergoing. 
There are only a few, specific impressions on the body that can be immediately 
considered as mere representations and are thus exceptions to what has just been said; 
these impressions do not stimulate the will and it is only through them that the body 
becomes an immediate object of cognition, because, as an intuition in understanding, 
the body is mediated just like all other objects.” (WR, 125) 
Pain and pleasure (or wellbeing and woe) are affects for and against something. We identify 
with wellbeing and woe in a manner that we do not with other objects, which includes those 
objects that motivate us. He defines them as “final ends” (OBM, 198) of our actions, which 
presumably means they are fundamental reasons or grounds for acting. When we perceive 
them as bodily vicissitudes or states, then we do so as from another perspective and thus we 
treat them as objects in the world, which we can pursue. However, we can only ever pursue 
them if they somehow relate to wellbeing and woe. Recall that the motivational efficacy of 
 
                                               
72 We can argue that just my friend’s mention of his girlfriend constitutes that my girlfriend is indirectly a part of 
the cognition or object that caused the bodily vicissitude in me. There is an argument and consideration available 
to us here regarding how the causal aspect of any cognition relates to the driven or wilful aspect, but I cannot 
consider it at length here. There is room for a distinction, even if one in degree, e.g., of the token-type variety. Our 
friend spoke about the same type, i.e., girlfriend, but a different token, i.e., his girlfriend, though it reminded me 
of my girlfriend since I am also in a relationship. For the sake of clarity, however, it is important for us to separate 
the causal from the intentional object of the will, and we ought to consider them separately if our interest is in 
determining the direction of the will or the agent’s aim. The identical object of the will is distinct from the previous 
two, however, and is, I believe, important for making sense of wellbeing and woe and their status in his philosophy. 
Coincidentally, we find a very similar distinction in Wittgenstein (cf. 1953, §476).  
73 This picture becomes somewhat complicated when we consider the ascetic mainspring and ascetic resignation.  
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objects corresponds to the particular change in us characterised as experiencing wellbeing 
and woe, but this efficacy is distinct from the particular object since all objects that motivate 
follow the same pattern of corresponding to a particular change, i.e., to wellbeing and woe. 
Motives reflect our aiming for wellbeing and woe, but are not wellbeing and woe, even if 
we are able to turn wellbeing and woe into objects of cognition using the will-body identity.  
Our body is an object among objects and thus, by extension, wellbeing and woe are 
cognisable as objects, i.e., bodily changes. We can only cognise our body as an object among 
objects if we assume the stance of a weakly affected subject of willing (cf. WR, 126). We 
can say wellbeing and woe have their objective correlates, but not that they are objects of 
cognition, like a stone or a duck, because the identical or immediate object that is our body 
differs from other objects. They have an irreducible closeness to us, or, to put it differently, 
we identify with them in a way that do we do not with other objects in the world.  
We cannot claim motives are wellbeing and woe, but that if something motivates us, 
then it “has a relation to wellbeing and woe” (OBM, 198) by promising, minimally, the 
successful execution or discharge of the will. This discharge is always in a specific direction 
or possesses a specific aim and thus requires an act of identification with something in the 
world through which it expresses itself. Likewise, inherent to every act of will is the ‘final 
end’ of willing itself, which is simply the urge to act. Even if the object we aim for and that 
motivates us is wellbeing or woe as such, that is, if we aim for woe directly, not indirectly 
through an external object or activity, then this must have its intentional object (i.e. the 
body) and relate to wellbeing and woe.74Our body corresponds to our will. Wellbeing is a 
bodily state seen as an object or object-relation; so, we can will ‘wellbeing’ as we do any 
object and thus treat it as a motive. Nevertheless, in doing so, the motive that is wellbeing 
(i.e., a particular bodily state) must have a relationship to a mainspring, i.e., be driven by 
egoism, compassion etc., and so relate to wellbeing and woe. 
Let us use an example to illustrate how wellbeing and woe feature in our actions. I 
am hungry and the sandwich in front of me strikes me as a motive. I can construe my hunger 
as a part of the causal process, i.e., as part of objects relating causally to one another and so 
see my hunger as representing a particular bodily state. For example, the sandwich caused 
consumption and consumption caused nourishment, each one is an object or object-relation, 
and they represent different bodily states. We cannot separate what made the sandwich 
efficacious from the object that is the body and the state that preceded consumption, i.e., 
from hunger. Equally, we cannot separate the previous from the ensuing state corresponding 
to nourishment. The action entails both an object (seen as a motive) and an aim. However, 
for any particular mainspring and its corresponding motive, only one of the two bodily states 
(i.e., hunger or nourishment) describes the mainspring or contributes to its characterisation. 
If cognition of a sandwich incites consumption, then what we aim for with the action and 
 
                                               
74 I will argue that Schopenhauer describes and defines the mainsprings of our actions in this manner, i.e. as aiming 
for either the wellbeing or woe of ‘some’ recipient (whether that recipient is us or another with whom we identify).   
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what characterises the mainspring is the subsequent not the preceding bodily state. Hunger 
motivates, but it does not reveal our aim and so the mainspring of our subsequent action. A 
preceding state of hunger (i.e., woe) is as the bow whose string is extended or tensed; it 
prepares the arrow for release whose target is hitherto undetermined aside from the urge to 
act itself.75 In short, our hunger does not guarantee consumption, but it does guarantee some 
particular action or discharge, only any discharge whatsoever. The target alone tells us what 
we aim for given our state (e.g., hunger) and so what characterises the particular direction 
of our will. Accordingly, the state that follows a successful execution of the action via the 
attainment of its aim (e.g., wellbeing following our consumption or nourishment) shows the 
action’s aim and thereby allows us to recognise its mainspring.76 We use the change of state 
and specifically the latter state to characterise the mainspring of our action.77 
The will is always directional: it aims at something in the world to change it against 
the backdrop of changes noticeable in its identical object, i.e., the body. The aim is not the 
preceding state; otherwise, no change would be needed because we would already be where 
we aimed to be. The subsequent bodily state reflects the mainspring of an action (more on 
this below). Hungry people who consume something aim for nourishment, not for hunger. 
The cessation of hunger is identical to aiming for nourishment, if not its pleonasm. Hunger 
motivates us, but it does not tell us what particular object we strive for to satiate ourselves. 
The distinction between what motivates and what drives is crucial. There is ‘pleasure’ in the 
release from hunger (i.e., the release of the tensed string, which is pleasure in willing itself 
and thus in goal-oriented action) and ‘pleasure’ after our hitting the target with the action. 
Schopenhauer did not make this distinction, but it is immensely useful for ironing out some 
conceptual difficulties found in his description of the mainsprings of our actions juxtaposed 
to his views on willing itself. Moreover, this distinction accords with his philosophy of the 
will and correlation theory of cognition.  
Given the above, are we not tempted to categorise all of our motives in terms of their 
relationship to our wellbeing and woe as agents? Does Schopenhauer defend a motivational 
monism of the egoistic sort?78 I will argue his distinctions and claims encourage us to resist 
this conclusion, which would lead us to construe willing itself as egoistic or that we can 
explain all actions as aiming for our own wellbeing. Not all actions aim for the continued 
existence or welfare of our body. We can aim for another agent’s wellbeing and so support 
another with her aims or to promote the successful execution of her willing. We can even 
aim for our woe (i.e. to sabotage our aims). Recognition of another’s woe sometimes drives 
 
                                               
75 Schopenhauer uses the following analogy for the same relation I am considering: “By the way, this might be the 
place to note an odd likeness: the relation between desire and deed has a completely accidental but nonetheless 
exact analogy in the relation between electrical accumulation and electrical discharge” (WR, 327).  
76 Remember that we should distinguish between the pleasures that follow all successful executions of the will 
from the will’s particular aim manifest as the mainspring of our action. The claim that we seek pleasure (or seek 
to avoid pain) fails to grasp the previous distinction. 
77 It is crucial to note here that this aim need not be self-conscious or self-reflective, and perhaps the concept of 
aim leads us astray here even though I believe it is the best way we can understand what he means by the extended 
concept of the ‘will’ (Wille). 
78 For more on motivational monism see Cartwright (2008).  
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us to aim for our woe or it drives us to promote her wellbeing. The previous undermine the 
proposition that our only mainspring is egoism or that we can reduce willing itself to egoism. 
His analysis of the basis of morals rests on our overcoming egoism, which he calls “the 
great mystery of ethics” (OBM, 201), is a further example why we cannot reduce willing to 
egoism.  
We can conclude, then, that wellbeing and woe reveal how a mainspring drives us 
correlative to its motives. Motives are motivationally efficacious objects and mainsprings 
are constituents of our will. Motives cause movements of the body, not the will. Rather, they 
occasion or activate the will, which then expresses itself in bodily movement. Mainsprings 
explain the motivational efficacy of objects that caused bodily movement. Between motives 
and mainsprings are wellbeing and woe, which distinguish moving ‘towards’ something or 
‘away from’ it. They are modifications of our will that relate to particular objects and thus 
explain their motivational efficacy. We can perceive them as objects because of the will-
body identity, but something motivates us because it facilitates a change in us characterised 
by wellbeing or woe.  
1.10 The Mainsprings of our Actions 
Schopenhauer does not offer an explicit definition of a ‘mainspring’ (Triebfeder). The above 
reflections come at a cost of substantially stretching his claims, but I strove to stay as close 
to his distinctions (and what is implicit to them) as I could. For the most part, I worked with 
his primary distinction between the will and the intellect, his correlation theory of cognition, 
the will-body identity and the individual differences in willing. In this section, I will suggest 
a definition of the various mainsprings of our actions using what we have discussed so far.  
A mainspring is a constituent of the will that characterises the different aims, not the 
causes of our actions. We can distinguish three aspects of our various mainsprings, which 
contribute to their definition. First, the ‘recipient’ of the action. Second, the aim of the action 
based on how the recipient’s wellbeing and woe relate to the action. Third, the target of the 
action or that upon which we act, which reflects the previous features.  
Consider the following example couple of examples to illustrate how we can apply 
the above to determine someone’s mainspring. George turned down the volume to the 
television after recognising his spouse Nancy had fallen asleep. The motive to turn down 
the volume arose in circumstances where a) there is a loud television and b) Nancy is asleep. 
The recipient of the action is Nancy. Whereas, the target of his action is the loud television. 
His aim was to promote Nancy’s wellbeing. Notice that he does not perceive Nancy as an 
object, but as a person who needs sleep. He identifies with her and her needs. In that moment, 
he forgot about himself and his interests of enjoying the television. In short, projection of 
willing on her enabled him to act for her sake, i.e., to promote her wellbeing. Let us consider 
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another example: Nancy eats the last piece of cake at breakfast. The circumstances of being 
one piece left over represents a motive for consumption that led to her eating it. The action’s 
recipient was herself. Its target was the last piece of cake and her aim was to promote her 
own wellbeing.  
Notice in both cases that the mainspring is not the motive (i.e., the object that caused 
the bodily movement), nor the action itself, but in how both relate to the action’s recipient. 
Often we focus only on the object or on the action and so conflate the relationship between 
the agent and the object(s) by making our conception either too agent-centered or too object-
centered.  
Let us consider an example of how we may go wrong and how we can clear up any 
confusions. I want to help Joe pass his exam because I know the difficult circumstances that 
have befallen him. The mainspring of my action is not apparent in the motive ‘to help him’, 
or in the action. Nevertheless, my action and motive imply the mainspring of my action. As 
third-person observers of actions, we may be inclined to project an aim on my action. In the 
previous case, we project a compassionate aim on my action to help Joe. Nevertheless, my 
mainsprings are not transparent or accessible to third-person observers. Unbeknownst to 
those inclined to construe my action as altruistic, I helped Joe knowing his character and 
expecting his indebtedness to me: I helped him to gain his favour. Alleviating Joe’s suffering 
did not drive my action. However, his suffering did cause me to help him and motivated me, 
but on different grounds and so based on different aims.  
We should not allow the examples I presented above to mislead us, however. We do 
not necessarily have self-conscious access to the mainsprings of our actions as I assume. We 
should distinguish our self-conscious access to our mainsprings from our acting based on a 
mainspring. I may have a self-interest in Joe faring well because I want to gain his favor in 
return for my help and this drives me to help him. His suffering, which is the target of my 
action, provided my mainspring with an opportunity to express itself. Schopenhauer puts it 
in the following manner: 
“But Malebranche is right: every natural cause is only an occasional cause, it only 
gives the occasion, the opportunity for the appearance of that one and indivisible will 
that is the in-itself of all things and whose gradual objectivation is this whole visible 
world. The cause only brings about the emergence of the will, allows it to become 
visible at this place, in this time. To this extent, the emergence is dependent on the 
cause; but the entirety of appearance, its inner essence, is not: this essence is the will 
itself, which the principle of sufficient reason does not apply to, and which is, 
accordingly, groundless. No thing in the world has a cause of its existence per se and 
in general; rather, there is only a cause for it to be precisely here and precisely now.” 
(WR, 162) 
In other words, what appears as my acting for his wellbeing when I help him is, in fact, my 
aiming to promote my wellbeing, which I conceal in the act that shows I care about Joe for 
his sake. I will likely deny that egoism drove me and deceive a third-person observer. I may 
even be ignorant of my own selfishness and boast of how caring I am. I later discover that I 
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am indignant over his refusal to help me when I request it. I expect him to reciprocate, which 
shows that my own wellbeing drove me all along.  
Schopenhauer contends that our character is composed of all the mainsprings. This 
permits him to claim that agents do not lack a mainspring, but that they are often more prone 
to one (or a few) over others. There is a priority between our mainsprings that defines our 
character and makes us individuals. Our mainsprings are not fully transparent to us because 
we are always acting and reasoning in accordance with them, rather than reflecting on them. 
Moreover, we cannot possibly fail to act in accordance with our mainsprings; without them, 
we would no longer be the individuals that we are. This proposition underpins his pessimism 
about the change in willing, but, as we see with ascetic resignation, he does not and cannot 
give up all hope in this change (more on this below). Nevertheless, self-deception or errors 
in self-cognition are possible, as we saw previously with the example of someone who loses 
their belief in an afterlife and over God’s decree. Where we cannot err, however, is in the 
recognition that there is a recurrence in our actions. This recurrence can partially shed light 
on the mainsprings of our actions. He calls this our ‘empirical character’: 
“Just as the same theme can be presented in a hundred variations, so too the same 
character can be presented in a hundred very different life histories. But as different 
as the external influences may be, the empirical character that expresses itself in the 
course of a life must, however it turns out, objectify the intelligible character 
precisely, since it adapts its objectivation to the given material of factual 
circumstances.” (WR, 183f) 
For example, I consistently help people in need without expecting reciprocity irrespective 
of the context or person, which leads me and other people to recognise not only that I have 
compassion, but that I am a compassionate person. If I perform one compassionate action 
out of a thousand egoistic ones, even if compassion did drive my action that one time, it is 
insufficient to determine that I am compassionate or that it defined my character. It shows 
that part of my battery of mainsprings is compassion, but everyone is composed of all the 
mainsprings, according to him. In my case, compassion expresses itself rarely whereas for 
another it does so more often. Someone’s character or temperament is a wider concept not 
encapsulated by one or two actions, but determined by the connected history of her actions, 
according to Schopenhauer.  
Compassion is one of my mainsprings, it can sometimes drive me in some moments, 
but these moments do not determine my character.79 It is likely that I made a cognitive error 
and thus did not act out of compassion at all; or maybe I did act out of compassion and I 
 
                                               
79 This constitutes the distinction between empirical and intelligible character; the former concerns what I am 
likely to or most often motivated to do, whereas the latter what I can possibly be motivated to do given the object 
or circumstance.  
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latter feel regret when I reflect on it due to the dominance of my egoism.80 For example, 
when I reflect on how I helped her and did not seek or expect recompense, I realise I missed 
a chance to gain her favour; or I allowed her to gain an upper hand by luring me into acting 
for her sake ‘for nothing’. Compassion is a constituent of our will, but it can lack the priority 
in relation to other mainsprings to constitute a compassionate character. Therefore, there is 
a difference between our constituent parts and our character. Mainsprings are common to 
everyone, that is, we all have the same battery of mainsprings. How these mainsprings hang 
together or relate to one another and so are expressed in actions over time is what 
distinguishes us from other human beings. Schopenhauer uses the distinction between the 
intelligible and empirical character to flesh out the previous. The former is purely formal 
and given a priori, whereas the latter we recognise a posteriori by the relationship between 
our original ‘temperament’ and the ‘circumstances’ in which we find ourselves.81  
In considering the mainsprings of our actions, we are no longer concerned with the 
objects of our actions, but with the fundamental constituents of our will or individuality, 
which is what makes objects efficacious in the first place. We are not concerned with the 
circumstances in which we are going to act, but with the aims towards which we are prone 
to acting given some circumstance. There are, for him, four recognisable mainsprings. Three 
are explicitly described in OBM, the fourth82 is implicit to his thoughts on asceticism and 
negation of the will to life.  
Schopenhauer tells us that for the most part, the concern for our own wellbeing drives 
us, and only by derivation are we also concerned for our own woe. This does not mean that 
wellbeing is positive and woe is negative. On the contrary, he argues that our woe is primary 
and hence announces itself. Our aim to alleviate our woe reflects our egoism. When we try 
to alleviate our own suffering, we aim to promote our own wellbeing. For example, our state 
of woe motivates us to alleviate it (i.e., presents itself as an object that motives us to react 
negatively towards it by moving away from it) under the presupposition that we aim for our 
wellbeing, i.e., we are driven by egoism. The alleviation of our own woe corresponds to our 
aiming for our wellbeing. We only try to alleviate our woe if we aim for our own wellbeing.  
The above distinction between one’s ‘state’ and ‘aim’ also helps nuance how motives 
differ from mainsprings. The motive concerns the agent’s ‘state’ in relation to our particular 
circumstances, whereas the mainspring concerns the agent’s ‘aim’ independently from the 
circumstances; it concerns his movement from this state into that. We should remember that 
the distinction is conceptual, however; it shows the source of an action as distinct from the 
 
                                               
80 Someone who operates in adherence to a religious doctrine that motivates her through the promise of punishment 
and reward in the afterlife seems to encapsulate this case. He puts it in the following manner: “furthermore, it can 
still be objected against any good action that issued solely from religious convictions that it was not disinterested, 
but rather occurred out of concern for reward and punishment, and consequently has no purely moral worth” (OBM, 
223). See also, (WR, 395f). 
81 The previous has implications for his views on virtue. Virtue in Schopenhauer’s philosophy represents the 
priority of a mainspring given a circumstance, but it likewise assumes a basic hierarchical order of our mainsprings, 
which he calls ‘temperament’. The virtuous character, in its formal or descriptive sense, is a specific organisation 
of mainsprings that consistently manifests in certain circumstance as this or that action.   
82 See Cartwright (2012, 27) for a discussion on the mainspring responsible for asceticism.  
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circumstances under which it arises. In our ordinary experiences, our states and aims come 
together and any distinction between them seems unrecognisable. Note, e.g., how we are 
likely to respond to thirst. Often, we unreflectively reach for the glass of water. Notice how 
we respond to another person’s suffering with our own suffering. Reflection can still be part 
of the process leading to action, but it changes nothing about what drives it. For example, 
we can respond to the discomfort of hunger by deliberating on whether we will have pasta 
or a sandwich, or if we should skip lunch entirely lest we miss an impending deadline and 
the anxiety associated with doing so. The previous shows two states of woe in relation to 
two different circumstances and object. The decision over the course of action to undertake 
shows us ‘who we are’ (or ‘what we aim for’). The latter are always positive. In other words, 
we base our choice to respond to the woe of hunger over that of our anxiety over the deadline 
in the aim to promote our own wellbeing. We may choose to respond to the deadline because 
missing it will inconvenience more than just ourselves, or we choose the deadline because 
we compromise our future needs by risking the loss of our job. Notice, then, that we can 
have the same circumstances and motives, i.e., to alleviate our woe (whether it is hunger or 
anxiety), but different mainsprings. Consequently, we need the recipient to characterise the 
mainspring of an action, too. If the woe is something someone else is subject to, then we 
can identify with her and aim to alleviate it for her sake. Alternatively, we can perceive her 
suffering as an opportunity to promote our good chances in a heavenly afterlife, or because 
we expect her to feel indebted to us. Let us assess and define the mainsprings he lays out. 
Schopenhauer argues the mainspring that aims to promote our own wellbeing, i.e., 
egoism (Selbstsucht), is our strongest. Egoism imparts efficacy on motives that promise the 
agent’s own wellbeing. By derivation from the previous, it imparts efficacy on motives that 
promise the agent’s own woe, i.e., threaten to negate our individual will or body. In egoism, 
we identify with our ‘individual’ will. Egoism is not only inherent to humans, but all living 
creatures, according to him: 
“The chief and fundamental incentive (Triebfeder) in a human being, as in an animal, 
is egoism, i.e. the urge to existence and wellbeing.” (OBM, 190) 
By the ‘urge to existence and wellbeing’, he means an individual’s existence and wellbeing. 
Human and animal egoism differ only by virtue of the distinctly human faculty of reason 
and reflection; human beings are self-interested. Peoccupation with our will characterises 
self-interest (Eigennutz) and egoism. We can define it as follows: 
Egoism: An action stems from egoism if and only if a) the recipient is the agent herself 
and, b) the action aims to promote her own wellbeing.83  
 
                                               
83 This relates to her woe as a consequence and derivation from the former and so as a logical correlate, i.e. only 
on the presupposition of aiming at her own wellbeing can we explain why she is moved to alleviate her current 
state of woe. 
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Egoism is the original and primary mainspring of our constitution, which he also construes 
as the “first simple affirmation of the will to life” (WR, 360) and “simply the affirmation of 
one’s own body” (ibid.). All living beings must, to a degree and thus by their very existence 
affirm their own body, because the continued existence of the body presupposes an action 
aiming to and succeeding in preserving it. He construes it as the basic and original striving 
of the will as such: it aims at the continued existence of the individual. If we identify with 
our will in this way and are recipients of our actions aiming to promote wellbeing, then they 
spring from egoism. For example, egoistically motivated agents run upon hearing a wolf’s 
howl, because the wolf’s possible attack impedes the pursuit of their wellbeing. He describes 
it in the following manner:  
“…he knows with complete certainty that this very self that is important above all 
else, this microcosm, of which the macrocosm, or his whole world, appears as the 
mere modification or accident, must be extinguished in death, which for him is thus 
synonymous with the extinction of the world.” (OBM, 191) 
 
 “…the human being unconditionally wills to preserve his existence, wills it 
unconditionally free from pains, including also from all lack and privation, wills every 
pleasure of which he is capable, and even seeks where possible to develop new 
capacities for pleasure.” (OBM, 190) 
The clearest characterisation of egoism is in terms of what we aim for, which allows us to 
link between egoism and the foundation of willing itself (or the ‘will to life’).84   
The above describes a constituent of our will (or character) whose defining feature 
is that objects promising our own wellbeing motivate us. Hence, to make sense of the above, 
it is useful to bear in mind the distinction between motives, mainsprings and character. A 
motive is the cognition that invites a particular course of action. A mainspring is how we 
organise and demarcate motives through their recipient (with whom we identify) and how 
the intentional object relates to a recipient’s wellbeing and woe, which shows what we aim 
for with our actions. Our character is a hierarchical composition of the various mainsprings.  
 The second mainspring Schopenhauer describes is ‘malice’, under which he groups 
spitefulness (Gehässigkeit), Schadenfreude85, envy, cruelty and illwill (Uebelwollen). He 
distinguishes them as follows: “envy and Schadenfreude are in themselves merely 
theoretical: practically they become malice and cruelty” (OBM, 194). What each have in 
common is that they harbor illwill towards another individual. Since we primarily concern 
 
                                               
84 The following passage further shows the relationship between egoism and the will to life, “thus, every cognising 
individual is in fact – and finds himself to be – the entire will to life, the in-itself of the world itself, the condition 
that completes the world as representation, and consequently a microcosm equal in value to the macrocosm”. He 
continues a few lines further down, “this outlook is egoism, which is essential to everything in nature” (WR, 358). 
85 Enjoyment of another’s woe.  
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with the perspective of action, I call it ‘malice’ as opposed to ‘Schadenfreude’. I will suggest 
the following definition: 
Malice: An action stems from malice if and only if a) its recipient is another agent, 
and b) it aims to promote the recipient’s woe.86  
An agent driven by malice harbors illwill towards another and aims at their woe; he aims to 
negate (or sabotage) either a specific aim a recipient may have or, in extreme cases, he aims 
to negate (or sabotage) the recipient entirely (i.e., her individual existence). Notice that for 
us to act maliciously, we must conceive of the recipient as willing, striving and so on. Malice 
is contrary to egoism where another’s woe, i.e., another’s failure to attain some end, can at 
most be a means to our wellbeing, but not an end in itself. Thus, we should distinguish the 
following: 
A) The pleasure a malicious agent feels at another’s woe after successful execution of 
an action aiming at another’s woe. 
B) The pleasure she feels when she succeeds in realising another’s woe.  
C) Her aiming at her own wellbeing.  
The pleasure in A results from the successful execution of an action aiming to bring about 
another’s woe irrespective of the realisation of the aim. This pleasure, as we said previously, 
follows all willing independent from the aim of the action. What characterises the particular 
mainspring is its aim, not the byproduct of all aim-oriented action. The pleasure in B arises 
from the realisation of the aim to bring about another’s woe and is constitutive of malice. B 
may be instrumental to egoism, which gives us the pleasure in C, but it is not intrinsic to it. 
Notice then that there is a subtle but crucial difference between egoism and malice, which 
rests on their aim, not necessarily the action itself. The same action can be both egoistic and 
malicious; as third-person observers or bystanders, we may not notice a difference without 
access to an agent’s aims, however.  
Though there is a difference in aim between egoism and malice, Schopenhauer still 
envisages a relationship between them:  
“Ill-will arises in large measure from the unavoidable collisions of egoism that occur 
at every step. It is also provoked objectively too, by the sight of the vices, failings, 
weaknesses, follies, deficiencies and imperfections of all kinds which to a greater or 
lesser extent everyone displays to others at least sometimes.” (OBM, 193)  
Our day-to-day contact with other people and the clashes of egoism are, according to him, 
a fertile ground of illwill and envy, but the latter arises from the recognition of a mismatch 
between our limitations and another’s. Malice is distinct from egoism in that it bears no 
essential relationship to the agent’s own wellbeing; a malicious agent is uninterested in his 
 
                                               
86 This relates to the wellbeing of the recipient as a derivation of the former, in other words, as far as the recipient’s 
wellbeing is a hindrance to b).   
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own wellbeing. To test the relationship between our egoism and malice we have to introduce 
a self-interested motive to our deliberation. If the self-interested motive does not stop the 
action, then malice drove it. We cannot deter a malicious agent from poisoning or murdering 
another by pointing out that they risk life imprisonment.   
The third mainspring that Schopenhauer lists is compassion (Mitleid) or sympathy 
(Theilnahme). Compassion, he contends, is the only moral mainspring whose actions possess 
genuine moral worth or that serve as an indicator of a moral character.87 His description of 
compassion takes under consideration a distinct capacity for abstract cognition and so, as 
with egoism and self-interest, he construes human beings as ‘disinterested’.88 I will suggest 
the following definition of compassion: 
Compassion: An action stems from compassion if and only if a) its recipient is another 
agent, and b) it aims to promote the recipient’s wellbeing.89 
An agent driven by compassion or sympathy aims to promote another’s wellbeing.90 The 
actions driven by compassion aim to promote another’s wellbeing, which we can construe 
as aiming to alleviate another’s woe. Nevertheless, there is no logical difference between 
the previous two aims.  
There is a fourth mainspring that Schopenhauer implicitly demonstrates, which I will 
briefly mention. He contends that this mainspring arises only in those few agents who have 
recognised the source of woe in the world and associated it with the will to life and so with 
the fundamental role of individuality and egoism in it. Upon this recognition, such agents 
aim to terminate willing and engage in the actions whose mainspring I will call asceticism, 
which I will define as follows: 
Asceticism: An action stems from asceticism if and only if a) its recipient is oneself 
and b) it aims to promote one’s own woe.91  
 
                                               
87 We can translate Mitleid literally as ‘suffering-with’, or ‘with-pain (sorrow)’.  
88 He tells us with respect to selflessness, “compassion is apparent in our heartfelt participation in the friend’s 
wellbeing and woe, and the selfless sacrifices made on account of the latter” (WR: 403). Also, “compassion, which 
has been proved as the sole source of disinterested actions and consequently as the true basis of morality” (OBM: 
232).  
89 This relates to the recipient’s woe as a logical correlate of B. For more on the problem of suffering and negative 
motivation see Janaway (1999, 318-343), and Soll (2012, 300-313).     
90 Schopenhauer says a lot more about compassion and its relation to morality and asceticism, but also its relation 
to malice and disinterestedness. I discuss these relations rigorously where I expound Schopenhauer’s criteria for 
moral worth. 
91 The way this relates to wellbeing is by derivation from the former, namely, that wellbeing inhibits b). The case 
of asceticism is more complicated than I have initially laid out here, and this complication will become apparent 
as we proceed to consider the will to life in the next section. The question of which will or body we identify with 
when we act from asceticism is not straightforward, and so I will leave this discussion for the section on asceticism 
below.  
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An agent driven by asceticism aims to promote her own woe. This, Schopenhauer argues, is 
a movement of the will towards negation or abolition of the will to life.92 In recognising that 
anothers’ suffering stems from her ‘urge to do something’, namely, from the will to life, the 
ascetic agent aims to negate it by promoting its opposite. She aims to inhibit her urges 
independent from their recipient by striving against and negating all motives that incite her 
to some action. It primarily aims at egoism because this is the strongest of all the mainsprings 
by its aiming to preserve one’s bodily existence, but it is not limited to this. Asceticism aims 
to negate the will to life, which includes both compassionate and malicious actions.  
Notice that apart from egoism, which is identifying with our own will and body, the 
other mainsprings imply that we do not identify with our own body, but we can identify with 
other people’s bodies and their needs; we can aim for their wellbeing or woe. The difference 
in identification would be impossible without our ability to aesthetically contemplate; even 
the vague and elusive asceticism is impossible without it. It allows us to perceive as willing 
in their own right (or agents) what we previously construed as objects for our own will or 
an independent will through which we vicariously enjoyed egoism. In short, we have to first 
perceive a target of cognition as willing, striving etc. such that we can aim for its wellbeing 
or woe. Only something with aims, values and ends, can we identify with and can be subject 
to wellbeing and woe. Only based on the previous (or following our projection of willing) 
can we act on another’s behalf, for another’s sake (or against it).  
I will briefly consider some objections to the above definitions of the mainsprings 
before I proceed. We can object that the above descriptions of compassion and egoism are 
un-Schopenhauerian by not taking into account his conception of happiness as synonymous 
with the removal of suffering or pain. I will aim to show that he can preserve his synonymy 
between happiness and the removal of suffering and claim that egoistic agents have the 
original aim of promoting their own wellbeing; but similarly, that compassionate agents 
have the original aim of promoting another’s wellbeing.  
Firstly, we ought to remember that we are investigating how the will works without 
bringing to bear any particular object; so, we are trying to characterise the will’s operations 
with the bare minimum from the objective world. Consequently, wellbeing and woe for 
Schopenhauer mean ‘in accordance’ and ‘in discordance’ with a will. This description states 
nothing about the particular intentional object of the will, it only lays claim to any particular 
object’s relationship to any particular will.  
Secondly, we should distinguish between mainsprings positively. Aiming for a lack, 
privation, failure or woe in some will, i.e., malice and asceticism are distinct from those that 
aim for pleasure, abundance, success or wellbeing, i.e., egoism and compassion. We can 
construe them as actions enabling and disabling some will. In both cases, they aim for a 
state of affairs correlative to the interests of some will; they are concerned with the success 
 
                                               
92 He defines it in the following manner, “I have often used the expression asceticism, and I understand by it, in 
the narrow sense, this deliberate breaking of the will by forgoing what is pleasant and seeking out what is 
unpleasant, choosing a lifestyle of penitence and self-castigation for the constant mortification of the will” (WR, 
419). 
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or failure of some will. Their difference lies only in the target of their aim. Accordingly, we 
need not necessarily construe the original will in a negative manner, as operating negatively 
or reactively. Even if we characterise it negatively, we succeed only in showing the other 
side of a logical equivalence. In so doing, we do not increase our knowledge of what willing 
is or consists in. What Schopenhauer is trying to show when he contends that compassion 
is the alleviation of woe is to indicate the object-relations that have to pertain for someone 
to be motivated to act in a compassionate manner, not to characterise the aim of compassion, 
which is positive.  
To defend the above, we ought to employ the distinction between the agent’s ‘state’ 
and ‘aim’, and take care to avoid a confusion. For example, the recognition of the state of 
woe in another moves us to alleviate it, precisely because we aim for her wellbeing. The state 
of woe is first in the causal process and its effect is an action aiming to promote wellbeing. 
Though woe may take precedence in the causal process leading to the action whose aim is 
wellbeing, and so logically entails its alleviation, it is obvious that we do not aim for woe. 
It is absurd for us to aim to alleviate that which we aim. Similarly, it is uninformative or a 
pleonasm if we claim that we are motivated to alleviate woe. Surely, what we aim for when 
we alleviate woe is its opposite, wellbeing, or what is in accordance with the will.  
To avoid unnecessary confusions we ought to characterise the will in terms of what 
it positively aims for as opposed to what it aims to avoid. We ought to do this in relation to 
how we transition between states, which shows the direction our will. To claim that we aim 
at the alleviation of woe is an indirect way of saying that we aim to promote wellbeing.There 
is, we can say, a logical not a motivational difference between the alleviation of woe and the 
promotion of wellbeing. Promotion of wellbeing remains constant, whereas the alleviation 
of woe only tells us how it is instantiated objectively; how it appears in relation to an object 
or object-relation. Lacking something motivates us. It kindles the flame that is our will, but 
only our aim and so our subsequent state characterises the will. It would have been better if 
he stated that an object is that on which we focus when we are in a particular state. The 
object does not tell us why we focus on it. What motivates us bears some relationship to our 
aim, but to recognise what kind of relationship it is, we require the action or response that 
it incited. The state-aim distinction can help make his categorisation of the mainsprings of 
our actions easier to follow. It is unfortunate Schopenhauer did not consider it as part of his 
conceptual tools, becuase it works coherently with his correlation theory of cognition.  
In sum, according to Schopenhauer, what drives our actions (or what explains an 
omission of action) relates to certain modifications of our body, which delineate the original 
aims of our will. A mainspring is an original aim and direction of the will that makes objects 
efficacious and determines whether it promises wellbeing or woe. All human actions can be 
traced to the various mainsprings, which, for him, can likewise jointly operate. Furthermore, 
all human beings are constituted by the mainspring: 
“The three fundamental ethical incentives (Grundtriebfedern) of human beings, 
egoism, malice, compassion, are present in each one in different and incredibly 
diverse proportions.” (OBM, 238) 
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The consistency of one mainspring over the others represents our character. Consequently, 
he claims: “only egoistic motives will have power over an egoistic character” (ibid.). He 
concludes that we cannot educate people on how to be, but realign their cognition to better 
correlate with their willing, which has implications for his views on morality:   
“On the contrary, all that we are able to do is to enlighten the head, to correct insight, 
to bring the human being to a more correct apprehension of what is objectively 
present, of the true circumstances of life. But in doing this nothing further is achieved 
than the constitution of his will laying itself open to view more consistently, clearly 
and decisively, expressing itself unfalsified.” (OBM, 240)  
Cognition can affect how we act by providing an inadequate and falsified representation of 
the circumstances, either through omission of parts of those circumstance or by someone’s 
rhetoric, which engenders a falsified motive. Alternatively, cognition can show us a clear 
representation that permits our will to express itself clearly and wholly. Therefore, we can 
enhance and refine cognition of things, not change one’s character, which is predominantly 
unalterable.93 We can offer a better relationship between the intellect and will, and so clearer 
self-expression through the correct knowledge of the world and self-knowledge.  
The above shows that there is a symmetry and harmony in Schopenhauer’s thoughts 
on the will’s mainsprings facilitated by the will-intellect distinction and correlation theory 
of cognition.94 Prior to assessing compassion and self-knowledge in his philosophy, I will 
introduce and elaborate on a distinction between the mainsprings and the ‘will to life’. The 
latter plays a central role, but it has likewise engendered varied and deep confusions in the 
philosophical commentary on his thoughts, which I also discuss below.  
 
                                               
93 I say ‘predominantly’, because he seemingly argues that we have the freedom to affirm or deny the will; some 
individuals can attain a state of grace through abolishing the will to life. It is uncertain to what degree this abolition 
too rests on the will and so on one’s character, because of his introduction of asceticism as a mainspring and thus 
a constituent of the will. This state of grace constitutes a change in the will to some extent, but we are unsure about 
what motivates us towards it other than the will itself. I call it unusual because the state itself is not wellbeing since 
there is no willing, but also not woe even if woe somehow ‘causes’ grace. Nevertheless, he argues that grace can 
come from our promoting our own woe. He suggests that it comes from intense suffering, “…proximity of death 
and hopelessness is not absolutely necessary for such a reformation (Läuterung) through suffering. Even without 
it, great misfortune and pain can lead to the violent obtrusion of cognition of the conflict of the will to life with 
itself, and the nothingness of all striving becoming evident.” (WR, 421)  
94 Schopenhauer claims the following about his philosophy: “A system of thoughts must always have an 
architectonic coherence, i.e. a coherence in which one part always supports another without the second supporting 
the first, so the foundation stone will ultimately support all the parts without itself being supported by any of them, 
and the summit will be supported without itself supporting anything” (WR, 5). 
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1.11 The Will to Life 
Schopenhauer defines the ‘will to life’ at the start of the fourth book of WR. The passage I 
have in mind is the following, admittedly convoluted one, which merits quoting in full: 
“Regarded simply in itself, the will is just a blind and inexorable impulse, devoid of 
cognition; this is how we have seen it appear in inorganic and vegetative nature and 
their laws, as well as in the vegetative aspect of our own lives. With the emergence 
of the world as representation (which has developed to serve the will) the will obtains 
cognition of its willing and what it wills: namely, nothing other than this world, life, 
precisely as it exists. That is why we called the appearing world the mirror of the will, 
its objecthood: and since what the will wills is always life, precisely because life is 
nothing but the presentation of that willing for representation, it is a mere pleonasm 
and amounts to the same thing if, instead of simply saying ‘the will’, we say ‘the will 
to life’.” (WR, 301) 
The faculty of reason, which is specific to the human intellect and whose primary purpose 
is to service the will with cognition of something upon which it can act, permits human 
beings to acquire insight into the willing of both organic and inorganic objects. This insight 
rests on the projection of willing inherent to aesthetic contemplation, which allows us to 
perceive a target of cognition as a willing thing rather than an object or motive for the will. 
I will try to bring our attention to an overlooked ambiguity in his use of the ‘will’ (Wille). 
This ambiguity is between the following references to the will: 
A) The will of individual things (e.g., a human being, a stone, a plant and an animal or 
even the Ideas of each one of these). 
B) The will ‘regarded simply in itself’ or, as he also clarifies, the will “free of every 
form of cognition” (WR, 153).  
The above are different uses of the ‘will’ that often lead to confusions. I discuss one of these 
confusions in the coming sections, but, for now, let us closely analyse what these different 
uses of ‘the will’ might be. 
Schopenhauer sometimes use the concept of ‘will’ to denote our mainsprings, but 
likewise to refer to the strivings of inorganic objects, or to the impulses in plant, or even to 
animals’ instincts. We should also include the various Ideas as tokens of this use of the will, 
since he takes the will to be “the thing in itself, and the Idea to be the immediate objecthood 
of that will on a specific level” (WR, 192). We might call the previous the ‘individuated use’ 
of ‘will’ or ‘individual will’, for brevity.  
The ‘individual’ will requires a distinction between one thing and another, which 
thereby entails cognition of something and the PSR. It presupposes a multiplicity of things, 
which includes its application to our mainsprings. In other words, there is a ‘mainspring of 
action’ if and only if we presuppose cognition of something and, equally, other mainsprings 
in juxtaposition to it. Furthermore, there is no such thing as a plant unless there are other 
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things we can juxtapose them to and on which we base our distinction; the same is the case 
with any ‘individual’ thing. Something (or someone) is individual by virtue of its 
juxtaposition to something (or someone) else, which we perceive as individual. Accordingly, 
whatever we claim about an individual will presupposes a distinction and juxtaposition 
between one ‘thing’ and another, which grounds its individuality.  
This typifies ‘individuation’, which he also calls the ‘principium individuationis’ (PI) 
or ‘objecthood of the will’: 
“We know that multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by time and space 
and is thinkable only through them; in this respect, we call them the principium 
individuationis. But we have recognised time and space as forms of the principle of 
sufficient reason, a principle that expresses all our a priori cognition. However, as we 
discussed earlier, this only affects whether things can be cognised, it does not affect 
the things themselves, i.e. it is only the form of our cognition, not a property of the 
thing in itself; as such, the thing in itself is free of every form of cognition, even the 
most general, that of being an object for a subject, i.e. it is something wholly and 
completely distinct from representation.” (WR, 152-3) 
The will conceived as individual is thus fundamentally relational or presupposes relations, 
which, in turn, presupposes the cognition of something, anything whatsoever by someone. 
Accordingly, what we cognise is individuated and the most objective cognition we can have 
of something is its Idea, which is also relational.  
At other times, however, he uses the ‘will’ to denote movement, change or action of 
any kind irrespective of its direction or the object that moves. The faculty of reason, which 
“allows us to survey the whole in the abstract” (WR, 301), allows us to project the will in 
this way. Nevertheless, reason is not enough to yield anything remotely as meaningful as our 
will and so we correspondingly rely on imagination to render this concept meaningful. The 
following passage summarises the above: 
“Once we have seen all this it will not take any great stretch of the imagination to 
recognise (despite its distance from our own essence) the very same thing that in us 
pursues its goal illuminated by cognition while here, in the weakest of its appearances, 
it is blind, dull, one-sided and unalterable in its striving. Nonetheless, because it is 
everywhere one and the same, – just as the first light of dawn shares the name sunlight 
with the bright rays of noon, – it must be called will here as well as there, a name 
signifying the being in itself of every thing in the world and the sole kernel of every 
appearance.” (WR, 143) 
We can call this the ‘metaphysical or general use’ of the will or ‘metaphysical will’, for 
brevity. He applies this use to any target of cognition undergoing change or moving. This is 
likewise the same use of ‘will’ we find in what he later calls the ‘will to life’: 
“That is why we called the appearing world the mirror of the will, its objecthood: and 
since what the will wills is always life, precisely because life is nothing but the 
presentation of that willing for representation, it is a mere pleonasm and amounts to 
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the same thing if, instead of simply saying ‘the will’, we say ‘the will to life’.” (WR, 
301) 
There is an impasse between the ‘individual’ and ‘metaphysical’ will, however, which is 
apparent when we inquire into the conceptual status of the ‘will to life’. If the only kind of 
cognition we can have is cognition of something, then what is the will to life other than a 
construct of reason that abstractly unifies distinct cognitions (or objectivations) of the will?  
To answer the above and thereby make Schopenhauer’s ‘will to life’ meaningful and 
coherent we should recall that his metaphysics has a natural basis. He does not confuse the 
metaphysical for the supernatural or immaterial. The will to life is metaphysical in the 
following senses: 
A) It accompanies all movements irrespective of their form or direction, which we thus 
project onto a target of cognition.  
B) We do not perceive the will to life, but only the movements to which it corresponds, 
which we base on the first-person experience of a movement of our own body. 
The will to life appears as ‘deliberate’ or ‘motivated’ movement in human beings and some 
animals, but it is not limited to deliberation or motivation alone; it encapsulates ‘stimulation’ 
and ‘causality’, too. Thus, deliberation, motivation, stimulation and causality are seemingly 
expressions of the so-called ‘will to life’. It is a blanket term that he applies to all perceptible 
changes in the targets of our cognition. Yet, recall that we only cognise an individual thing, 
so what is the corresponding cognitive target of the ‘will to life’? What is the ‘individual 
thing’ to which the will to life corresponds?  
Furthermore, why did Schopenhauer introduce the ‘will to life’ to shed light on the 
significance of movements and the changes in the targets of cognition when the ‘individual 
will’ is seemingly enough? Why is the apparently groundless proposition that ‘a target of 
cognition X undergoes change Y because this is what X wills and all willing is groundless’ 
satisfactory? As far as my reading permits, Schopenhauer does not answer this question. It 
is also surprising he introduces this term at all when we consider the following claims: 
“According to all we have said, when the will is illuminated by cognition it always 
knows what it wills here, what it wills now; but never what it wills in general: every 
particular act has a goal; but the whole of willing has none: just as every particular 
appearance of nature is determined by a sufficient cause to enter at this place, in this 
time, but the force manifesting itself in general in the appearance does not have a 
cause, because such a force is a level of appearance of the thing in itself, of the 
groundless will.” (WR, 189) 
Schopenhauer risks reducing his insight that ‘the will’ and ‘will to life’ are equivalents to a 
tautology. We notice this tautology clearly in the following clarification, which argues that 
the will to life is the objective correlate or ‘mirror’ of the will as thing in itself: 
“Since the will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essential aspect of the world, 
while life, the visible world, appearance, is only the mirror of the will; life will be as 
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inseparable from the will as a shadow from its body. And where there is will, there 
will be life and world as well. So for the will to life, life is a certainty, and as long as 
we are filled with life-will, we do not need to worry about our existence, even in the 
face of death.” (WR, 301) 
The will to life, then, is the self-conscious recognition of the identity between willing and 
life. Does the previous proposition advance our insight in any way, however? The ‘will to 
life’ refers to what we cannot possibly make a target of cognition, i.e., the thing in itself. 
The ‘will to life’ refers to the ‘metaphysical will’, which is what we cannot possibly make 
an object of cognition, because nothing corresponds to it in the objective world; except, as 
he would claim, the world itself, but this is also unhelpful. What sense do we make of these 
concepts of the world itself or the will to life or the will (or willing) as such?  
 To begin making sense of the ‘will to life’, we should recall what he claims about 
‘concepts’, or the so-called products of reason: 
“…the whole essence of an abstract representation lies in just one single thing: its 
relation to another representation, its cognitive ground. Now to start with, this ground 
can be another concept, i.e. another abstract representation; and even this concept can 
itself have another such abstract cognitive ground. But not forever: in the end, the 
series of cognitive grounds must terminate with a concept that has its ground in 
intuitive cognition. For the world of reflection as a whole is based on the intuitive 
world as its cognitive ground. The class of abstract representations is therefore 
distinguished from other classes in this way: in other classes, the principle of 
sufficient reason always demands some relation to another representation of the same 
class; but in the case of abstract representations, it ultimately demands a relation to a 
representation from another class.” (WR, 64) 
Assuming that the ‘will to life’ is a concept of reason, which “continually allows us to survey 
the whole in the abstract” (WR, 301), how do we render it meaningful? Given the above 
claim about concepts of reason, it must refer to something we have an intuitive cognition of 
from which we extend its application in scope.  
We remember that Schopenhauer initially introduces the will to shed light on 
morphology and aetiology. His dissatisfaction with the scientific approach to metaphysical 
concerns with ‘what there is’ (or what is ultimately real) led him to postulate the ‘will’ as 
this meaningful ground:  
“But if we devote ourselves to this teaching [morphology and aetiology in mechanics, 
physics, chemistry and physiology] we soon realise that the information we are 
looking for does not belong to aetiology any more than it belongs to morphology. The 
latter presents us with an infinite variety of innumerable forms that are clearly related 
through an unmistakable family resemblance; these are representations that will 
forever remain foreign to us if we approach them along this path; looking at them 
only in this way, they stand before us like hieroglyphs we do not comprehend.” (WR, 
121) 
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The best these ‘paths’ offers us regarding what is true or real is an unknown albeit relatively 
stable quality denoted by the concept of a natural force and its ostensibly mathematical 
conditions of appearance in accordance with fixed rules. These are dissatisfactory for 
illustrating the significance or meaningfulness of these forces, however. These forces, he 
contends, ‘remain foreign to us’: they are ‘hieroglyphs we do not comprehend’. His aim, 
then, is to make natural forces, which allegedly explain the consistent activities, operations 
and relations between objects in the objective world more familiar and so to determine their 
meaning or significance (Bedeutung) to us. To arrive at the latter, we must project something 
of ourselves.  
We compromise our scientific objectivity by creating an unbridgeable gap between 
‘the target of our cognition’ and ‘ourselves’. It prevents us from having complete cognition 
of it as it is in itself or as it is independent from its use(s) to us. To do this we need to project 
willing and-or a sense of goal-directedness on the target. He recognises that ‘will’ is not 
enough for the meaning he wants, because willing is directional; it aims at something, it has 
a target(s). There is apparently more to the target of cognition than what aesthetic 
contemplation yields. What more than the previous can he propose that will accord with the 
limits of cognition? He introduces the ‘will to life’, which, presented this way, seems a mere 
tautology. I will attempt to propose something about the will to life that is in accordance 
with his philosophy, but that is also more meaningful than this tautology. In any case, I omit 
that this is stretching his claims and that a detailed debate on the exact status of the will to 
life or the metaphysical use of the ‘will’ is pressing.      
Schopenhauer’s characterisation of the metaphysical will as the will to life is an 
attempt to find the intentional object of willing as such without distinguishing one object 
from another (i.e., without an appeal to the PI or PSR). The intentional object of willing as 
such must not be an object in the strict sense, e.g., a stone or an event. It is something as far 
from a particular object or an event as is possible for cognition. It must be broad enough to 
avoid the distinction between one thing and another and thus avoid conflating it for the 
individual will. However, it must also be narrow enough to be meaningful and thus refer to 
something. This seems like a conceptual impossibility. Based on his views on aesthetic 
contemplation, we know he intends the ‘felt consciousness’ to do the work he needs to make 
meaningful the will to life. Let us flesh this concept out, however.  
Schopenhauer moved from the inside out in his attempt to render natural forces 
meaningful for us, here we see him doing something similar to render the willing that 
apparently permeates all targets of cognition meaningful by proposing its general direction 
or intentional object. He does not suggest the intentional object of an individual target of 
cognition, but the intentional object of the need to cognise or do anything at all. He achieves 
this by projecting something characteristic of human agents. We can find this ‘something’, 
I think, in our actions and the ‘sense of self’ associated with the actions we undertake when 
they are intentional or aim at something we see as a motive. We should not confuse the latter 
for projection of one mainspring (e.g. egoism, compassion etc.), but projection of our ‘urge’ 
to act or do something, which we can see as a precondition of the differences in mainsprings.  
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Schopenhauer’s metaphysical concerns then begin with our personal purposes in life, 
but it culminates in the same purposiveness and significance of life taken as a whole in 
accordance with our cognitive limits. He recognises that the significance of an object of our 
cognition always appears with a correlate movement or alteration in our body.95 This means 
that our sense of self (or our being anything at all instead of nothing) invests in movements 
of the body and thus in actions. Our sense of self does not invest in any specific aim, but in 
aiming itself and so in doing something, anything whatsoever. Consequently, the will to life 
is the urge to have an aim, i.e., the urge to do something; it is the urge to direct our focus 
towards something, anything whatsoever with a view to acting upon it.  
In sum, we can distinguish two kinds of claims featuring the ‘will’, in Schopenhauer. 
We have, on the one hand, claims made about an individuated will, which presupposes a 
distinction and a relation between individual ‘things’. On the other hand, there are claims 
made about the metaphysical will, which concerns the urge to do something, anything 
whatsoever. The latter serves as the precondition of change or movement. Schopenhauer 
construes all targets of our cognition as instantiations of the urge to do something appearing 
under the PSR. Thus, the PI is the PSR seen through aesthetic contemplation. All motivation 
(mainsprings), stimulation (stimuli) and causation (causes) relate to the will to life, so, we 
can describe them in relation to it. The will to life is not one kind of motivation distinct from 
another, however. It is the urge, the spark, or oomph accompanying all movement or change.  
This double application of the will also generates confusions in the commentary and 
interpretations of his philosophy.96 We confuse these different uses of the will because we 
cannot distinguish moments where he refers to an individual will, which is set up in relation 
to another will, from moments where he refers to the metaphysical will or the will to life. 
The difference between these two uses is in their scope: one use is broader than the other, 
but both refer to different expressions of the same thing, i.e., movement or change. Although 
all individual things that strive also experience (or identify) with the will to life, we acquire 
no insight into their individuality if we construe them as tokens or instantiations of the will 
to life and leave it at that. The individual will aims at this kind of life, which makes sense 
only in juxtaposition to that kind of life. In short, it always presupposes this in juxtaposition 
to that; i.e., it is relational.  
The individual will and its identical object (i.e. the body and its mainsprings for 
human beings, the forces of ‘rigidity’ and ‘gravity’ for stones, ‘life-impulses’ for plants and 
‘instincts’ for animals) are relational. According to Schopenhauer, we all identify with the 
will to life, but this differs from the claim that we or I (as George or Mike, Suzy or Janice) 
are the will to life. Individuality requires us to distinguish ourselves from something else; 
the claim that we are the ‘will to life’ does not capture this distinction and so it is, at best, a 
 
                                               
95 Wille denotes both the reflective and unreflective instances of embodied motivation.Thus, Schopenhauer he has 
in mind the object-directedness that characterises our bodily vicissitudes and impulses, rather than any one impulse 
or direction.  
96 One confusion is apparent in what the philosophical commentary calls the ‘metaphysical egoism objection’. I 
will assess the limits and merits of this objection in a subsequent section. 
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precondition of individuality. The will to life blankets over anything that changes, moves or 
experiences urges. It is more accurate to argue that we experience the will to life, or we are 
instantiations of it, rather than saying that we are the will to life. The latter would entail our 
inevitable cessation as the individuals that we are; it would mean our death. Therefore, as 
individuals, we can speak about life itself and speak about the will to a kind of life, but we 
cannot say that we are the will to life without making a fundamental mistake in expression 
that spawns confusions.   
The two uses of the will in his philosophy help us avoid a confusion that leads us to 
comprehend the will to life as someone’s or something’s property. When we speak of my or 
Jane’s will to life, we make a fundamental error and confuse the two uses of the will. There 
is no such thing as ‘the will to life’. I am who I am, just as Jane is who she is, not because 
of the will to life, but because of what I and she will; we both experience the urge to do 
something and we put it towards different ends and at different times such that this urge 
objectivates or individuates as different things or people. There are no different wills to life 
even if, as the ‘individuals’ that we are, we will different things at different times, which we 
must to be individuals in the first place. We share the urge to do something with all other 
targets of cognition, but what makes us individuals is not the urge to do something, but its 
target or direction, i.e., our actions. The main difference between the two uses of the will is 
that the one is individuated (me, it, us or them) and the other is a blanket term.  
The two distinct uses on the will often leads us to confounding an individual or our 
individual urges, i.e., a mainspring (compassion, egoism, malice etc.), with how we make 
these changes meaningful in the objective sense97, whether they are our bodily changes or 
of our target of cognition seen as separate and distinct from us. There is thus a difference in 
degree and complexity between motivation, stimulation and causation, for Schopenhauer. I 
will argue below that our motivations and their corresponding actions either enhance or 
thwart, enable or disable the will to life. The previous is the only way we can begin to explain 
the role each mainspring plays in life and how the will to life features in our actions. The 
will to life itself is not one motivation, stimulation, or causation distinct from another, nor 
can it be identical with any one of them taken individually. 
The will to life is also a limited concept. We can recognise this limit if we take the 
two uses of the will together while bearing in mind their differences. They permit us to 
understand what he means by the following admittedly vague and misleading description of 
the will to life:  
“… it becomes evident that I have rightly declared the will-to-live to be that which is 
incapable of further explanation, but is the basis of every explanation; and that, far 
from being an empty-sounding word, like the Absolute, the infinite, the idea, and 
 
                                               
97 What I mean by ‘the objective sense’ is his linking of the will to life with the aesthetic view of the world. After 
the distinct encounter with the felt consciousness, which is clearest in his discussion of the sublime and which 
impels us to inquire into the significance, meaning or value of life as such independent of this or that form of life.  
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other similar expressions, it is the most real thing we know, in fact the kernel of reality 
itself.” (WRII, 351) 
Notice that he construes the will to life as ‘the basis of every explanation’ and as ‘the most 
real thing we know’. The fact that he says ‘we know’ as opposed ‘there is’, which implies 
epistemic limitations is not arbitrary. He is aware that calling the forces of nature ‘will’ and 
claiming that all willing that permeates nature aims at life is nothing other than a projection, 
i.e., our projection. Only by this introspective route can we have a meaningful grasp of the 
thing in itself. Our projection lets us familiarise with the ‘foreign’ or ‘hieroglyphic’ natural 
forces underpinning the natural order of events in the world. What applies to the ‘will to 
life’ and what applies to the ‘individual will’ differ, but he does not make this difference 
sufficiently clear. Nevertheless, the following shows the epistemic and metaphysical status 
of the will to life: 
“…being-known of itself contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is known is 
as such only phenomenon. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing-
in-itself, which we know (erkennen) most immediately in the will, may have, entirely 
outside all possible phenomenon, determinations, qualities, and modes of existence 
which for us are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible, and which then 
remain as the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, when this, as explained in the fourth 
book, has freely abolished itself as will, has thus stepped out of the phenomenon 
entirely, and as regards our knowledge, that is to say as regards the world of 
phenomena, has passed over into empty nothingness. If the will were positively and 
absolutely the thing-in-itself, then this nothing would be absolute, instead of which it 
expressly appears to us there only as a relative nothing.” (WRII, 198) 
The will to life then is the most approximate ‘knowledge’ of the direction of life, i.e., the 
movement and changes we cognise. Life as we experience it limits our ‘knowledge’ of the 
direction of life itself.98 Nevertheless, the will to life is a by-product of the most genuinely 
objective stance we can take following the recognition that we are both willing and, by our 
identity with our body, likewise an object among objects. Schopenhauer gave the aesthetic 
world-view a higher truth-value than the scientific world-view. If we can explain anything 
at all in a meaningful manner, he argues, we do so through the will to life, which is the limit 
of the meaningfulness of the concepts of reason, specifically, the thing in itself. Anything 
 
                                               
98 An anthropomorphism of the will as thing in itself happens here that he believes cannot be escaped if we are to 
say or determine anything about the significance of the thing in itself. Consider what he says about theoretical 
egoism: “since our knowledge will always be bound up with and limited by our individuality, everyone can 
necessarily be only one thing while having cognition of everything else; and in fact, this limitation of cognition is 
what gives rise to the need for philosophy” (WR, 129). Therefore, some projection onto nature, people and objects, 
i.e., our experience of the world is inescapable. In Schopenhauer’s defence, this projection need not, and certainly 
must not, be our projecting onto the world of one kind of motivation distinct from another. It can be and I argue it 
is projection of what for us is a precondition of all motivation, it constitutes the bridge between ourselves and the 
world. This precondition is that to feel the urge to act individuates us and so is equivalent to being someone and-
or something instead of nothing at all.     
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outside these limits will remain foreign and incomprehensible to us or they will be a relative 
“nothing” (WR, 437). Similarly, the meaning of anything outside of these limits would be 
dubious and remain dubious for us; it is likewise dubious that we will be able think about 
(or direct our attention towards) what lies outside these limits. Individuals who negate the 
will to life are incommensurable with our world-view and thus incomprehensible to us. We 
cannot understand them and evaluate their way of life; it is essentially meaningless to us.  
In sum, the ‘will to life’ is an epistemic concept that differs from the (individual) 
‘will’ in scope; it is a blanket term aiming to render meaningful the changes we perceive in 
the targets of our cognition. Next, I will assess the difference between selflessness and 
compassion with the aim of demonstrating what he takes to be the ground of morally worthy 
actions.  
1.12 The Difference between Selflessness and Compassion 
(Mitleid) 
Schopenhauer’s search for the sole moral mainspring is the central concern of OBM. This 
search begins with an analysis of what he characterises as the main moral phenomena, i.e., 
actions of freely willed justice and genuine loving kindness. Before proceeding to analyse 
what grounds morally worthy actions, I will discuss a crucial distinction that underpins this 
analysis, which has significant bearing on his views on morality.  
Schopenhauer distinguishes the moral worth from the legal soundness of any action. 
Thus, morality is distinct from the law of the land, which he also refers to as a ‘community’ 
or ‘state’ (cf. WR, 363). What makes an action morally worthy differs from what makes it 
legally sound. The mainspring of an action and therefore an agent’s character and-or virtue 
play a central and defining role in the moral evaluation of an action. We cannot reduce the 
moral worth of an action to whether or not the agent acted in accordance or in discordance 
with the law or her (dis)obedience to custom, according to him. The reason he gives is that 
the law focuses on the immediate consequences to the recipient of an action, ignoring the 
action’s aim, which plays a central role in our moral evaluation of it.99 Morality, he claims, 
 
                                               
99 To further nuance the difference between morality and legislation consider what he says about the state’s 
relationship to the unlawful agent’s disposition: “the state takes absolutely no notice of the will or the disposition 
merely as such; it only cares about the deed… (whether it be attempted or executed), because the correlate of 
doing, on the other side, is suffering: so the deed, the event, is the only thing that the state takes to be real: the 
disposition, the intention is investigated only to the extent that it can shed light on the meaning of the deed. Thus 
the state does not forbid anyone from thinking incessantly about murdering and poisoning someone as long as it 
is sure that fear of the sword and the wheel will keep this will constantly in check.” (WR, 370-1). 
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focuses on what drove or underpinned the action; it is more concerned with our character.100 
Legislation attempts to limit and thus demotivate the socially harmful effects of an action, 
but is (or in principle should be) silent over what drives an action. Thus, the circumstances 
and the customs of a community101 determine the socially harmful effects of an action, but 
what is common in each case is that they are neutral in their evaluation of the mainsprings 
of an action independent from its effect.102 For example, legislation is not against egoism or 
in principle against any mainspring. It is against the harmful effects and so consequences of 
any action, whose basis can be any mainspring.103 By contrast, morality is concerned only 
with the character of agents and so the meaning or significance of their action. Accordingly, 
morality cannot coherently take a similarly neutral perspective on a mainspring as we saw 
with the state. Morality evaluates all of mainsprings because it represents one mainspring’s 
superiority over others. We can argue that he construed morality as a positive ‘ideal’ to 
which we commit. Nevertheless, morality is concerned with the mainspring of an action and 
legislation focuses on its consequences. Legislation governs actions themselves independent 
from their mainspring, whereas morality governs the mainsprings of an action. The two can 
and do overlap, but Schopenhauer is concerned less with the overlaps than with showing 
how they differ fundamentally.  
Schopenhauer’s introduction of the maxims for morally worthy actions aims to show 
us how to recognise or distinguish morally worthy actions from their counterparts. These 
maxims are not normative principles for generating morally worthy actions; they are not 
rules of thumb we can use when deliberating on and choosing how we should act. They are 
criteria that help us recognise the mainspring of an action with the aim of distinguishing 
morality worthy from morally unworthy actions. The moral relevance of any action rests on 
what it tells us about an agent’s character, rather than the performance of it or her ability to 
perform it and its consequences, which is the fundamental concern of legislation.  
From the outset, Schopenhauer tells us that the moral mainspring is compassion 
(Mitleid), which is in keeping with his views on morality as an ‘ideal’. He supports his ideal 
by utilising our intuitions on the grounds of certain actions. He begins with negative criteria 
that aim to distinguish an action of moral worth from its opposite. He aims to demonstrate 
 
                                               
100 The following passage is exemplary of his account of morality: “the object under consideration for morality, 
the only thing morality takes to be real, is the will, the disposition… accordingly, it will condemn one who wills 
in this [wrong] way as unjust from its seat of judgement” (WR, 370). 
101 The following passages exemplify Schopenhauer’s views on the relationship between morality and legislation: 
“legislation, will borrow from morality this chapter containing the doctrine of right and use it for its own purpose; 
this is the chapter that discusses the inner meaning of right and wrong and also determines the precise boundary 
between them” (WR, 371). See also: “Positive legislation is thus an application of the reverse side of the purely 
moral doctrine of right. This application can take place in the light of the distinctive conditions and circumstances 
of a particular people” (WR, 373). Morality then determines the boundaries between right and wrong and the state 
makes sure that nobody crosses them and makes sure to punish those that do.  
102 Consider the following quote regarding non-harmful egoistic motivation: “if we could think of someone doing 
wrong in a way that did not involve another party being wronged, the state, to be consistent, could not prohibit 
such a deed” (WR, 370). 
103 Consider what he claims about the state’s relationship to egoism: “the state, in endeavouring to further the 
common good, is not directed against egoism but only against the detrimental effects of egoism” (WR, 372). 
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how we can arrive at what is morally worthy from the negation of what is not or cannot 
possibly be using our intuitions as the guiding threads. He expresses the previous clearly in 
what he claims are the two morally exemplary kinds of actions, i.e., freely willed justice and 
genuine loving kindness. He uses these actions as intuitive anchors.  
My approach will be to clarify Schopenhauer’s strategy of appealing to intuitions by 
analysing his claims in terms of the criteria for morally worthy actions. An action is morally 
worthy if and only if A) the motive that underpins it was not self-interested:  
“…the discovery of a self-interested motive entirely removes the moral worth of an 
action if it was the only motive, and reduces it if it had an accessory effect…” (OBM, 
197) 
If the action is egoistic, then it cannot be morally worthy. Furthermore, if egoism partook 
in the action, then the action’s moral worth is ‘reduced’. Nevertheless, we should distinguish 
the mainspring of actions from the action’s self-reference or its being our action, which is 
pertinent with respect to comprehending what makes an action egoistic. We have ownership 
over our actions, which is not reducible to our action’s aim. Therefore, our identifying with 
our actions does not imply that its aim is self-interested or egoistic. More importantly, we 
should distinguish ‘taking an interest’ in something from being self-interested. Interest in a 
target of cognition is the logical correlate of an agential action or a response to something. 
As we saw previously, we take different kinds of interest on something, which correspond 
to different aims. Therefore, morally worthy actions arise from a ‘selfless’ and ‘interested’ 
mainspring. 
Note from A above that the mainspring of malice satisfies it. Nevertheless, intuition 
suggests that malice cannot be moral. Once again, Schopenhauer arrives at his rejection of 
malice by elimination and utilising our intuitions. In addition to condition A, our actions are 
morally worthy if and only if B) they promote another’s wellbeing. He defends the previous 
as follows, which suggests a deduction, but is in fact an extension of his appeal to intuitions:  
“It could indeed be objected that actions of pure malice and cruelty are also not self-
interested: however, it is plain to see that these cannot be meant here, since they are 
the opposite of the actions under discussion.” (OBM, 197) 
Given that both malice and compassion are selfless or un-egoistic, based on A, we can argue 
that both are morally worthy. However, there is an implicit distinction between the moral 
worth and the moral relevance of an action. Malice does not accord with our intuitions and 
fails to be the ground of freely willed justice and genuine loving kindness; it lacks moral 
worth. Nonetheless, it is morally relevant and more relevant than egoism. Malice is immoral, 
i.e., it is both selfless and morally reprehensible. Selflessness, then, seemingly defines moral 
relevance, but it is insufficient to account for morally worthy actions in juxtaposition to 
morally worthless or reprehensible ones. Egoism is morally worthless, but it is not, like 
malice, morally reprehensible. Egoism is morally ‘worthless’ or ‘amoral’ in that it renders 
actions morally neutral, whereas malice is morally ‘reprehensible’ or ‘immoral’ in that it 
fundamentally opposes morality. We have instances where egoism promotes another’s 
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wellbeing, but as a byproduct of promoting one’s own wellbeing, but malice cannot possibly 
promote another’s wellbeing. 
In sum, Schopenhauer’s criteria focus entirely on determining the ‘mainspring’ of 
those action(s) we intuitively deem as morally worthy, i.e., freely willed justice and genuine 
loving kindness. Morality is not concerned with an action’s consequences to the recipient, 
but with what drives it, which he also construes as the ground. Criteria A and B are jointly 
sufficient for representing the ground or source of freely willed justice and genuine loving 
kindness, which he construes as tokens of morally worthy actions.   
Since egoism and malice cannot possibly be the moral mainsprings, then the options 
available to Schopenhauer from his battery of mainsprings are asceticism and compassion. 
He mentions asceticism’s relationship to morality in OBM: 
“If there really are genuine moral motives against suicide, then they lie very deep and 
are not to be reached with the plumb line of the usual ethics in any case; they belong 
rather to a higher mode of consideration than is appropriate even to the standpoint of 
the present essay.” (OBM, 132) 
In the footnote to this passage, he claims that these grounds are ‘ascetic’, which implies a 
confusion of asceticism with morality; he then refers his readers to the fourth book of his 
WR. He was not as explicit in his analysis of the relationship between moral and ascetic 
actions, but he did remark on the transition from ‘virtue’ to ‘asceticism’, which shows he 
accepts a distinction between morality and asceticism: 
“The phenomenon in which this is revealed is the transition from virtue to asceticism. 
Specifically, he is no longer satisfied with loving others as himself and doing as much 
for them as for himself; instead, he has conceived a loathing for the essence that is 
expressed as his own appearance, the will to life, the kernel and essence of that world 
he recognises as a miserable place.” (WR, 407) 
Schopenhauer distinguishes compassion from asceticism, but he seemingly also construes 
them as part of a continuum, which shows in his conception of them as a transition and 
through the operative phrase of ‘no longer satisfied’. Nevertheless, this ‘continuum’ and 
‘satisfaction’ suggest a particular direction and thus it confounds the two mainsprings. This 
misleads us and demonstrates Schopenhauer’s ambivalence over the relationship between 
morality and asceticism (more on this in later chapters).  
Schopenhauer characterises asceticism as negation of the will to life, i.e., it aims to 
promote the agent’s own woe using her body as its intentional object. If promoting the 
recipient’s wellbeing entails promoting our own woe, then asceticism can generate morally 
worthy actions. Asceticism can incite a ‘seemingly’ moral action if the action entails the 
agent’s woe. Notice, however, that we do not ordinarily aim to promote our own woe when 
we act out of freely willed justice or genuine loving kindness. Instead, we focus on her 
wellbeing and woe, not on its implications for our own wellbeing and woe. Accordingly, 
our intuitions suggest that ascetic actions cannot possibly have genuine moral worth. Ascetic 
actions are morally neutral. In sum, asceticism cannot be the source of morally worthy 
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actions because it fails to accord fully with B. It can indirectly generate the ‘semblance’ of 
morally worthy actions, i.e., it can ‘apparently’ accord with B under specific circumstances. 
This façade can also arise from egoism through legislation, which, e.g., financially rewards 
‘charitable donations’, or from religious dogma through its edicts, which we confuse a duty 
to god with alleviating another’s woe. Asceticism and egoism are morally neutral or 
worthless, while malice is morally reprehensible. The mainspring from his battery that 
remains is compassion (Mitleid).  
Recall that he defines compassion as the mainspring whose recipient is another agent 
and whose aim is to promote his or her wellbeing. Schopenhauer now has to show how 
freely willed justice and genuine loving kindness correlate with compassion. He starts with 
an intricate analysis of the mainspring prior to demonstrating how freely willed justice and 
loving kindness stem from it. He asks: 
“…how is it at all possible for the wellbeing and woe of another to move my will 
immediately, i.e. in just the way that only my own otherwise does, that is, for it to 
become my motive directly, and further to become it even to such a degree that I give 
it more or less preference over my own wellbeing and woe, which is otherwise the 
sole source of my motives?” (OBM, 200) 
He distinguishes compassion from egoism, which he claims is the most dominant 
mainspring owing to our embodiment. Compassion excludes the agent’s own interest and so 
is selfless, but it also extends to showing preference for the recipient’s wellbeing. How is 
this possible?  
Though I hesitate to employ the following distinction, because Schopenhauer did 
not, it is nevertheless useful for a better comprehension of how he distinguishes compassion 
from the other mainsprings. The distinction I have in mind is between empathy and 
sympathy.104 We can define empathy in the following way: 
Empathy: Identifying with the recipient’s plight, which requires cognition (abstract or 
intuitive) of the recipient’s being in some state, i.e., of wellbeing or woe, but it goes 
further into the recognition of the significance or meaning of her being in that state.105  
 
                                               
104 I introduce this distinction on the basis of the idea in Schopenhauer that our willing requires cognition of an 
object and so cognition precedes the operations of the will: “to be effective, a motive does not just need to be 
present, it must be recognised” (WR, 321). Nevertheless, the motive has its efficacy only based on the 
presupposition of the will’s being what it is. This is why empathy does not tell us anything about the will, because 
it is mere cognition or recognition of the recipient’s state without delineating how that state drives us or motivates 
us. Conversely, sympathy does tell us about the will because it motivates us in a specific direction; it presupposes 
an aim and-or disposition in relation to the recipient’s state. See Blum (1980) and Darwall (1998) for more on the 
distinction between sympathy and empathy. 
105 Consider the following discussion by Schopenhauer, which suggests that some projection of willing is required 
for us to have empathy. He claims, “for the relationship between (for instance) egoism and compassion to emerge 
in any given person, it is not enough for that person to possess wealth and see others in need; he must also know 
what wealth can do both for himself and for others; the suffering of others must not only present itself, he must 
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Empathy is the recognition of a state in another individual along with a recognition of its 
significance or meaning to them. The previous is insufficient for characterising his account 
of a compassionate response, because recognising another is suffering and its significance 
to him is insufficient to suggest that the agent aims to alleviate it. An agent can empathise 
with another while, at the same time, be malicious. Identifying with another’s plight then is 
the same as recognising it. We make an object of the recipient’s suffering and its significance 
to him. Therefrom, we can respond to it in various ways; each one of our mainsprings can 
turn it into a motive. Accordingly, although “our sympathy rests on an identification” (OBM, 
202; my emphasis) with the recipient, this identification is not enough to imply compassion. 
Empathy is necessary, but insufficient for sympathy or compassion. The agent’s response 
to this recognition determines which mainspring turned it into a motive. Sympathy, then, 
differs from empathy and captures compassion more clearly and we can define it as follows:  
Sympathy: A response to one’s empathy that acts in accordance with the recipient’s 
will, which is best characterised as our aiming to promote her wellbeing. 
Sympathy rests on empathy, but is distinct from it by our aiming to promote the recipient’s 
individual wellbeing. The agent refers to the recipient’s state for feedback regarding the 
success or failure of actions aiming at her wellbeing. He adjusts his actions in accordance 
with how she receives the action (or how it affects her), i.e., whether or not it succeededs in 
bringing about her wellbeing or alleviating her woe.  
Compassion is not simply an identification with the recipient’s plight, which is its 
‘intentional’ object, not its ‘identical’ object. In addition, we remember that our actions have 
moral relevance not by virtue of their consequences, but because they are an access-point to 
our will or character (more on this below). Thus, one’s actions determine whether the agent 
was acting out of compassion based on whether or not he aimed to promote the recipient’s 
wellbeing.  
So far, Schopenhauer has described moral actions, but has not asked how they are 
possible in the first place? How can a person’s circumstances and experiences be a motive 
for me in the way he describes? How can I act upon her circumstances as if they were my 
circumstances and experiences? In compassion, we identify with another individual’s will 
and act on her behalf, or we value her just as much as we would otherwise value ourselves 
when driven by egoism: 
“Obviously only by that other’s becoming the ultimate end of my will, just as I myself 
otherwise am: by the fact that I will his wellbeing and do not will his woe, and that I 
do so quite immediately, as immediately as I otherwise do only my own.” (OBM, 200) 
 
                                               
also know what suffering is, as well as enjoyment” (WR, 321; my emphasis). The emphasis on ‘knowing’ suggests 
Schopenhauer expects empathic agents to be able to recognise the significance of that state to the recipient, and so 
a projection of willing is a necessary component of empathy.   
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We remember that the will is essentially moved by (the promise of) wellbeing and-or woe. 
In addition, it is for the most part characterised by the dominance of egoism given its close 
affiliation with the will to life of which it is the most basic and original expression (more on 
this below). Insofar as a person is alive, we can assume that egoism plays a role in her life. 
This role must be central enough for the basic bodily functions and needs that preserve her 
existence. An egoistic agent affirms her own existence as represented by her body and its 
urges. In compassion, we sometimes overlook our wellbeing. Another person’s state (who 
is fundamentally distinct from us), i.e., her goals and aims, and ultimately the body through 
which they appear and exert their influence on the objective world, become my motives as 
they would if it were my own body. I identify with the recipient’s motives and thereby adopt 
her egoism, as I would otherwise do with my own. I cater to her individual needs and aims. 
This requires explanation. Schopenhauer, I argue, has enough conceptual room to explain it 
using the insights inherent to his account of aesthetic contemplation and the cognition that 
facilitates it.  
One of the consequence of taking a disinterested stance on something is that we aim 
to perceive its individual will, which enables us to attune to it. Recall, that disinterestedness 
requires us to suspend the willing stance such that we can project willing onto the target of 
our cognition. Therefrom, we become tools or means for her will; we become a means to 
her end.106 His aesthetics holds the key to his morality, which is clearer in WR and WRII than 
in his detailed discussion on morality in OBM.107 In aesthetic contemplation of something, 
we take an interest in it for its own sake because we see it as willing, striving etc., in addition 
to seeing it as an object among objects. To perceive something or someone not only as an 
object, but additionally as willing, striving etc. just as we are, is fundamental to morality. 
The previous allows us to take an interest in her by identifying with her, at least doing so 
long enough to act on her behalf for her sake. In taking an interest in her, we adopt her goals 
and aims. Notice, however, that we suspend both our interest and recognise her individual 
interest before we can begin acting on her behalf and for her sake.  
When we claim that compassion overcomes egoism, we mean that we have identified 
with the recipient and that our will to life, i.e., the urge to do something, expresses itself as 
affirmation of the recipient’s individual will. We should not confuse overcoming egoism 
for overcoming the will to life or argue that the will to life and egoism are synonyms. In 
compassion, two physically and thus empirically distinct bodies identify with one another, 
which rests on the agent recognising the recipient’s woe and aiming to act for her benefit 
and the continued existence of her body. She has her own individual aims independent and 
 
                                               
106 The metaphor of the tool should not mislead us by suggesting that the recipient of compassion perceives its 
agent as an object among objects. Though the recipient can and sometimes does perceive the compassionate agent 
in this manner, this is not necessarily always the case. It depends on whether or not the recipient herself can 
contemplate aesthetically on the world, i.e., she can see the targets of her cognition not as objects among objects, 
but as willing things. The sense of genuine gratitude would stem from the previous.  
107 The reason for this difference in clarity may be due to the condition of anonymity that the Royal Danish Society 
of Scientific Studies placed on his essay. 
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distinct from the compassionate agent’s aims. Her individuality is a condition of there being 
separate bodies and so wills in the first place. Furthermore, the previous individuality is what 
grounds a distinction between compassion and egoism. Therefore, compassion only makes 
sense if we preserve the difference between the agent and recipient, i.e., if they really are 
(or are perceived as being) different individuals (more on this below).108   
In sum, Schopenhauer should have fleshed out two conditions of our compassionate 
actions: 
A) They rest on identifying and recognising the recipient’s suffering and its meaning 
to her.  
B) The agent’s response to this recognition is crucial for identifying and distinguishing 
compassion from the other mainsprings, because malice and asceticism also require 
us to perceive things as willing, striving and so on.  
Note that A is a minimal participation in the recipient’s state, which allows us to recognise 
its significance to her without determining our subsequent response to it. The moral agent 
then must be capable of empathy as a precondition. He has to recognise that the target of his 
cognition is not only an object, but that it wills like he does. In Schopenhauer’s lexicon, he 
has to ‘see through the principium individuationis’. What he aims to capture with ‘seeing 
through the PI’ is one’s capacity for empathy. Without the cognition that typifies aesthetic 
contemplation, we would be incapable of recognising that the objects of cognition are not 
just there to be utilised, but willing things.  
Condition B brings to light something the philosophical commentary on his thoughts 
often overlooks. The actions Schopenhauer labelled as ‘morally worthy’ are one response 
to recognising another’s suffering and its significance to her; this response distinguishes 
compassion from the other mainsprings. Moreover, it shows that the cognition that typifies 
aesthetic contemplation does not lead to morally worthy actions of its own accord, but it 
permits, enables or makes possible such actions. An agent with an aesthetic world-view still 
has available to him the other mainsprings from which he can respond. Therefore, cognition 
is impotent: it can open doors, but it cannot drive us to go through them; only ‘the will’ drives 
(more on this below).109  
 
                                               
108 Some preliminary remarks. Compassion, we can say, is the mirror image of egoism and relates to it 
conceptually, i.e., that they are both affirmations of the will to life. Compassion is akin to a vicarious affirmation 
of the will to life, but not vicarious ‘egoism’. The will to life refers to the urge to act or do something and egoism 
is an affirmation of the will to life. Compassionate actions likewise affirm the will to life, however. They affirm 
another’s individual will as it appears through her body and its states. It is a kind of motivational synchronicity 
with another and is the only mainspring that both overcomes egoism (it is selfless) and it aims at the recipient’s 
wellbeing, which makes it a genuine candidate for the source of the moral phenomena and-or actions, i.e., freely 
willed justice and genuine loving kindness.  
109 I am deviating somewhat from Schopenhauer’s central claim that the intellect transcends or liberates itself from 
the will here, but I hope to defend my reasons for doing so when I assess his views on ascetic resignation (more 
on this below).   
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Let us take a common objection to Schopenhauer’s account of compassion, which 
demonstrates how the above distinction between empathy and sympathy can resolve some 
conceptual difficulties in his account of compassion.  
Cartwright argues that Schopenhauer’s claim that compassionate agents participate 
immediately in the recipient’s suffering implies the extraordinary experience of feeling the 
recipient’s pain in her body. We would be more consistent, he argues, if we construe this 
participation in her suffering as an ‘imaginative’ participation: 
“I believe that we should reformulate Schopenhauer’s conception of compassion by 
understanding (iii) not as that A participates immediately in B’s suffering but as (iii): 
A participates imaginatively in B’s suffering.” (Cartwright 2008, 303) 
Cartwright’s suggestion can be misleading, because it implies that compassionate agents 
cannot respond immediately or unreflectively to the recipient’s plight. However, he is right 
to emphasise the role of imagination in compassion, but we should distinguish two uses of 
imagination:  
A) The reflective use. 
B) The unreflectively use.  
With respect to A, Cartwright’s suggestion is that agents cannot respond immediately to 
help another while acting from compassion. In other words, George has to ‘imagine’ that 
her bodily state ‘X’ is what he experiences as suffering ‘Y’. Compassion places a cognitive 
demand. It requires an inference, which presupposes considerable ‘reflection’ or cognitive 
labour.  
Construing the compassionate agent’s participation in suffering as ‘imaginative’ in 
juxtaposition to (or with a view to replacing an) ‘immediate’ participation, entails we make 
an inference from the observation of something on the recipient’s body (e.g., some gesture) 
to its implication about her first-person experience. The previous implies that reflection and 
inferences are taking place. If we understand Cartwright’s suggestion as distinguishing 
‘immediate’ from ‘imaginative’ participation through such inferences and reflections, then 
when agents respond immediately to another who suffers entails the agent cannot be acting 
out of compassion. This casts doubt on those compassionate actions leaving no time for 
inferences or reflection; for example, in moments where someone is in danger and we react 
immediately means we are not acting out of compassion. Although I do not think Cartwright 
aims to reject the immediacy of compassionate actions, his suggestion still presupposes it. 
Furthermore, I do not believe this view of compassion offers an insight into Schopenhauer’s 
views on compassion. Cartwright’s view introduces a conceptual knot that we can untie by 
arguing that we should comprehend the use of imagination in the case of compassion is a 
priori. We use reason and imagination to project willing onto the target of our cognition 
prior to and so that we can perceive it as a willing thing. Thus, an alternative explanation of 
this ‘immediacy’ is available to us, which salvages Cartwright’s suspicion about an error in 
Schopenhauer’s claims and preserves Cartwright’s appeal to imagination, albeit by way of 
a different use of imagination than he seemingly suggests.    
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As we saw previously, the aesthetic world-view underpinning the compassionate 
response is not an inference from the objective picture, but a suspension of the willing stance 
that is the subjective correlate of this picture. The move from egoism (the subject of willing) 
to selflessness (disinterestedness) requires an inference using the will-body identity, i.e., 
projection of willing on the target of cognition. We do not project our ego when we make 
this inference or infer that our ego is the same as another’s. We do not project ourselves on 
things. We project the relationship of identity we experience with our body, i.e., the will-
body identity. We project the fact that our body moves only when we will something, that 
is, we project the fact that we have desires, urges, aims, projects etc. and that these typify 
our bodily movements. This permits us to act compassionately towards them, but it does not 
necessitate us to do so; selflessness can permit asceticism and malice too. We recognise the 
identity between our will and body and project it on the objects of our cognition. We do not 
do this for compassion, but to break free from the chains of an egoistic world-view saturated 
with objects that are fair game for willing.  
Once we make the cognitive (i.e., reflective and imaginative) leap from egoism to 
selflessness, we do not need to make it every time we encounter an object, but just assume 
a particular stance towards them. Compare, for example, this stance with what happens 
when we direct our attention from our lover to a stranger. We take a qualitatively different 
stance towards the stranger than we do to our lover. In ordinary cases, we may be defensive 
and suspicious of a stranger as juxtaposed to our lover. We do not make the inference every 
time that, right now, we are no longer attentive to our lover, but to a stranger—we just 
perceive a stranger and all that comes with it. We do not have to tell ourselves this person 
is now not our lover, or ‘imagine’ that we now perceive a stranger; we immediately respond 
differently to them because we assume a different stance in relation to them. This stance is 
immediate and bodily, which is reflected in our subsequent thoughts and actions. Something 
similar to the previous happens when we notice that someone is suffering.110 
To be sure, we can agree with the major premise that recognising that someone is 
suffering rests on an inference, but if this premise will lead us to an account of compassion 
inclusive of our immediate responses, then we have to make the further claim that we 
sometimes make un-self-conscious inferences. The grammar of our language forbids us to 
claim that we made an inference when we unreflectively responded to events or changes in 
the state of affairs or in persons. If we commit ourselves to a conception of un-self-conscious 
inferences, then we can account for why we immediately respond to her suffering while also 
 
                                               
110 For more on the immediate response of compassion see Taylor (1999, 83) who argues that the compassionate 
response to someone’s suffering is a ‘primitive’ response that does not require any inference; though Taylor also 
reads Schopenhauer, wrongly in my view, as claiming that compassion requires some inference about the 
recipient’s suffering before we can have compassion for them. Both Taylor and Cartwright do not recognise the 
difference between a motive and a mainspring in Schopenhauer, which may explain why they believe compassion 
requires an inference and cannot be immediate. Compassion is not a motive, but a mainspring of action and so it 
is a primitive response depending on the strength of the agent’s egoism compared to their compassion. 
Schopenhauer’s conception of ‘loving-kindness’ represents this immediacy. Both Taylor and Cartwright would 
have an easier time with their reading using what I called the projection of willing and what underpins it.     
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imaginatively participating in it. It seems that Schopenhauer did commit to this kind of 
inference through his conception of aesthetic contemplation and again through his remarks 
on the immediacy of loving-kindness. We can argue, then, that we make an inference about 
there being a suffering agent as opposed an object among objects, but we are not self-
consciously aware of this in all instances when we recognise that someone is suffering. We 
perceive objects as willing things without the cognitive labour we require to suspend egoism 
long enough to project willing via imagination and reason. The reason is that compassion is 
its own mainspring unrelated to egoism even if they are both affirmations of the will to life. 
Consequently, we cannot always construe the difference between perceiving someone as an 
object fit for an independent purpose and perceiving him or her as willing as a self-conscious 
inference from the perception of an object to that of willing, striving and so on.  
We can argue that there are un-self-conscious inferences to satisfy the skeptic, but at 
a cost because he can ask: why speak of un-self-conscious inferences when every inference 
we know or can assess is conscious and reflective? Placing our theoretical hopes on un-self-
conscious inferences is unnecessary and misleading, albeit it typifies the Kantian philosophy 
Schopenhauer espoused. Schopenhauer’s account of the aesthetic stance, i.e., projecting the 
will-body identity on the targets of our cognition, offers a different perception of them and 
this leads us to perceiving the world itself differently. To perceive the target as willing is not 
to infer anything from the object to the willing it represents using our imagination; it is not 
to imagine a person in place of the object in front of us. It means perceiving the whole world 
differently, i.e., as driving, striving and alive; it consists in an entirely different world-view, 
which we cannot adequately reduce to the objective picture. 
I suspect that Cartwright’s aim with the suggestion is not to commit us to an un-self-
conscious inferences, but to preserve the distinction between the agent and the recipient’s 
individualities and respective states in compassionating with someone. If I am correct in 
reading him this way, then he rightly presses Schopenhauer to be clear on this point. He is 
right to argue that we do not literally feel his pain in his body. Nevertheless, we have to allow 
that we feel his pain and not our own. All that an imaginative reconstruction of his pain can 
offer us is a memory of our own pain in place of his pain regardless of the difference between 
him and us. We want to claim that it is his pain we feel, not our own. This is because we 
simply do not literally have the same plight he does and perhaps never did. Nonetheless, we 
still identify with it in that moment. Accordingly, we need an account that permits us to feel 
his pain rather than our pain, but not feel his pain in his body. We want to feel his pain in our 
body. There is room for such an account in accordance with Schopenhauer’s propositions, 
which can dispel Cartwright’s worry about people feeling another’s suffering in their body, 
but still resist the proposition that seems to undermine immediate compassionate feelings 
and actions. Schopenhauer’s aesthetics helps in that regard.  
Recall that egoism is a preoccupation with our own body and individuality; another’s 
body is not and cannot possibly be our own. Furthermore, if their body were our own in any 
sense, then the distinction between egoism and compassion would collapse. A distinction 
between oneself and the recipient is a precondition of both compassion and egoism, because 
we require different bodies to distinguish the different preoccupations and concerns inherent 
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to compassion and egoism. Also, recall that the disinterestedness underpinning cognition of 
something as willing, striving etc., stems from our perceiving the target’s ‘Idea’. We do not 
forget that we are the ones taking a disinterested stance on the target, or that we perceive it 
as it strives to be. Individuality and willing are the same, but as we saw in previous chapters, 
disinterestedness does not forgo the subject-target correlation, but the individual-object (or 
individual-motive) correlation. We do not confuse ourselves with the target, but suspend the 
willing stance in relation to it. The object’s ‘will’ bubbles up to the top of our focus and 
becomes its target. Thus, we preserve a subject-target correlation in aesthetic contemplation 
and maintain the difference between the individual target of cognition and us. Similarly, we 
cannot feel compassion if we confuse his suffering for our own, nor do we have to make the 
same conscious inference about his suffering at all times.111  
Schopenhauer’s claims can mislead, however. He sometimes claims that compassion 
requires one to make “less of a distinction than everyone else between himself and others” 
(OBM, 249). Though it is important to recognise the difference between compassion and 
egoism, it is also important to recognise that without the difference between the agent and 
the recipient there can be nothing we call egoism or compassion. She acts for another’s sake 
as she would act for herself, but it is wrong to infer from the previous that, in doing so, she 
is egoistic in some way. We must be cautious about what Schopenhauer attempts to capture 
about the compassionate agent’s identification with the recipient with claims such as the 
following: 
“…this presupposes that I have identified myself to a certain extent with the other, 
and consequently that the barrier between I and not-I is removed for the moment: only 
then does the other’s business, his need, his distress, his suffering immediately 
become mine” (OBM, 218; my emphasis) 
We are always conscious of his suffering being his, even when we identify with it and act 
on his behalf. The morally worthy agent does not only recognise, immediately or through 
deliberation (reflection or memory), that the recipient feels or undergoes something similar 
in significance to what she herself has felt before, or can feel at some stage. She aims to 
promote his wellbeing and sometimes does so at the expense of her own wellbeing, which 
entails a fundamental break with egoism.112 The reason to consider such a break is that in 
such instances the egoist finds the strongest motive to act. If egoism were his dominant or 
only mainspring, then this break would be impossible. He immerses himself in the recipient 
and her plight, as he immerses himself in aesthetic contemplation; he forgets his egoism, 
but not his self-reference (more on this below where we reconsider the metaphysical egoism 
objection). 
 Next and before moving on, we should briefly assess Schopenhauer’s defence of the 
proposition that compassion is the only source of freely willed justice and genuine loving 
 
                                               
111 For more on these issues see Cartwright (2008 & 2012). 
112 Schopenhauer desperately tries to show us that this phenomenon is possible and indeed actual with the story of 
Arnold von Winkelried (cf. OBM, 196). 
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kindness. He begins by considering how another’s plight motivates us. His answer is 
twofold. Either by placing a block to egoistic tendencies motivated by the recognition of the 
harm an egoistic action would bring another, or by our actively helping another following 
our ‘immediate participation’ in her suffering. The former he construes as freely willed 
justice and the latter as genuine loving kindness, from which, he argues, arises the principle 
that helps us identify a compassionate action: “harm no one; rather help everyone to the 
extent that you can” (OBM, 162).  
 Schopenhauer sees freely willed justice as “showing the first degree of effectiveness 
of this genuine and natural moral incentive (Triebfeder)” (OBM, 204). For him, injustice 
drives us by our nature as embodied beings burdened with the immediate and basic aim of 
preserving or enhancing our body. Egoism holds the “right of prior occupancy” (OBM, 204). 
Though compassion is a mainspring of action and therefore a constituent or objectivation of 
the will to life, it struggles with egoistic urges. In freely willed justice, compassion operates 
negatively, by holding back or prohibiting our egoism. Consequently, in the first degree of 
its effectiveness, compassion operates negatively. It suppresses actions that inflict (directly 
or indirectly) suffering on another person. If egoism drove us to suppress an action of this 
sort, then it would stem from the motive of avoiding (legal) punishment, rather than the fact 
that our action inflicted suffering on another. Recall, that alleviating her woe is logically the 
same as aiming to promote her wellbeing. Similarly, suppressing actions that inflict 
suffering on another derives from compassion. It is due to the previous that he construes 
suppression of this sort as ‘freely willed’ justice. We do not suspend an action based on its 
consequences to ourselves, but on its consequences to the recipient. We stop ourselves from 
harming another person by identifying with her and not wanting to inflict suffering on her; 
it shows the extent to which we can pursue self-interested ends without inflicting suffering 
on another. Actions that excludes this identification with a recipient and do not evaluate her 
suffering in the same way lack moral worth.113  
Schopenhauer construes genuine loving kindness as the “second level at which the 
suffering of others immediately becomes my motive in itself and as such” (OBM, 216). It 
differs from freely willed justice by “the positive character of the actions that issue from it, 
in that now compassion does not merely hold me back from injuring the other but actually 
drives me on to help him” (ibid.). The second part of the above maxim represents this feature 
of genuine loving kindness: ‘help everyone to the extent that you can’. It proceeds from the 
same recognition and possesses the same aim as justice. It differs from justice, however, by 
overcoming egoism not through self-conscious reflection over how our actions might inflict 
suffering on a recipient, but by instigating the appropriate action to alleviate the suffering 
we recognise irrespective of whether or not we inflicted it. Compassionate agents do not 
help another because they seek their indebtedness or out of guilt. They do not help another 
 
                                               
113 Presumably for Schopenhauer the malicious person would still identify with the recipient, and certainly must 
in certain forms of malice that are not physical, but psychological and-or emotional. The latter forms of malice 
require the agent to a certain extent to empathise with the recipient to know that these words, gestures or thoughts 
can and will harm him more than others.  
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person in hope that if they help enough people, they might have a better chance in a heavenly 
afterlife, or because their peers will esteem them more highly and so on.  
We notice that Schopenhauer’s epistemological distinction between the will and the 
intellect is present throughout his thoughts; it is central to his analysis of the mainspring of 
morally worthy actions. I assessed his thoughts on how to distinguish the morally worthy 
character from other characters and introduced a distinction that nuances these differences. 
I also assessed morality’s relationship to legislation, which the difference in mainsprings 
underpins. Next, I will analyse an objection to his proposition that ‘compassion’ is the basis 
of morality, which hinges on how compassion relates to his metaphysics of the will.  
1.13 The Metaphysical Egoism Objection  
The Anglophone commentary on Schopenhauer’s account of compassion focuses on how it 
relates to his metaphysics of the will. I will avoid an in-depth discussion of the state of 
affairs in the philosophical commentary on this topic. I will focus instead on whether or not 
Schopenhauer can answer what I will call the metaphysical egoism objection without 
sacrificing the conceptual coherence of his metaphysics of the will. I believe he can by 
approaching the objection using the distinction between an ‘individual will’ and the ‘will to 
life’. Similarly, careful assessment of a distinction between compassion and negation of the 
will to life helps offer a robust response to the objection, which I assess in the next chapter. 
First, let us lay out the metaphysical egoism objection.  
The objection argues that Schopenhauer’s metaphysical explanation of compassion 
leads him to the unwarranted proposition that compassion phenomenally overcomes, but 
metaphysically preserves egoism.114 Julian Young describes the objection in the following 
way: 
“As the discussion proceeds, however, it becomes clear that, after all, the altruist does 
act for the sake of his own interest, the only difference between him and the egoist 
being that he acts for the sake of the interests of his metaphysical rather than his 
empirical self. So, as we might put it, the empirical altruist turns out to be a 
metaphysical egoist. And given that egoism excludes ‘moral worth’, it is entirely 
 
                                               
114 See for example, Gardiner (1967, 276-7) who contends that identification with recipient based on a recognition 
of the metaphysical identity between agent and recipient, as a requirement for our having compassion, supports 
the idea that egoism can explain compassion and that the latter has no privileged explanatory power. Young (2005, 
182) coined the term ‘metaphysical egoist’ and construes compassion as phenomenally alleviating the recipient’s 
woe for the recipient’s sake while the aim is to promote the wellbeing of one’s metaphysical self. Hamlyn (1980, 
145) construes compassion as an enlarged form of egoism. For a response to the previous and a more detailed 
discussion of the objection see also Cartwright (2008 & 2012).  
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unclear why his moral status should be any different from that of the common-or-
garden egoist.” (Young 2005, 182-3) 
According to the objection, then, a compassionate agent is a metaphysical egoist because of 
the metaphysical identity between the agent and the recipient of her compassionate action. 
I will argue that there is a misleading reading of the will underpinning the metaphysical 
egoism objection. First, I will clarify the objection’s aim by distinguishing two possible 
interpretations of it. Second, I will defend the claim that compassion is its own mainspring 
that overcomes egoism. Therefore, we cannot reduce compassion to egoism or understand 
it in its terms.  
The two possible interpretations of the metaphysical egoism objection are as follows: 
the first I call the categorical interpretation and the second the motivational interpretation. 
The categorical interpretation argues that his explanation fails to show how a compassionate 
agent genuinely overcomes egoism to merit construing compassion as its own mainspring 
of action. If one’s ‘metaphysical self’ drives her to help another, because she recognised her 
‘metaphysical self’ in the recipient, then it is plainly wrong to argue compassion explains 
the action independent from egoism. Thus, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will ensures 
that compassion has no explanatory value independent from egoism. Compassionate actions 
can be reduced to egoism, i.e., they are metaphyscially egoistic ones. Therefore, compassion 
is a token of metaphysical egoism.  
The motivational interpretation states that an agent who recognises the metaphysical 
identity between herself and the recipient may still be motivated to act egoistically, even 
though she can likewise act to promote the recipient’s wellbeing. In short, recognising our 
metaphysical identity with someone does not necessarily drive us to promote her wellbeing. 
However, the mere presence, apart from the effect of a compassionate motive presupposes 
the ‘felt consciousness’ of this identity, as Schopenhauer argues: 
“The magnitude of the world, which we used to find unsettling, is now settled securely 
within ourselves: our dependence on it is nullified by its dependence on us. – Yet we 
do not reflect on all this straight away; instead it appears only as the felt consciousness 
that we are, in some sense (that only philosophy makes clear), one with the world, 
and thus not brought down, but rather elevated, by its immensity.” (WR, 230) 
If we are moved to act on the recipient’s behalf for her sake, then we are in a sense elevated 
by the recognition of the identity between us, even though we do not necessarily have to act 
on her behalf as a result of recognising this identity. The motivational interpretation, then, 
places a conditional relationship between the compassionate action and the metaphysical 
identity between the recipient and us. This means that someone who does not recognise this 
identity could not possibly be in a position to overcome his colossal and all-encompassing 
egoism for long enough to even perceive a motive in promoting another’s wellbeing without 
receiving something in return. An individual who does recognise this identity, however, is 
not necessarily motivated to act compassionately. Recall, that both asceticism and malice are 
such that they presuppose the felt consciousness. Nevertheless, only as a consequences of 
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recognising this identity is the agent capable of noticing compassionate motives, even if 
they are too weak to overcome his egoism. In other words, the felt consciousness works as 
an open door or an invitation into another room of the house of motives that is our life and 
will, but as with any invitation, it only succeeds in motivating us if we, as individuals, want 
or will it. Compassion is not open to or an option for individuals who do not recognise this 
metaphysical identity. She lacks the empathy required to generate compassionate motives, 
which are a precondition of compassion.  
If we intend the motivational interpretation to serve as the objection, then, though it 
is correct, it is also unwarranted. Schopenhauer was aware that the recognition of an identity 
between the recipient and ourselves enables without necessitating compassion. The previous 
does not necessarily lead us to overcoming our egoism, nor does it necessarily lead us to the 
negation of the will to life. The following passage is an example of the previous proposition 
and shows Schopenhauer’s awareness of the motivational limits of the ‘felt consciousness’: 
“The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognises as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition.” (WR, 311)115  
The motivational interpretation of the objection repeats Schopenhauer’s claims and so fails 
to qualify as an objection. I will focus on the categorical interpretation instead.  
If we intend the categorical interpretation of the objection, then will Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of the will have enough conceptual room to avert compassion’s reduction to a 
species of egoism? If we take the concept of metaphysical egoism literally, then I will argue 
that it constitutes an error in our understanding and misapplication of his terms, rather than 
a philosophical inconsistency on his part.  
A compassionate agent who overcomes egoism does so based on his recognising an 
identity between the recipient and himself, but this identity does not necessarily lead him to 
overcome egoism; it merely enables him to perceive other, non-egoistic motives. The reason 
is that without his identifying with someone as he does in aesthetic contemplation he cannot 
possibly find a way out of egoism. The agent would be bound to perceive others as objects 
and thus potential motives, rather than as willing things. He has to perceive the recipient as 
willing like himself, namely, as someone with a body, subjected to urges or impulses, and 
as fundamentally experiencing an urge to do something, anything whatsoever, which is what 
the will to life amounts to. If he is to feel compassion or perceive compassionate motives, 
then he has to identify with the recipient, but this does not guarantee that he will act out of 
compassion. Hence, compassion is conditionally (rather than bi-conditionally) reliant on 
identifying with the recipient.  
 
                                               
115 For more on this topic see Schopenhauer’s discussion on eternal justice (WR, 377-83). See also an insightful 
paper by Gemes & Janaway (cf. 2012, 283-6), who rightly argue that there are “two kinds of affirmation for 
Schopenhauer, reflective and unreflective” (Gemes & Janaway 2012, 284). 
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I will defend the above by showing two errors of the categorical interpretation. First, 
there is a misapplication of the distinction between the individual and metaphysical use of 
the will. We can call this the misapplication error. Second, there is a misconception of the 
relationship between a mainspring (of which there are four) and the will to life. We can call 
this the will to life error. These two errors will aim to demonstrate that what we construe as 
metaphysical egoism constitutes a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, it misunderstands 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical explanation of compassion.  
The misapplication error arises from an incorrect understanding of Schopenhauer’s 
two uses of the ‘will’. We are not always sure whether he speaks about an individual will, 
i.e., this mainspring in juxtaposition to another, or about the precondition of individuation 
or objectivation underpinning all mainsprings of action, i.e., the will to life. All mainsprings 
and their corresponding motives relate to the will to life, but the will to life itself, is not one 
mainspring in juxtaposition to another. Therefore, it is misleading to refer to an individual’s 
‘will to life’. We notice this clearly in Atwell’s reading: 
“The pitying agent denies or renounces the will to life as belonging exclusively to 
himself or herself (he or she abandons egoism, which is the normal incentive for 
human beings) and “identifies” with the will to life in other animate (and suffering) 
creatures. For the pitying agent any known suffering is taken on as his or her suffering, 
hence he or she works toward eliminating it wherever it occurs. This agent therefore 
renounces only the will to life in himself or herself, that is, this agent renounces the 
selfish will, and does so only in the sense of regarding any suffering on a par with his 
or her suffering. Again, then, this agent adopts what might be called the "objective" 
or "impartial" will to life; but he or she continues to affirm life as such.” (Atwell 1995, 
155-6) 
Atwell is not wrong in his intuition that there is a difference between the will to life and 
egoism, also in claiming that the agent indentifies with the recipient. Where he errs is that 
he associates the will to life with egoism and argues that the agent ‘renounces only the will 
to life in himself’. The previous conflates Schopenhauer’s two uses of the will, i.e., the 
metaphysical and the individual. Below, I will discuss the fundamental difference between 
compassion, egoism and the will to life as a response to the metaphysical egoism objection.  
If we individuate the will to life, then and only then can we recognise differences in 
persons, i.e., in individual wills. The previous, in turn, allows us to recognise differences in 
mainsprings and to have different mainsprings. It leads us to identify with something other 
than ourselves, which is the basis on which we overcome the preoccupation with our body 
and will. The difference between egoism and other mainsprings, fundamentally, rests on the 
ability to perceive ourselves as both a willing thing and an object among objects, which we 
subsequently project onto the targets of our cognition, which ordinarily appear as objects 
among objects. This projection paves the way for the other mainsprings, that is, for malice, 
compassion and even asceticism.  
Unlike the motivational interpretation of the metaphysical egoism objection, the 
categorical interpretation and the conflation grounding it are not accidental. Schopenhauer’s 
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claims often confuse his readers by seemingly linking agents’ recognition that the recipient 
is willing, striving etc. with negation of the will to life. Let us look at some passages where 
the previous link is implied and notice how easily they perplex us over the broadness of use 
of the ‘will’:  
A: “… love, whose origin and essence we know to involve seeing through the 
principium individuationis, leads to redemption, namely the complete abandonment of 
the will to life, i.e. all willing.” (WR, 401) 
 
B: “… the same source that gives rise to all goodness, love, virtue and nobility there 
ultimately emerges also what I call the negation of the will to life.” (WR, 405) 
Notice that ‘A’ associates the will to life with ‘all willing’ rather than one kind of willing. 
In ‘B’, he implies that the root of all goodness, love etc. (apparently compassion) gives rise 
to negation of the will to life (apparently asceticism). We know that, according to his views, 
the root of goodness, love etc. is compassion, which now supposedly gives rise to another 
mainspring, which is its own negation. The above claims seemingly contradict, but I suggest 
there is another way we can read them that can avoid the apparent contradiction.  
Firstly, the source of goodness, love etc. to which Schopenhauer refers in the above 
passage is not compassion. It is the recognition that the recipient and we, as agents, are both 
willing; the recipient is not an object among objects, but willing, striving etc. like we are. 
This is what ‘seeing through the PI’ means. As I argued above, however, seeing through the 
PI is not limited to inciting compassion, which is the genuine source of goodness, love etc., 
but is also a precondition of the other mainsprings. It refers to our ability to identify with a 
target of cognition. Therefore, seeing through the PI makes possible our compassion and the 
other mainsprings, too. If we do not perceive the recipient as willing, striving etc. (albeit 
differently to us) as opposed to another object among objects, then there would be neither a 
reason nor a basis for us to aim for his wellbeing as if it was our own or to aim for his woe. 
We would be too preoccupied with either looking for ways to utilise him or ignore him. 
Schopenhauer does not refer to compassion when he claims that the same source that gives 
rise to goodness likewise leads to negation of the will to life, but he misleads his readers 
when he claims that ‘seeing through the PI’ is the root of goodness etc. (more on this below).  
Secondly, the same identification supposedly gives rise to the negation of the will to 
life, but we must not confuse this for the negation of a particular instantiation of willing, 
i.e., death of the individual. It is rather the loss or the depression of the urge to do something 
irrespective of the deed (more on this below). Not even compassion, which we can construe 
as being an object for a recipient’s will, can drive us after we have negated the will to life. 
Consequently, there is a lack of clarity in Schopenhauer’s expressions that leads readers to 
confound the recognition of an identity between us and the target of cognition with the aim 
to negate this urge.   
To avoid the confusions, we can distinguish individual willing from the metaphysical 
will. We can separate claims concerning relations between our mainsprings, which implies 
individuation and juxtaposition, from claims made about willing itself independent of how 
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it appears through some person, action, object or motive. The will to life is not one will in 
juxtaposition to another, but the precondition for individuals and mainsprings. I argue that 
we should construe it as the urge to do something, anything whatsoever, which enables us to 
take various and differing actions in relation to various and diferring circumstances. The 
affirmation or negation of the urge to do something exhausts the metaphysical significance 
of any mainspring we possess (more on this below).116 
Through the distinction between what pertains to all aims and what pertains to one 
aim in juxtaposition to another, we may clarify Schopenhauer’s account of the relationship 
between compassion and egoism and so respond to the metaphysical egoism objection. We 
know how compassion and egoism relate to the will to life, i.e., they are different expressions 
of the urge to do something. We know our mainsprings differ from one another only when 
juxtaposed to each other. Notice, however, that we do not know what this difference consists 
in if we read them as affirmations of the will to life. We require something more than their 
being affirmations of the will to life to define and differentiate them. In short, affirmation 
of the will to life is a second-order response to the distinct kinds of first-order mainsprings 
we possess, which differ based on their first-order relations. With these distinctions in mind, 
we can proceed to seeing how a different approach to the relationship between egoism and 
compassion can resolve the conceptual challenge of the metaphysical egoism objection.  
1.14 Compassion and Egoism: A Response to the 
Metaphysical Egoism Objection 
A response to the metaphysical egoism objection requires us to assess Schopenhauer’s 
views on egoism based on his distinct uses of the will, i.e., the individual and metaphysical. 
I will attempt this assessment by starting with how egoism relates to the metaphysical use 
of the will. A well-known and frequently-quoted description of egoism he gives us is the 
following: 
 
                                               
116 Recall, however, that the option to affirm or negate the will to life is not available to the will devoid of cognition, 
which appears as a blind and inexorable impulse, but only to cognitive beings with reason and reflection. This is 
because we can recognise all things identify with the will to life, i.e., with the blind inexorable impulse impelling 
or urging all things to do something, anything whatsoever. It permits this same impulse to no longer be blind, but 
acquire the self-image on which it acts as it does on anything else and continues to realise this urge through 
identification with another thing. In other words, through us, the will to life acquires self-knowledge and can 
subsequently respond to itself (i.e. negate or affirm itself) where it once was only able to affirm itself in its pursuit 
of something deemed as distinct from and external to us. The recognition that all beings, objects and forces are the 
will to life, i.e., that they are subject to the urge to do something and so to express (i.e., objectivate) themselves 
through actions of any kind, makes possible two responses: affirmation or negation. Using the individual use of 
the will, we can see that this constitutes our (personal) will and its relationship to life, whereas using the 
metaphysical use, it constitutes the limits of all urges in life, i.e., the urge to do anything at all.  
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“This egoism, both in an animal and in a human being, is linked in the most precise 
way with his innermost core and essence, and indeed is properly identical with it. So 
all his actions, as a rule, spring from egoism and the explanation of any given action 
is always to be sought in it first of all; and likewise the calculation of all means by 
which one attempts to steer a human being towards any goal is also entirely grounded 
upon it.” (OBM, 190) 
The above characterisation is misleading because it implies an identity relationship between 
egoism and one’s ‘innermost core and essence’. Recall that egoism is one mainspring among 
four others. In the same book, he defines it as the mainspring whose aim is to promote the 
agent’s wellbeing (cf. OBM, 190-1). There are other mainsprings, which we cannot reduce 
to egoism, but which nonetheless bear some relationship to the will to life, i.e., the urge to 
do something or ‘his innermost core and essence’. Accordingly, the above passage conflates 
egoism with the will to life and this misleads his readers and undermines his metaphysics 
of the will. 
His description of egoism in WR differs from the above passage and reflects how it 
relates to the will to life more clearly and coherently in relation to his metaphysics of the 
will. In WR, he construes egoism as follows: 
“… [T]he first simple affirmation of the will to life is simply the affirmation of one’s 
own body, i.e. the presentation of the will through acts in time, to the extent that the 
body is already the spatial presentation of the same will through its form and 
purposiveness, and no further. This affirmation reveals itself as the preservation of 
the body through the use of its own forces… Now the will presents a self-affirmation 
of the particular body in countless coexisting individuals, and because they are all 
characterised by egoism, the will very easily exceeds this affirmation in any given 
individual and becomes a negation of the same will as it appears in other individuals. 
The will of the first individual violates the boundaries of the other individual’s 
affirmation of will.” (WR, 360; some emphasis is mine) 
Egoism is the affirmation of ‘one’s own body’, not any ‘body’ or bodies. Notice, also, that 
he argues the ‘will’ (i.e., the will to life) affirms itself in ‘countless coexisting individuals’, 
which, by their existence as individuals, affirm their own bodies. In short, each individual 
affirms his or her own body, in one form or other and at some time or other; every individual 
is egoistic to some extent. What I derive from the above is that what distinguishes one 
individual from another is not the will to life, but the individual will (i.e., the body) and its 
representation through acts of will (i.e., actions) over time. The previous becomes clearer 
when, as we will shortly see, we notice that we can affirm the will to life in ways that do not 
necessarily entail affirming our own body. Therefore, we should distinguish the affirmation 
of one’s own body or self-affirmation from an affirmation of the will to life.  
In OBM, Schopenhauer seemingly suggests that that the will to life itself is egoistic, 
but a careful reading of other passages suggest otherwise. For example, his views on egoism 
in WR, reveal that what is egoistic in purposive action is not the will to life, but the body in 
which it instantiates and the aim to promote its wellbeing by its own efforts. Egoism is core 
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to our embodiment, individuality and existence. Only someone who possesses a body acts 
purposefully. Moreover, only someone who promotes her own (body’s) wellbeing exists at 
all. However, we cannot reduce all urges to egoism or even argue that all urges spring from 
it without contradiction; conflating egoism with the will to life promotes this contradiction. 
There is likewise a conceptual limitation here. The urge to do something cannot possibly be 
egoistic; only the aim of the urge to do something can be egoistic.  
Schopenhauer’s hasty rhetoric about egoism in OBM misleads us with respect to his 
metaphysical conception of egoism and compassion. We affirm the will to life in different 
ways, some of which are not egoistic, because they do not aim to promote one’s own body. 
What distinguishes them from egoism is the aim, not the fact that they affirm the will to life, 
i.e., that they express the urge to do something. Thus, egoism is one type ‘affirmation of the 
will to life’ or self-affirmation. The will to life merely expresses the motivational bedrock 
of any action, which always expresses the urge to do something, anything whatsoever.  
We are alive to the degree that we cater to ourselves through our own body and thus 
are concerned with its welfare, i.e., to the degree that we affirm ourselves, but we are not 
limited to this affirmation alone. According to Schopenhauer, we can affirm the will to life 
in different ways than self-affirmation, because the will to life and our ‘self’ are different 
things. The will to life is the urge to do something, whereas egoism is the urge to promote 
one’s own body or promote our self. Note that the latter presupposes individuation, which is 
not present in the former.117 
We experience an urge to do something when we identify with others through the 
will to life to which we are both subject because we both experience an urge to do something. 
Yet, this does not mean that if we identify with others in this way and act on their behalf, 
we act egoistically in the so-called ‘metaphysical sense’. This is equivalent to saying nothing 
or a contradiction in terms. There is a subtle difference between affirmation of the will to 
life and egoism. Egoism is an urge with an aim that requires us to distinguish ourselves from 
another. The will to life is a precondition of all urges irrespective of their aim and thus does 
not permit or require any distinction. Let us nuance the previous proposition by showing the 
how egoism differs from the other mainsprings starting with compassion. There are two 
propositions we can make about egoism, compassion and the will to life: 
1) Like egoism, compassion is an affirmation of the will to life.  
2) Compassion overcomes egoism, however, which makes it a separate motivational 
category, i.e., it is its own mainspring.  
If compassion moves our body, i.e., if it generates unique actions, then it too is a constituent 
of the will. If the will to life represents any action irrespective of its aim, we can characterise 
compassion in terms of how it relates to the will to life. It cannot be the negation of the will 
 
                                               
117 Consider his discussion on the relationship between the will to life and suicide, which, he contends, is an 
affirmation of the will to life which negates the body whence an action arises (WR, 384-6). Equally, there are other 
modifications of the will or bodily urges, which are not concerned with affirmation of one’s own body: compassion 
is one of them, but also the mysterious urge responsible for asceticism.  
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to life, because it would entail no urge and so no action whatsoever, or, more correctly, the 
aim to stifle our urges and action. In fact, compassion affirms the will to life because it is an 
urge to do something. What kind of an affirmation is it and how do we distinguish it from 
others? Can we construe it in terms of egoism?  
If we define egoism as Schopenhauer defines it in WR, namely, as the ‘first simple 
affirmation of the will to life’ (my emphasis), or affirmation of one’s own body, or an urge 
to promote our own body, then we cannot construe compassion as a kind of egoism. In short, 
affirmation of the will to life is not the affirmation of one’s metaphysical ego.118 We refer 
to nothing when we speak of our ‘metaphysical ego’. It is a contradiction in terms and it 
conflates having an urge in the first place with having an urge with a specific target or aim. 
Compassion is an affirmation of the will to life using the recipient’s individual body. Thus, 
it is an affirmation of some body, but not of our own body. Compassion allows us to express 
the will to life by identifying with somebody else, i.e., their individuality and their body, its 
urges and wellbeing. We present ourselves as the willing tools or a means for the recipient’s 
individuality.119 Compassionate agents do not and cannot possibly act egoistically; also, the 
will to life is not a ‘thing’ or ‘body’, but a precondition of embodiment and thing-hood.  
Schopenhauer’s leap from the felt consciousness in his aesthetics to its significance 
for morality and ascetic resignation is what, I believe, makes us conflate the will to life with 
one of its mainsprings or affirmations. It is in carelessly hyperbolic claims of the following 
sort that we find the germ facilitating the conflation between the will to life and egoism:  
“…instead of ‘affirmation of the will’, we could also say ‘affirmation of the body’. 
The basic theme of all the various acts of will is the satisfaction of needs that are 
inseparable from the healthy existence of the body, are already expressed in it, and 
can be reduced to the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the 
species.” (WR, 353) 
The compassionate agent acts with the aim to preserve some body, but it is misleading to 
suggest she is egoistic. She is the one responsible for the action, but her aim is not to promote 
her own welfare. In aiming to help someone and by being concerned for his welfare, she 
suspends her own wellbeing. Compassion is still an affirmation of the will to life, but not her 
self-affirmation, because she still aims to benefit somebody, namely, it is still an urge to do 
something and thus an affirmation of the will to life. An action’s mainspring depends on its 
aim. Consequently, metaphysically, egoism and compassion are different parts of the same 
whole, but they are not identical. Both compassion and egoism would lose their meaning 
 
                                               
118 Remember that the concept of an ego only makes sense in distinction to an object seen as a non-ego, a distinction 
that is forbidden as concerns the metaphysical will. See also Cartwright (2008, 298) on this point. 
119 This may be hard to swallow for those of us inclined to a religious or esoteric conception of compassion. In 
compassionating, we support the recipient’s egoism and thus we become willing tools towards his individual ends. 
Schopenhauer was not referring to compassion in discussing the religious and esoteric dimension of his thoughts, 
which we saw as the effects of grace and ascetic resignation; he was referring to the negation of the will to life, or 
the mainspring of asceticism, which differs fundamentally from compassion. 
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and-or significance if we saw them as identical, but, when we consider them metaphysically, 
we do not express their identity so much as their being different parts of the same whole.  
Compassion overcomes our concern with our own body and thus our individual will, 
but it does not overcome the will to life. To forgo the distinction between one’s own body 
and another’s and then attempt to carry self-interest into the metaphysical is to abandon both 
compassion and egoism and reduce them to absurdities. In short, it is an error in category to 
allow one expression of the will to life to be synonymous with it. Without the distinction 
between one thing another, there cannot be a concept of ‘self’. Likewise, without a concept 
of self, there cannot be ‘self-concern’. In turn, without self-concern we cannot make sense 
of being ‘concerned for another’. To lose the distinction between one person and another is 
to lose all of our mainsprings. Here we should guard from conflating self-concern with self-
reference. Forgoing our self-concern is not equivalent to forgoing our self-reference or our 
identity with our actions. It is always ‘I’ and not someone else who performs my actions; so, 
I preserve the distinction between myself and the recipient by recognising that I act for his 
sake on his behalf. Hamlyn, for example, misleadingly argues that Schopenhauer is in some 
way committed to linking “compassion with an enlarged form of egoism” (Hamlyn 1908, 
145). If we apply Hamlyn’s suggestion to Schopenhauer’s conception of egoism, while 
utilising Schopenhauer’s two uses of the will or avoid conflating them, then we have the 
following account of what compassion means. According to Hamlyn, the compassionate 
agent acts on another’s behalf because both of them constitute a sense of self construed in 
opposition to a third party that both perceive as foreign and therefore as an object correlative 
to their shared will (purpose, aim etc.) and shared individuality. The previous must be the 
case, because egoism only makes sense if we have the same aim to promote the same body 
with which we both identity. Furthermore, the fact that there is some ‘body’ with which we 
both identity makes sense only in juxtaposition to another body or object we both recognise 
and perceive as being in accordance or discordance with our shared aim to promote the same 
body, i.e., we both perceive it as an ‘object among objects’. 
In sum, though self-reference and the urge to do something which underpins it are 
constitutive of both egoistic and compassionate actions, there is nonetheless a motivational 
difference between them. This difference is based on the ‘body’, which is the recipient of the 
action. Compassion does not and cannot possibly arise from negation of the will to life. It 
overcomes the first simple affirmation of the will to life, i.e., affirmation of one’s own body. 
Consequently, compassion is affirmation of the will to life by aiming to promote someone 
else’s body.  
The second and related error stems from the proposition that one mainspring is such 
that it characterise all the others, i.e., that we can reduce all mainsprings to some version of 
one. This error stems from misunderstanding and misapplying Schopenhauer’s distinct uses 
of the will, but we should omit that some of his comments do not help. He is often eager to 
demonstrate how negation of the will to life is possible, why it is desirable and how it relates 
to the recognition that objects of cognition are willing, striving etc. like we will, strive and 
so on. We should omit that Schopenhauer seems intent on showing that a compassionate 
action is partial to egoism in a loose and extended sense. Compassion still promotes egoism, 
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but the previous does not mean that we are acting egoistically. Our partiality is not to the 
agent, but the recipient. Compassionate agents act on behalf of the recipient’s egoism. A 
motivational synchronicity occurs between the agent and recipient, which is partial to the 
recipient’s ‘ego’. The compassionate agent plugs into the recipient’s individual will, so to 
speak. Although there is personal overcoming of egoism in compassion, there is not by this 
token an overcoming of egoism in all senses. We promote some body, which means we are 
still acting in someone’s benefit and thus affirms individuality or individuation. We do not 
abolish egoism when we act morally, but our actions do not serve us and so we cannot say 
that our moral actions are egoistic.  
Another source of the conflation between the two uses of the will is Schopenhauer’s 
contention that the compassionate agent “realises it is he himself that now appears to him” 
as the recipient. Another proposition is that the compassionate agent “recognises his own 
essence in itself in someone else’s appearance” (OBM, 255). Compare the previous with the 
following: “the good character lives in an external world homogeneous with his essence: 
others for him are not not-I, but are ‘I once more’” (OBM, 254). Equally likely to confuse is 
the perplexing proposition that compassion is grounded on “one individual’s immediately 
recognising himself, his own true essence, in the other” (OBM, 253). Therefore, Cartwright 
rightly objects and argues there is a problem with claims that purportedly point to the 
extraordinary experiences, such as those opining that it is, 
“…precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the pain, to our distress. We suffer 
with him, thus in him: we feel his pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours” (OBM, 
203)   
Cartwright’s suggestion is that Schopenhauer cannot possibly mean the above literally and 
so favors an interpretation of these sentences as metaphorical (cf. Cartwright 2008, 298). I 
agree that Schopenhauer’s comments are unfortunately misleading and do not do enough to 
show how his purported metaphysical basis for compassion relates to the rest of his thoughts 
on it, notably his psychological views and distinctions between the various mainsprings. I 
would add that he was aware of the difficulty of doing so and explicitly stated it (cf. OBM, 
246-248). Our ‘true essence’ is our urge to do something, not any one of our mainsprings, 
i.e., egoism, compassion and so on. I argue that conflating the individual and metaphysical 
will mislead us. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether the conflation was his own 
or if we misread him, because some of his comments facilitate it, wheras his philosophical 
distinctions ensure we have a way to avoid it.  
The ‘I once more’ (or ‘self’) we recognise in another person cannot refer to our 
individual will, for then it is patently a contradiction. To recognise oneself in the first place 
requires the distinction between the recipient and us on whose basis we can see anything as 
an object among objects, but also as willing, striving and so on. The ‘I once more’ (or ‘self’) 
refers to the will to life, but the will to life cannot possibly be any individual. Recall that the 
‘I’ is preoccupied with willing and its affirmation in whatever form. What he tries to capture 
with ‘willing’ is the agent’s identity with her action, or her “sense of self” as Reginster (cf. 
2009, 99) aptly puts it. I argued that we should construe this as the urge to do something, 
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which is a precondition of individuality without denoting what makes us individual. We 
should distinguish this ‘urge to do something’ accompanying all actions from our action’s 
aim, which determines what makes us individual. Our ‘sense of self’ is inherent to any 
action, because it represents the urge to act itself. The objective correlate of the previous is 
the cognition of ‘something’ as an object and its subjective correlate is our identifying with 
something. We identity with our own body when egoism drives us, or with another body 
when malice and compassion drives us. Nevertheless, for us to act in the first place, we have 
to perceive something as an object, first, and a motive, second. Even malice and compassion 
must adhere to the previous, although they do not cognise the recipient as an object, but the 
circumstances the recipient finds herself in or her plight, as an object and so a motive. Malice 
aims to promote her plight and compassion aims to alleviate it. 
There is a distinction between one’s sense of self and the mainspring of our action. 
Our ‘sense of self’ emerges in juxtaposition to something distinct from us, which we see as 
an object fit for purpose without defining it. Whereas, egoism, compassion, malice and 
asceticism have their characteristic purposes. In performing an action, we identify with it as 
its performers, i.e., as our own action. Schopenhauer puts it in the following way:  
“The greatest concentration of subjectivity consists in the act of will proper, and in 
this therefore we have the clearest consciousness of our own selves” (WRII, 368) 
Given that compassion and egoism are acts of will, we become conscious of our own selves 
through them. What distinguishes an act of will from another is its aim and not the fact that 
through it we become self-conscious. Recall that acts of will are inseparable from bodily 
movement. Thus, the claim that an act of will gives us the ‘clearest consciousness of our 
own selves’ means that when we are acting or experiencing an urge to act, we are conscious 
of the fact that we are the performers or authors of the action. For Schopenhauer, all of our 
actions are deliberate and based on thoughtfulness to some extent (cf. WR, 326f), which 
accentuates the self-consciousness accompanying them. When I act egoistically, it is I who 
acts. Likewise, when I act compassionately, it is I who acts. Nevertheless, my aim with the 
action and what determines its success or failure differs in each case. In the case of egoism, 
promoting my own body or individuality determines its success or failure. In compassion, 
it is promotion of another’s body or individuality. Therefore, we identify with our actions 
and urges to act and some are not egoistic. We do not define our mainsprings by our identity 
with our actions and urges, but by their different aims.  
In light of the above, how do we explain that we always identify with our body via 
our actions, but are not always motivated to promote our body? We recognise an identity 
between ourselves and the recipient premised on the will to life. We perceive her as someone 
who is willing, striving and so on. In other words, we assume that she also undergoes an 
urge to act and is conscious of the identity between her ‘self’ and her actions. The projection 
of willing onto the target of cognition, which constitutes aesthetic contemplation, underpins 
one’s ability to identify with oneself or another, but not always aim to promote oneself. We 
perceive the recipient like us ‘in our heart of hearts’, someone who also wills. The will-body 
identity shows us that we are a body and thus an object among objects. The recognition of 
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our objecthood through our identity with our body enables the recognition of another’s being 
a willing thing; it allows us to make the leap out of egoism.  
All actions that we undertake refer to ourselves by being modifications of our body. 
Our actions have self-reference. However, we can distinguish acts of will from one another 
by their aim. In compassionating with others, for example, we are fully aware that we aim 
to preserve their body or that we synchronise with their aims. Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
strives to explain how we can possibly synchronise with another’s aims if we are inherently 
different people. His explanation is the will to life or the urge to do something. Although we 
are different individuals, we are not different in our willing or striving to promote ourselves 
or in willing our own perfection. The previous identity between us has implications for how 
we approach others, as we saw with morality, but also the world or life itself, as we will see 
below.    
Given the above, can we argue that Schopenhauer successfully offers a metaphysical 
explanation of compassion? The will to life—which he perhaps misleadingly calls the aim 
or direction of the will as thing in itself—is a limit of our cognition. We can construe it as 
transcendental to our urges and actions and thus metaphysical in this sense. The will to life 
is the basis of all explanations we can possibly provide for the significance or the meaning 
of an event, action or change in the world. The recognition that my body is an object among 
objects and it is that through which my will expresses itself permits a question. What if other 
things have the same relationship to their body as I have to mine? What if this object is 
willing and what I see is its body and so its bridge to the objective world? Some objects we 
perceive are, seemingly, not as different to my body as others; what if they will something 
as I will something. This bridge between my will and body allows me (by a small stretch of 
my reason and imagination) to construct a further bridge between my will and another’s 
using their body, which I had hitherto construed as an object among objects such that I could 
enable my own will. This allows me to be interested in another person not only as an object 
for the promotion of my own body, but as an individual in her own right.  
In sum, the misapplication of Schopenhauer’s concept of the ‘will’, which too often 
is facilitated by his own comments, forms the basis of the metaphysical egoism objection. 
Atwell likewise recognises the previous, but does not show the errors whence it arises. He 
initially argues that we cannot conflate the will to life and egoism in his discussion of the 
alms-giver looking into the beggar’s heart:  
“…what he finds is simply the will-to-live. For this, and nothing else (so far as one 
can know), is the thing-in-itself. This means that what he actually finds is egoism—a 
drive to perpetuate itself, an impulse to continue existing (no matter what the cost for 
others), an insatiable, hungry, self-devouring force.” (Atwell 1990, 122)  
Atwell correctly rejects the possibility of the alms-giver recognising the will to life (cf. 
Atwell 1990, 123), but I will argue that the alms-giver does not literally see egoism. Indeed, 
we are as little able to recognise the will to life as we are able to recognise ‘egoism’. We 
cannot make the will (or its mainsprings) an object of cognition. We can have access to it 
using our imagination and reflection. What we recognise in the recipient when we look into 
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them is not the will to life, but the recipient herself as an individual motivated to act by some 
bodily impulse. In short, we see someone with urges, desires, impulses etc., or we see a 
person, like us. We infer from the previous that she experiences the will to life and is acting 
from a mainspring. If by looking into her we saw the will to life or egoism, we would not 
be looking at her at all, but something broader: life (or living) itself or one of the ways it 
expresses itself. We can argue that we perceive a movement, which we associate with the 
urge to do something that objectivates in actions by a particular body, but not that we 
perceive the ‘will to life’ or ‘egoism’. Recognising we are an object among objects and a 
willing subject enables us to project willing onto something, but not to literally see the will 
to life or one of its mainsprings. Without recognising our objecthood, we would have no 
bridge between us and the objects of our cognition. We would have no way out of egoism. 
We would have no way of construing things as more than just an object. Nevertheless, we 
should distinguish that which enables something from that which drives it: a door permits 
entry, but it does not necessarily cause us to enter.    
What I want to look at now in closing is the link between ‘overcoming egoism’ and 
‘the negation of the will to life’, which is ascetic resignation. Our overcoming egoism 
permits the negation of the will to life, which, he claims, comes as an effect “of grace, as if 
from the outside” (WR: 435). Nevertheless, overcoming egoism can also lead to other kinds 
of affirmation of the will to life.  
Schopenhauer was either too eager to resound a moral warning or express his deeply 
personal yearning to elucidate the fundamental differences between the three ways we can 
and actually do overcome egoism. What each have in common is negative: they do not aim 
to promote one’s own body.   
The first I will mention is malice, but there is an interesting and more controversial 
version of it which appears in Schopenhauer’s views on revenge. Revenge can arise even 
after we recognise an identity between ourselves and the target of cognition. This is different 
to revenge based on egoism, however. He begins to elucidate this unusual species of revenge 
in the following way: 
“We sometimes see a man so profoundly infuriated by a great injustice he has 
experienced, or perhaps only witnessed, that he deliberately and irretrievably 
dedicates his whole life to taking revenge on the person who committed the atrocity.” 
(WR, 385) 
Martyrdom can be candidate for representing these actions. For our purposes, however, we 
have to demonstrate the motivational difference between ‘egoistic revenge’ and the above, 
which we may call ‘selfless revenge’. Egoistic revenge differs from the latter by its aiming 
to re-assert our individuality, i.e., we take revenge to promote ourselves. However, there is 
a kind of revenge driven by a different mainspring. The best candidate for the mainspring 
that expalins this is malice, because compassion does not permit infliction of suffering on 
 180 
another and asceticism does not permit affirmation of the will to life.120 Consumed by 
malice, some agents may aim to harm another without concern for their self-preservation. 
In addition, for this distinct kind of revenge, they do not harm for the sake of hurting itself 
or the pleasure of hurting another. They ignore their injury or death, equally their pleasure 
is in the act itself. They identify with something other than their individuality (but likewise 
other than another individual) when they perform the action. Schopenhauer describes it as 
follows:   
“It seems to me that the indignation that would drive a man so far beyond the 
boundary of any self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he is himself 
the entire will to life (a will that appears in all beings through all times) and that the 
most distant future belongs to him in the same way the present does, and thus cannot 
be a matter of indifference. Affirming this will, he nonetheless demands that the 
drama which is a presentation of its essence never exhibit such a terrible injustice 
again.” (WR, 385)  
This kind of malice is uncommon because the pleasure an agent acquires from it, i.e., the 
conditions for its success or failure, are not someone’s pain irrespective of who that person 
may be. The pain of a particular person determines its success or failure, because of what 
that person and her actions signify for the affirmation of the will to life. The person on whom 
the agent seeks to inflict suffering is detrimental to life itself. His action aims to benefit the 
will to life. It is neither egoism nor compassion that drives him, but life itself, because the 
recipient of the action is not a particular agent even if the target is in a symbolic sense. Also, 
it cannot be asceticism, because its recipient is not the agent himself. The agent aims to deter 
others who might aspire to the same unjust action at another time irrespective of who might 
endure the injustice. Accordingly, there is an unusual affirmation of the will to life that also 
overcomes egoism in uncommon malice. It is uncommon because of the difference between 
 
                                               
120 Another way we could possibly construe this uncommon malice is as an extreme form of righteousness, which 
ignores one’s own self. Though it is difficult to separate this peculiar kind of malice from common malice, which 
aims to hurt another for its own sake as a reaction of harm done to the agent, we must try all the same. The ‘malice’ 
Schopenhauer has in mind here, i.e., the one that pursues another’s injury based on the felt consciousness, is not 
necessarily based on the harm done to the agent whether imagined or otherwise. It is also wrong to construe this 
uncommon malice (and its common counterpart) as reducible to egoism. The difference between malice and 
egoism is that one treats the individual as a willing thing, not as an object fit for purpose. Malice is only possible if 
we construe another as a willing thing. In the absence of this recognition, the action would be egoistic. Both 
common and uncommon malice perceive the target as a willing thing. Equally, both are responses to an injustice 
or harm the agent has recognised. Common and uncommon malice are distinct by their aim: one aims to hurt for 
the sake of pleasure in hurting, while another aims to hurt for the sake of the will to life. We can think of the malice 
of martyrs, or soldiers, or revolutionaries, who give up their life to deal harm to another for the sake of something 
larger than both combined. Our ordinary moral attitude towards common malice makes it difficult to consider that 
a malicious attitude in the uncommon sense can be beneficial to more than the person who is feeling it and acts on 
its basis; such a difficulty comes from our overeager attempt to project egoistic motivation onto a malicious person. 
For Schopenhauer, we must separate them. I think more research and debate can go on Schopenhauer’s conception 
of revenge, malice and their relation to the affirmation (or negation) of the will to life. This research and debate 
can, I believe, be useful to understanding how his aesthetics relates to his ethics and both to ascetic resignation.  
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taking pleasure in hurting another and taking revenge on behalf of all individuals or of life 
itself. I have called it ‘selfless’ revenge, in the strictest sense of the term, for brevity. 
The second overcoming of egoism is compassion, where we overcome egoism, but 
continue to affirm the will to life. The aim to promote another’s wellbeing we can construe 
as an indirect affirmation of the will to life. I discussed at length the reasons why compassion 
affirms the will to life, so I move on to third and final overcoming of egoism.  
The last overcoming of egoism is through the cessation of the urge to do something. 
I think Schopenhauer construes the previous as the final state or outcome of asceticism. The 
mainspring of asceticism does not just overcome egoism, which we can do while preserving 
the affirmation of the will to life. It is one kind of overcoming of egoism. When we act from 
ascetic motives, we no do not identify with ourselves or other people and their individuality, 
or even with a general or broader concept such as humanity, but apparently with the will to 
life itself. Asceticism overcomes egoism through the loss or the depression of the urge to do 
something. We experience this depression irrespective of our action’s aim, i.e., irrespective 
of whether the motive was egoistic, compassionate or malicious. Asceticism aims to depress 
willing itself by continually obstructing or thwarting our urge to act itself.   
In sum, when we present Schopenhauer’s thoughts in the above manner, we notice 
compassion cannot possibly be a kind of egoism. The metaphysical objection is misguided 
and rests on a contradiction in terms or a conflation of the will to life and its mainsprings. 
Cartwright (2008, 144) was right to show that Schopenhauer’s comments on compassion 
are conceptually problematic and to pave the way for the objections. These objections arise 
from our wrongly construing an individual will (a person or mainspring) and the will to life 
(the urge to do something) as indistinguishable, however. The error lies on our reading, but, 
admittedly, Schopenhauer often facilitates this error by his lack of clarity in some passages 
or by overdoing his rhetoric. Opposition between compassion and egoism has motivational 
relevance, but if we consider them metaphysically, they are simply urges to do something. 
They are affirmations of the will to life. There is no metaphysical distinction between myself 
and another person sufficient to make coherent the claim that there is such a thing as 
‘metaphysical egoism’. However, there is a difference between experiencing an urge to do 
something and the moments where this urge is absent. Compassion and egoism are urges to 
do something and thus affirmation of the will to life, which shows only how they relate to a 
second-order response. The same is not available in the reverse without error, that is, we 
cannot explain all motivation based on egoism or compassion. How can the will to life 
itself—not seen as a thing, but as the urge to do something—be egoistic or compassionate? 
What can possibly distinguish itself from the will to life without including or presupposing 
it? Egoism and compassion only make sense after we distinguish one thing from another, 
i.e., following the PI and thus the PSR. The will to life appears as egoistic or compassionate 
in an individual’s urges following her relation to another individual. The will to life cannot 
possibly be only ‘egoistic’ or only ‘compassionate’. Its only opposition is the absence of any 
urge to do something, which we can construe as a demotivation found in those individuals 
who do not will, not even another’s wellbeing.  
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We notice, then, that there is a difference between compassion and negation of the 
will to life. We also notice that selflessness arises from our recognising our embodiment, 
our being an object among objects, which underpins the identity relationship ourselves and 
other people, including sentient beings and finally the objective world itself. The previous 
recognition, Schopenhauer argues, enables the negation of the will to life, which I argued 
we should construe as loss of motivation, depression of willing or an absence of the urge to 
do something. We experience no urge to act at all and thus perceive nothing as aim-worthy 
and action-worthy. Nevertheless, he engenders conceptual knots by arguing that negation 
of the will to life also appears as a mainspring for action. How does the absence of an urge 
fit with the mainspring that is asceticism? How does depression fit with the aim to become 
depressed? How is it possible for us to aim for the end of all aiming? How can we perform 
actions aiming to subdue the urge to do something? I will suggest some answers to these 
puzzling questions, which rely on the difference between the mainspring of an action in 
terms of its aims and the means by which we realise that aim. Before I assess his account of 
ascetic resignation and the conceptual knots arising from it, I will analyse the distinction 
between the conscience and self-knowledge, which are preparatory to the previous account.  
1.15 The Conscience and Self-knowledge 
Schopenhauer’s views on the conscience are linked to his views on self-knowledge of the 
will. As we will see below, these views support the proposition that the moral mainspring, 
i.e., compassion, is a ‘fact of consciousness’ and so a constituent of the will. Once again, he 
uses his distinction between the will and intellect to detail his views on the conscience.  
Our conscience is rooted in the role of self-consciousness in our actions, i.e., in the 
identity between ‘ourselves’ and ‘our acts of will’. The latter’s objective representations are 
our actions (or deliberate bodily vicissitudes). Becoming self-conscious entails identifying 
with something as our or us, which often means identifying with our own body by default. 
Our conscience goes further, however. What underpins our conscience enables us to adopt 
various attitudes towards ourselves and thus respond in different ways to our own body. The 
previous entails that we will something on our own body and so no longer treat it as wholly 
identical to us (our will), but as an object among objects, as something in the world to which 
we can respond or upon which we can act. The previous is enabled by self-knowledge.  
Self-knowledge rests on identifying with our body and its vicissitudes, but it requires 
a different perspective on ourselves than the first-person perspective of self-consciousness. 
Self-knowledge is a product of reason, which unifies our actions and motives into a picture, 
which Schopenhauer calls our (empirical) character and which consists of the mainsprings 
and their arrangement in us. Self-knowledge is a picture of ourselves and thus it is not wholly 
ourselves nor something wholly foreign or distinct from us. We preserve the relationship of 
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identity we require for it to be a picture of ourselves, but we also know that it is not actually 
and fully ourselves. We perceive ourselves as an object; we construe our body as the identical 
and causal object, but in doing so we adopt the stance of the pure subject of cogntion.  
Our embodiment demonstrates that we are “an object among objects, and must obey 
the laws of objects” (WR, 25). This embodiment is reflected to us by our bodily vicissitudes, 
i.e., our moods, feelings, emotions and actions. Nevertheless, these vicissitudes are linked 
to the objects that incite them. Using the previous link, we construct a picture of our overall 
willing or ‘character’. Conscience is a commentary, evaluation or response to this character. 
Accordingly, his views on the conscience intertwine with Schopenhauer’s account of self-
knowledge:  
“…conscience is in fact just acquaintance with one’s own self, arising out of one’s 
own actions and growing ever more intimate” (OBM, 175)  
Our conscience is a response to the image of ourselves or the self-image we construct from 
the history of our actions and their mainsprings. I will examine the distinctions he uses to 
illustrate his views on conscience starting with remorse and guilt. I will likewise assess the 
distinction between indirect and direct (dis)approval of conscience. Before this examination, 
I will briefly examine his objections to the liberium arbitrium indifferentiae to illustrate that 
Schopenhauer was a compatibilist.  
We experience our conscience as an (dis)approval of our actions correlative to what 
they reveal about our character. We have a sense of responsibility and ownership over our 
actions that runs through self-knowledge: we identify with our actions, we consider them to 
be our own. They make us the individuals we are.121 We often construe the ownership and 
responsibility over our actions as showing that our actions show the liberum arbitrium 
indifferentiae. Schopenhauer rejects the previous arguing that it commits us to the claim that 
our actions arise ex nihilo, i.e., without reference to their object and so motive, which has a 
causal effect on us. His correlation theory of cognition argues that motives have an effect 
on us based on our being the individuals we are, i.e., based on our character. According to 
the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, our actions are somehow independent from any external 
influence, i.e., from the cognitive object or circumstance that motivates us, but also from our 
own character. According to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will and correlation theory 
of cognition, our actions have some object that incites them whereas our will (i.e., who we 
are as individuals) makes them efficacious, which yields motives. We cannot possibly (re)act 
to anything without reacting to ‘something’ which we see as action-permitting or action-
worthy, i.e., an object. Where an object is missing, we imagine it. We always will something. 
Our will enters into an irreducible relationship with its correlative object, which we cannot 
wave away. Consequently, he rejects both the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae and fatalism. 
 
                                               
121 We saw previously that this is simply the limit of self-consciousness for Schopenhauer, whose most immediate 
expression is the individual’s cognition of his or her identification with the will and so her body based on her acts 
of will which are identical to bodily action.  
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We falsely believe in the arbitrary genesis of our actions separated from an external 
object, which presents itself as an object and thus as distinct or separate from us, which we 
then evaluate or perceive as action-worthy. Our emotions, affects and moods in relation to 
an object represents its worthiness. Our actions are part of the objective world and thus we 
establish causal relations with other objects. We seemingly operate on the same necessity 
as we purportedly perceive among other objects, but this does not mean our actions are not 
free in another sense, namely, that they are not individual. Schopenhauer’s conception of 
freedom is that of individuality in juxtaposition to generality, rather than the ability to act 
differently than how we previously acted without thereby being a different person entirely. 
We are free by virtue of our individuality, but not by our ability to act out of character or act 
as if out of nothing or nowhere. We may not know our character fully, but we never act out 
of character, according to Schopenhauer. Thus, when it seems as if we acted out of character, 
it is most likely that our cognition of ourselves or self-image was wrong or incomplete.  
The complexity of our body and thus the conditions for the generation or prediction 
of these changes is immense compared to other laws of nature, but this difficulty does not 
imply impossibility. We are part of the objective world or in the trenches with it and the other 
objects of our cognition. What applies to them applies also to us. The ground of our actions 
is our character, which expresses itself through bodily movement, affection or a full-fledged 
action pending a sufficient reason, namely, a motive, but it could not possibly express itself 
independently from any object or motive. A motive operates on us as an object does another 
object in which it produces an effect, because of the will body identity. Some object X could 
not possibly produce this or that effect on us unless we are such that we can be effected by 
X. ‘Who’ and ‘what’ we are ‘makes possible’ this or that response. Therefore, he preserves 
responsibility by appealing to our individuality or our character, rather than the fact that we 
could have acted otherwise.   
We are free to do what we will, because ‘what we will’ is what we are. We cannot 
possibly be free to do what is contrary to our will or to who we are, because we cannot will 
what is not in accordance with who we are without this supposed contrary willing declaring 
itself as another constituent of our will or part of who we are. We are what we will, for him, 
and so we are responsible for the actions that stem from us. If we seemingly will something 
that is contrary to us, then the contradiction lies not in our willing, but in what we perceive 
as us, i.e., our self-image. Our will never contradicts itself. A mistaken self-image leads to 
apparently contradictory actions by virtue of our possessing flawed self-knowledge and so, 
in such moments, we are driven to reform our self-image rather than our will. In sum, if we 
‘will something’, then we commit to an aim and the object which is its instantiation or its 
correlate, which then appears as a motive. For us to act contrary to our aims, it presupposes 
an alternative aim, equally our own and arising from us, which means that to act contrary to 
our aims is impossible. Schopenhauer is revisionist about responsibility and individuality in 
his rejection of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, which states that actions arise ex nihilo.   
Our conscience, Schopenhauer argues, is concerned with an action: “our actions are 
the theme of conscience” (OBM, 242). This is because they are recognisable and indubitable 
instantiations of our character. They are cognitive bridges to the rule(s) or principle(s) on 
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whose basis we respond to the world, i.e., our mainsprings. A question arises about guilt in 
relation to the previous, however. If we do not ground guilt on the belief that we could have 
acted otherwise (or not acted at all), because we were free or not compelled to act in some 
way, then on what do we ground it? Schopenhauer suggests the following: guilt rests on 
recognising our character through our actions. We ground it on the knowledge that we cannot 
possibly act otherwise, which sounds counterintuitive. We feel guilty because we could have 
acted otherwise, but only if we were different people. We are not and cannot possibly be 
different, so we cannot have acted otherwise and this is what our guilt expresses (more on 
this below).  
 Schopenhauer contests with the problem posed by what he calls the ‘consciousness of 
freedom’ that accompanies our actions, which he described as follows: 
“Our actions are accompanied by a consciousness of independence and originality, 
through which we recognise them as our work, and everyone with unerring certainty 
feels himself as the real doer of his deeds and morally responsible for them. But now, 
since responsibility presupposes a possibility of having acted otherwise, and thus 
freedom in some way or other, so in the consciousness of responsibility there lies 
mediately also that of freedom.” (OBM, 173)  
His solution to the problem is to use the Kantian distinction between appearance and thing 
in itself. As the ‘thing in itself’, we are free, but as ‘appearance (or representation)’ we are 
bound by natural laws. We are free to the extent that we can ‘think a different character for 
ourselves’, but we cannot possibly be a different character because that is fixed by what we 
will and thus by who we are. We can only act in accordance with who we are. Accordingly, 
we feel guilty not because we know we could have acted otherwise, but because we know we 
would have acted otherwise if we could. There is a hopelessness and resignation to our guilty 
feelings, which often we do not notice. We could have acted otherwise if we were a different 
person; so, our feelings of guilt demonstrates the failure of the aim to be other than who we 
are. It reminds us that we are who we are and what we will is identical to who we are.  
Let me elaborate on the above admittedly nuanced and unusual conception using a 
few examples and distinctions beginning with an analysis of the distinction between remorse 
and guilt. This will elaborate on the two distinct relations we have to our actions and show 
that he only takes one to be the genuine concern of the (dis)approval of conscience. Remorse 
and guilt are different responses to our actions resting on a subtle distinction between them. 
This distinction informs us about his views on the conscience.  
Remorse or regret, Schopenhauer tells us, is a disapproval arising from a recognition 
that an action does not accord with what we will: we acted erroneously because of erroneous 
representations of our circumstances, not because of our will. He describes it as follows: 
“Remorse never comes from alterations in the will (which would be impossible) but 
rather from the fact that cognition has altered. I must continue to will the essential 
and real aspect of what I have willed previously, because I am myself this will lying 
outside time and alteration.” (WR, 322) 
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Let us take an example. Imagine Jack grows suspicious of his wife after seeing her converse 
at length with a handsome man at a party while oblivious of everyone around her including 
her husband. This leads Jack to question the handsome man’s intentions. Upon recognising 
that his accusations stem from inadequate understanding of the reasons behind his wife’s 
immersed conversation with the handsome man, he feels remorse or regret. He realises that 
his actions stemmed not from his being jealous, but an incomplete cognition which sparked 
his ‘defensiveness’. He sought stop her from becoming ensnared by the manipulative, 
superficial advances of another man. He knows that his jealousy, even if it is a constituent 
of his character, was not driving him in that moment. His defensiveness arose from his 
erroneous representation of the circumstances that appeared as jealousy, when, in fact, he 
was driven by a concern for her welfare. Jack imagined her being seduced and driven to do 
something that she would later regret, and wished to alleviate her of this pain. The trust he 
demonstrated to her explanations and reasons reveals to him his loving disposition, i.e., that 
he was concerned for her welfare all along. Therefore, he showed remose by correcting his 
actions and so by not pursuing his suspicion any further. 
Let us take another example. Juliet purchases a dress she has coveted for quite some 
time from a multinational clothes store. She wears it at a fundraising event for charity that 
her best friend is hosting. In the event, she converses with a lovely couple who work for an 
international charity based in Thailand; they have previously worked in China, Indonesia, 
India and Malaysia. They tell her about the effects of ‘Western’ trade and investment in the 
previous countries, about the children making products for multinational companies that 
charge comparably more than what they spend to make them. They check her dress’s label 
and point out to her that it is likely such a product. In turn, Juliet feels remorse for having 
bought it. She recognises that she had no idea about the trading habits of multinational 
companies and their exploitation of cheap labour to maximise profits. Now that she is aware 
of it, she readjusts her commitments. According to Schopenhauer, the previous readjustment 
is her realigning her cognition with her will. She resolves to not contribute to exploiting 
people to maximise profits for a small group of other people. 
For Schopenhauer, then, remorse is a response to the recognition that our action was 
out of sync with our character. It arose from an erroneous or incomplete representation of 
the circumstances upon which we acted: 
“I can never regret what I have willed, although I can regret what I have done, because 
I was led by false conceptions to do something what was out of keeping with my will. 
The insight that comes from correcting our cognition is remorse.” (WR, 322) 
The regretful agent who acts in ‘discordance with his will’ does so by an error in cognition. 
Remorse attends to the action because it was in discordance with our will by misrepresenting 
the circumstances in which we acted. We cannot possibly regret what we do not know or 
what we do not want to change. What remorse is urging us to change is not our character—
that is impossible—but our cognition. The discordance between the action and the aim, e.g., 
as Jack realised that he overreacted and misjudged the situation, or as Juliet realised that she 
was ignorant of common trading practices of some multi-national companies. Consequently, 
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disapproval of an action realigns our cognition with our character; remorse is a fleeting act 
of conscience. 
Guilt, which Schopenhauer calls ‘anxiety or anguish of conscience’, fundamentally 
differs from remorse. The following passage highlights the basis for this difference between 
the two: 
“Thus remorse always proceeds from recognition that has been corrected, not from a 
change of will, which would be impossible. The anguish of conscience over what has 
been done is nothing like remorse; it is the pain of recognising yourself as such, i.e. 
as will. It is squarely based on the certainty that you still have the same will. If the 
will were altered and the anguish of conscience were just remorse, then it would be 
abolished: the past could no longer cause any anxiety, since it would present the 
expression of a will that was no longer that of the person experiencing remorse.” (WR, 
323) 
What separates remorse from guilt, however, is not clear in all cases, certainly not as clear 
as the above passage shows. An agent with the right kind of cognition, i.e., recognition that 
the will to life is inherent to all things, which leads to ascetic resignation experiences guilt 
and remorse differently. An ascetic agent can feel guilt for actions that only merit remorse, 
because he recognises that all actions stem from the will to life.122 To use the previous 
example, unlike Jack, an ascetic feels guilty for loving his wife, since he sees his love as an 
expression of the will to life. Schopenhauer describes the ascetic agent’s character in the 
following manner: 
“Anyone who has reached this point will continue to sense a tendency for all sorts of 
willing, since he is still an animated body and concrete appearance of the will: but he 
intentionally suppresses this by compelling himself not to do anything he really wants 
to do, and instead doing everything he does not want to, even when this serves no 
further purpose other than to mortify the will. Since he himself negates the will that 
appears in his own person, he will not resist it when someone else does the same to 
him, i.e. does him wrong; that is why he welcomes every bit of suffering that comes 
to him from the outside, through chance or by someone’s malicious actions, every 
harm, every injury, every disgrace, every insult: he receives them cheerfully, as an 
opportunity for assuring himself that he no longer affirms the will; rather, he 
cheerfully sides with everyone hostile to the expression of the will that is his own 
person.” (WR, 408-9) 
 
                                               
122 See, e.g., how Schopenhauer describes the over-sensitivity to the will of the resigned even if we take their 
actions to be accidental, in that they are premised on an error in cognition not premised on their individual will. 
There is seemingly no such thing as an accident for those resigned to identifying with the will to life: “someone 
who has maimed or killed another without the slightest intention and quite accidentally, laments this sin his whole 
life long with a feeling that seems related to guilt, and also experiences from others a peculiar kind of discredit as 
a person of sin (unfortunate human being)” (FW, 79). 
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Guilt remains with the agent long after the action and continues to invoke its disapproval, 
Moreover, much like remorse, guilt has the action in reflection as its starting point, and so 
attends to its relationship to our character: “guilt does not lie in willing but rather in willing 
accompanied by cognition” (WR, 181). The difference between the two emotions is not the 
cognition, but how the cognition relates to the will, i.e., in how we respond to our self-image. 
The remorseful conscience disapproves the action because it discords with our character. 
Guilt attends to our character via our cognition; it disapproves our character. Guilt then is a 
disapproval of ourselves, not of our actions.  
A guilty conscience follows the recognition that actions result from our will. It does 
not arise from a cognitive error we made over the state of affairs in the world. Our ignorance, 
our being tricked and-or our being misled in some way does not explain guilt. Consequently, 
guilt and remorse concern the relationship between an action and character, but differ in the 
responses stemming from that relationship. A remorseful conscience disapproves of actions 
based on our character, whereas the guilty conscience disapproves of our character (i.e. the 
mainspring of the action) because of an action.  
Let us look at an example of guilt to refine the difference between remorse and guilt. 
Heather feels guilty for sleeping with her boyfriend’s best friend. She has been attracted to 
him for a long time, but had suppressed and so not acted upon her attraction until now. She 
feels guilty after she recognises she has felt attracted to him for a long time and had merely 
suppressed the urge to act upon it. She was not misled by intoxication or by his manipulative 
advances. On the contrary, she willed to sleep with him from the moment she met him, but 
tried not to act upon it. The guilty person feels anguish or anxiety of conscience over the 
action because it reveals that the action arose from her character. The action is not a mistake 
based on her misconceiving or misperceiving the circumstances.  
There is a universal principle underlying our conscience that groups the differences 
in response. Whether it is remorseful, guilty or rewarding, our conscience is concerned with 
the actions we performed and how they relate to our character and thus with its mainspring. 
Its approvals or disapprovals are concerned with our character, not our action independent 
from it. Remorse is an approval of our character following the disapproval of an error in 
cognition that led us to act seemingly ‘out of character’.  
The identity relationship between our actions and our character permits us to create 
a ‘self-image’, on which we can act using its objective correlate or identical object, i.e., our 
body. Our body, then, becomes the target or motive of our actions. Both remorse and guilt 
show how our conscience is concerned with our character through our actions in different 
ways and for different reasons. In remorse, we realign our cognition with our character after 
dissatisfaction with what we did. In guilt, we are dissatisfied with who we are. Both are not 
concerned with actions independent from our character; certainly not through some kind of 
freedom that contends our actions arise ex nihilo. Self-knowledge is central to a response by 
our conscience, because to exert any influence at all, conscience requires and presupposes 
an ‘object’ of cognition. The previous object is our self-image. Therefore, we cannot have 
a conscience without self-knowledge, i.e., without making an object of our will: “conscience 
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is in fact just acquaintance with one’s own self, arising out of one’s own actions and growing 
ever more intimate” (OBM, 175).123  
The second distinction he employs, which elaborates his views on the conscience, is 
between the direct and indirect (dis)approval of conscience. Our conscience can only voice 
its (dis)approval after performance of an action: it “properly does not speak until afterwards” 
(OBM, 168). Where it seems to us that our conscience disapproves of our action prior to our 
undertaking it, so disapproves of the motive arising in deliberation, it does so indirectly by 
the intervention of memory. Reflection of over a similar action(s) that we have undertaken 
intervenes. Consequently, indirect approval of conscience, which presupposes deliberation, 
likewise rests on our self-image: 
“Before the deed it [our conscience] can at most speak indirectly, that is through the 
mediation of reflection, which holds before it the memory of previous cases where 
similar deeds have been subject to the disapproval of conscience.” (OBM, 168)124 
He introduces the distinction between direct and indirect (dis)approval of conscience to 
show that our conscience is concerned with what we have done, not with what we might do. 
The actions we have actually undertaken are the cognitive objects of our conscience, because 
it is only through them that we can have a self-image from which to enable a response based 
on that self-image. In other words, we require a self-image to be able to respond to ourselves, 
but we also require an action to formulate that self-image.  
In sum, our conscience has our character as its target, but the action as its object. We 
unify actions into a self-image composed of various mainsprings. Schopenhauer avoid the 
assumption that the voice of conscience shows that actions arise ex nihilo. He emphasises 
the relationship between our conscience and self-knowledge. Our conscience relies on our 
self-image, which we construct out of our actions. In turn, our actions arise from the effect 
of motives, which are motivationally efficacious objects which borrow their efficacy from 
what we will or who we are. Thus, our actions are the starting and focal point of the voice 
of conscience, but its target is our self-image or character:  
“Everyone comes to know himself, just like others, empirically in his deeds, and only 
they weigh on the conscience. For they alone are not problematic, like thoughts, but 
on the contrary are certain, stay there unchangeably, and are not merely thought but 
known.” (OBM, 168) 
The emphasis here is on what we ‘know’ and what is ‘certain’ about ourselves, which then 
becomes the target of the voice of conscience. Self-consciousness gives us an immediate 
 
                                               
123 See also: “this closer acquaintance, growing ever more intimate, is properly what we call conscience, which for 
that reason is voiced directly only after the action, prior to it at most only indirectly” (FW, 107). 
124 Compare the previous with: “[the] conscience is conditioned by reason simply because it is only by means of 
the latter that a clear and coherent recollection is possible. It is in the nature of the matter that conscience speaks 
only afterwards, which is why it is also called verdict-giving conscience. Beforehand it can speak only in a non-
genuine way, that is indirectly, as reflection infers from the memory of similar cases to the future disapproval of a 
merely projected deed” (OBM, 243). 
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acquaintance with ourselves, but this is minimal. Its limit is our identifying with our willing 
and body. Using our actions, we acquire a self-image, which he calls the empirical character. 
The cognitive access to our willing in self-knowledge is not minimal; it is not the ‘I will’ or 
‘I will X’. Our cognitive access to ourselves is akin to ‘I will X’ and X suggests I am a Y-
type of person’, or, ‘I will X because I am a Y-type person’. Thus, the voice of conscience 
responds to the fact that we are a particular type of person, for example, a selfless and caring 
person, or a callous or self-centered person. Our type reflects the dominance or priority of 
a particular mainspring.   
According to Schopenhauer, actions are like “the cachet in a thousand seals” (OBM, 
173), each is a mirror revealing to us the constituents of our will. Self-knowledge produces 
a self-image and our conscience is a subsequent response to this self-image. According to 
him, conscience is the “acquaintance with ourselves that becomes ever more complete, the 
ever growing protocol of deeds, is conscience” (OBM, 242). The concept of ‘protocol’ here 
refers to our fundamental aims or mainsprings. Thus, our conscience is concerned with the 
action because it expresses who we are, not because it reflects that we could have acted or 
can act otherwise: 
“Although the reproaches of conscience immediately and ostensibly concern what we 
have done, they really and fundamentally concern what we are, about which our deeds 
simply provide conclusive testimony, relating to our character as symptoms do to a 
disease.” (OBM, 241) 
We cannot have a conscience without a degree of self-knowledge, or have self-knowledge 
without this engendering an evaluative and affective response, which is either negative or 
affirmative. In some cases, we find people who hurt their body due to what they recognise 
about themselves through their actions.  
The primary difference between self-knowledge and the conscience is that the latter is 
taking action on ourselves; it is a way of regulating or shaping ourselves. Self-knowledge is 
what makes the previous possible without actually ‘determining’ how we respond, shape or 
regulate ourselves. We cannot predict how people will react to their self-image, but we can 
claim that without a self-image the person cannot possibly react to himself.  
The final comments Schopenhauer makes on the conscience is about its criteria for 
approval or disapproval, i.e., the basis on which our conscience (dis)approves of our actions. 
He states that our conscience is the “ever growing protocol of deeds” (ibid.) without actually 
and explicitly telling us what this protocol is. In other words, what is the maxim or principle 
through which we respond to our self-image? We know that with remorse our conscience 
disapproves the relationship between our cognition and the will over which the will has final 
verdict by realigning our cognition. The same relationship is not clear with guilt, however. 
Guilt presupposes a negation of at least a constituent of our will or a negative response to 
our self-image. However, only our will can respond to our self-image. Is disapproval of our 
self-image also by our will? We notice an impasse here, but before we show this impasse, 
let us consider what the above ‘protocol’ of deeds is, according to him.  
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Schopenhauer states that our conscience evaluates our actions relative to their moral 
worth. It evaluates our action according to the degree to which compassion was its dominant 
mainspring. He argues morality and the voice of conscience as interlinked. He even uses the 
voice of conscience as first-person evidence of moral worth: 
“…a wholly internal and hence less evident sign of actions of moral worth, there is 
the fact that they leave behind a certain satisfaction with ourselves, which is called 
the approval of conscience; just as for their part the actions opposed to them, those of 
injustice and unkindness, even more those of malice and cruelty, receive an opposite 
internal self-judgment” (OBM, 197) 
Likewise, in a later passage he calls the conscience an “ethical fact of consciousness” (OBM, 
243). He supports this claim by arguing that conscience begins with our actions as opposed 
to our thoughts and inclinations because our actions show what we will do whereas our 
thoughts and inclinations show what “the human being in general” (OBM, 168) is capable of 
doing. Our actions then individuate us. He grounds the previous on a distinction between the 
agent’s individual character and the character of humanity. Our character is only certain and 
sealed in our actions. Although we are composed of all of the mainsprings that are part of 
humanity, only the most dominant is testimony to what we will and exemplifies who or what 
we are. Nevertheless, we have to consider the fact that some of those actions incite the self-
dissatisfaction of guilt, which he explains as follows: 
“…when we think over our actions, there occasionally comes over us a dissatisfaction 
with ourselves of a particular kind, having the peculiarity that it concerns not the 
consequence, but the action itself, and does not rest on egoistic grounds like all the 
others where we regret the imprudence of our doings, since here we are discontent 
precisely because we have acted too egoistically, too considerately towards our own 
wellbeing, too little towards that of others, or have even made our end the woe of 
others for its own sake, without any advantage to ourselves. That this is what we are 
discontent with ourselves about, and that we can grieve over sufferings that we have 
not undergone but rather caused – this is the naked fact, and no one will deny it.” 
(OBM, 172) 
He construes the disapproving conscience as arising from a recognition that our actions are 
too egoistic or malicious. These ‘gradations of actions’ reveal an interaction between our 
mainsprings in deliberation. Thus, conscience expresses the voice of morality as presumably 
a matter of fact.  
We should distinguish acting ‘compassionately’ from acting ‘conscientiously’, 
however. We can imagine a person who cannot reflect on herself and so lacks a self-image, 
but who feels compassion for others and acts on it. The previous person lacks a conscience 
because she has no self-knowledge and she is unable to formulate a self-image, but she does 
not lack the mainspring of compassion and thus the aim to promote another’s wellbeing. She 
can act morally without knowing she is moral. Our conscience results from our self-image. 
When we state that ‘someone lacks a conscience’, we mean that she does not feel remorse 
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or guilt over her acting out of another mainspring than compassion. Accordingly, his views 
are consistent with the common sense conception of our conscience.  
In principle, we can have other responses to our self-image. There are cases where, 
according to Schopenhauer, the “regret and anxiety that many a person feels over what he 
has done is often at bottom nothing other than fear of what can happen to him in return” 
(OBM, 186). Such cases represent what he calls a “spurious’’ (OBM, 186) conscience; the 
agent still reacts to his self-image and thus it seems as if he has a conscience, but the ground 
of his response is not compassion, but another mainspring. Consequently, what makes the 
response to our self-image an act of conscience is the moral mainspring of compassion; its 
absence reflects a spurious conscience, but is still a response to our self-image.  
We can evaluate our self-image based on a non-moral mainspring and thus ‘lack a 
conscience’ or have a ‘spurious’ conscience. We can be mistaken over the reasons for our 
self-dissatisfaction—perhaps because we hold dogmatic beliefs—but we cannot mistake our 
self-dissatisfaction or fail to recognise that we are dissatisfied with ourselves. Schopenhauer 
tells us, in an admittedly convoluted manner, that:  
“When someone appeals to dogmas in doing good deeds, we must distinguish whether 
these dogmas are the true motives or whether, as I said above, they are nothing more 
than an ostensible account that the person uses to try to satisfy his own reason 
concerning a deed that emanates from a completely different source. He does the deed 
because he is good, but does not know how to explain it properly because he is no 
philosopher; still, he would like to have something to think.” (WR, 396: some 
emphasis is mine) 
He distinguishes between one’s interpretation of an action and the ‘true motive’125 (i.e., the 
mainspring) of the action. We can ‘lack a conscience’, which means we respond to what we 
recognise based on another mainspring than compassion, but we can likewise ‘misinterpret’ 
what occurs when we respond to what we recognise about ourselves. Accordingly, there is 
a difference between responding differently to our self-image and our misinterpreting our 
responses to that self-image. For example, John may interpret his guilt over having hurt his 
sister Susie as his punishment from God for having sinned and thus for being a sinner. He 
does not feel guilty because he fears for his soul in the afterlife. He feels guilty because he 
believes he is a sinner for having hurt a child of God, whom he loves deeply. According to 
Schopenhauer, John is mistaken in his interpretation, i.e., in his reasons for his guilt, but he 
cannot possibly mistake the fact that he is dissatisfied with himself. He knows that he hurt 
the person he loves and that he is the kind of person who hurts those he loves, which leads 
him to disapprove of himself. John’s guilt arose from compassion, but he misinterprets his 
 
                                               
125 It would have been clearer here if Schopenhauer consistently used the notion of Triebfeder as opposed to ‘true’ 
motive. However, since Triebfeder is a term he employed later, primarily in OBM, it makes sense that he operated 
on this distinction as opposed to the tripartite distinction I explored here between a cognition, a motive and a 
mainspring. Nevertheless, what he intends to capture with the notion of true motive is precisely the driving force 
or mainspring of the action as an attempt to avoid the problems regarding self-deception.  
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guilt through his misguided and dogmatic world-view. John has an erroneous world-view, 
not an erroneous self-image. Likewise, his response to his self-image is also not erroneous. 
His world-view stems from religious dogma, i.e., that Susie is a child of God whom he loves 
and that God punishes sinners through guilt.  
Schopenhauer can offer John a naturalistic interpretation of his guilt that accords 
with the limits of our cognition, but he cannot change John’s self-dissatisfaction and the 
moral sensitivity underpinning it. John’s moral sensitivity reflects a mainspring of action, 
which is triggered by his self-image. His self-image incites him as any other cognition of an 
object incites him. Our conscience is a response to perceiving ourselves as an object among 
objects, which entails that we make a motive of ourselves using our self-image. According 
to the previous, we can envisage people whose compassion is so feeble they can only have 
glimpses of it without actually responding to it.  
In sum, the intellect alone is insufficient to generate morally worthy attitudes and 
actions, but it does enable us to reflect and act upon ourselves in response to our actions and 
their mainsprings. Before we proceed to his views on ascetic resignation, I will assess the 
impasse in self-knowledge that emerges from the above, which will lay the ground for my 
reading of his views on ascetic resignation. 
1.16 Schopenhauer’s Objection to Kant on the Conscience 
and the Impasse of Self-knowledge 
There is an impasse in Schopenhauer’s conception of guilt, which we can notice when we 
analyse it in light of his philosophy of the will. Guilt is self-dissatisfaction aimed at what 
we recognise about our character; its target is our self-image. According to his correlation 
theory of cognition, however, all responses to any target of cognition stem from the will or 
presuppose its activity. Even the self-dissatisfaction of guilt is a response by the will and so 
our character. Our will evaluates our self-image and so renders it efficacious. If our response 
to our self-image stems from our will, then the evaluation must always be affirmative. If all 
responses arise from the will, then a response to its self-image must also arise from the will 
and should always be affirmative. The claim that the will negates itself without an addition 
from something external to it is conceptually problematic.  
The above impasse threatens his account of the conscience. If the will uses itself as 
a criterion for its response to its self-image, then this must surely always result in the self-
affirmation or approval of our self-image. If our conscience requires a self-image generated 
by self-knowledge, and the response to this self-image stems from that of which it is a self-
image, i.e., the will, then why would it negate itself? Why would an egoistic or malicious 
character, who reflects his egoism and malice back to himself through his self-image, ever 
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be dissatisfied or disapproving of his egoism or malice? Why would he approve of it? How 
can predominantly egoistic agents disapprove of a reflection of their egoism?  
Schopenhauer leaves himself some conceptual room to wiggle out of the impasse by 
arguing that we are composed of more than one mainspring. Compassion drives disapproval 
of conscience, in such instancesm. Yet, even if he can conceptually circumvent the impasse 
in this way, the problem appears again in a different light. If the individual whose 
compassion is apparently too weak to drive her to a compassionate action in the first place, 
then how can she subsequently be in any position to disapprove her egoism. If compassion 
has somehow won over her egoism, then it entails her character has somehow changed in 
the process. The previous undermines his propositions about the inalterability of someone’s 
character. Thus, he struggles to render coherent the following conflicting claims:  
A) Our character is unalterable.  
B) Agents undergo a transformation from egoism into benevolence through guilt.  
Yet, he nevertheless holds both of the above propositions as true:  
A: “Our character is to be seen as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal and 
thus indivisible and unalterable act of will, or an intelligible character; and this act 
irrevocably determines everything essential, i.e. the ethical content of how we 
conduct our lives, which must express itself as such in its appearance, the empirical 
character.” (WR, 328) 
 
B: “In real life, we see that unfortunate people who have to drink to the dregs the 
greatest amounts of suffering and face a shameful, violent and often miserable death 
on the scaffold, fully lucid but deprived of all hope, are quite often transformed in 
this way… Nonetheless, they are guilty and evil to a considerable degree. But after 
complete hopelessness has set in, we see many of them transformed in the way we 
have described. Now they exhibit genuine goodness and purity of mind, true horror 
at any deed that is the least bit evil or uncaring… In fact, their sufferings and death 
ultimately become precious to them, because the negation of the will to life has 
emerged.” (WR, 420)  
We can attempt to resolve this impasse by fleshing out a distinction that he alludes to in his 
objection to Kant’s account of the conscience. This distinction is evident in his objections 
of the “juridical–dramatic form” (OBM, 171) of Kant’s conception of conscience.  
Schopenhauer tells us that Kant’s account of the conscience confuses “deliberation 
about every practical situation” (OBM, 171) with the conscience. What Kant understands as 
‘conscience’, according to Schopenhauer, is the following:  
“[A] much more universal form which deliberation about every practical situation 
easily assumes, and which chiefly arises from the conflict of opposing motives that 
occurs in most such cases; reflective reason successively examines the weight of these 
motives, and in this it makes no difference whether these motives are moral or egoistic 
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in kind, and whether it concerns a deliberation about what is still to be done or a 
rumination about what has already been carried out” (OBM, 171) 
This so-called ‘juridical–dramatic form’ captures the deliberation or reflective operations of 
our intellect about our actions, not our conscience. We may respond to our deliberations—
or to a memory of past actions—in a manner that fits and is consistent with the initial driving 
force of our action. This is not what we ordinarily understand as our voice of conscience, 
however. Thus, Schopenhauer objects to Kant’s characterisation on empirical grounds. Kant 
failed to capture what a conscience means. Kant’s suggestion is morally neutral. Conscience 
differs from deliberation in that it cannot possibly be morally neutral, however. Kant’s 
characterisation gives egoism a fortress; it permits us to construe our conscience as a morally 
neutral phenomenon operating on potentially amoral maxims. The (dis)approval of 
conscience is not neutral, however. It is the voice of morality; it reflects one mainspring and 
maxim. Its criterion for approval is the degree to which compassion drove our action, for 
Schopenhauer. Kant’s proposal does not define the conscience at all, but, at best, it captures 
the initial mainspring and so what generated the action. The same mainspring responds to 
the action we undertook based on whether or not we succeeded in realising its aim. Thus, 
Kant’s account allows conscience to be both compassionate and egoistic simultaneously.  
Deliberation differs from the conscience not only by virtue of its mainspring, but 
likewise by virtue of the target of the (dis)approval. Deliberation aims at the right action 
relative to its mainspring. Our conscience, on the other hand, aims at the right mainspring 
given some action. Although, like deliberation, our conscience can presuppose a conflict of 
motives, the conflict is not in relation to what course of action we should take presupposing 
different motives based on only one mainspring. Rather, our conscience reflects a conflict 
of motives underpinned by the interaction between two or more mainsprings. Therefore, the 
conflict of motives we encounter in our conscience represents a conflict of mainsprings, 
whereas the conflict of motives in deliberation can represent different motives arising from 
the same mainspring.  
A striking difference between Kant’s suggestion and Schopenhauer’s is in the target 
of conscience. The target of the (dis)approval of conscience is someone’s self-image, for 
Schopenhauer. For Kant, on the other hand, one’s conscience responds to the action in 
relation to its aim. Schopenhauer’s account of conscience distinguishes it from deliberation, 
which is captured in the following propositions: 
A) Its target is our self-image constructed from our actions.  
B) Its response is based on one mainspring, i.e., compassion.  
C) Its conflict of motives is not between different actions given one mainspring, but 
represents an interaction between different mainsprings. 
None of this helps with the impasse, however. He argues that conscience represents how 
compassion turns our self-image into a motive and that self-knowledge is not sufficient for 
generating morally worthy actions. His distinction between the ‘conscience’ and ‘spurious 
conscience’ shows this. There are moments where an agent will respond by approving the 
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self-image which merely reflects her egoism or malice. Her self-image is another object of 
cognition and so her responses to it are as diverse as her responses to any object of cognition. 
The impasse is not limited to his account of the conscience, however. It has an 
extensive reach and becomes more apparent in what occurs when an individual gains the 
correct insight or cognition of things, i.e., when they attain self-knowledge not based on the 
dogmatic world-view. Self-knowledge uses the will-body identity to yield a self-image, but 
our self-image alone is insufficient to account for an agent’s conscience and incite a response 
premised on compassion. One’s temperament may be egoistic or malicious. We are unable 
change that temperament by means of the intellect, according to Schopenhauer: 
“…all that we are able to do is to enlighten the head, to correct insight, to bring the 
human being to a more correct apprehension of what is objectively present, of the true 
circumstances of life. But in doing this nothing further is achieved than the 
constitution of his will laying itself open to view more consistently, clearly and 
decisively, expressing itself unfalsified.” (OBM, 240) 
The agent can align her cognition with her willing, i.e., she can attain self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the world, which allows her to harmonise her self-image with her world-view. 
His concept of ‘acquired character’ (cf. WR, 329-331) is an apt representation of an agent 
who acts based on a harmony between her self-image and world-view. This harmony alone 
does not determine whether or not she has an affirmative or negative attitude with respect 
to herself, however. Her ‘acquired character’ is as much a product of her will as it is of the 
harmony between her self-cognition and cognition of the world. The previous accords with 
his definitions, but his proposition that the intellect tranquilises the will undermines it. How 
can the intellect operate without the given ground of the will, which alone makes a motive 
of the targets of cognition and accounts for their efficacy and our responses? The intellect 
cannot operate without the will, but then the proposition that our intellect tranquilises the 
will requires an explanation.   
Affirmation or negation of the will does not rest on cognition of something, but must 
respond to such a cognition given his correlation theory of cognition: no willing without its 
corresponding object and no object without its subjective correlate. No amount of telling or 
showing someone how bad they are, how sinful, evil or cruel they are, can transform them 
into benevolent, loving persons. Such a transformation presupposes a benevolent, loving 
part of their will that is already present within them and is sufficiently strong to influence 
and supersede other mainsprings. Schopenhauer suggests that negation of the will to life, 
which “arrives suddenly, as if flying in from outside” (WR, 432), is such a transformation. 
Moreover, he argues that the intellect or reason incites it. In some moments, he explains it 
differently. He claims that it is not only a consequence of the intellect, but of the “innermost 
relation of cognition to willing in human beings” (WR, 432; my emphasis). He later links it 
to mystical practices. Likewise, he offers a non-religious interpretation of what he calls the 
“effect of divine grace” (WR, 432). I will attempt to salvage the coherence of his philosophy, 
or at least make sense of his claims, by introducing an overlooked distinction between the 
negation of the ‘individual’ (i.e., individual will or mainspring) and the negation of the will 
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to life. Although, as we will see by assessing his views on ascetic resignation below, the 
conceptual knot creeps up again. 
We can negate an individual mainspring, e.g., our egoism. Recall, e.g., that three of 
our mainsprings overcome egoism and our individuality. We cannot reduce negation of the 
will to life to any one of them, however, as we will see in the next chapter. Nonetheless, we 
should distinguish self-affirmation and self-negation from affirmation and negation of the 
will to life. Both rest on self-knowledge and presuppose a self-image, but there is a difference 
between them. We overlook this difference if we read Schopenhauer’s philosophy without 
heeding his varied uses of the ‘will’. His philosophy allows reflective agents to judge and 
respond to life itself, not only to ourselves. Thus, our affective responses are not limited to 
our individuality or our character.  
Recall that the ‘felt consciousness’ allows us to recognise that we and everything we 
perceive experience the will to life, i.e., something like the urge to do something, anything 
whatsoever. Moreover, that we can identify with it. The ‘will to life’ does not refer to an 
individual will or any particular mainspring, but to the metaphysical will, in Schopenhauer’s 
sense. The assumption is that by identifying with the will to life we can respond to ourselves 
as if we are responding to the will to life itself. Schopenhauer describes it in the following 
manner: 
“…the will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognises as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition.” (WR, 311) 
He adds to the previous that the negation of the will arises precisely from the same cognition: 
“…the opposite of this, the negation of the will to life, is manifest when willing comes 
to an end with that cognition. The particular, known appearances no longer act as 
motives for willing, but instead, cognition of the essence of the world (which mirrors 
the will) – cognition that has arisen by grasping the Ideas – becomes a tranquilliser of 
the will and the will freely abolishes itself.” (WR, 311) 
There are conceptual problems with the above propositions that I will assess at length in the 
following chapter, but for now, I mention it in passing to aid our understanding of the extent 
and reach of the impasse of self-knowledge. 
We can make a general claim about the relationship between cognition and the will, 
which can help make sense of his account of self-knowledge and what follows from it. This 
claim is that all affects, attitudes or actions whose target is self-knowledge and which then 
becomes a motive, must, like all motives, be rooted in the will and so be construed as based 
on one of the mainsprings. All cognition does is provide our will with an object upon which 
it can act. Cognition can also provide the will with its objective correlate, i.e., its self-image.  
Given what we have said about Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition, it 
would seem that any given cognition of an object C, could result to two opposed responses 
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to C upon which it becomes a motive. Given the previous two opposed responses to C, it is 
impossible that this opposition is rooted in C even if we perceive C as causing our response. 
C cannot perform two opposed operations in two different circumstances on the same agent 
without some change occurring from one circumstance that is not present in the next. C does 
not imply this change: it merely reflects our identity with the will to life. Therefore, it must 
reside in the agent herself or her will. If multiple responses are possible given C, then the 
response to C stems from the will, not from C.    
We can go further than the above and argue that any knowledge K, presupposing the 
veracity of the cognition C that underpins K, also suggests two possible responses to K. We 
can argue that K caused the response, but the response cannot possibly arise from K. It arises 
from how K relates to the will, but this means it rests wholly on the will. Our responses arise 
from our character, which is composed of mainsprings; they arise from how K relates to our 
ends and aims. They depend on the previous ends and aims. Yet, if this is the case, then what 
does Schopenhauer mean when he implicitly tells us that our conscience grows out of self-
knowledge: 
“Both cases show the magnitude of the distinction we make between ourselves and 
others. It is on this distinction that the degrees of morality or immorality, i.e. of justice 
and loving kindness and also their opposite, ultimately rest. As the memory of actions 
significant in this regard becomes ever richer, it completes more and more the picture 
of our character, our true acquaintance with ourselves. But out of this grows 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with what we are, i.e. to what extent egoism, malice or 
compassion have predominated, i.e. to what extent the distinction we have made 
between our own person and the rest has been greater or smaller.” (OBM, 242; some 
emphasis is mine) 
Schopenhauer is once again vague and ambivalent about the central role of knowledge or 
the intellect with respect to the will. He does little to elucidate how the above ever-growing 
acquaintance with ourselves, which offers us a more complete picture of our ourselves, also 
leads to the conscience when it can just as easily lead to the spurious conscience, that is, an 
attitude towards our self-image that affirms egoism because of our egoism? Surely, he does 
not mean self-knowledge leads to conscience independent from our character, for then we 
have a contradiction, or we settle for holding true that something arises out of nothing. This 
is because K cannot possibly produce two opposed responses to itself on its own basis and 
so without addition or subtraction to it from elsewhere. It is impossible for K to lead to not-
K without something included in the picture that is not-K.  
If the ground of our (dis)approval of ourselves is ourselves, then our self-image 
achieves a clearer and more unified relationship between our actions and aims. It cannot 
possibly tranquilise the will as Schopenhauer argues, i.e., as the intellect’s effect or anarchy 
over the will, which requires us to conceive of the intellect as somehow separate from the 
will. We can allow the previous at the cost of changing our conception of the will from 
encompassing all bodily responses to encompassing some or most. As we will see below, 
going down this road means conflating the individual and metaphysical use of will. I believe 
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it is important that we reject this change in conception of the will for the sake of coherence 
in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. I will stick to what I see as a more accurate conception of 
the will as encompassing all affective responses, which is aptly summarised by the following 
passage:   
“Only motives can affect the will externally. But they can never alter the will itself, 
because their power is based on the presupposition that the will is precisely what it is. 
All that they can do is to alter the direction of its striving, i.e. get the will to use a 
different path to search for the thing that it invariably seeks.” (WR, 321) 
In sum, the ‘will’ cannot possibly be tranquilised unless it in wills to be tranquilised. His 
distinctions and definitions seemingly reach their explanatory apex in the above. He settles 
for an account of freedom of the will as a thing in itself to explain what could possibly enable 
the will’s transformation. Consider the following example as a clarification of the previous. 
Having hitherto advanced a predominantly egoistic lifestyle due to the dominance of 
my egoism, I recognise that I can identify with other people and recognise the suffering my 
actions have inflicted upon them. This leads me to undergo a change in the strength or 
priority of my compassion. My compassion extends beyond the people who benefit me and 
shows up when their benefit to me is outweighed by their disadvantage. Can the mainsprings 
that compose my character change solely through my recognition or K, however? Am I free 
in this sense, i.e., through my cognition and intellect alone, or is some effort required to 
underpin the change in me? Schopenhauer’s answer in some instances is that I am free 
through my cognition alone, but in other instances he says that this is impossible. If I 
undergo this change, it is not by virtue of self-conscious resolve, but by something already 
present in me, which my self-image activates, namely, my compassion. This means that 
what is already a part of me has gained in strength or priority while another has diminished 
by comparison. The previous accords with his conception of this transformation (cf. WR, 
420f). No cognitive object and thus no account of something based on the PSR can explain 
the latter transformation in us, however. According to him, it represents the freedom of the 
will as thing in itself. We should not confuse this conception of freedom for the freedom 
arising from identifying with my actions in self-consciousness that generates the confusion 
of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. The freedom he defends has both an object it responds 
to (i.e. our self-image) and a ground for that response (our mainsprings and will), unlike the 
liberum arbitrium indifferentiae.  
Without self-knowledge and so without a self-image, we could not experience nor 
undergo any changes in disposition. If we were not self-conscious or capable of perceiving 
ourselves as from without, i.e., as an object among other objects, then we would endlessly 
continue to do as we always do: act blindly. The freedom he has in mind is ascetic 
resignation is what he calls a ‘contradiction in appearance’, but it reflects a change in us. It 
reflects a change in the hierarchical order of our mainsprings or temperament. They cannot 
possibly arise out of nothing. According to Schopenhauer, we can change ourselves using 
our body. Freedom lies in our ability to make an object of ourselves, but that is not enough 
to render us free. Moreover, since for every object there is a correlative subject, the correlate 
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of a conscientious or moral change in us is a rise in the priority or strength of compassion. 
Nevertheless, we should point out that his distinctions do not reject the possibility of 
undergoing other transformations, ones that are perhaps less conscientious, but also based 
on our self-image. The priority or strength of our compassion makes us conscientious. We 
would lack a conscience if we lacked an adequately strong compassion, but we would not 
necessarily lack self-knowledge if we did not respond compassionately to our self-image. 
In sum, the proposition that self-knowledge alters the will demonstrates an impasse 
with an extensive reach in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. On the one hand, he claims that 
cognition cannot change the will, and, on the other hand, knowledge somehow tranquilises 
the will. He shows a vast ambivalence towards this impasse. We can argue that the previous 
echoes Kant’s ambivalence over the moral value of self-knowledge, which we identify from 
the famous passage: “only the decent into the hell of self-knowledge can pave the way to 
godliness” (Kant 1991, 236). Schopenhauer struggles to explain its possibility through his 
conceptual framework. It appears that he struggled to steer away from some key aspects of 
Kant’s moral insights while being consistent in his objections to Kant’s conception of the 
conscience.  
I argued above that we should interpret Schopenhauer’s views on conscience as 
caused by self-knowledge, but as the latter being insufficient to ground it. The fundamental 
difference in individuals serves as a sufficient ground for its causal efficacy. The differences 
in individuals is fundamental to his philosophy, but again reveals the impasse. He seems to 
ground individuality on the intellect as opposed to the will: 
“…desire only expresses the character of the species, as in animals, and not the 
individual, i.e. it merely signifies what human beings in general, not the individual who 
experiences this desire, would be able to do. Because it is already a human action, the 
deed always requires a certain amount of deliberation, and because people are 
generally in control of their reason, which is to say they are thoughtful, i.e. they make 
decisions according to well-considered, abstract motives, only the action is the 
expression of the intelligible maxim of their acting, the result of their innermost 
willing.” (WR, 326f) 
He uses the will in the human sense to ground our affective responses in some cases, while 
in others he claims that we cannot possibly arrive at virtue or holiness by anything we do or 
will; it graces us, instead. The previous leads him to associate willing with egoism:  
“We see, namely, that genuine virtue and holiness of mind do not first arise from 
deliberate free choice (works) but rather from cognition (faith)… Works come from 
motives and deliberate decisions, and if this was what led to blessedness, then 
however we look at it, virtue would never be anything except a prudent, methodical, 
far-seeing egoism.” (WR, 434) 
Nevertheless, he also argues that there is such a thing as our deliberately inflicting pain on 
ourselves to attain this grace through ascetic practices: 
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“I have often used the expression asceticism, and I understand by it, in the narrow 
sense, this deliberate breaking of the will by forgoing what is pleasant and seeking 
out what is unpleasant, choosing a lifestyle of penitence and self-castigation for the 
constant mortification of the will.” (WR, 419) 
The above claims render Schopenhauer’s conceptions incoherent. The alleged tranquilising 
effect of cognition on the will, which suggests that either the will ‘freely negated itself’ or 
the intellect ‘calmed’ the will, essentially blurs the boundary between the intellect and will. 
We cannot determine which is passive and which is active. The previous blurring does not 
necessarily contradict his philosophy and metaphysical monism, because it contends that 
there is no ontological difference between the intellect and the will. Nevertheless, it places 
us at the limits of the explanatory power of the previous difference. Its ability to explain our 
experiences comes at a standstill when we notice that the will acts contrary to its nature. I 
will assess these themes at length below. Likewise, I hope they become increasingly clearer 
in Nietzsche’s objections and alternative conception of agency and the will. 
The following passage adequately summarises the above in his own words and it 
merits quoting in full: 
“As the memory of actions significant in this regard becomes ever richer, it completes 
more and more the picture of our character, our true acquaintance with ourselves. But 
out of this grows satisfaction or dissatisfaction with what we are, i.e. to what extent 
egoism, malice or compassion have predominated, i.e. to what extent the distinction 
we have made between our own person and the rest has been greater or smaller. By 
the same yardstick we also judge others, whose character we come to know just as 
empirically as our own, only more incompletely: here there appear as praise, acclaim, 
respect or blame, indignation and contempt, that which in our self-judgment 
manifested itself as satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which can go as far as anxiety of 
conscience.” (OBM, 242) 
Self-knowledge arising from reflection over our actions and mainsprings enables responses 
to it. These responses are an exercise of our will on ourselves: we aim our actions at our own 
body. Aside from the above impasse, his views on self-knowledge show that the identical 
object to our will can also serves as the intentional object (and thus become a motive).  
In sum, the will constantly moves, even when it negates itself, which coincidentally 
contradicts the claim the intellect tranquilises it. I assess the pevious contradiction below.  
1.17 The Paradox of Ascetic Resignation and 
Schopenhauer’s Error 
“[T]he world is the self-cognition of the will.” (WR, 437) 
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Previously, we analysed Schopenhauer’s apprehension of the relationship between the will 
and the intellect. Specifically, the relationship between knowledge K and our response to 
K. We recognised that, for him, there are two possible affective responses to K: affirmation 
or negation. He describes what I called ‘K’ previously as follows, which merits quoting in 
full: 
“But if this seeing through the principium individuationis, this immediate cognition of 
the identity of the will in all of its appearances, is present at a high degree of clarity, 
then it will at once show an even greater influence on the will. If the veil of maya, the 
principium individuationis, is lifted from a human being’s eyes to such an extent that 
he no longer makes the egoistic distinction between his person and that of others, but 
rather takes as much interest in the sufferings of other individuals as he does in his 
own, and is not only exceedingly charitable but is actually prepared to sacrifice his 
own individual as soon as several others can be saved by doing so, then it clearly 
follows that such a human being, who recognises himself, his innermost and true self 
in all beings, must also regard the endless suffering of all living things as his own, 
and take upon himself the pain of the whole world. No suffering is foreign to him 
anymore. All the miseries of others that he sees and is so rarely in a position to 
alleviate, all the misery he learns about indirectly or in fact only knows to be possible, 
all these affect his spirit as if they were his own. He no longer bears in mind the 
changing wellbeing and woe of his own person, as is the case with the human being 
still trapped in egoism; as he sees through the principium individuationis, everything 
is equally close to him. He recognises the whole, comprehends its essence, and finds 
that it is constantly passing away, caught up in vain strivings, inner conflict, and 
perpetual suffering. Wherever he looks, he sees the sufferings of humanity, the 
sufferings of the animal kingdom, and a fleeting, fading world. But this is now all just 
as close to him as only his own person is to the egoist.” (WR, 405-6) 
Some response to a given cognition is inevitable, especially when its target is our own will 
as represented by our self-image. In the above passage, K represents something about our 
will, but it does so by logical extension: what is true about all living things (or life itself) is 
also true about us as one living thing among many. Therefore, what pertains to the objective 
world also pertains to us through our body.  
 Here, I will consider a conceptual problem that is not resolved by the distinct uses of 
the will. This problem emerges from his views on ascetic resignation. We can recognise the 
previous conceptual problem if we ask how the negation of the will to life is possible in the 
first place. I will leave open whether Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will can resolve the 
impasse or explain the possibility of ascetic resignation. I will argue that he can explain the 
self-dissatisfaction that is guilt, but struggles to explain the depression of willing that typifies 
ascetic resignation. However, embarking on this inquiry is important for delineating the 
limits of his philosophy of the will.   
Schopenhauer’s conception of ascetic resignation struggles with a similar impasse 
as the one we noticed in guilt. Like guilt, some self-knowledge incites ascetic resignation, 
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but the knowledge here is of the will itself, which means the will to life. The self-knowledge 
of the will tranquilises it: 
“The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation… 
The opposite of this, the negation of the will to life, is manifest when willing comes to 
an end with that cognition.” (WR, 311; second emphasis is mine) 
The subjective correlate of this knowledge is not an individual’s will; it does not mirror an 
individual’s will, but the will to life. Schopenhauer believes only human beings can have a 
purely objective knowledge of the world such that the previous can be enabled: 
“…a human being is the most perfect appearance of the will, whose existence (as we 
showed in the Second Book) requires illumination by such a high degree of cognition, 
that a fully adequate repetition of the essence of the world under the form of 
representation becomes possible in this cognition; and this, as we learned in the Third 
Book, is the apprehension of the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world. Thus, in human 
beings the will can achieve full self-consciousness, clear and exhaustive cognition of 
its own essence as it is mirrored in the whole world… At the very end of our 
discussion it will also be established that, since the will relates it to itself, the same 
cognition makes possible an abolition and self-negation of the will in its most perfect 
appearance…” (WR, 314) 
His use of ‘the will’ in the above passage is not individual, but metaphysical. It refers to the 
will to life. In other words, this pure objective knowledge ‘K’ that incites both affirmation 
and negation is the same irrespective of the individual, because the subjective correlate of 
K is the pure subject of cognition. K can incite two conflicting responses in us: affirmation or 
negation. How can K incite conflicting responses without some addition or subtraction (or 
some difference from somewhere) that explains this conflict? We remember that something 
cannot arise out of nothing, just as something (X) cannot possibly give rise to its opposite 
(–X). The claim that purely objective knowledge leads to conflicting subjective responses 
is the conceptual problem we face.   
I will assess Schopenhauer’s claim that the same objective representation leads to 
affirmation or negation of the will to life. To pave the way for this assessment, however, I 
will firstly elucidate what he means by ascetic resignation and what he thinks causes it.  
In certain passages, Schopenhauer states that ascetic resignation is not a consequence 
of our actions or resolve. It “begins with cognition” and it “cannot be forced by any intention 
or resolution”: it “arrives suddenly, as if flying in from outside” (WR, 432). This and similar 
passages lead commentators to wonder how ascetic resignation can possibly stem from 
knowledge and not the will. We know that the will accounts for all changes including our 
response to a cognition. Therefore, the claim that cognition causes something independently 
from the will undermines his philosophy. Furthermore, he contends that after we experience 
the depression of willing that is the negation of the will to life, we must struggle to preserve 
or maintain it: 
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“…we must not think that, after cognition has become a tranquilliser of the will and 
given rise to the negation of the will to life, it will never falter and that it can be relied 
upon like inherited property. Rather, it must constantly be regained by steady 
struggle.” (WR, 418)  
According to the above, we maintain the state of ascetic resignation via deliberate actions 
aiming at our own woe, which characterises the mainspring of asceticism. He echoes the 
previous in the following definition of asceticism:    
“I have often used the expression asceticism, and I understand by it, in the narrow 
sense, this deliberate breaking of the will by forgoing what is pleasant and seeking out 
what is unpleasant, choosing a lifestyle of penitence and self-castigation for the 
constant mortification of the will.” (WR, 419) 
He expands on this ‘deliberate breaking of the will’ by stating that there is an instrumental 
value to personal suffering. Personal suffering can lead to ascetic resignation, which he also 
calls the “redemption from life and from suffering” (WR, 424): 
“Indeed, we can assume that most people can only come to it in this way, and that it 
is the personal experience of suffering – not just the recognition of suffering – that 
most frequently leads to a full resignation, often not until the presence of death. Only 
a very few people find it enough to begin with pure cognition which, seeing through 
the principium individuationis, first produces the most perfect goodness of disposition 
and universal human kindness, ultimately enabling them to recognise all the suffering 
in the world as their own, thus bringing about the negation of the will.” (WR, 419)  
Thus, there are two apparently conflicting remarks. First, purely objective knowledge causes 
negation of the will to life or ascetic resignation. Second, we must maintain the state of 
ascetic resignation by struggling with our urge to do something, which inevitably flares up 
because we are alive. In certain passages, he construes ascetic resignation as voluntary and, 
again, this only adds to our conceptual woes: 
“The will begins turning away from life: it shrinks from each of the pleasures in which 
it sees life being affirmed. A human being achieves the state of voluntary renunciation, 
resignation, true composure, and complete will-lessness.” (WR, 406)  
This struggle has implications about his conception of ‘the will’. Whence the urge to end all 
urges? How can we make sense of such an urge?  
 At times, Schopenhauer construes these apparently conflicting remarks as different 
paths leading to the same destination. He invites us to understand them metaphorically. He 
does not construe them as philosophical propositions that have implications about his views. 
Consider the following passage as an example of the previous:    
“In the final part of my presentation, I will show how love, whose origin and essence 
we know to involve seeing through the principium individuationis, leads to 
redemption, namely the complete abandonment of the will to life, i.e. all willing, but 
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also how another path, a path which, though not as smooth, is more frequently 
travelled, can bring a human being there. But before coming to this final theme I will 
first discuss and explain a paradoxical claim, not because it is paradoxical but because 
it is true and is part of the complete thought I am presenting.” (WR, 401; some 
emphasis is mine) 
He describes as ‘two paths’ what I suggest that we should read as ‘conflicting claims’. The 
first path suggests that our seeing through the PI leads to ascetic resignation, which means 
‘cognition’ incites it. The second path—though he does not explicitly state it in the above 
passage—argues that ‘personal suffering’ and torment (under which he places deliberate, 
ascetic practices of self-torment) incites ascetic resignation. The first path represents the 
effect of cognition, while the second path represents the effects of a perpetually thwarted 
will, whether that thwarting is deliberate or not. He summarises it in the following manner: 
“The difference that we have presented by means of two paths is whether this 
recognition is called into existence by suffering that is merely and purely cognised, 
and which is freely approached by our seeing through the principium individuationis, 
or whether, on the other hand, recognition comes from one’s own immediate feeling 
of suffering. True salvation, redemption from life and from suffering, is unthinkable 
without the complete negation of the will.” (WR, 424) 
Are we satisfied with the metaphorical concept of a ‘path’ for explaining the negation of the 
will to life? How do these ‘paths’ cohere with his philosophy of the will? We should probe 
and analyse his thoughts further before settling for the metaphorical reading, which would 
have us accept them as true even if they conflict. I will not construe them as ‘paths’ here. I 
will treat them as philosophical propositions with philosophical implications. 
These apparently conflicting propositions suggest that cognition both is and is not 
enough for ascetic resignation. Schopenhauer proposes a metaphysical explanation, which 
argues that we should read it as representing fundamental ethical differences in character. 
K’s sufficiency for ascetic resignation represents a fundamental difference in individuals, but 
according to his philosophy, the difference in individuals is a pleonasm for the differences 
in willing. By extension, whether or not K is enough to incite ascetic resignation rests on 
the will. If K plays no role in it, then it must be the will, which leaves us with the proposition 
that what does the negating is the same as what it negates.   
Schopenhauer cannot move us past the impasse with by circumventing it using his 
views on the individual differences in character. In addition, recall that the knowledge which 
incites ascetic resignation requires us to assume the stance of pure subjects of cognition and 
so we suspend our individual will as a precondition for acquiring this knowledge. We are at 
the summit of his will-intellect distinction here. We would not be wrong in suggesting that 
we reach the peak of its explanatory power precisely here. He is silent over the conceptual 
implications of this limit, however, except offering a vague summary, which is as follows: 
“Now as we have seen, the self-abolition of the will begins with cognition, but 
cognition and insight as such are independent of free choice; consequently, that 
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negation of the will, that entrance into freedom cannot be forced by any intention or 
resolution, but rather emerges from the innermost relation of cognition to willing in 
human beings, and thus arrives suddenly, as if flying in from outside.” (WR, 432) 
The same cognition of the miseries of life can somehow lead to affirmation of the will to life, 
which makes the picture even more confusing for us. I will argue that in spite of the impasse, 
his propositions on resignation can be consistent with his philosophy of the will, but with a 
caveat: we have to ignore the errors he makes in relating ascetic resignation and the artistic 
genre of tragedy. Let me try to elucidate the previous starting with distinguishing guilt from 
ascetic resignation and showing why something analogous to guilt cannot be what resolves 
the impasse.    
Previously we saw that self-knowledge gives Schopenhauer room to reject fatalism. 
It allows alterations in the organisation of our mainsprings and so character. Self-knowledge 
does not determine these alterations, but it nonetheless makes them possible; it enables them. 
What we recognise about ourselves does not determine character changes, but without our 
recognising something about ourselves, such a change would be impossible. Previously, we 
distinguished all possible responses to self-knowledge from the conscientious response of 
compassion. Nevertheless, all responses to our self-image stem from turning the identical 
object of the will, i.e., the body and its actions, into motives. What we did not discuss, which 
fits with the current inquiry, is the difference between self-negation based on one’s self-
image and the negation of the will to life that is ascetic resignation.  
Recall that the target of our guilt is our individual will by way of our self-image, not 
the will to life. Our guilt presupposes that we harbor a resolve to be someone else or to have 
a different character, but we recognise that we cannot. Schopenhauer intimates the previous 
in the following passage:  
“I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give all that I have to the poor and so become one 
of them myself – if I will! But I cannot will it, because the opposing motives have 
much too much power over me for me to be able to.” (FW, 64) 
Her guilt aims at herself and presupposes a struggle between opposed mainsprings. Can we 
avoid the impasse of the negation of the will to life by arguing that ascetic resignation also 
represents a struggle between mainsprings? He seems to suggest something along the lines 
of such a struggle: 
“…we must not think that, after cognition has become a tranquilliser of the will and 
given rise to the negation of the will to life, it will never falter and that it can be relied 
upon like inherited property. Rather, it must constantly be regained by steady 
struggle.” (WR, 418) 
Can we see the ‘steady struggle to maintain resignation’ to which he refers as one between 
opposed mainsprings? Alternatively, should we expect him to resign to the claim that there 
are actions aiming at inaction or a mainspring that generates actions aiming at inaction? We 
know the negation of the will to life cannot be the same as guilt, because their targets are 
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not the same. Guilt negates the individual or character, while ascetic resignation negates the 
will to life. Correspondingly, negating the individual we are presupposes we have an urge to 
be another individual or character, which is not the same as negating the urge to be anybody 
or to do anything at all. Thus, Schopenhauer claims that ascetic resignation is not “alteration 
but rather a complete abolition of the character” (WR, 431). If we construe negation of the 
will to life as a mainspring of action, then it paradoxically aims at not willing; it is an urge 
impelling us to not-feel the urge to do something, anything whatsoever.  
We can make sense of self-dissatisfaction using the will to life by claiming that guilty 
responses reveal a desire to be someone else. Guilt, then, does not negate the will to life, but 
affirms it by virtue of the desire to be someone else, to still do something, albeit differently. 
Deliberation premised on guilt involves considerations over whether to perform action X or 
Y, because each suggests something different about our character. We feel guilty over what 
we did because this represents our failure to be a different person, a person who would not 
do what we did. By definition, there is no desire to be another person in ascetic resignation, 
however. There is no urge to perform one action as opposed to another, which would imply 
the urge to be someone else. Asceticism aims at no action whatsoever or at the abolition of 
anything resembling a character. The will to life that underpins our sense of self is lacking 
in asceticism. Recall the definition of asceticism:  
Asceticism: An action stems from asceticism if and only if a) its recipient is the agent 
herself, and b) its aim is to promote her woe.126  
Asceticism aims to promote our own woe, which implies stifling egoism, but we know it is 
not limited to egoism. If it aims to promote one’s own woe, and if woe only makes sense in 
relation to some will, then it aims to stifle our actions irrespective of their target or aim. Its 
aim is not to engender one action as opposed to another, or focus on one target rather than 
another, or even to be a different person. Asceticism aims to forgo the urge to act in the first 
place. It aims to stifle the will to life irrespective of the mainspring in which it affirms itself. 
Therefore, we cannot use guilt to explain negation of the will to life. The conceptual problem 
lingers. Moreover, it becomes worse following his claims about the instrumental value of 
deliberate suffering for ascetic resignation. Notwithstanding it flies in the face of the effect 
of grace, how can someone generate actions that aim to stifle her will without these actions 
also being consequences of her willing, which undermines her aim to stifle it? Deliberate 
suffering thus fails to realise negation of the will to life by aiming to realise it.  
In sum, the target of ascetic resignation is not an individual person. Ascetic resignation 
is not self-dissatisfaction; it bypasses the urge to do something and thus to be an individual. 
Its target is life or living itself as represented by the will to life, i.e., the urge to do something. 
It represents the desire to forgo the urge to be anyone or to do anything. The guilty individual 
is thus at odds with (and devalues) herself, whereas the ascetic is at odds with (and devalues) 
 
                                               
126 We remember that woe is something that is in discordance with a will; it relates to wellbeing by being a 
derivation of the former, namely, that wellbeing inhibits b).  
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life and willing itself. He does not want to be someone; he simply does not want to be. This 
represents more than a resolve to die or to commit suicide, which according to Schopenhauer 
represent an affirmation of the will to life. The suffering that he believes causes us to commit 
suicide can be an initial step towards negation of the will to life provided we respond to it 
differently than to commit suicide (cf. WR, 426). There is a species of suicide that represents 
the negation of the will to life, but it is not an ‘act’ of suicide. He construes it as follows: 
“When death finally arrives to dissolve the appearance of that will whose essence had 
already died here long ago through voluntary self-negation, with the exception of the 
feeble remnant that appeared as the vitality of this body, this death is highly welcome 
and will be received cheerfully as a longed-for redemption. Death, in this case, does 
not just bring an end to appearance, as in other cases; rather, the essence itself is 
abolished, that essence that led only a feeble existence in and through appearance; 
and this last, brittle bond has now been broken too. When someone comes to an end 
in this manner, the world comes to an end at the same time.” (WR, 409; my emphasis) 
This distinct species of suicide is voluntary death by the absence of any urge, like the flame 
that suddenly stops burning (cf. WR, 428f). The difference between them is that one dies by 
willing death because they cannot attain something in life, while the other dies by not willing 
anything at all in life. The ascetic does not want life in any form it comes, whereas the guilty 
wish they were a different, more compassionate person.  
The paradox we face is that what is negated also does the negating: the agent thwarts 
her will when it arises, but this means her will thwarted itself, which is paradoxical. Can we 
settle for the claim that the intellect incites ascetic resignation, instead? I assess and evaluate 
Reginster’s reading of ascetic resignation, which broadly defends the previous.  
Reginster’s reading of Schopenhauer’s views on ascetic resignation begin with a 
distinction between two types of resignation: ‘ordinary’ and ‘complete’ (Reginster 2009, 
105). ‘Ordinary’ resignation forgoes the object of our desire following the recognition that 
the desire is beyond our reach. With ordinary resignation, then, we renounce the object (or 
the target) of our desire. The previous allows us to pursue something else in place of what 
we renounced; it replaces the object of desire. Conversely, ‘complete’ resignation requires 
us to become indifferent to the fulfilment of our desire and therefore renounces the desire 
itself rather than replacing its object. It forsakes the desire itself by becoming indifferent to 
its satisfaction in a manner that is distinct from what Reginster calls ‘stoical indifference’ 
or ‘rational control’: 
“Complete resignation, by contrast, requires not only that I renounce pursuing a 
desire, but also that I become indifferent to whether or not it is satisfied, and this 
amounts to renouncing the desire itself. For after all, to have a desire is precisely not 
to be indifferent to whether or not it will be satisfied.” (Reginster 2009, 105) 
The two types of resignation differ by virtue of what is renounced, not recognition that our 
desire is beyond our reach or that it cannot be fulfilled. Schopenhauer’s ascetic resignation 
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is what Reginster calls ‘complete’ resignation: it is indifference towards the satisfaction of 
our desire, which, Reginster claims, is synonymous to our forgoing the desire itself.   
Reginster suggests that ascetic resignation is indifference towards the satisfaction of 
our desires after we recognise our inability to fulfil them. Why or how does recognising our 
inability to fulfil a particular desire lead to ‘complete’ resignation from desiring? Reginster 
admits that, in a sense, our indifference to some desire is not the same as its cessation or the 
cessation of all desiring: 
“For even though I no longer deliberate and decide on which among my desires I 
ought to pursue, I remain troubled by those desires and affected by their frustration… 
Accordingly, if complete resignation is to put an end to this trouble, it must amount 
to more than a breakdown of my agency. It must produce what Schopenhauer 
describes as a complete ‘indifference’ to whether or not my desires get satisfied, and 
this is equivalent to the elimination of these desires themselves.” (Reginster 2009, 
107) 
He rightly points out that Schopenhauer’s ascetic resignation aims to capture cessation from 
desiring. According to Reginster, we can explain the previous by how expectations affect 
our experiences: 
“Representations of ‘merely possible satisfaction’ affect our actual susceptibility to 
pleasure and pain by shaping our expectations. In general terms, the view is that our 
susceptibility to pleasure and pain will decrease if either the pleasure or the pain is 
expected, and increase if either is unexpected.” (Reginster 2009, 107) 
The recognition that necessary to every desire is the impossibility of its fulfilment—and by 
extension the inevitability of suffering—creates an expectation in us, which makes us 
indifferent to its fulfilment. This indifference is synonymous to our ceasing to experience a 
desire, argues Reginster. Accordingly, his reading suggests that the intellect causes ascetic 
resignation by engendering an indifference with respect to whether we fulfil a desire or not.  
I will argue that Schopenhauer must offer a different explanation, becasue he contends 
that we find the same expectation, and by extension the same indifference, in agents who 
affirm the will to life. Knowledge of the impossibility of fulfilment does not only lead to the 
negation of the will to life, but can also lead to its affirmation or an unimpeded and continued 
pursuit of our desires: 
“The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognises as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition. – The opposite of this, the negation of the will to life, is 
manifest when willing comes to an end with that cognition. The particular, known 
appearances no longer act as motives for willing, but instead, cognition of the essence 
of the world (which mirrors the will) – cognition that has arisen by grasping the Ideas 
– becomes a tranquilliser of the will and the will freely abolishes itself.” (WR, 311) 
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The same knowledge K or the ‘expectation’ that produces resignation likewise produces 
affirmation of the will to life. The previous brings us back to our initial impasse: how is it 
possible that K can both abolish our agency and rejuvenate it? We have not made sufficient 
headway into understanding the coherence of the negation of the will to life, because we are 
confusing it with indifference, which likewise characterises self-conscious affirmation of 
the will to life. This confusion arises from our overestimating the role of knowledge (and 
the intellect) on the will, that is, its role independent from (or irrespective of) the will. 
In his paper, however, Reginster focuses more on elucidating the so-called ‘paradox 
of reflection’ rather than making sense of negation of the will to life, so I cannot stretch his 
propositions too far. His insights into the paradox of reflection and their limitations can be 
useful for making headway towards offering a coherent account of ascetic resignation that 
overcomes the impasse. He describes the paradox of reflection in the following way: 
“On the one hand, reflection allows me to gain the necessary knowledge of the world 
and its miseries by making me take a pure, objective stance toward it and contemplate 
it as it were ‘from the outside’, as something ‘foreign’ to me, in which I am ‘not 
actively involved at all’, and so which cannot affect me… On the other hand, if this 
reflective knowledge of the world and its miseries is supposed to induce resignation 
in me, then it must affect me (or my will), which means that I must experience myself 
as actively involved in the world I know in this manner. For unless I came to recognise 
that the miseries I contemplate are also my own, such contemplation could not affect 
my will and elicit resignation.” (Reginster 2009, 114) 
Aesthetic contemplation leads to the recognition that our desires find no final satisfaction 
and that they are the roots of our suffering. If we suspend our personal interest in aesthetic 
contemplation, however, then how can its content and the free play of the intellect inherent 
to it affect us? If knowledge about something affects our desires, then it presupposes that 
we are interested in its target. This interest, Reginster claims, is prima facie unproblematic 
because to will something is to seek satisfaction or attainment of an end.  
Reginster claims we can provisionally begin to make sense of the phenomenon in 
question by assessing the possible ways the intellect and will relate, focusing specifically 
on how the intellect can affect the will. He highlights two ways. Firstly, the intellect affects 
the will by focusing on a specific aspect of our experience. Secondly, it can affect it using 
the content of that cognition. He favours the first for explaining how the intellect partakes 
in ascetic resignation. The intellect affects our will by making us ‘focus’ on specific features 
of the world that are of interest to our will, one such feature is the world’s being inhospitable 
to our aims:  
“Schopenhauer claims to uncover is that the world is essentially inhospitable to the 
complete satisfaction of the will—an insight to which one is presumably driven by an 
interest in the will’s satisfaction. Since this sort of knowledge is supposed to have 
influence on the will, we might surmise that the knowledge of the impossibility of a 
complete satisfaction of the will would compel the agent to postpone it indefinitely, 
that is to say, to produce his resignation.” (Reginster 2009, 115-6) 
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The solution is that our striving for fulfillment explains why knowledge of the impossibility 
of final fulfillment impedes our will. We have an interest in the world’s hospitality to our 
aims and so the recognition that the world is not hospitable affects our will. Seemingly then, 
some sort of disappointment precedes ascetic resignation and even explains it.  
I believe Reginster’s solution, though plausible, falls short of capturing the negation 
of the will to life following the insights inherent to aesthetic contemplation. It falls short 
because he does not do enough to distinguish reflection from aesthetic contemplation. He 
construes aesthetic contemplation as a reflection that perceives its target as ‘foreign’. This 
is an unusual definition, because the felt consciousness required for aesthetic contemplation 
allows us to see as familiar precisely what we saw as foreign (or unsettling) under ordinary 
cognition or reflection. Let me elaborate. 
Recall that, according to Schopenhauer, the sublime tension presupposes reflecting 
on the world as from the perspective of humanity. Aesthetic contemplation is different from 
this reflection, because it also suspends the perspective of humanity following the felt 
consciousness. Also, negation of the will to life sometimes follows aesthetic contemplation 
and sometimes it does not. Reginster’s reading helps us recognise the role of reflection in 
ascetic resignation, but this is not the same as aesthetic contemplation and the insights that 
stem from it. He seems implicitly aware of the difference between reflection and aesthetic 
contemplation, but does not flesh it out: 
“Schopenhauer indeed places two apparently conflicting demands on reflection. On 
the one hand, reflection allows me to gain the necessary knowledge of the world and 
its miseries by making me take a pure, objective stance toward it and contemplate it 
as it were ‘from the outside’, as something ‘foreign’ to me, in which I am ‘not actively 
involved at all’, and so which cannot affect me…On the other hand, if this reflective 
knowledge of the world and its miseries is supposed to induce resignation in me, then 
it must affect me (or my will), which means that I must experience myself as actively 
involved in the world I know in this manner. For unless I came to recognise that the 
miseries I contemplate are also my own, such contemplation could not affect my will 
and elicit resignation.” (Reginster 2009, 114) 
The conflicting demands of reflection to which he refers represent distinct types of cognitive 
engagement with something. The first is aesthetic contemplation of something, whose target 
we perceive as the representations of willing, striving and so on. The second is reflection on 
something, whose target we perceive or conceive as an object among objects, rather than a 
motive. His confusion of the two, however, most likely mirrors Schopenhauer’s lack of 
clarity over the relationship between reflection and aesthetic contemplation. In any case, I 
believe the claim that a clear and accurate description of aesthetic contemplation involves 
choosing between understanding it as a diversion or as reflection is false. My reason is that 
both diversion and reflection are involved in aesthetic contemplation, which is apparent in 
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition.  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition gives us an account of aesthetic 
contemplation, which is both ‘objective’ and ‘will-less’, or objective because it is will-less. 
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In aesthetic contemplation, we suspend the purposive stance on the target of cognition that 
makes us see it as an object. We see it as a mirror of willing. Reginster’s reading misses this 
conception of aesthetic contemplation by construing it as synonymous with taking a stance 
that makes the target of our cognition “foreign” (Reginster 2009, 110). According to this 
reading, then, aesthetic contemplation renders the target of cognition into an object among 
objects, which is what, according to Schopenhauer it means to see something as ‘foreign’ or 
as ‘hieroglyphic’. This and similar readings of aesthetic contemplation are misleading for 
two reasons. 
Firstly, they undermine Schopenhauer’s core aim of rendering the objective world 
‘meaningful’ or ‘familiar’. The content of the objective picture appears as ‘hieroglyphic’ or 
‘foreign’, for Schopenhauer. This is the world as perceived by us when we assume the stance 
of impure subjects of cognition. He aimed to make the objective world meaningful, while 
preserving its objectivity and so he wanted the world to appear meaningful without having 
to appeal to our egoism in doing so. Accordingly, he wanted to offer a non-egoistic, but still 
meaningful, world-view. He thought the ‘felt consciousness’ offered us such a world-view 
because it shows us the means by which we adopt a ‘disinterested’ stance on something. Far 
from making us perceive a foreign or hieroglyphic world, aesthetic contemplation makes us 
as familiar with the world and its objects as we possibly can be. He describes it as follows:  
“The magnitude of the world, which we used to find unsettling, is now settled securely 
within ourselves: our dependence on it is nullified by its dependence on us. – Yet we 
do not reflect on all this straight away; instead it appears only as the felt consciousness 
that we are, in some sense (that only philosophy makes clear), one with the world, 
and thus not brought down, but rather elevated, by its immensity. It is the felt 
consciousness of what the Upanishads of the Vedas repeatedly express in so many 
ways, but most exquisitely in that dictum already cited above: ‘I am all these creations 
taken together, and there is no other being besides me’ (Oupnek’hat, Vol. 1, p. 122). 
This is an elevation above one’s own individuality, the feeling of the sublime.” (WR, 
230) 
The ‘felt consciousness’ settles the sublime tension by inciting aesthetic contemplation. It 
does not lead us to perceive the target in its relation to us as individuals (or as humans). We 
project willing on it and thus identify with it. The previous is not a consequence of aesthetic 
contemplation, but its precondition. It is what makes it possible. We cannot begin perceiving 
something as an Idea without first projecting willing on it. Readings that construe the targets 
of aesthetic contemplation as ‘foreign’ miss the distinction between ordinary, will-based 
objectivity (of the impure subject of cognition) and aesthetic objectivity (of the disinterested 
subject of cognition). 127 
Secondly, failing to distinguish reflection from aesthetic contemplation means we 
misconstrue what actually brings about negation of the will to life. This misunderstanding 
 
                                               
127 Schopenhauer offers an interesting discussion on aesthetic objectivity (cf. WRII, 381-2). 
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comes from a subtle distinction between an impure subject of cognition and the disinterested 
stance; the latter is genuinely pure, according to Schopenhauer. Recall that he mockingly 
describes the impure subject of cognition as “a winged cherub’s head without a body” (WR, 
124) who perceives the world as filled with objects, object-relations and natural forces. The 
objective picture appears foreign to her, because nothing motivates or strongly affects her. 
Yet, the impure subject of cognition is not genuinely pure because she still perceives objects, 
which are conditions for the possibility of motives. Put another way, they are the kinds of 
targets of cognition that permit someone to utilise them. Consequently, the ‘winged cherub’s 
head without a body’, to continue the metaphor, still yearns for a body. Schopenhauer rejects 
the objectivity of the impure subject of cognition while suggesting an alternative objectivity, 
which is more ‘familiar’ or ‘friendly’, i.e., more meaningful. The suspension of willing 
underpinning aesthetic contemplation is not synonymous to the objectivity of the ‘uprooted’ 
and impure subject of cognition. He offers another conception of objectivity, which rests on 
our assuming the disinterested stance and thus project willing on the world that the impure 
subject of cognition experiences as foreign.  
In sum, the subjective correlate of the objective picture is suspension of our personal 
interests, which means our assuming the stance of impure subjects of cognition. This is not 
the suspension of all interest, however. The impure subject searches for something to will 
as evidenced by her perceiving the world as filled with objects that permit willing. There is 
a difference between taking an ‘impersonal’ stance and taking a ‘disinterested’ stance on 
something. Aesthetic contemplation does not involve the suspension of our own will in favor 
of another will, which is not our own, i.e., another agent aiming to utilise the target. Rather, 
aesthetic contemplation involves projection of willing onto the target, which thereby makes 
us genuinely pure subjects of cognition. We suspend the kind of willing whose objective 
correlate is the cognition of something as an object.  
Suspending our interests defines ‘objectivity’, but there are two kinds of ‘objectivity’ 
correlated by two kinds of suspensions of the will, according to Schopenhauer. We can call 
them ‘complete’ (or pure) and ‘incomplete’ (impure) objectivity, for brevity. Incomplete 
objectivity characterises the world-view of the impure subject of cognition who is not willing 
anything directly, but indirectly by her search for something to will. Complete objectivity 
designates the kind of cognition we associate with aesthetic contemplation and its correlate 
world view.  
Aesthetic contemplation is a stance on the world as filled with things that mirror the 
will, both the object’s individual will and the will to life. Schopenhauer apparently misleads 
his readers over his account of aesthetic contemplation in certain passages, however, as 
evidenced by the following: 
“…there floats before the mind of the genius, in its objective apprehension, the 
phenomenon of the world as something foreign to him, as an object of contemplation, 
expelling his willing from consciousness” (WRII, 387, my emphasis) 
This passage on genius is misleading when we pluck it out of its context, however. Here he 
is using it to juxtapose the subject of cognition with the willing subject. He does not compare 
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the impure subject of cognition, the genius and the aesthetic contemplator. There is reason 
to suggest that the previous comparison is implicit to his thoughts and even inevitable if we 
track his distinctions and stay consistent with them. Compare the above passage with the 
following on the limitations of the impure subject of cognition. If we follow this description, 
then the limitations of genius are synonymous to those of the impure subject of cognition, 
because both perceive the world as foreign: 
“To the pure subject of cognition as such, this body is a representation like any other, 
an object among objects: to this extent, the subject is familiar with its movements and 
its actions in the same way he is familiar with the alterations that take place in other 
objects of intuition; and these movements would be just as foreign and 
incomprehensible as these other objects if their meaning were not unriddled in an 
entirely different way.” (WR, 124, my emphasis) 
The genius and the impure subject of cognition have the same limitation: their world appears 
foreign to them. In addition, if their world is limited to appearing foreign, then so does their 
body and its actions. This is not the world-view of the aesthetic contemplator, however. The 
latter is elevated following the felt consciousness, which makes the world as familiar as her 
own will.  
A world that appears foreign can more readily appear as filled with such things that 
are mysteriously obliging (beautiful) or powerfully and overwhelmingly hostile (sublime) 
to us, albeit not necessarily. The world is more open to appearing beautiful or sublime when 
it appears as foreign to us.128 The previous is implicit to Schopenhauer’s claim that there is 
sometimes a smooth transition from the impure to the disinterested subject of cognition, or 
a gradual movement from the ‘subjection to the will’ in ordinary reflection to the ‘projection 
of willing’ in aesthetic contemplation:  
“Clearly the apprehension of the relations that things have to one another takes place 
only indirectly in the service of the will. It therefore forms the transition to the purely 
objective knowledge that is entirely independent of the will; it is scientific knowledge, 
the latter being artistic knowledge. Thus, if many and varied relations of an object are 
immediately apprehended, its peculiar and proper nature then appears from these 
more and more distinctly, and is thus gradually constructed out of mere relations, 
although it itself is entirely different from them. With this method of apprehension, 
the subjection of the intellect to the will at the same time becomes more and more 
indirect and limited.” (WRII, 363; some emphasis is mine) 
Notice that he construes ordinary reflection as working indirectly in the service of the will. 
Ordinary reflection represents things in light of their relative existence, i.e., as objects. The 
 
                                               
128 I believe a closer look at his account of the logic of motivation can prove very insightful for making sense of 
why it is that the world that appears most foreign is also the one that will most likely present a beautiful and-or a 
sublime object that then incites aesthetic contemplation. Yet, it is important to distinguish aesthetic contemplation 
itself from what we require to enter it. 
  215 
impure subject of cognition (and the genius who is not yet the disinterested subject) is still 
closer to aesthetic contemplation than the subject of willing. In this reading, the genius is 
the prerequisite of aesthetic contemplation and not quite an aesthetic contemplator herself. 
Thus, reflection has its own kind of diversion from willing, which falls short of aesthetic 
contemplation, because it is still indirectly (or vicariously) based on willing by virtue of her 
perceiving a world that enables the will, i.e., a world filled with objects.  
Following this elaboration, let us return to Reginster’s solution and evaluate whether 
it helps to resolve the impasse that follows the proposition that the intellect causes ascetic 
resignation. Reginster’s reading suggests that our intellect brings about ascetic resignation 
by focusing on the features of the world that represent its being inhospitable to our will. 
This suggestion will not do for our purposes, because any focusing of cognition results from 
willing. If aesthetic contemplation is genuinely disinterested, then Reginster’s suggestion is 
not apt for explaining the movement from aesthetic contemplation to ascetic resignation. 
Reflection cannot bring about ascetic resignation because the goal-directedness of reflection 
(which includes its focus) is a consequence of wiling or represents its activity. The following 
passage demonstrates the difference between cognition focused on those features relevant to 
the will (as Reginster defines it) and our aesthetic contemplation: 
“In abstract employment of the mind, the will is also ruler. According to its intentions, 
the will imparts direction to the employment of the mind, and also fixes the attention; 
therefore this is always associated with some exertion; but such exertion presupposes 
activity of the will.” (WRII, 369; my emphasis)  
The focus of the intellect Reginster describes shows that it is driven and so related to willing 
in the narrow sense of what is of interest to us as opposed the target of cognition, on which 
we have projected the will. Additionally, he argues, this ‘objectivity’ is not as complete as 
its aesthetic counterpart: 
“Therefore complete objectivity of consciousness does not occur with this kind of 
mental activity in the same way as it accompanies, as its condition, aesthetic 
contemplation, i.e., a knowledge of the Ideas. (WRII, 369; my emphasis) 
Even if we give free reign to the intellect to project the will on things such that it stumbles 
upon the world’s inherent inhospitality to willing, this alone does not explain why we focus 
on something that is significant to our will while we assume a ‘disinterested’ stance, which 
focuses us wholly on the target instead. We must come out of aesthetic contemplation for 
this focus to occur and thus we fall from the disinterested stance. It is possible, if not 
inevitable, for us to come out of aesthetic contemplation when we recognise some truth 
about the world or life that relates to our interests, but aesthetic contemplation does not 
cause this. The reasons are two-fold. Firstly, we can come out of aesthetic contemplation 
and end up with affirmation or negation of the will to life, which suggests something 
interjects aesthetic contemplation and suspends it, which we must factor into our causal 
explanation. I will argue that our will is responsible for the previous and becomes part of 
the explanation. In addition, it is unclear why the urge to do something, focuses on something 
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that disables it. Self-deception, ignorance or forgetfulness are preferable or more appropriate 
for what is inherently driven to do something.  
Reginster is right to highlight that what drives our focus is concern with ‘satisfying 
our aims’. It is because we want to satisfy our aims that we focus on the world’s inhospitality 
to those aims. However, he is wrong to comprehend this focus as synonymous with aesthetic 
contemplation. We should also ask why our will does not force the intellect to forget such 
that it can continue willing if willing is its chief concern. Why does it not force the intellect 
to focus on something else, instead? Why does it not lead the intellect to daydream instead 
(cf. WR, 210)? If we are inherently interested in satisfying our urges, then we would prohibit 
focusing on thoughts that lead us to forgoing all urges. Something is amiss in our conception.  
Knowledge of the world being inhospitable only produces resignation if and only if 
we positively aimed for complete satisfaction. Someone striving for the fulfillment of some 
aim is not the same as the person concerned with complete fulfillment of all aims. Why 
would someone who is committed to fulfilment aim to block the possibility of fulfillment 
by being preoccupied with complete fulfillment? Complete fulfillment is equivalent to the 
end of fulfilment: it blocks the possibility of future fulfillment. Consequently, the paradox 
resides in negation of the will to life itself, not in aesthetic contemplation or in reflection. 
What is driving our focus when we reflect on an aesthetic experience we had that then leads 
to resignation is the will to resign from living. This is where the paradox lies. Our reflection 
merely reflects the activation of this will. The will to end all willing is driving our focus, not, 
as Reginster claims, satisfaction of an aim which we recognise is beyond our reach.  
When we respond to the recognition of the impossibility of complete fulfillment by 
resigning, then this mirrors our striving for complete fulfilment. It reflects our not wanting 
to go through the motions of fulfillment and so our not wanting to be fulfilled. The previous, 
strangely enough, presupposes that we have no aims, in the first place. It is apparent that 
Schopenhauer’s will-intellect distinction breaks down when he tries to explain the previous 
phenomenon. Yet, he seems to settle for the claim that reflecting on aesthetic contemplation 
mirrors our own will, which is what we experience as ascetic resignation or as affirmation 
of the will to life. To analyse the negation of the will to life we must begin from aesthetic 
contemplation and the felt consciousness, not abstract reflection through concepts under the 
PSR.  
The recognition that the world is inherently inhospitable to complete satisfaction of 
our willing can be both a conceptual claim about the world under the PSR and a claim about 
it following aesthetic contemplation. Schopenhauer is cautious to argue that not all forms 
of reflection can be objective, because they are ‘driven by some will’ and its satisfaction at 
the expense of something perceived as an object. We can make rational claims about the 
world’s inhospitality to complete satisfaction of our will or we can recognise its inhospitality 
in aesthetic contemplation. What aesthetic contemplation shows, and what becomes clear in 
reflection after the fact, is that the world is inhospitable to complete satisfaction: the ‘wheel 
of Ixion’ never stands still (cf. WR, 220). The will to life is fundamental and indestructible 
for an individual, also to living and willing itself. We are nothing special in relation to life; 
everything we perceive goes through what we go through in its own way, to its own degree 
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and in its own form. We are a piece of that which churns the never-ending cycle of suffering 
and pleasure that is our world. However, in affirming or in negating the will to life based on 
the previous insight, the intellect is no longer free as when we aesthetically contemplate on 
something. 
The negation (or affirmation) of the will to life mirrors our individual will. It explains 
the focus Reginster sees as inherent to what leads to ascetic resignation. Our individual will 
responds to insights gained from the free-play of the intellect in our aesthetic contemplation; 
it drives ascetic resignation. If ascetic resignation blocks the possibility of fulfilment, and 
our will fixes on that which blocks this possibility and depresses itself, then a constituent of 
our will corresponds to it. This resolves the paradox with a trade-off, however. Focusing on 
what blocks fulfilment is only possible if our individual will is not only egoistic or affirms 
the will to life. It cannot possibly be if ascetic resignation is real, because then we would 
have to explain why our will would fix our attention on the inhospitality of the world to 
complete satisfaction and disable willing through it. Why does it not force the intellect to 
ignore K or forget it altogether; or settle for the self-deception akin to daydreaming? Recall, 
also, that complete satisfaction means no more satisfaction. Moreover, if egoism drove the 
previous fixation on K and given that K is inhospital to complete satisfaction, then why do 
we not rejoice over the fact that we will never be completely satisfied?  
When we reflect on aesthetic contemplation, which showed us our identity with what 
churns the world and all that appears in it, we always do so through how our will relates to 
K. We have assumed the willing stance and sank back into the urge to act along with all of 
its mainsprings. This can happen immediately after aesthetic contemplation has passed, but 
our response to it makes an object of the insights in aesthetic contemplation. Thus, aesthetic 
contemplation shows us the world is inhospitable to complete satisfaction and bypasses our 
individual relationship to this cognition—we are not negating the will to life in aesthetic 
contemplation, nor affirming it, but redirecting it, projecting it onto the world or life itself. 
Ascetic resignation follows the previous; it begins when the latter ends. Recall that aesthetic 
contemplation suspends our individual will by projecting willing on the target of cognition. 
Reflection on aesthetic contemplation is post hoc and so the will drives it from the outset. 
I will suggest an alternative approach to the conceptual problem posed by ascetic 
resignation. I will propose that reflecting on aesthetic contemplation and thus responding 
by ascetic resignation mirrors our own will to resign; it does not cause it. In reflection, we 
perceive exactly what and how we will. Reflection does not cause us to will differently. 
Therefore, what explains ascetic resignation is simply nothing; ascetic resignation is part of 
our individual will and so a ground of explanation.  
Recall that there is a difference between our resolving to attain some end (or realise 
some will) and our resolving for complete satisfaction, i.e., to realise all possible aims. This 
difference shows us something about recognising the impossibility of complete satisfaction, 
i.e., it permits both affirmation and negation of the will to life. It can either enable or disable 
our urge to do something. No amount of thwarting of a particular effort towards some end 
can drive us to abandon all possible efforts towards all possible ends. It can move us to 
change the object or direction of our effort, or even change our approach to its attainment, 
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but not remove the urge to exert some effort in some way. A thwarting of some effort can 
incite anxiety of conscience and self-dissatisfaction, whose object is our character, both of 
which point to the urge to be someone else. However, it does not necessarily lead to the urge 
to forgo living and willing itself. Admittedly, we need more than thwarting of a particular 
effort towards a specific end to explain our relinquishing all effort towards all ends.  
Ascetic resignation is not a response to the recognition of our inability to attain some 
end. It is a response to the recognition about the nature of all ends, which enables or activates 
something present, but dormant in us. Nonetheless, we can only take an individual interest 
in it so that it affects our own efforts and urges after the recognition. Our own will guides us 
to reflect on the recognition in aesthetic contemplation and to respond to it one way rather 
than another. Reflection derives something from aesthetic contemplation relating to our life 
and efforts. Recognition that we cannot be completely satisfied leads us to a loss of resolve 
because we have a resolve, positive in its own right, to be completely satisfied. Accordingly, 
we have an inherent urge to end all urges, which is the paradox Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
struggles to explain.  
In sum, aesthetic contemplation cannot possibly cause ascetic resignation or even an 
affirmation of the will to life, because both are possible following its insight about willing. 
Both are possible after we recognise the world’s inhospitality to complete satisfaction. It can 
enable some agents, but it also disables others. Some of us affirm the will to life based on 
the insight of aesthetic contemplation, which Schopenhauer describes as follows: 
“The will affirms itself, which means that while in its objectivity (i.e. in the world 
and life) its own essence is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, this 
cognition is no impediment to its willing; rather, consciously, deliberately, and with 
cognition, it wills the life that it thus recognises as such, just as it did as a blind urge 
before it had this cognition.” (WR, 311) 
We rejoice over the recognition that life keeps moving and never rests. In the same passage, 
he claims: 
“The opposite of this, the negation of the will to life, is manifest when willing comes 
to an end with that cognition. The particular, known appearances no longer act as 
motives for willing, but instead, cognition of the essence of the world (which mirrors 
the will) – cognition that has arisen by grasping the Ideas – becomes a tranquilliser of 
the will and the will freely abolishes itself.” (WR, 311) 
The difference between the two possible responses by the will to life follow the “cognition 
that has arisen by grasping the Ideas” (WR, 311), but he does not explain them. He does not 
seem committed to explaining them, but to state that what follows represents a fundamental 
difference in characters. Some people who grasp the Ideas and recognise the will to life 
permeating everything respond through ascetic resignation. Following the same cognition, 
others respond through a rejuvenation and conscious conviction, which now is in the place 
of their hitherto blind urges, that life itself and, by extension, their own life with all of its 
urges and projects is worth it.  
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The same recognition about the impossibility of complete satisfaction can bring about 
both affirmation and negation of the will to life. Those who affirms the will to life continue 
with their aims even though they recognise that each one leads back to a never-ending urge 
to do something (boredom), or to the inevitable thwarting of their will (suffering). The same 
cognition drives one individual to continue willing as before and another to be demotivated 
or disinclined to do anything whatsoever. Why does K lead to polar opposite responses? My 
suggestion is Schopenhauer has no explanation for either affirmation or negation except that 
each mirrors our individual will or represents distinct mainsprings. The world appears to us 
as unworthy of living and willing when we have already resigned. In reflection following 
the recognition that the world is inhospital to our aims, we notice something arise from us 
in response to it, something deeply personal that demonstrates our relationship to living. 
Schopenhauer hints at this in his discussion of tragedy: 
“At this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn our will away from life, to give up 
willing and loving life. But precisely in this way we become aware that there is still 
left in us something different that we cannot possibly know positively, but only 
negatively, as that which does not will life.” (WRII, 433)  
Reflection mirrors our individual will, it does not change it. The recognition that the world 
is inhospitable to complete satisfaction can also bring about affirmation of the will to life; 
it can enable willing, just as it can disable it. The affirmer rejoices over the thought that no 
matter what she does, no project completely will satisfy her. She rejoices over the fact that 
never will she be completely satisfied. The world and life appear as worthy to her after she 
reflects on its inhospitality to complete satisfaction. She ‘resolves to do something’ 
repeatedly without end. She enjoys willing itself; she is indifferent to boredom and suffering 
for this reason alone. She expects that she will be bored and suffer, because she knows both 
are essential ingredients of satisfaction; they are prerequisites of satisfaction and she enjoys 
it above all. She welcomes boredom and suffering as promises of future satisfaction. She 
does not seek complete satisfaction, knowing that to seek complete satisfaction is to want to 
end all satisfaction, because the precondition of satisfaction is dissatisfaction, i.e., boredom 
and suffering.  
The recognition that life is willing and that it never stops willing only incites ascetic 
resignation in us if we already resolve to resign. The response to recognising that the world 
is inhospitable to complete satisfaction mirrors our individual will. It is misleading to claim 
that K causes resignation without explaining why some people, far from resigning, affirm 
the will to life following K. In reflection, we become aware of something or self-aware. That 
some people do not feel the urge to do anything is undeniable, but Schopenhauer explains 
this by stating that the previous is a constituent of the will, which K activates. The previous 
is consistent with his correlation theory of cognition, but it amounts to saying that some 
individuals will to negate the will to life. The previous sounds more like a description than 
an explanation, however. 
Soll’s reading of Schopenhauer’s conception of desire and aesthetic contemplation 
comes close to showing how reflection merely mirrors the will, but it falls short. He is right 
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to point out that conceiving of ordinary desire as not giving lasting satisfaction because it 
does not bring desiring to an end unwarrantedly presupposes all desires aim to bring desiring 
itself to an end (cf. Soll 1998, 85-6). Soll’s objections are correct; however, the correlation 
theory suggests that there is an original will, i.e., a constituent of the will and so a mainspring 
of action that is positive in its own right, which corresponds to negation of the will to life. 
Consequently, there is a desire for the end of desiring, but not that all desires aim for the 
end of desiring. Soll wrongly reads Schopenhauer as claiming all desires possess the illusory 
intrinsic aim of complete satisfaction. Recall that the same recognition leading us to negate 
the will to life also leads us to affirm it. Where Soll’s reading errs is in failing to distinguish 
motives from mainsprings and to see the correlation theory of cognition underpinning it.  
Schopenhauer conceives of the ‘illusion’ inherent to desire not to lie in the desire or 
desiring itself. The illusion lies in what is presupposed by individuals who desire something 
(anything whatsoever) that will bring about complete satisfaction. Put another way, some 
agents desire something that brings all desiring to an end; others desire something apt for 
their satisfaction. The previous represent two different mainsprings. What is illusory, then, 
is the possibility of complete or final satisfaction, not any satisfaction at all, not even desire 
itself. Notice in the following quote that the constant attempt to fulfill all of our desires 
cannot possibly bring all desiring to an end; the claim is not that all desires strive for ‘total’ 
or ‘complete’ satisfaction, however: 
“But even final satisfaction itself is only illusory: the fulfilled wish quickly gives way 
to a new one: the former is known to be a mistake, the latter is not yet known to be 
one.” (WR, 219; my emphasis).  
Notice two important propositions in the above passage. First, the final satisfaction itself is 
the illusion, because of its method of attainment, i.e., willful action, not because of its aim. 
Second, we recognise that an already-fulfilled desire did not bring about final satisfaction, 
whilst some new desire may bring it about and we cannot know for sure until after fulfilling 
it. The illusion, for him, lies in the coexistence of both propositions. The second proposition 
seemingly suggests that the intrinsic aim of any desire is to en all desiring, but that is not so. 
He does not suggest a candidate for all desires; rather, he assumes that we possess some 
desire to end all desires. Following the assumption, he claims, it is illusory to expect a new 
desire to make it happen when the previous one did not. In short, any desire we can think of 
and then fulfill cannot bring about final satisfaction. This is the illusion: no amount of effort, 
or effort in a different direction, can bring desiring to an end. Effort is an extension of willing 
and presupposes its activity. It is an indirect affirmation of the will to life. Consequently, for 
individuals who harbor the desire to end all desiring—not anyone who desires something—
this effort itself is the problem.  
There is a tempting reading of Schopenhauer’s ascetic resignation that argues that to 
bring desiring to an end (i.e., negate the will to life), we should aesthetically contemplate, 
not will. He seems to suggest the previous when he claims: 
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“…the will to life is the sole metaphysical entity or thing in itself, where it exists, no 
violence can break it; the only thing violence can do is to destroy its appearance in a 
particular place, at a particular time. The will to life itself cannot be suppressed by 
anything except cognition. That is why the only path to salvation is for the will to 
appear without restraints, so that it can recognise its own essence in this appearance. 
Only as a result of this recognition can the will abolish itself and in so doing put an 
end to suffering too, since suffering is inseparable from the will’s appearance.” (WR, 
427) 
Seemingly, we can achieve ‘final’ or ‘complete’ satisfaction by aesthetically contemplating 
without end. We attain ‘final’ satisfaction by gazing out into the world absent an urge to do 
something, except to aesthetically contemplate. The effort following our desiring something, 
some object or project that ends all desiring, does not incite ascetic resignation. Although 
this reading is tempting, it does not explain why aesthetic contemplation both enables and 
disables the will to life. The will to life can just as likely affirm as it can negative itself after 
it recognises ‘its own essence in this appearance’. It perceives the apparent horror it brings 
on itself and even after it recognises that the world is inhospitable to ‘complete’ satisfaction, 
it continues to affirm itself.  
Schopenhauer does hint at another explanation of negation of the will to life, which, 
I will argue, leads him to make potentially irreconcilable errors. In the supplementary essays 
where he discusses the artistic genre of tragedy, he claims that the tragic arts aim to arouse 
ascetic resignation:  
“…to turn away the will from life remains the true tendency of tragedy, the ultimate 
purpose of the intentional presentation of the sufferings of mankind” (WRII, 435) 
The above purpose ascribed to the artistic genre of tragedy is ethical rather than aesthetic, 
however, which leads to two fundamental errors. The first error is in the proposition that 
tragedy does not aim to incite a sublime tension and so facilitate aesthetic contemplation, 
which would be consistent with his views on the aesthetic value of the arts. Instead, its aim 
is to produce one possible response to aesthetic contemplation, i.e., ascetic resignation. The 
first error skips aesthetic contemplation, which permits both affirmation and negation. Thus, 
the proposition is that tragedy aims for ascetic resignation and not aesthetic contemplation, 
which substantially undermines his aesthetics. 
The second error is Schopenhauer’s explanation of the pleasure in tragedy and how 
the will relates to it. He construes ascetic resignation not as depression of willing, or absence 
of an urge to do something, but as the commitment or the hope for another kind of life that 
is wholly inconceivable to us: 
“Just as the chord of the seventh demands the fundamental chord; just as a red colour 
demands green, and even produces it in the eye; so every tragedy demands an 
existence of an entirely different kind, a different world, the knowledge of which can 
always be given to us only indirectly, as here by such a demand” (WRII, 433). 
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There is a conceptual problem with the above claim aptly summarised by the question: what 
other kind of life can there be apart from the will to life and its affirmation, its suffering and 
inhospitality? What can another kind of life be indepenent from the urge to do something in 
it? Therefore, he compromises his philosophy of the will, his correlation theory of cognition 
and his conception of the will to life by his views on the pleasure in tragedy. The following 
comments on tragedy’s effect on us and its relationship to ascetic resignation elucidate this 
error:  
“Thus in the depth of his being the consciousness is then stirred that for a different 
kind of willing there must be a different kind of existence also. For if this were not 
so, if this rising above all the aims and good things of life, this turning away from life 
and its temptations, and the turning, already to be found here, to an existence of a 
different kind, although wholly inconceivable to us, were not the tendency of tragedy, 
then how would it be possible generally for the presentation of the terrible side of life, 
brought before our eyes in the most glaring light, to be capable of affecting us so 
beneficially, and of affording us an exalted pleasure?” (WRII, 433) 
What different kind of willing can there be? It is counterintuitive to argue displaying life’s 
miseries to us will please us. Ensnared by the recognition that far from bringing vicarious 
enjoyment of suffering and linking this enjoyment to what we recognise about life itself, 
tragedy extraordinarily afford us an exalted pleasure. Recall his definition of pleasure is that 
something accords with our will, which means that we must will something for anything to 
please us; the converse is the case for displeasure or suffering, which he defines as something 
discordant with our will. If we supposedly recognise that ‘nothing is worth willing in this 
life’ through tragedy, then why should this please us? How else can this pleasure be possible 
other than by showing us that if we willed differently, then we would live in a different 
world? His explanation of pleasure in tragedy seemingly makes his error irredeemable.129  
Schopenhauer completes his analysis of ascetic resignation with the proposition that 
we are seduced into it because we already will another kind of life, i.e., one without misery. 
In short, he construes negation of the will to life as affirmation of another kind of life. The 
reason he seemed inclined to make this suggestion is that there is something counterintuitive 
in negation of the will to life; it represents a will or a mainspring of action, i.e., asceticism. 
He seemingly applies the fundamental proposition that “where there is will, there will be 
life and world as well” (WR, 301) to the previous. Thus, tragedy pleases us and is ‘beneficial’ 
to us because we will a different life. But, what does the previous mean other than that we 
aim for different things? What is aiming other than ‘some kind of willing’? Finally, what is 
willing if not an affirmation of the will to life and how to do we arrive at this other world to 
which aspire? His answer is ‘by not willing anything at all in this life or by a deliberate and 
 
                                               
129 For a more detailed analysis of Schopenhauer’s account of tragedy and the pleasure we experience in the tragic 
arts than I can offer here see Shapshay (2012). 
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resolved depression of our efforts’. Schopenhauer makes a muddle of his views on the arts, 
the will to life and ascetic resignation with his views on tragedy.  
Irrespective of the above muddle, he does make some consistent claims about ascetic 
resignation, i.e., that reflection has not, strictly speaking, affected the will of its own accord. 
Rather, ascetic resignation represents our will’s relationship and thus reaction to cognition. 
That we reflected and focused on something is a consequence of the will’s relationship to it. 
The intellect remains the tool of the will. It may seem otherwise, at times, but we can be sure 
the will still drives and directs. The intellect mirrors the will and thus ‘represents’ its activity. 
Where he is most coherent is in making clear that another response is possible following a 
recognition of the terrible side of life. This other response is affirmation of the will to life, 
whose subjective correlate I will call the life-affirmer for brevity. As a final offer of clarity, 
I embody the life-affirmer and voice his response to the insight of aesthetic contemplation.  
The life-affirmer loves to do something. The felt consciousness of his identity with 
the will to life makes him prolific at creating new ends towards which he can exercise his 
resolve. Whether he does so egoistically, compassionately or maliciously, it does not matter. 
The intellect’s free-play does not affect his will even when it stumbles upon the recognition 
that he will never attain ‘complete’ satisfaction. He rejoices over the recognition that though 
he—as an individual—will eventually perish, the vehement resolve that is a precondition of 
his individuality survives his death. Thus, he rejoices that what underpins his resolve is 
eternal. The so-called ‘felt consciousness’ shows him that it permeates everything and so it 
vehemently re-emerges as another body at another other time under different circumstances. 
The difference is in the objects, the particular aims, and the projects in relation to different 
circumstances. It is not in the will to life. He is who he is because of the circumstances he is 
in, i.e., because of his relations to other things or people. He rejoices most of all when he 
recognises that he will never be completely satisfied. Why would he want to be completely 
satisfied? What could this entail except not being able to resolve towards anything and 
thereby pass up the opportunity for satisfaction? He would longer be able to enjoy the 
rejuvenated will that springs from boredom and-or suffering, that exciting new project that 
sparks him and promises him satisfaction. He wants satisfaction and shudders at the mere 
mention or thought of complete satisfaction. He does not resolve to an end all satisfaction as 
the life-negator does by striving for complete satisfaction. The life-affirmer loves the urge 
for new projects and aims with which to struggle out of his suffering and boredom and thus 
be elevated over both. His solution to his suffering is the constant creation of new projects. 
He does not seek the one project that ends all suffering and boredom. The thought that his 
individuality and his body through which it expresses itself are not special exalts him. He is 
an object among other objects. He knows that what embodies here and now as him will 
embody as another and continue to embody as something forever:  
“So for the will to life, life is a certainty, and as long as we are filled with life-will, 
we do not need to worry about our existence, even in the face of death. It is true we 
see the individual come into being and pass away: but the individual is only 
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appearance, it exists only for cognition that is caught up in the principle of sufficient 
reason, the principium individuationis.” (WR, 301) 
What is death to the life-affirmer who has returned from aesthetic contemplation with a 
rejuvenated will to life? Notice how, unlike the life-negator, he rejoices in the recognition 
that he cannot be completely satisfied. It exalts him. He yearns for the pursuit of this new 
project, that new aim, and these new possibilities that mean springing out of boredom and 
suffering. He sees boredom and suffering as prerequisites of something new; they promise 
new projects for his resolve. They whisper promises of exultant happiness in willing. They 
make room for new projects and satisfaction. The life-affirmer positively and self-reflectively 
wills satisfaction without end where the life-negator positively and self-reflectively wills 
complete satisfaction, i.e., to end willing by ending its precondition: suffering and boredom. 
The life-affirmer would not dream of forgoing boredom or suffering. The life-affirmer 
affirms the inevitable dance that is life or living, the will or willing, with what Schopenhauer 
calls, “full self-consciousness” (WR, 314), which to some appears as a tug-of-war.130 
The crucial philosophical point here is that the same recognition that leads to ascetic 
resignation can facilitate affirmation of the will to life. The best we can say on the basis of 
Schopenhauer’s conceptual tools about why one or the other appears in some individual is 
that they are simply original constituents of the will that dominate now in this and now in 
that individual. This is the same as saying that nothing can explain it. Whether we undergo 
affirmation or negation of the will to life after we reflect on aesthetic contemplation is down 
to individual differences. 
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition limits his ability to resolve the 
impasse in ascetic resignation. Next, I will assess Nietzsche’s alternative attempt at such an 
explanation. For our current purposes, we should distinguish ascetic resignation from moral 
motivation. Selflessness, or overcoming egoism, does not equate or necessarily lead to the 
negation of the will to life. The latter is our overcoming all purposive cognition, including 
our identification with the recipient’s purpose underpinning morally worthy actions. The 
possibility of both rests with aesthetic contemplation. We can selflessly affirm the will to life, 
which takes the shape of not only aiming to continue our individual existence, but also act 
for the sake of something or someone other than us. Only through recognising that we are 
objects among objects and that objects are not just objects, but likewise represent willing, 
striving etc., can the negation (or self-abolition) of the will to life be possible. Accordingly, 
the disinterestedness that underpins aesthetic contemplation makes negation of the will to 
life possible, but it does not determine or cause it. Disinterestedness is the spark that ignites 
the flame of ascetic resignation, but the material that the flame consumes, i.e., the individual, 
determines whether the spark will be successful or not. Perhaps the previous suggestion can 
shed light on the following admittedly obscure passage in Schopenhauer: 
 
                                               
130 For more on affirmation and negation see Gemes & Janaway (2012). 
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“Now as we have seen, the self-abolition of the will begins with cognition, but 
cognition and insight as such are independent of free choice [Willkür]; consequently, 
that negation of the will, that entrance into freedom cannot be forced by any intention 
or resolution, but rather emerges from the innermost relation of cognition to willing 
in human beings, and thus arrives suddenly, as if flying in from outside.” (WR, 432)  
What brought about resignation is not our effort to bring it about, however. Rather, the 
asceticism that is already inside us is elevated to the forefront, which we cannot conceive 
as distinct from being a kind of effort, i.e., as a constituent of our individual will. The paradox 
of ascetic resignation may be inherent to his philosophy and a limit of his conceptual tools. 
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 2 Nietzsche on Agency, Morality and the 
Ascetic Ideal 
Previously, I critically assessed Schopenhauer’s conception of aesthetic contemplation, his 
views on the moral value of compassion and his claims about the role of self-knowledge in 
agency and ascetic resignation. Our ‘human’ experience is composed of two ostensibly albeit 
not fundamentally distinct aspects, i.e., the intellect and will, according to him. We do not 
encounter these two aspects separately, but there is a clear difference in their respective 
contributions to our experience. The will is responsible for affective orientation and actions; 
the intellect provides us with a target to which we can respond and a perspective on the 
world that correlates to our will and is thus determined by its interests. The intellect offers 
a target for the will, whereas the will determines which of the countless targets of cognition 
are worthy of striving towards or away from.  
We notice that how the will and the intellect relate changes after he introduces his 
account of aesthetic contemplation. The subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation is 
disinterestedness; when we take a disinterested stance in relation to something, we project 
the will onto a target of our cognition. This projection underpins our perceiving it as an Idea 
rather than an object.131 Furthermore, his psychological analysis of beauty and the sublime 
demonstrates that an indirect relationship to willing motivates aesthetic contemplation. The 
aesthetic pleasure we feel over some objects that thus incite aesthetic contemplation shows 
that their value for the will is in distracting us from our personal projects and aims, which 
are sources of our suffering. The satisfaction we feel in the presence of beauty borrows its 
motivation from a thwarted will. In other words, aesthetic pleasure in beauty is an auxiliary 
pleasure resting on dissatisfaction with our projects and aims. The sublime, however, is our 
encounter with the limits of the satisfaction of human needs, which he construes as operating 
on and presupposing the suppression of our individual will. Yet, it relates to human willing 
 
                                               
131 Previously, we distinguished the object of a cognition from our cognising something as an object. The former 
is the aim of the cognition in general independent from what it aims at. I argued that the ‘target’ serves better than 
the ‘object’ in capturing the previous. Whereas perceiving something as an object concerns one kind of cognition 
among others. Perceiving the target of cognition as an object means that we assume the willing stance in relation 
to it, i.e., we are readying ourselves to act upon it.  
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by extension, so even the pleasure in the sublime is (indirectly) against the backdrop of our 
personal limitations. The previous relation by extension explains the pleasure we feel as the 
sublime tension settles into aesthetic contemplation. Therefore, the beautiful and the sublime 
are properties of objects. We ascribe them to an object based on its ability and manner by 
which it incites aesthetic contemplation. They do not coincide with or follow from aesthetic 
contemplation, but cause it.  
Schopenhauer’s psychological analysis of the disinterested individual as from the 
perspective of her relationship to her individual life is nuanced and rich. It considers what 
could motivate someone to project the will onto an object of cognition. He argues that there 
are prerequisites with respect to our personal lives that encourages us to project willing onto 
something. We require frustration with our projects and aims, i.e., a thwarted will. These 
are preconditions of ‘aesthetic contemplation’, so they should not be confused for aesthetic 
contemplation itself. They are the causal and the motivational factors involved in bringing 
about (and, for aesthetic artists, facilitating) aesthetic contemplation.  
Aesthetic contemplation does not abolish the will, but projects it onto the target of 
cognition. In aesthetically contemplating, we feel no discernible urge for action on the target 
itself, but rather we identify with it and thereby perceive it as willing, striving and so on. We 
identify with it in the same way that we identify with our body. By analogy we are receptive 
to it and its movements as the follower in a dance is receptive to the leader’s movements. 
Consequently, aesthetic contemplation is will-less in the sense that our personal will is not 
what permeates and distorts our cognition of the target, but likewise with respect to any will 
independent from the target. It is still a cognition, however. We reason that it wills and use 
our imagination to perceive it as a willing thing or willing something. This conception can 
help us make sense of Schopenhauer’s purportedly smooth transition and harmony between 
aesthetics and ethics, which is the supposed hallmark of his philosophy of the will.  
We saw that Schopenhauer’s views on morality rest on the agent’s ability to suspend 
her egoism enough to recognise another as a person, i.e., as willing something, as opposed 
to an object permitting use. He construed this perception as a prerequisite of morality in that 
we are moral or immoral, morally praiseworthy or morally reprehensible, in relation to our 
ability to percevie someone as willing something. Absent the recognition of someone as 
willing something, i.e., as someone with wishes, desires etc., we are at best morally neutral 
or incapable of moral reason. Without it, we fall outside the sphere of moral worth, but also 
of moral reprehensibility, because malice also requires the recognition that the objects of 
our cognition are representations of a willing thing.  
Schopenhauer’s correlation theory of cognition likewise allows him to argue that the 
intellect can recognise the identical object of the will and formulate a self-image. In other 
words, human reason can be a means for the will (both the individual and metaphysical) to 
acquire self-cognition, that is, to make an object of itself and so perceive its identical object 
in the world. For the individual will, this identical object is one’s body and our actions over 
time, whereas for the will to life, this identical object is the world itself and any movement 
we perceive in it. After this recognition of its identity with the world itself and everything 
in it, the will to life can strive in an enlightened manner by acting upon and so responding 
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to its self-image, which peaks in its affirmation or negation.132 These responses to the self-
image would not have been possible without the faculty of reason that “allows us to survey 
the whole in the abstract” (WR, 301).  
We will notice in the current section that many of the distinctions, arguments and 
themes that preoccupied Schopenhauer, Nietzsche picks up and considers as from a different 
perspective. For example, he accepts Schopenhauer’s ontological monism and immanence, 
which is inherent to his philosophy of the will and will-body identity. However, Nietzsche 
derives a different and unique philosophical method from them, which I will characterise 
by two key concepts. First, he favours the concept of the ‘drive’ over the will; he employs 
his drive psychology to explain phenomena. Second, he favours a historical account or 
explanation of phenomena after rejecting metaphysical and logical accounts. I will aim to 
clarify how the two concepts relate by introducing what I will call the ‘conceptual link’. I 
will argue that Nietzsche is revisionist with respect to agency, morality, objectivity and 
aesthetic contemplation.  
I will also propose that Nietzsche’s central theme is ‘ideals’, specifically, the ‘ascetic 
ideal’ and its effect on our lives as individuals. He inherits his focus on the ‘ascetic ideal’ 
from Schopenhauer; specifically, Schopenhauer’s positive evaluation of the negation of the 
will to life. This concern permeates three key areas of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which I will 
focus on. These areas are the possibility of ‘self-conscious agency’, the limits of ‘morality’ 
and the role of ‘aesthetic contemplation in the arts’. He construes the ascetic ideal as a 
framework for making sense of actions and aims, but also for evaluating them in a manner 
that permits “of no other interpretation, no other goal” (GM III, 23). We cannot question its 
truth-value, its legitimacy or put any limits on it, since doing so would entail our suspending 
or transgressing the ideal itself, rather than building upon it. It is due to the previous that he 
construes it rhetorically as a “fixed idea” (GM II, 3). His approach and critique of the ascetic 
ideal is with respect to its value for life, not its truth-value or moral value. He has an entirely 
different approach for comprehending and critiquing ideals, which is as from the perspective 
of life or living. The meaning of the ‘value for life’ is not clear and in many respects remains 
incomplete both as a result of my analysis, but likewise because I think Nietzsche himself 
did not fully work it out. I will attempt to disambiguate it at least in part by looking at the 
perspective from which he approaches life and living, which, I argue, is the individual’s 
 
                                               
132 “Thus, in human beings the will can achieve full (völligen) self-consciousness, clear and exhaustive cognition 
of its own essence as it is mirrored in the whole world” (WR, 314; my emphasis). A better translation of ‘völligen’ 
would be ‘complete’ as opposed to ‘full’, because it allows us to stay consistent with his project of offering us a 
complete picture. Schopenhauer associates complete self-consciousness (völligen Selbstbewußtseyn) with what I 
construed as self-knowledge. The target of self-consciousness, i.e., the ‘I’ or ‘I will’, though a part of the complete 
picture of our experiences, is nevertheless incomplete on its own by virtue of its one-sided perception of the world. 
The picture is completed by the identical object that is the objective correlate of the ‘I will’ and the actions that 
ensue from our willing something. The picture is extended to the objects we perceive as external to us, which we 
used to perceive as fit for a purpose independent from their own purpose, and predominantly for our purpose (as 
individuals or humanity) in relation to them. This, I believe, is what Schopenhauer means by “the one eye of the 
world” (WR, 221) or what he alternatively calls “the eternal eye of the world” (WR, 308).  
 230 
perspective. I aim to explain what this perspective amounts to, what motivates his turn to it 
most notably in the evaluative part of his philosophy and how far reaching it is. I will argue 
that this perspective is crucial for revealing his Weltanschauung.  
It behoves us as philosophical commentators on Nietzsche to not only consider if 
there is a guiding thread to his thoughts that allows access to the grounds for his evaluations, 
objections and his account of certain phenomena, but equally to strive to bring this guiding 
thread133 to light. My strategy will be to focus on where he departs from Schopenhauer, his 
educator and biggest philosophical influence.  
As is common with attempts to find a unified and coherent thread in Nietzsche’s 
thoughts, his writing style and the unfortunate fact that he does not provide adequate and 
straightforward definitions of his terms, which has immensely impeded my efforts. Some 
of the definitions he does attempt change with the text, approach and arguments he makes, 
which makes it considerably harder to hook onto a sense of consistency. We often wander 
without a sufficient foothold and path into his thoughts and resort to inferring a definition 
from his uses, which also change. I approach his thoughts and so attempt to find a better 
foothold by using Schopenhauer’s philosophy as a backdrop. I strive to establish a useful 
juxtaposition between them on key concepts and distinctions. I aim to identify the important 
areas or themes where they agree and disagree, but also to assess their reasons for doing so. 
I assess Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will and the world-view 
underpinning it. I focus on the ethical and aesthetic themes of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
but to make their agreements and their differences in those areas clearer, I will likewise seek 
what underpins those differences, i.e., their respective conceptions of the ‘will’, ‘agency’, 
‘self-knowledge’ (or ‘self-consciousness’) and ‘morality’. Firstly, I will assess Nietzsche’s 
views on agency and self-knowledge in light of recent philosophical commentary. Secondly, 
I will analyse his descriptive account and subsequent evaluation of morality. Thirdly, and 
in summary of the previous views and arguments, I will suggest an alternative solution to 
what the philosophical commentary construe as the ‘lack of fit’ in his thoughts on agency. 
Fourthly, I assess Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s view of aesthetic contemplation 
and argue that Nietzsche has a novel account of aesthetic contemplation that he calls Rausch 
or the ‘act of idealising’. Finally, I assess why Nietzsche claims that compassion [Mitleid] 
is a ‘great danger to mankind’ by looking at the grounds he gives for the pernicious 
relationship between ‘morality’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’. I will demonstrate that he leaves 
open the possibility of an opposing ideal to the ascetic ideal and thus for an alternative ethics 
or morality.  
 
                                               
133 By a guiding thread here, I do not mean to suggest that there is one position or argument in Nietzsche that 
makes everything he says on a particular topic, or on any topic, intelligible or coherent. A thinker like Nietzsche 
is actively against this coherence. We can nonetheless aim to look for what unites or brings his thoughts together 
to give at least a vague picture of the world-view that motivates his conceptions and evaluations. This vague picture 
is what I aim for and how I understand the guiding thread. 
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2.1 Nietzschean Agency: Conscious Thought and the 
Drives 
For a robust understanding of the relationship between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s 
philosophies, I will assess Nietzsche’s conceptual tools with respect to agency and the will. 
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche likewise recognises that there is no fundamental difference 
between one’s will and body: “body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and 
soul is just a word for something in the body” (Z, ‘Despisers’, 23). His conception of agency 
stems from his reading of Schopenhauer’s will-body identity thesis. However, I will argue 
that what he makes of the thesis differs from Schopenhauer. First, and as a preliminary, we 
recall the broad and pervasive role that the will-body identity thesis plays in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy.  
 The world, for Schopenhauer, would be a strange place if we did not experience it (or 
at least a part of it) as something(s) we take an interest in, are committed to and so value. The 
picture of the world in terms of objects, object relations, natural forces and causal relations, 
which is what the sciences of his day provided, does not capture our evaluations (or our 
evaluating stance in relation to it). Our taking an interest in something is fundamental, but 
unaccounted for by the so-called objective picture. The concept ‘force’ was supposed to fill 
the lacuna in the objective picture by being the driving principle behind any change or event; 
we also used it to describe our interests, evaluations and so on. Nevertheless, ‘force’ stood 
before us as something unfamiliar and devoid of meaning or significance. Thus, even if our 
interests are describable in terms of forces, they are by no means reducible to such forces 
and the object-relations they obtain, because this reduction would fail to capture the meaning 
or significance afforded to the objects that interest us, but also to their appearance when they 
do interest us. If the object picture cannot account for this meaningfulness, then how do we 
make sense of the fact that there is something peculiar about us—which we associate with 
‘taking an interest’ in something—that has no objective representation? Taking an interest 
is fundamentally distinct from a world filled with objects, object-relations and forces. 
Apart from objects, object-relations and forces, we likewise will or are willing these 
objects, object-relations and forces; our will is the unacknowledged correlate to the scientific 
picture of the world. For us to make sense of the will’s relationship to that picture there must 
be a bridge between the will and the objective world. He argues that we can recognise this 
bridge by reflecting on what he calls an ‘act of will’ and recognising that its immediate 
object is our bodily movement or action. Some bodily movements follow immediately the 
so-called ‘act of will’. In fact, they are equivalents. Put another way, there is an irreducible 
correlation between our taking an interest in something and a bodily movement or change, 
and a change in how the objects and the world itself appears. This allows us to postulate an 
identity between our will (interests, evaluations etc.) and the bodily changes we undergo or 
experience. On this basis, we can analyse our will by analysing our body and thus acquire 
self-knowledge. It permits us to respond to, take action upon and-or change ourselves using 
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our bodily changes, which allows to respond to ourselves using our own body. Disabling 
our will allows us to recognise the meaning of willing as such, i.e., the will to life, and finally 
to respond to it through affirmation or negation.  
What does Nietzsche make of the above? To answer this question, I will begin by 
assessing how he conceives of our ‘taking an interest in something’. How he analyses taking 
an interest in something, responding to it and evaluating it. What picture of agency, seen as 
a source of our actions, responses and evaluations, does Nietzsche offer?   
 In a similar manner to Schopenhauer who uses the concept ‘mainspring’ (Triebfeder) 
for his analysis of agency and selfhood, Nietzsche uses the concept of a drive (Trieb) for the 
same purposes. Although, we should point out that the two concepts are not synonymous. 
The concept of a mainspring is broader in scope and application than the concept of a drive. 
The Anglophone commentary on Nietzsche’s thoughts offers some useful, albeit differing 
definitions and readings of the concept ‘drive’. Most commentators often construe ‘drives’ 
as ‘dispositions’, but not much more by way of a definition is given. However, ‘dispositions’ 
are as unclear as the ‘drives’. Some commentators suggest something other than disposition. 
Here I will assess four useful and clearer attempts to define a drive than ‘disposition’; these 
are by Richardson (1996), Conway (1997), Janaway (2009) and Katsafanas (2013A). I will 
assess the merits of their definitions and the differences between them before moving on to 
what I think is a more useful approach to Nietzschean drives, which helps us better to define 
the concept of a drive.  
The first definition of a drive I assess is Richardson (1996), who uses it to elucidate 
the concept of the ‘will to power’, which he argues characterises Nietzsche’s ontology. 
According to Richardson’s reading: 
“…just as scientists speak of a variety of drives or forces, so Nietzsche takes the units 
of will to power to be deeply diverse in their types, differentiated by their distinctive 
efforts or tendencies. The sex drive, for example, is one pattern of activity aiming at 
its own network of ends—perhaps these are centered on seduction or coupling or 
orgasm—whereas the drive to eat aims at a very different network.” (Richardson 
1996, 21) 
The definition Richardson proposes is that a drive is an effort exerted towards some ‘pattern’ 
of activity aiming at some ‘network’ of ends. What distinguishes one drive from another is 
the “internal ends” (ibid.) or internal network of ends. The essential or the ‘highest end’ of 
these networks is what Nietzsche calls ‘power’. Inherent to every drive is the ‘will to power’. 
We can summarise his definition as follows: 
D1: A drive is an effort exerted towards some pattern of activity aiming at an internal 
network of ends whose overarching aim is power, or, presumably, the repetition of 
this activity towards as many ends as possible. Drives are units of the will to power.  
In other words, drives are units of the will to power, which strive to optimise, realise and 
prioritise their internal network of ends in relation to other drives and their own networks. 
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Conway’s (1997) definition distinguishes two commonly related terms Nietzsche 
employs, i.e., ‘drive’ and ‘instinct’ (Instinkt). According to Conway’s reading, Nietzsche’s 
use of drives and instincts until 1888 are ‘intensionally equivalent’; they refer to “the primal, 
unconscious vitality that human beings share (and discharge) in common with all other 
members of the animal kingdom” (Conway 1997, 30). However, after 1888, they are “no 
longer intensionally equivalent” (Conway 1997, 30). The concept of the drive remains 
unchanged, whilst instincts refer to “any specific organisation of the drives and impulses, 
as determined by the dominant mores of the particular people or epoch in question” 
(Conway 1997, 31). We can summaries his readings as follows: 
D2: Drives are the basic units of discharge and effort. Instincts are specific 
organisations of the drives determined by the values of a particular people or epoch.   
Therefore, according to Conway’s reading, Nietzsche uses two distinct concepts: ‘instincts’ 
and ‘drives’. An instinct is an organisation of drives in accordance with a people or epoch, 
whereas drives are the ontologically basic units of discharge and effort.  
The definition of drives proposed by Janaway distinguishes affects from drives and 
argues that Nietzsche employs two concepts towards his analysis of agency: 
“…we might hypothesise that a drive is a relatively stable tendency to active 
behaviour of some kind, while an affect, put very roughly, is what it feels like when a 
drive is active inside oneself. Affects, as we have seen, are glossed as inclinations and 
aversions or fors and againsts. An affect would then be a positive or negative feeling 
that occurs in response to the success or failure of a particular drive in its striving, or 
in response to the confluence of the activities of more than one drive within oneself” 
(Janaway 2009, 55; my emphasis) 
In a later paper he qualifies his definition and emphasises the notion of ‘relatively stable’, 
because there are passages in Nietzsche suggesting that “drives can come into existence, or 
at any rate something that was at some time not a drive in some individual can come to be 
a drive for that individual” (Janaway 2012, 190). He likewise adds that Nietzsche construes 
our drives as largely out of our conscious or rational control; they dispose us towards some 
activity: 
“… a drive is a relatively enduring disposition of which the agent may be ignorant, 
but which, even when the agent has some awareness of it, operates in a manner outside 
the agent’s full rational or conscious control, and which disposes the agent to evaluate 
things in ways that give rise to certain kinds of behaviour.” (Janaway 2012, 187) 
We can summarise Janaway’s proposed definition of Nietzschean drives in the following 
manner: 
D3: Drives are relatively stable tendencies towards active behavior that operate 
independent of the agent’s rational or conscious control; whilst affects are conscious 
feelings of ‘for’ or ‘against’ something that indicates an activity of the drives.  
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The final definition of ‘drives’ I will consider is offered by Katsafanas, who likewise 
operates with the distinction introduced by Janaway between ‘drives’ and what we may call 
‘the self-conscious I’ or what Katsafanas calls “reflective agency” (Katsafanas 2013A, 748). 
Prima facie, he agrees with the general propositions that drives are inherently related to our 
actions and that they can be construed as dispositions or tendencies, but he rightly cautions 
about construing drives as dispositions, which “offer[s] no real explanation of the agential 
language Nietzsche uses when he appeals to drives” (Katsafanas 2013A, 732). According 
to Katsafanas, we require a more nuanced account of the drives to demonstrate how they 
dispose us by elaborating on the concept of a ‘disposition’. He summarises the previous in 
the following manner: 
“In short, an instinct134 might operate purely mechanically, by producing a series of 
behaviors; or it might operate at one remove, by producing internal states, such as 
emotions, desires, and urges, which then strongly dispose the organism to pursue 
some end.” (Katsafanas 2013A, 738) 
The operations of an instinct or drive in the latter sense, he claims, is more significant for 
Nietzsche’s account of agency, because they capture how drives affect reflective agents, i.e., 
agents with conscious thoughts. Consequently, Drives are “dispositions that generate 
evaluative orientations” (Katsafanas 2013A, 745). We can summarise his definition in the 
following manner: 
D4: Drives are dispositions towards some action or response that operate on reflective 
agents, or agents with self-conscious thought, by inducing an evaluative orientation 
toward some object or circumstance; or by influencing her perception or conception 
of the object or circumstance.  
There is a common thread permeating the above definitions, which, I believe, leads 
us to a split in the commentary. I pose this split by asking the following question: How do 
we arrive at the complex, ordered and self-consciously organised activity that characterises 
human agency from the basic quanta of an urge to act that is the drive? Some commentators 
say that we arrive at it through the role of consciousness or the self-conscious ‘I’. Others 
argue that the ordering happens by itself. It is in the nature of drives tending in distinct 
directions to organise into the unified wholes that are self-conscious agents.  
Richardson135 and Conway, for example, claim that the complex whole that is the 
human agent arises independently from our conscious control. In Richardson’s reading, 
 
                                               
134 Here we must highlight that he finds the relevance of the distinction between ‘drive’ and ‘instinct’ advanced 
by Conway’s reading as marginal to his argument and uses the two terms interchangeably (Katsafanas 2013A, 
725, footnote).  
135 At least in his early characterisation he claims, “[w]e should imagine the person, then, as such a unit, though 
one vastly more complex, because it is a synthesis of many parts, which are themselves syntheses of simpler parts; 
the different organs of the body, or rather their functionings, are such lower-order complexes. Thus a person is 
formed of a vast network of power balances, struck at a hierarchy of levels” (Richardson 1996, 47). His approach 
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human agents are organisations of power relations between drives (cf. Richardson 1996, 45 
& Richardson 2009, 134-5). For Conway, human agency results from unconscious processes 
of structuring drives, which occur via social interactions. Our instincts are the direct traces 
of this organisation and find their root in a people or time.  
D1 and D2 defend an apparent leap over an abyss from disparate micro-movements136 
in distinct directions to self-conscious agents and actions. D1 holds that this leap occurs 
through an internal principle (will to power and self-overcoming). D2 claims that ‘society’ 
organises and makes possible this leap. D2 does not factor into the picture the fact that a 
society is composed of drives that constitute the various individuals or persons in it. Society 
is the sum of its parts, so we cannot think of it as independent from them. The suggestions, 
then, leave us at a loss as to what explains how and why drives organise in such a way as to 
yield agents. We do not resolve this problem of organisation at the individual level or at the 
level of a community. Moreover, we have hitherto not given any reason why there should 
be any order at all between these disparate micro-movements that compose us. D1 is more 
promising by postulating an internal principle constitutive of all these micro-movements, 
which operates independently from their directions and brings them together to form an 
organised whole in favor of their own respective ends. This principle is the ‘will to power’ 
and its internal end of self-overcoming as argued by Richardson (1996, 26), but likewise 
usefully elaborated by Reginster (2006, 124-147). The insight here is that the will to power 
internally organises drives so they can pursue together and thus in greater strength what they 
already pursue individually, i.e., power.      
We notice a different conception of the drives in D3 and D4. They agree that drives 
play a key role in Nietzsche’s account of human agency, but they also strive to defend the 
independence of the self-conscious ‘I’ from ‘unconscious’ drives. Janaway claims that the 
previous independence and interaction is crucial for Nietzsche’s account of the sovereign 
individual. Katsafanas argues that it is crucial for Nietzsche’s views on freedom, reflective 
choice and “genuine agency” (cf. Katsafanas 2011, 111-3). Nietzsche’s views postulate or, 
at least, must accept that there is an interaction between two different ‘things’, which 
explains how we arrive at an organised whole from relatively stable micro-movements. 
Thus, the question of how we get from micro-movements to conscious agents is a non-issue, 
for Nietzsche, since they interact from the start. The previous commits Nietzsche to claiming 
 
                                               
changes somewhat in a later paper, which takes into account Nietzsche’s views on agential freedom and the 
sovereign individual as somehow distinct from the drives in the above sense: “although, as I have said, drives are 
Nietzsche’s principal explainers, they are not his sole explainers” (Richardson 2009, 137). In the same paper and 
passage, he argues agency can be seen as a drive: “agency is indeed a kind of drive itself, which I think is one 
reason Nietzsche sometimes denies that there can be any self or agent… [T]he very act of reflecting and choosing 
involves a self-misconception: even as it refers to itself as ‘I’ and ‘self’ and ‘free’, it gets itself wrong” (Richardson 
2009, 137-8). Richardson rightly touches upon a crucial tension and split in Nietzsche between his conception of 
a drive and the self-conscious ‘I’. His suggestion does not do enough to show why drives are not his sole explainers, 
however. The proposition that the self-conscious ‘I’ is a kind of drive in the trenches with other drives, but 
somehow not actually a drive is misleading. I will suggest and defend a different approach to resolving this tension 
and split.   
136 I am using word ‘micro-movement’ rhetorically here to refer to movements and events within our body that 
aim to become actions, i.e., movements of the whole body.  
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that there is a fundamental difference between drives and self-conscious thought that cannot 
be explained by (nor reduced to) drives or drive relations.  
In the next chapter, I assess the fuller Nietzschean picture(s) of agency that emerges 
from the above definitions and their limitations. 
2.2 The Lack of Fit and the Two Commitments 
The above definitions of Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘drive’ reveals a split in the Anglophone 
philosophical literature on Nietzschean agency. Gardner’s paper on the so-called dominant 
‘naturalistic’ reading of Nietzschean selfhood or self-conscious ‘I’, clearly shows this split.  
Gardner coined the ‘lack of fit’ (Gardner 2009, 7) to describe a conceptual problem 
with respect to ‘naturalistic’ readings of Nietzschean agency, which characterises the basis 
of the split in Nietzschean agency. I agree with Gardner on the ‘lack of fit’ and I will aim to 
show that it pervades all readings of Nietzschean agency. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
‘lack of fit’ is entrenched in how some commentators define the concept of the ‘drive’ itself.  
The ‘lack of fit’, according to Gardner’s reading, is between Nietzsche’s theoretical 
claims about the third-person perspective of selfhood and his practical claims on the 
sovereign individual, specifically, the latter’s first-person experience of willing. They often 
lead to the following two conflicting propositions:  
1. There is a complex multiplicity of drives brought into unity by hierarchical power 
relations responsible for our responses and full-fledged agential actions.  
 
2. The sovereign individual demonstrates a simple unity that controls and owns her 
responses and actions and thus, by extension, her drives.137 
How can a multiplicity of drives towards different ends organised hierarchically by power 
relations lead to the seemingly simple unity and self-mastery that characterises sovereign 
individuality? There are two proposed answers to the previous question and so two solutions 
to the lack of fit.  
The first ‘bites the bullet’ and debunks the causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’ 
by arguing that Nietzsche does not require it to explain agential actions. We can call this 
broadly—and with the unfortunate consequence of considerable albeit unavoidable violence 
to the nuances of the claims and arguments for it—the ‘naturalist’ or ‘epiphenomenalist’ 
 
                                               
137 See, for example, Gardner 2009; Gemes 2009 & Ridley 2009.  
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reading138 and solution to the lack of fit. The reading can be summarised using the following 
propositions alongside 1 and 2 above: 
3.  There is a distinction between simplicity and unity. The ‘I’ is unified, but its unity 
is in terms of a synthesis of disparate parts that is a process and matter of achievement, 
not simple or given.  
 
4. The unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ is falsely construed as simple or irreducible; this 
undermines the role of the manifold of drives in our actions. The apparent ownership 
and control we practice in the first-person perspective is just a synthetic relationship 
between drives that, a) based on a strong reading is ‘causal’139, or b) based on a weak 
reading is ‘normative’140.  
The main argument from the epiphenomenalist reading follows an interpretation of an early 
passage in Nietzsche, which rejects the proposition that the ‘I’ occupies any privileged status 
or position independent from the drives. Our awareness of a drive’s activity presupposes the 
activity of another drive with which the previous interacts, according to Nietzsche:  
“…that one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand 
within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the 
success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire 
procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of 
the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us: whether it be the drive to restfulness, or 
the fear of disgrace and other evil consequences, or love. While ‘we’ believe we are 
complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is 
complaining about another; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering 
from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement 
or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect 
is going to have to take sides.” (D 109) 
Such passages seem to demonstrate that self-consciousness has a wholly subordinate role in 
Nietzschean agency. We take an interest in the various aspects of, or objects in, the world 
based on the activity of our drives. We become self-conscious of something in us because 
of the activity of another drive(s). To be conscious of something (also self-conscious) means 
our drives are activated. Therefore, according to this reading, Nietzsche does not commit to 
the proposition that there is something ‘over and above’ the ‘drives’ that interacts with them 
and unifies them to give cognition of something or to bring about any action. Furthermore, 
 
                                               
138 This solution to the problem of the lack of fit and approach to Nietzschean selfhood and the drives is found in 
Anderson (2006 & 2012), Clark & Dudrick (2009), Constancio (2011), Cox (1999), Gemes (2009), Leiter (2001 
& 2009), Richardson (1995 & 2009) & Welshon (2004, 152-156). 
139 Leiter (2009 & 2012) specifically and in certain passages Gemes (2009, 48). 
140 See especially Anderson (2012, 229) and Richardson (1996 & 2009), but also in certain respects Davis-
Acampora (2013m 102-8; 159-164). 
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this ‘something’ is not the simple unity implied by the self-conscious ‘I’. According to the 
epiphenomenalist readings, the ‘I’ is either an illusion, it does not exist or it is the outcome 
of preconscious processes we call drives.  
There are two limitations to the epiphenomenalist reading. Firstly, it does not provide 
an argument that explains why in some passages Nietzsche discusses a relationship between 
‘drives’ and ‘us’, presumably implying the ‘I’ and our first-person experience.141 Secondly, 
it renders superfluous first-person agency. It cannot explain why one relates to oneself and 
speaks to others about oneself in ‘I’-terms. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s practical exemplar is 
committed to using the ‘I’ in her first-person experience of the world.142 These difficulties 
limit the above reading. Gardner and Janaway are main proponents of this critical position 
and defenders of what I will call the ‘transcendental’ reading of Nietzschean agency. They 
suggest the following two propositions as potential replacements of propositions 3 and 4 
above and they propose as a transcendental solution to the ‘lack of fit’: 
3*. Relations between drives do not account for the unity of first-person agency. This 
unity grounds the practice of first-person agency, which we attribute to the self-
conscious ‘I’.  
 
4*. Given that it is inherent to first-person practical agency, the self-conscious ‘I’ is 
distinct from the third-person drives and is ineliminable. 
It is certainly true that first-person agency requires the ‘I’ and so long as we practice first-
person agency, then we cannot eliminate it. One cannot fully construe or relate to oneself as 
a set of drives, but one can conceive of oneself as possessing or owning a set of drives. 
Ownership or possession presupposes an interaction between drives and the ‘I’ construed 
as distinct kinds, which Nietzsche’s theoretical remarks resist.  
Gardner and Janaway argue that we can causally explain agential action by appealing 
to drives, but also not undermine the role of the ‘I’ in first-person practical agency. For 
example, John bought flowers and asked Julie on a date because his sexual drives (coupled 
with other drives) were active in her presence. In short, his drives caused him to buy flowers 
and ask her on a date. John’s self-conception, which is necessary for first-person practical 
agency, is not in terms of drives, however. John conceives of the events as he is buying 
flowers and he is asking Julie out, not a set of drives. Consequently, John’s attribution of 
his affects and actions to himself as opposed to drive relations is not explicable in terms of 
‘the drives’. It constitutes John’s act of self-identification.  
The above conception of how John’s relates to himself and comprehends his actions 
and their reasons seems intuitive, but it can also be misleading. One does not own one’s 
drives as one owns a set of marbles that one can distribute at will. Nevertheless, that John 
identifies with his action and their reasons in the first place is something we cannot do away 
 
                                               
141 See Janaway (2009, 56-60).  
142 See Gardner (2009, 11-13). 
  239 
with. John can identify with his drives, but not have control over them: his drives may 
overpower him. Moreover, he may be both aware and express to others that his own drives 
overpower him. We can distinguish our identifying with our drives from our making a claim 
about ‘ownership, control or possession’ of the drives with which we identify. Accordingly, 
we can distinguish a relationship of identity with our drives from possession or ownership 
of our drives (more on this below).  
There is more to self-mastery than mere identification with our drives, but likewise 
first-person practical agency and the use of the ‘I’ that is the precondition of it. I will argue 
that even if we commit Nietzsche to the claim that he requires the ‘I’ and its role in self-
conscious agency to resolve the lack of fit, we need not commit him to making sense of the 
relationship between the drives and the ‘I’ as ‘ownership’ or ‘possession’. We require a 
solution to the ‘lack of fit’ that resists the commitment to construing the ‘I’ and the drives 
as distinct kinds that somehow interact. Likewise, we require a solution that respects the 
proposition that there is some relationship between the self-conscious ‘I’ and the drives, 
such that Nietzsche’s practical claims and his exemplar to make sense. 
Nietzsche has to accept the ‘I’ is central to first-person agency. He cannot reject the 
fact that there is some relation between the drives and the ‘I’. What relation he has in mind 
or to which he must commit himself is not always clear, either in Nietzsche himself or the 
philosophical commentary. Is it ‘ownership’, which commits him to an entity or thing that 
stands above or is distinct from the drives that constitute the person. Is it a relationship of 
identity, which avoids the previous commitment, but struggles to explain the privileged 
status of the ‘I’? Gardner and Janaway are not always clear about which conception of the 
relationship they have in mind when they suggest he is committed to the ‘I’ of first-person 
agency. I will defend the identity relationship (more on this below) and suggest that we 
should avoid discussion of ‘ownership’ or ‘conscious control’ over our drives, because we 
risk understanding the previous in terms of there being a place or position outside the drives 
from which the sovereign individual assumes this ownership or control. In short, we should 
preserve the immanence of Nietzsche’s thoughts by not introducing a new ‘concept’ distinct 
in kind (or in location) from the drives.  
The split in the literature on Nietzschean agency then seemingly entails two positions 
on the relationship between the drives and self-consciousness. On the one hand, we have a 
rejection of the role of the ‘I’ in agency, which leads us to construe it as epiphenomenonal. 
On the other hand, we have a valorisation of the ‘I’ as having a privileged status, represented 
by first-person practical agency and the sovereign individual. This status is not debunked 
by our construing the ‘I’ as causally inert. Therefore, the important question arises: which 
of the two positions on the drives and their relationship to the self-conscious ‘I’ is correct, 
according to Nietzsche’s view?143 I will argue both views are right in that they bring out 
different features of his thoughts, but both are wrong for leaving him with an undesirable 
 
                                               
143 I agree with Katsafanas (2013B, 4, footnote) here that the best approach to reading Nietzsche is to seek the 
argument or position that makes some of his central themes, arguments and concerns intelligible.  
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and incoherent picture of agency. The picture is dualistic and commits him to affirm the 
existence of something with no third-person representation, i.e., ‘I’, which I will call the 
‘phantom’. This picture emerges from what we can see as two implicit commitments shared 
by both views, which I will elucidate in hope of motivating us to abandon what we can 
construe as the ‘interactive’ approach or comprehension of the ‘I’-‘drive’ relationship.  
We recognise the first commitment represented in Gardner’s proposal, who argues 
that the self-conscious ‘I’ grounds the unity of the self.144 We also recognise it in Leiter’s 
proposition that “qua conscious self or “agent”, the person takes no active part in the 
process” (Leiter 2009: 125) leading up to the ‘agential’ action. I will call this the ‘conscious 
identity commitment’. 
Gardner’s proposal is not entirely clear, however. If his proposition is that the self-
conscious ‘I’ grounds the first-person experience of practical agency, then his challenge to 
Nietzsche is correct. If he suggests that the self-conscious ‘I’ grounds agency itself because 
it captures the source of our actions, or the ‘I’ refers to the relationship between an agent’s 
will and their corresponding action, then the challenge misses the point. Nietzsche’s critique 
is illuminating because we do not know ourselves or we do not have the mastery over our 
actions and urges that we claim we do and that we imply by our use of the ‘I’ in first-person 
practical agency. In short, the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ overstates the control we have 
over our actions. What we say we will do (or we say we value) is not always expressed in 
our actions (cf. BGE 17 & 19). We likewise err in what we assume drives us (cf. HH Pref. 
1). Let us take an example. Julie may think of herself as an altruistic and generous person 
who will help a friend in need and she does. Later, however, she experiences a situation 
where she is in need, but the same friend does not help her. She responds with anger and 
scornfully reminds him of the time she helped him. She reflects on the situation and her 
response bewilders her. She wonders if she is in fact egoistic and hitherto has been wrong 
about herself, because only egoism could motivate her subsequent expectation of reciprocity 
and anger over its lack. Nietzsche offers similar examples of the errors and deceptions of 
our first-person experience (cf. GM Pref., 1; HH, Pref., 3; TI ‘Errors’) and highlights the 
limitations of our self-conscious access to the totality of our activities, drives, motivations 
and their geneses (cf. D 115).  
Nietzsche is making the following point: if we can err about our motivations and our 
self-image, then we cannot assume the unity of the ‘I’ is the ground of agency. Although, 
we have to admit that the ‘I’ is indispensable and constitutive of first-person practical 
agency. As such, there is a difference between what actually drives our actions and what we 
think drives them. First-person practical agency is too fallible to rely on for grounding the 
correlation between a thought, wish, will etc. and an action, which he demands of sovereign 
individuals, i.e., his practical exemplar.  
 
                                               
144 See also Anderson (2012, 213), for a similar objection to Gardner’s reading.  
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The conscious identity commitment incorrectly establishes an identity relationship 
between the unity of the ‘I’ and the unity of agency. Nietzsche construe the latter as an 
attribute of a special few individuals, rather than the majority.145 We think we are unified 
self-conscious agents and that we act in accordance with this self-conscious unity. We think 
that our actions infallibly mirror the unity of our self-image. Yet, we experience cases and 
moments of acting in discordance with that self-image, which debunks the latter assumption. 
Here we should avoid the absurd proposition that since we are not conscious of the processes 
of our kidney or liver or other vital organs that we do not identify with those organs or, that 
they do not play a role in our actions and choices. In short, self-deception is a central theme 
in Nietzsche’s analysis of our first-person experience and his conception of first-person 
agency as we practice it (more on this below).  
Nietzsche’s account of ‘genuine’ self-conscious agency does not ascribe to the 
premise that the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ is synonymous with genuine self-conscious 
agency; or that the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ imposes on our actions simply by virtue of 
our use of the ‘I’ when we think or speak about ourselves. First-person practical agency, 
which is characterised by our use of the ‘I’ and our conceiving ourselves as self-conscious 
subjects, is necessary, but insufficient for ‘genuine’ self-conscious agency. His sovereign 
individual exemplifies the latter, since they requires more than the ability to speak and think 
in terms of the ‘I’ to be genuinely ‘sovereign’. Does an account that argues ‘genuine self-
conscious agency’ is the effect or result of an interaction between the third-person drives 
sidestep the conscious identity commitment? Does it offer an alternative solution to the lack 
of fit? Let us look at such an account and assess its ability to side-step the conscious identity 
commitment.  
In Leiter’s reading, we preserve the identity between ‘self’ and ‘self-consciousness’ 
by rejecting the causal role of the conscious ‘I’ with respect to our actions, but not rejecting 
the existence of the ‘I’ or by replacing it with something else. To make the previous clear, 
let us juxtapose the following two propositions on Nietzschean agency according to Leiter’s 
reading: 
A: “There is, as it were, no ‘‘self ’’ in ‘‘self-mastery’’: that is, no conscious ‘‘self ’’ 
who contributes anything to the process. ‘‘Self-mastery’’ is merely an effect of the 
interplay of certain unconscious drives, drives over which the conscious self exercises 
no control.” (Leiter 2009, 125) 
 
 
                                               
145 Katsafanas (2011) argues that conscious thought and reflection are necessary for distinguishing between 
ordinary and genuine agency. He contends that the relationship “between drives and other parts of the individual”, 
i.e., “self-conscious thought” (2011, 103) characterises Nietzschean agential unity. The lack of fit problem shows 
us that Nietzsche cannot explain how self-conscious thought can work given our third-person identity with drives, 
however. The claim that the agent is not only a set of drives, but also has other parts, bypasses the problem of the 
lack of fit, but does not resolve it. It merely moves its burden elsewhere. We now require a story that explains the 
interaction between drives and self-conscious thought, just as we required one for the ‘I’ as a faculty of 
consciousness and the drives as unconscious urges or passions. It is unfortunate that Katsafanas did not explore a 
solution to it (cf. 2011,113, footnote). 
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B: “A ‘‘person’’ is an arena in which the struggle of drive (type-facts) is played out; 
how they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes. 
But, qua conscious self or ‘‘agent’’, the person takes no active part in the process.” 
(Leiter 2009, 125) 
Notice the conflict in the above two distinct propositions. We have, in ‘A’, the claim that 
there is no conscious self. In ‘B’, however, there seemingly is a ‘conscious self’, but it takes 
no active part in the processes determining our actions. Leiter conflates agency with self-
consciousness or with the self-conscious ‘I’. ‘A’ conflicts with ‘B’ since the so-called ‘self’ 
presumably exists and it conscious, but it is not (causally) efficacious. In other words, there 
is a phantom we call a ‘self’ that is causally inert or ineffective. ‘A’ places Leiter at the heart 
of the conscious identity commitment by rejecting the self after associating it with the ‘self-
conscious ‘I’’, but not suggesting a replacement for it in his deterministic picture. In ‘B’, 
however, his reading moves to the second commitment, which though related to the first 
commitment, slightly differs from it (more on this below). Leiter debunks the causal efficacy 
of the ‘I’, but he does not reject its existence or provide us with a deterministic alternative 
for it. The self-conscious ‘I’ exists, but he construes it as a passive conduit for our thoughts, 
beliefs and values, which wholly stem from our drives.  
The second commitment follows from the first by contending that the unity of self-
conscious ‘I’ is distinct from ‘the drives’. The latter cannot explain this simple unity, i.e., it 
is irreducible and ineliminable. The unity of the ‘I’ is inherent to self-conscious agency, but 
separated from third-person propositions about it. I call this the ‘subjectivity commitment’. 
Using this commitment to resolve the lack of fit leads us to shifting the burden of the lack 
of fit. We can elucidate this shift of burden using the following question. How can drives 
constitute something, but this thing be inexplicable in drive terms? Alternatively, how can 
something possibly interact with the drives without simultaneously being the same as or a 
similar kind of thing as the drives, i.e., a drive or drive relation?  
The subjectivity commitment leaves Nietzsche with the following impasse, namely, 
that all agential actions are constituted by (or result from) something indiscernible in the 
third-person, while, simultaneously, this thing is accessible in our first-person experience of 
agency. Leiter rejects the claim that the ‘I’ causes our actions, but he contends that it exists 
as a passive and inactive conduit for the multiplicity of drives, which alone determine what 
we think, believe, value and so on. Notice that distinguishing the ‘I’ from the drives in this 
way commits us to the existence of something distinct in kind from the drives, which bloats 
Nietzsche’s ontology or commits him to the very dualistic picture he aims to avoid. 
Both attempted solutions of the lack of fit and their respective readings leave 
Nietzsche’s claims with an ontology committed to a third-person phantom since there is no 
such thing as an ‘I’ in the third-person experience of human beings and their actions. We 
perceive a body with organs, electro-chemical variations and bodily movements. One of the 
readings defends the fundamental role of the ‘I’ in practical agency, while the other debunks 
it and remains either non-committal about its existence or construes it as a passive conduit 
for drive relations. Let us look at more nuanced versions of the above solutions, which, I 
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will argue, also struggle with these two commitments and leave us with an incoherent or an 
undesirable picture of Nietzschean agency.  
2.3 The Nuanced Solutions to the Lack of Fit 
There are more nuanced proposed solutions to the lack of fit than we assessed above. I will 
address one solution that leans on the ‘transcendental’ reading and another that leans on the 
‘epiphenomenal’ reading in the current chapter.  
The transcendental reading claims that Nietzsche has to commit to the existence of 
the self-conscious ‘I’ inherent to first-person practical agency to avoid elimination of self-
conscious agency and to make sense of his practical exemplar, i.e., the sovereign individual. 
There is a nuanced version of this reading defended by Katsafanas, who claims that the self-
conscious ‘I’ is causally efficacious with respect to our actions by interacting with our drives. 
I will call this the ‘interaction theory’, for brevity.  
Katsafanas notes what he calls the homunculi problem in Nietzsche’s account of 
agency. Nietzsche’s reliance on the ‘drives’ and their activity to explain the activity of an 
‘agent’ leads him to the homunculi problem (cf. Katsafanas 2014A). To avoid the problem, 
he has to distinguish ‘drives’ from other parts of an agent and explain, “[w]hat can it mean 
to say that drives evaluate and interpret?” (Katsafanas 2013A, 732). Therefore, the previous 
accentuates the problem of what relationship obtains between ‘consciousness’ and ‘drives’. 
According to Katsafanas, we can characterise Nietzsche’s views on agency as a relationship 
“between drives and other parts of the individual” (Katsafanas 2011, 103). These are parts 
are “self-conscious thought[s]” (ibid.). Katsafanas rightly argues that we require an account 
of the relationship between consciousness and the drives that avoids the homunculi problem, 
but the part-whole picture he proposes opens up another problem, which I will to turn below.  
Katsafanas is aware that positing an interaction between consciousness and the drives 
leads to a conceptual problem plaguing dualistic pictures of agency (cf. Katsafanas 2011, 
113, footnote), but he does not do enough to assess whether or not Nietzsche can avoid it 
and how he could do so. We have to question the assumption that the self-conscious ‘I’ 
interacts with the drives in any sense whatsoever can be a solution to the homunculi problem 
or the lack of fit. This is because it bloats Nietzsche’s ontology. The commitments we noted 
previously demonstrate how splitting the agent into parts composed of drives and 
‘something else’ is problematic. This approach engenders a third-person phantom. Arguing 
for the independent status to consciousness in relation to the drives leads to the previous 
phantom. We should aim to explain self-conscious agency in terms of the drives without 
reducing the role of the self-conscious ‘I’ in first-person agency.  
Another approach proposed by Katsafanas accentuates the problem, we can make 
sense of Nietzsche’s objections to consciousness differently, i.e., as aiming at the conception 
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of consciousness as a faculty. Nietzsche does not reject the ‘existence’ or the ‘efficacy’ of 
consciousness itself (cf. Katsafanas 2005, 12), rather he proposes a revisionist conception 
of consciousness as operating on the drives from its own independent standpoint, i.e., by the 
use of conceptual content. Consciousness is a property of the mental that affects the drives 
or enters into a causal relationship with them. The previous renders us unable to account for 
passages stating that when we ‘think’ we ‘deliberate’ or ‘choose’, our drives are opposed to 
one another (cf. D 109; GS 333). The claim that we are composed of other parts in addition 
to the drives is not enough to prove that this other part is causally efficacious or it occupies 
its own independent standpoint. In short, consciousness may be causally efficacious, but is 
it so independent from the drives? Nietzsche often claims that consciousness or conscious 
thought is “only a certain behaviour of the drives towards one another” (GS 333), which is 
not captured by the distinction. There can be no thought for Nietzsche without a change in 
the drives, which constitute us (cf. BGE 3). Accordingly, if Nietzsche can explain conscious 
thought in terms of some drive-activity, then consciousness is reducible to the drives or it is 
a drive relation; so, we can construe consciousness as causally inert, because whatever 
efficacy it has, it does so in virtue of the drives. This is not the conclusion that Katsafanas 
aims to reach; he reads Nietzsche as committed to the causal efficacy of conscious thought. 
His reading forces Nietzsche to rethink his fundamental claim that “body am I through and 
through, and nothing besides; and soul is just a word for something on the body” (Z, 
‘Despisers’, 23). What is the body other than a collection of cells and organs operating on 
electro-chemical reactions that result in relatively stable behaviours we call ‘drives’? Where 
in the chain from cell to drive do we put conscious thought, deliberation or reflection? Can 
we construe them as activities of and so as integral parts of the chain such that we do not 
bloat his ontology?  
Furthermore, if we construe consciousness as a property of mental states responsible 
for conceptual content, which is distinct from non-conceptual drives, then we shift the 
burden of the lack of fit rather than resolve it. We now require a story demonstrating how a 
property of mental states can interact with the basic unit responsible for action (i.e. drives) 
without, in some way, being on the same level as this unit (that is, the same ontologically). 
‘Conscious’ mental states are causally efficacious, as Katsafanas argues, but how can these 
mental states possibly generate an action without thereby being seen as a drive or as drive-
like? Either these conscious mental states are consequences of the drives and drive relations 
(as Leiter argues) or they represent another unit that generates actions in addition to the 
drives. The latter units have their own characteristic behaviour in juxtaposition to the drives, 
which bloats Nietzsche’s ontology. Likewise, they must have a drive-independent aim that 
we can attribute to them if we are to distinguish them adequately from the ‘drives’ or ‘drive 
relations’. In other words, what does conscious thought aim for, such that it makes it as 
distinct from the drives as to merit its own category? If self-conscious thought is not a drive, 
or a faculty, or even a ‘thing’ or ‘object’, then how can it effect or mutually interact with the 
drives without also being “in the trenches with the drives” (Richardson 2009, 137), i.e., 
without being a drive itself? To construe it as a part of the agent among other parts, or as a 
property of mental states, shifts the burden by committing Nietzsche to an inflated ontology.  
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In sum, consciousness may be a property of mental states, but what we mean by 
‘mental’ is as unclear as the ‘mental status’ of the ‘drives’. Are drives a property of mental 
states, and if so, why do we not construe consciousness as a kind of drive or drive relation 
and jettison the distinction between consciousness and the drives?  
Katsafanas rejects Leiter’s solution, but he is not clear on whether Nietzsche should 
or can commit to an inflated ontology. Nietzsche is certainly committed to a relationship 
between self-conscious thought and the drives, but to construe this relationship as causal co-
efficacy is premature and misleading, since it bloats Nietzsche’s ontology. I think we should 
avoid the false dilemma that either consciousness exists and is thereby causally efficacious, 
or it exists as an epiphenomenon, i.e., it is a phantom. I will argue that consciousness exists, 
albeit it is not a ‘thing’ distinct from drives and Nietzsche did not construe it as such. Thus, 
Katsafanas’s reading does not resolve the lack of fit since it holds on to a kind of interaction 
that commits Nietzsche to ontological dualism between conscious thought and the drives. I 
will argue that Nietzsche has an unrecognised story about the apparent interaction that 
avoids bloating his ontology. Before moving on, I will look at a nuanced version of the 
epiphenomenalist reading. 
There are likewise nuanced versions of the epiphenomenalist reading that attempt to 
resolve the lack of fit by preserving the role for the self-conscious ‘I’, but in a limited sense. 
They aim to explain conscious agency by appealing to drives. I will assess Anderson’s 
(2012) reading, which argues that we should reject the Humean ‘bundle theory’ conception 
of Nietzschean selfhood:  
“The Nietzschean self is therefore not merely a Humean ‘bundle’ of intrinsically 
unrelated and ‘distinct existences’, nor even a mere ‘stage’ upon which they enter and 
exit for one-off causal interactions.” (Anderson 2012, 223) 
He argues that we can read the Nietzschean conception of the ‘self’ as the “repository self” 
(Anderson 2012, 224), or the “minimal self” (ibid.), which I will construe as the ‘repository 
theory’, for brevity:    
“Instead, Nietzsche’s conception of the relations between drives and affects forces 
the posit of a thicker notion of the self, existing as a repository of recruitable drives 
or affects” (Anderson 2012, 223) 
What exactly is this repository self and how does it differ from Leiter’s conception of the 
‘arena’ or ‘conduit’? Similarly, how does it differ from Katsafanas’ conception of the self 
as another ‘part’ of the individual or of the ‘mental’? Equally, how does Anderson’s picture 
propose to resolve the ‘lack of it’? The following propositions point us towards his proposed 
solution: 
A) The minimal or repository self is a “diachronic, structured whole within which 
enduring drives and affects” (Anderson 2012, 224) “organise themselves for the 
purposes of recruiting one another” (Anderson 2012, 226).   
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B) The repository self is “something over and above its constituent drives and affects” 
(Anderson 2012, 228) with the capacity to “take up attitudes (including evaluative 
attitudes) towards the world and also towards itself and its drives and affects” (ibid.) 
We recognise in A and B the same tension that plagued the lack of fit: the self is a whole 
composed of parts that mutually organise and ‘recruit’ one another. This internally organised 
whole somehow stands ‘over and above’ the parts of which it is composed, especially when 
it takes ‘attitudes’ towards itself and the world. If the drives and affects organise themselves 
into a whole, then whatever attitude is taken up is necessarily “built out of” (Anderson 2012, 
224) the drives, because Nietzsche does not permit us to postulate anything “fundamentally 
different in kind” (Anderson 2012, 225) from the drives. Accordingly, the self-organising 
drives are themselves doing the ‘evaluating’ in B, because, by A, the self is built out of and 
so simply is the ‘self-organised whole’ composed of drives. The repository theory flirts with 
the circular reasoning.  
The best way to recognise the conceptual problem in Anderson’s suggestion is by 
inquiring into the following. Who (or what) is doing the recruiting from this repository of 
‘recruitable’ drives? Is it the drives themselves that recruit one another, or does ‘something 
else’ recruit them? What conception of ‘recruiting’ can we apply at the sub-personal level 
of drives that avoids the homunculi problem Katsafanas described? Using self-conscious 
agential language to characterise sub-agential interactions that somehow accounts for self-
conscious agency flirts with circular reasoning. It forces us to postulate some ‘self’ above 
the drives, which we cannot postulate given the constraints placed upon us by the claim that 
everything is a ‘drive’ or ‘drive relation’. At the sub-personal level, we are no longer talking 
about micro-agents that perform what only full-fledged agents can perform, i.e., ‘recruit’, 
‘struggle’, ‘have a perspective’, ‘stand over and above’ and so on.146 Sub-agential events 
can explain agential behavior, but to avoid circular reasoning, we should not characterise 
sub-agential events in agential terms. Katsafanas’ solution avoids circular reasoning, but at 
the cost of bloating Nietzsche’s ontology and thus undermining his strongest claims against 
dualistic conceptions of selfhood and agency.    
If we take propositions A and B together, then we commit to construing drives as 
miniature ‘self-conscious’ agents, which brings up the homunculi problem.147 We can avoid 
this problem by contending that there is no such thing as conscious thought in the sense that 
“I separately endorse it [the action or activity], or intend it, or judge it to be good” (Anderson 
 
                                               
146 Richardson puts this very aptly: “[s]o when he says that a drive ‘aims’ at certain ends, ‘views’ the world in a 
consequent way, and ‘experiences’ certain values within it, none of this is supposed to entail that the drive is 
conscious. “For we could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also ‘act’ in every sense of that word, and 
yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’” [GS 354]” (Richardson 1996, 38). 
147 See Katsafanas (2014A) for a detailed discussion and criticism of the homunculi problem in the Nietzschean 
drives. I agree with him that we must avoid applying agential concepts to drive relations to avoid circular 
reasoning. However, I disagree with him that the solution is to posit another and distinct ‘part’ of the agent, a 
conscious part, that the drives interact with; and that moreover this part explains Nietzsche’s own statements that 
drives interpret, value, think etc.    
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2012, 225). ‘I’ do not endorse it, but the ‘self-organised’ process or activity endorses itself. 
There is no standing ‘over and above’ such an activity. Likewise, there is no such ability or 
event of ‘standing back’ from the drives. This construes agents as relations between the very 
things from which they are supposed to stand back. I do not think Anderson’s reading aims 
to conclude the previous or to ascribe it to Nietzschean agency. However, if his position 
strives to debunk the ‘I’ and if he construes genuine self-conscious agency as resulting from 
a self-organised repository of drives, then I do not see how he can avoid it.148 Nevertheless, 
if we go with the previous, then we lose what we were trying to explain: self-conscious 
agency and the self-conscious thoughts upon which it relies. The previous reintroduces the 
subjectivity commitment.  
In sum, we notice that both the interaction theory and the repository theory struggle 
to prevent the subtle resurfacing of the lack of fit in different ways. If, as Katsafanas argues, 
we inflate the concept of ‘consciousness’ to its being a part of the agent in an attempt to 
defend the causal efficacy of deliberation independent from the drives, then we end up with 
postulating a phantom to explain the interaction. Alternatively, if we go with Anderson’s 
suggestion and deflate the self-conscious ‘I’ to a repository composed of self-organised 
parts, which avoids the conscious identity commitment, then we remove what we sought to 
account for, i.e., self-conscious thought and action. The previous attempt does not avoid the 
subjectivity commitment, however.  
In the next chapter, I will argue that it is possible to formulate an alternative account 
of the relationship between the drives and the self-conscious ‘I’ that offers a different and 
more robust solution to the lack of fit. This solution is more apt to avoid the limitations and 
commitments I noted as stemming from other readings.   
2.4 Towards an Alternative Solution to the Lack of Fit  
Generally, there are two attempts at solving the problem of how, according to Nietzsche, do 
we get from a multiplicity of micro-movements to the self-conscious agent, which we deem 
‘responsible’ and ‘free’. One attempt argues that consciousness is distinct from the drives 
and interacts with them, which bloats Nietzsche’s ontology by distinguishing two things that 
 
                                               
148 It is dubious whether Anderson needs to undermine the proposition that we ‘stand back from the drives’, 
however. His reading can construe it as corresponding to an activity of the drives themselves and thus paint a drive 
picture of what we experience in the first-person as ‘self-conscious agency’: his position then would revisionist as 
opposed to debunking. However, once again, I am not sure whether Anderson wants to take his reading in this 
direction. Irrespective of these theoretical problems and shortcomings in resolving the lack of fit, Anderson is right 
to argue that we require an account of agency that allows Nietzsche both a descriptive and a normative account of 
selfhood (cf. Anderson 2012, 229-231), which is crucial for Nietzsche’s conception of the sovereign individual. I 
have benefited greatly from Anderson’s reading in formulating my proposed alternative solution to the lack of fit.  
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causally interact. The other argues that there is nothing distinct from the drives, or, if there 
is something distinct from the drives, then it does not partake in our actions. In other words, 
there is no interaction, least of all a causal interaction between consciousness and the drives. 
By its rejection of the interaction theory, the second attempt unjustifiably overshoots the 
mark by rejecting the distinction itself, which leaves us with the undesirable consequence 
of reading Nietzsche as rejecting first-person agency.  
The key requirement for the transcendental reading is seemingly that Nietzsche 
demonstrates how his drive psychology does not eliminate first-person agency and so ignore 
its practical necessity or value. It is unclear whether the elimination to which they refer is 
of the use of the ‘I’ in first-person agency, which refers to how we relate to our resolve and 
corresponding actions, or to the elimination of the unity of the ‘I’ after we transfer that unity 
to our resolve and actions, which refers to conscious ‘ownership’ or ‘control’ of the drives. 
The previous is a core limitation of the transcendental reading, which we cannot overcome, 
because the reading construes the self-conscious ‘I’ as having a more substantial role than 
that of a mere practical convenience or necessity. The reading appeals to one’s first-person 
experience to ground its substantial role. If we permit the reduction of the self-conscious ‘I’ 
to a mere practice, namely, to a behaviour, then nothing prevents us from construing it as a 
drive (or drive relation), which allows us to salvage consistency and so avoid bloating his 
ontology. However, in so doing, we would remove the privileged status of self-conscious 
thought in agential action and so, seemingly, risk undermining the concept of ‘freedom’ via 
‘conscious control’ or ‘responsibility’ via ‘conscious ownership’ that define self-conscious 
agency. Accordingly, if self-conscious thought is another drive (or a drive relation), then we 
risk the position that we are fettered and irresponsible individuals feigning freedom and 
responsibility.149 Transcendentalists resist this conclusion and argue that Nietzsche must 
allow conceptual room for the sovereign individual whom they construe as a self-conscious, 
responsible agent who has the ability to promise because he ‘wills’, and even wills because 
he masters himself and his destiny. In other words, he is free. What are self-mastery, self-
knowledge, conscience and freedom, i.e., the key characteristics of sovereign individuality, 
without self-conscious thought and thus the self-conscious ‘I’? A machine that follows an 
algorithmic function consistently without fail is some paces away from being the free and 
responsible agent or the self-conscious master of its destiny or nature. Therefore, Nietzsche 
should preserve the role and distinct, if not ‘privileged’, status of self-conscious thoughts 
and the so of the ‘I’ in relation to the drives as a minimal requirement of conscious agency. 
The epiphenomenalist reading and attempted solution responds by noticing a central 
point that Nietzsche raises about sovereign individuality. He calls the sovereign individual’s 
conscience “an instinct, his dominant instinct” (GM II, 2). If the sovereign individual is a 
multiplicity of drives, but practises a first-person unity that is distinct from the drives, which 
supposedly implies ownership or control of the drives, then the ‘I’ exists. If her ‘conscience’ 
 
                                               
149 Of course, this conclusion presupposes that we defend a mechanical reading of the drives, but we leave that to 
one side for now because the mechanical reading of the drives; more on this below.  
  249 
is an ‘instinct’, then the ‘I’ is an epiphenomenon. If Nietzsche did intend to argue for the I’s 
privileged status with respect to agential unity and action, and intended this to be distinct 
from the drives, then why did he call the defining feature of sovereign individuality an 
instinct? The epiphenomenalist reading attempts to offer an account of Nietzschean agency 
in terms of drives to preserve consistency with respect to Nietzsche’s claims. Armed with 
textual evidence of his rejection of the ‘I’ and his construal of affects and actions in drive-
terms, as well as recognising that we cannot offer an account that allows us to preserve the 
privilege status of the self-conscious ‘I’, epiphenomenalists settle for the proposition that 
the ‘I’ is an epiphenomenon.  
Both accounts, I will argue, are wrong for the same reason: both make the claim that 
the self-conscious ‘I’ is distinct from the drives, but likewise a ‘thing’. Both then attempt to 
explain an interaction between them. They construe the drives as mechanical or as operating 
in a mechanical way. Therefore, they construe self-mastery not as mastery over our promises 
to do something and so following through with what we promise, but as mastery over our 
mechanical drives. In short, both readings posit an interaction between the ‘I’ and the drives 
as an interaction between two distinct things. One reading defends it, while the other reading, 
seeing that it is indefensible, rejects it outright or reduces the ‘I’ to an epiphenomenon and 
so undermines self-conscious agency and responsibility. Both attempts to resolve the lack 
of fit mislead us in different ways, but seemingly for the same reason.  
Both readings rightly argue that Nietzsche is committed to a relationship between 
the ‘I’ and the drives. Nonetheless, we need not construe this relationship as an interaction 
between two distinct ‘things’. The relationship is not one of ownership or control, because 
this necessitates a distinction between two ‘things’, which bloat’s Nietzsches’ ontology. It 
commits him to a third-person phantom in the manner of Kant, who in the second edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason famously claimed that: 
“…if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold 
meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself; if its deduction of the pure 
concepts of the understanding is correct, and hence the principle of causality applies 
only to things taken in the first sense, namely insofar as they are objects of experience, 
while things in the second meaning are not subject to it; then just the same will is 
thought of in the appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily subject to the law of 
nature and to this extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is thought of as 
belonging to a thing in itself as not subject to that and hence free, without any 
contradiction hereby occurring.” (Kant 1998, 116)  
For Kant, we can have a transcendental conception of the agent as free and independent 
from her experience. If we attempt to make her an object of experience, however, then we 
conceive her as subject to the same physical laws as any other object of our experience. This 
led Kant to claim that her freedom and independence was a condition for the possibility of 
experience. Apparently, the previous need not lead to a contradiction, because of the double 
meaning of all objects: as an object for some experiencing subject through the categories of 
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the understanding and as a thing in itself. The agent is only free as a thing in itself and not as 
an object of experience for an experiencing subject.  
Nietzsche rejects the legitimacy of positing a thing in itself independent from our 
experiences. In doing so, he also opposes Schopenhauer, who construes the thing in itself 
as substantial. Kant, however, was unclear over how substantial it is as a concept. Nietzsche 
seems less concerned about positing a thing in itself as a limiting concept whose relationship 
to experience is negative, because it would render it empty of significance150: 
“Perhaps we shall then recognise that the thing in itself is worthy of Homeric laughter: 
that it appeared to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is to say 
empty of significance.” (HHI 16) 
Nevertheless, his objection to Kant was that the above posit actually has ‘empirical effects’ 
or ‘consequences’, for which we have to account. The thing in itself was more than a mere 
limiting concept for Kant, at least in respect to his practical philosophy, because he gave it 
the meaning or significance reserved for moral actions, which the ‘thing in itself’ supposedly 
underpins: 
“Your insight into how such things as moral judgements could ever have come into 
existence would spoil these emotional words for you, as other emotional words, for 
example, ‘sin’, ‘salvation of the soul’, and ‘redemption’ have been spoiled for you. 
And now don't bring up the categorical imperative, my friend! The term tickles my 
ear and makes me laugh despite your very serious presence. I am reminded of old 
Kant, who helped himself to (erschlichen) the ‘thing in itself’ — another very 
ridiculous thing! — and was punished for this when the 'categorical imperative' crept 
into (beschlichen) his heart and made him stray back to ‘God’, ‘soul’, ‘freedom’, 
‘immortality’, like a fox who strays back into his cage.” (GS 335) 
Accordingly, we should be careful not to confuse Nietzsche’s transcendental position on 
agency, if he had one, with his acceptance of the Kantian conception of agency, which thus 
includes the moral consequences of that conception. There are other and equally legitimate 
transcendental positions on agency, which Nietzsche could have also picked from and even 
aimed his objections, including Schopenhauer’s transcendental conception. 
Whether Nietzsche’s propositions permit a transcendental conception of agency 
without adopting the Kantian conception wholesale or not, (including a Kantian account of 
moral agency) is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. For a detailed and useful analysis 
of how Nietzsche relates to Kant see Hill (2003), who rightly emphasises the differences 
between the two thinkers on selfhood: 
“…whereas Kant believes that behind the merely synthetic unity of the apperceiving 
self, there is a noumenal self, Nietzsche claims that there is no such thing. There is 
 
                                               
150 Recall, that this was Schopenhauer’s objection to the thing itself and his solution was to render it meaningful 
by using our first person experience of willing something.  
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only the body. A genuine substance must not be adjectival on any other substance or 
attribute and it must not be composed of parts. The body is composed of parts. Thus 
there is no substantial self, either ‘here’ or ‘elsewhere’. This, Nietzsche takes it, 
represents a critical advance beyond Kant’s position, and depends crucially upon his 
rejection of things-in-themselves.” (Hill 2003, 181) 
Nietzsche does not allow a third-person phantom that somehow has a third-person effect of 
bringing about actions in the world. Both attempted solutions lead us to this phantom since 
both are committed to it: one defends it and the other rejects it.  
There is an alternative solution available to Nietzsche and thus an alternative reading 
available to us, however. We can abandon a conception of the interaction as an interaction 
between two distinct things, but do not have to abandon conceiving a relationship between 
them. I will aim to flesh out this alternative and the distinction between an ‘interaction’ and 
‘relationship’ below. 
I was given a clue towards this alternative solution by Simon May’s informative 
remarks on the relationship between freedom and the sovereign individual. May claims that: 
“These concepts—of a drive, of a value, and of particular cognitive perspectives—
cannot therefore be separated. A drive always values and cognises; a value always 
expresses a drive (or drives); and cognition always occurs from the perspective of a 
value, a perspective which involves adopting or being receptive to a particular way 
of seeing the world. (May 2009, 90) 
The above quote, on its own, flirts with the homunculi problem that Katsafanas highlighted. 
However, if we juxtapose the above with the following one on the next page, then a clearer 
picture emerges that, I believe, sidesteps the homunculi problem. May argues further that: 
“Successful hierarchy is therefore not the result of something else called ‘free will’; 
it is free will.” (May 2009, 91)  
We can discern two propositions from the above, which I will take forward in defence of 
what I will call the ‘identity’ relationship, which I propose as an alternative to a co-efficacy 
and-or control relationship, which reintroduce the ‘interaction’ theory and the problems that 
are associated with it. First, we cannot separate ontologically the concepts Nietzsche uses 
to describe or speak about selfhood and then argue he describes two ‘things’ that are distinct 
in kind. Second, we should not construe the self as resulting from drives or their interactions, 
i.e., the self is not their ‘consequence’ or their ‘effect’. The self is identical to the drives and 
their interactions.  
May acknowledges the first claim, but I am unsure of whether or not he inclines to 
defending the identity relationship inherent to the second claim. He contends that:  
“Hierarchy is a matter of commanding and obeying—of one’s drives becoming 
organised in such a way that one is able to commit oneself to projects that matter to 
one. It is the sort of command that, say, the concert pianist seeks through years of 
practice—not just the command that enables him to achieve speed, precision, 
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evenness, and rich tonal variety, but also the command—at once over body, emotion, 
sensibility, and conception—that enables his musical values, and the Weltanschauung 
that they in turn embody, to be expressed in his playing. (May 2009, 90-1) 
May’s reading argues that Nietzschean agency requires both mastery of one’s circumstances 
(or of objects) and self-mastery. He sees self-mastery as a “[largely unconscious] practice 
of commanding and obeying within oneself” (May 2009, 92). Equally, he construes 
successful hierarchy as the result of an “organising ‘idea’” (ibid.), but is this commanding 
idea also unconscious? There is an apparent conflict between the following two claims:  
A) Hierarchy is the practice of commanding and obeying within oneself and operating 
in accordance with an organising ‘idea’. 
B) This practice is unconscious.  
How can we unconsciously command something within ourselves and operate in accordance 
with an organising ‘idea’? Although we are unsure about the conscious status of such an 
organising ‘idea’, we can be sure that the agential language we ascribe to any sub-conscious 
parts or operations is problematic and often leads to circular reasoning. We cannot abandon 
the proposition that ‘ideas’, ‘commanding’ and ‘obedience’ are properties ascribable only 
to self-conscious agents, rather than to ‘unconscious’ parts of agents.  
The proposition that an agent’s values, thoughts and actions are the direct result of 
(or even synonymous to) an unconscious process will have problems telling us why there is 
consciousness in the first place, or even what it is in relation to these ‘unconscious’ drives? 
Nietzsche himself asks this question, albeit, rhetorically: “to what end does consciousness 
exist at all when it is basically superfluous?” (GS 354). It is more coherent to claim that, if 
we are nothing but these drive relations and that consciousness exists, then the latter is on 
equal footing with and thus a drive or drive relation in its own right. Nietzsche implicates 
this when he claims that consciousness develops out of a “need to communicate” (GS 354), 
but also, “the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason 
but strictly of the way in which we become conscious of reason) go hand in hand” (ibid). I 
will carefully analyse the previous propositions in proceeding chapters where I will likewise 
try to substantiate what I call the ‘identity’ relationship.  
May is right to reject the claim that ‘freedom is the result of a free will’ and from this 
claim, I believe, we can derive the ‘identity’ relationship. However, it is unfortunate that he 
did not also reject the claim that freedom is something to which we are fated (or not) by the 
unconscious relations between drives. For Nietzsche, we are these drives and nothing other 
than the drives.   
In sum, our attempts to analyse the role of consciousness in agential actions need not 
lead us to postulate something distinct in kind from the drives, i.e., a third-person phantom. 
Claiming that consciousness plays no role in the hierarchal organisation of drives leads us 
to undermine its role in agency and conclude that it is superfluous or there is no such thing. 
By construing it as a need, Nietzsche avoids this conclusion. Consciousness exists, but we 
have to change our conception of it and its limits. He provides a different and so a revisionist 
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conception of consciousness through what he calls the ‘need to communicate’. This different 
conception is, as Katsafanas rightly contends, that consciousness is not synonymous with 
‘awareness’, but a kind of awareness, i.e., I will argue, the linguistic kind. We are conscious 
only of what we can put into words and can communicate; the previous serves as a token of 
the particular mental state we call the ‘conscious’ mental state. Accordingly, the claim that 
successful hierarchy is the result of an unconscious process means that we cannot put the 
process into words, not necessarily that we are not aware of it. The successful hierarchy is 
us, i.e., we identify with it.151 Having the ability to put what we experience into words does 
not mean we are unaware of what we cannot put into words; being unconscious of something 
is, for Nietzsche, our being aware of it in a specific way, i.e., at least, non-linguistically. We 
are conscious of an affect if we can name it, and it is this latter relation to our affects that, I 
will argue, gives us grounds for an argument about the ‘identity’ relationship between the 
self-conscious ‘I’ and the drives. Therefore, agency can be a feature of both conscious and 
unconscious beings, but this only makes sense based on a necessary revision of how we 
understand ‘consciousness’.  
The above two claims by May, taken together, are pivotal for the alternative solution 
to the lack of fit that I will defend. My guiding questions are as follows. How can the concept 
of the ‘drive’ hang with that of ‘consciousness’ (or the self-conscious ‘I’) while avoiding a 
homunculi problem? How do drive relations constitute agency, self-mastery and ‘freedom 
of the will’? We require a coherent story of the relationship between the ‘I’ and the drives, 
that allows us to make sense of the claim that freedom is ‘the successful hierarchy of drives’ 
without debunking the role of deliberate, self-conscious action in this freedom. This account 
is available to Nietzsche. Rather than construing the ‘I’ as a conscious ‘spokesman’ of the 
drives, he should construe it as identical to the hierarchy of drives. To lay the ground for the 
alternative solution, I will argue that we require an insight into what Nietzsche learned and 
adopted from his predecessor, Schopenhauer.  
2.5 Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and the Will-Body Identity  
The alternative solution to the lack of fit I aim to defend begins with the proposition that 
Nietzschean agency and selfhood is grounded on an identity relationship between the ‘self-
conscious I’ and ‘the drives’. The difference between them is that of two perspectives on 
the same thing or activity, not two (or more) things or activities that are distinct in kind and-
or that (somehow) interact.  
 
                                               
151 Consider his claims on self-consciousness in D 115, “we are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance 
with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those cruder 
outbursts of which alone we are aware make us misunderstand ourselves”. 
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Here, I will strive to convince the reader that Nietzsche works with an ‘ontological 
monism’ and a commitment to ‘immanence’ whose root we find in Schopenhauer’s will-
body identity and that Nietzsche implicitly grounds his conception of agency and selfhood 
on this will-body identity. Furthermore, I will aim to show that Nietzsche does not deviate 
from this thesis and that he derives something different from it than Schopenhauer. I will 
argue that he favoured the will-body identity because it avoids a third-person phantom, the 
homunculi problem and the bloated ontology plaguing the solutions to the lack of fit I looked 
at previously.  
There is a lot of textual support for Nietzsche’s commitment to ontological monism 
and immanence. For example, he claims that ““Will” can naturally have effects only on 
“will” – and not on “matter” (not on “nerves” for instance –)” (BGE 36). He contends that 
“thinking is only a relation between these drives” (BGE 36) and that: 
“Just as the act of birth makes no difference to the overall course of heredity, neither 
is “consciousness” opposed to instinct in any decisive sense—most of a philosopher’s 
conscious thought is secretly directed and forced into determinate channels by the 
instincts.” (BGE 3) 
The above claims render dubious the opposition between conscious thought and the drives. 
If the drives are distinct in kind from conscious thought, then their interaction is impossible, 
for Nietzsche. He rejects the ‘interaction theory’ that contends that conscious thought and 
drives are distinct things that somehow interact without a demonstrable common ground for 
their interaction, which would make sense of the interaction. Nevertheless, we have to make 
sense of ‘conscious agency’, i.e., of the ‘motivational effectiveness’ of conscious thoughts, 
deliberations, language and so on. Nietzsche cannot possibly avoid the fact that conscious 
thoughts partake in our actions or that the self-conscious ‘I’ is inherent to our first-person 
experience of agential action. Equally, he cannot avoid or explain away the fact that at least 
some I-thoughts lead to action. Explaining the previous in his terms will be the theme of the 
other chapters. Presently, I will focus on his ontological commitments and general approach 
to the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘drives’. 
Nietzsche searches for a stable and coherent ontological ground for his account of 
agency in what he calls “the conscience of method” (BGE 36) or “moral of method” (ibid.), 
namely, that we should: 
“…understand the mechanistic world as belonging to the same plane of reality as our 
affects themselves –, as a primitive form of the world of affect, where everything is 
contained in a powerful unity before branching off and organising itself in the organic 
process… as a kind of life of the drives, where all the organic functions (self-
regulation, assimilation, nutrition, excretion, and metabolism) are still synthetically 
bound together – as a pre-form of life” (BGE 36) 
The above claim is strikingly similar to Schopenhauer’s rejection of the world-view of the 
impure subject of cognition; the objective picture that underpins aetiology and morphology, 
which, in his view is meaningless or without significance. We notice in willing something 
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that the target changes its appearance from an object to a motive. He thinks we can go further 
than perceiving the world as saturated by objects and motives to perceiving willing things 
by projecting willing on things, which makes the world meaningful without sacrificing its 
objectivity. Nietzsche’s claim in the above passage is that at least some objects from our 
third-person perspective on the world (i.e., the objective picture) correlate to our first-person 
experience of some affection (or desire). We should perceive our body and its processes and 
then the world itself, which we view mechanistically, as belonging to ‘the same plane of 
reality’ as our body and affects. The apparently mechanistic world, our body and its affects 
are in the trenches with one another. This proposition underpins Nietzsche’s conception of 
conscious agency, but note its Schopenhauerian foundations. Thus, Nietzsche agrees with 
Schopenhauer that if we are to make the objective world meaningful—or, as Nietzsche says, 
‘explain’ it rather than ‘describe’ it and its events—then we must approach it in the previous 
manner. I have understood the philosophical significance of the previous as his commitment 
to ontological monism and immanence. Does Nietzsche just paraphrase his predecessor, 
however, or does he have his own, original theory that is premised on his own conception 
of ontological monism and immanence? I will argue that he substantially deviates from 
Schopenhauer and comes to his own.    
We remember that Schopenhauer’s conception of the will’s relation to natural forces 
was as of two distinct perspectives on the same activity whose identity became apparent in 
acts of will. In other words, the will is a natural force and vice versa. The ‘will’ represents 
our first-person experience of what we perceive as a natural force; it shows that we identify 
with natural forces. In fact, the ‘will’ appears as a natural force when we assume the stance 
of impure subjects of cognition, i.e., the willing stance on something. To the impure subject 
of cognition, the ‘will’ operates like any other natural force: it has conditions for appearance 
x at time t in relation to objects and circumstances y. It appears as the movement of an object 
or complex of objects we call the ‘body’. The body also roots us in the objective world, 
however, which, in turn, explains why and how we are able to bring about changes in it. If 
our will did not move our body, and our body did not bring about a change in the objective 
world, then we could reasonably conclude that our will is illusory. When we will something 
(i.e., genuinely will something and not ‘wish’, ‘fancy’, ‘think’, ‘imagine’ etc.), it correlates 
to a bodily action or movement. The will-body identity roots us in the world. This rootedness 
explains our causal efficacy. Thus, the will-body identity is, in this sense, a precondition of 
agency. 
Our will is part of the causal nexus and adheres to the law of necessity as any other 
object in the objective world where natural forces appear according to certain conditions, 
but we are required to perceive it as a ‘force’, first. To perceive it as a force requires us to 
assume the willing stance on it and thus to approach it as impure subjects of cognition. Due 
to the previous, we notice that one’s will is open to analysis and its actions can be determined 
to the same degree of precision as the effects of any other natural force or collection of 
forces, assuming the correct and precise apparatus. This assumes that actions are 
predetermined, which threatens agency by debunking its two central features, i.e., freedom 
and responsibility. Debunking moral concepts such as freedom and responsibility leaves a 
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moral vacuum, too. Schopenhauer resolved to fill the vacuum by revising his account of 
freedom and responsibility within the confines of the will-body identity and the ontological 
monism and immanence he derived from it. Thus, ‘freedom of the will’ means acting in 
accordance with what we will, i.e., in accordance with who and what we are, rather than 
being capable of acting otherwise. Recall that he rejected the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae 
conception of freedom. In other words, we are free when we will something, but we can 
also appear fated to be whom and what we are when we take the willing stance on ourselves. 
We can perceive ourselves as a cluster of forces operating differently in different moments 
in relation to the differing circumstances, or as possessing a ‘character’ that is constituted 
by a hierarchy of ‘mainsprings’. The previous are meaningless if we do not project the will 
on them or perceive them as its representations, however. Our character makes sense only 
when we understand it as another way of referring to our ‘will’. Thus, the difference between 
‘will’ and ‘natural force’ rests on our perspective or stance. They are not distinct in kind or 
different things. 
Nietzsche makes an ostensibly similar claim about the first-person perspective’s 
relationship to the third-person ‘mechanistic’ world. Like Schopenhauer, he had his own 
reservations about the objective picture of world, which he calls the ‘mechanistic world’. 
This world-view, Nietzsche claims, cannot explain everything. It cannot give us an insight 
into every single aspect of our experience: 
“Thus, a ‘scientific’ interpretation of the world, as you understand it, might still be 
one of the stupidest of all possible interpretations of the world, i.e. one of those most 
lacking in significance. This to the ear and conscience of Mr Mechanic, who nowadays 
likes to pass as a philosopher and insists that mechanics is the doctrine of the first and 
final laws on which existence may be built, as on a ground floor. But an essentially 
mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world! Suppose one judged 
the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, 
and expressed in formulas—how absurd such a ‘scientific’ evaluation of music would 
be! What would one have comprehended, understood, recognised? Nothing, really 
nothing of what is ‘music’ in it!” (GS 373; some emphasis is mine)  
 
“We should not erroneously objectify “cause” and “effect” like the natural scientists 
do (and whoever else thinks naturalistically these days –) in accordance with the 
dominant mechanistic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it 
“effects” something; we should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts, which 
is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, 
not explanation. In the “in-itself” there is nothing like “causal association,” 
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“necessity,” or “psychological un-freedom.” There, the “effect” does not follow 
“from the cause,” there is no rule of “law”.” (BGE 21; some emphasis is mine)152 
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche suggests that we need to project on the objective picture. In 
fact, he goes further than Schopenhauer did by construing some ‘projection’ as inevitable. 
Unlike Schopenhauer, whom he criticised for choosing to project the ‘will’ on the objective 
world, Nietzsche prefers to use the concept of ‘drive’, but also sometimes ‘affect’, which is 
the first-person experience of the activity of drives. Nevertheless, in a similar move to 
Schopenhauer, he construes meaning or significance as derivable from drives, affects and 
actions. Accordingly, Nietzsche uses the concept of a ‘drive’ as his alternative to what his 
predecessor construed as the ‘will’. However, the ‘drives’ have the same role in his 
philosophy as the ‘will’ did in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The ‘drives’ aim to fill the gaps 
in the objective picture. Schopenhauer construes the gap in the world’s meaningfulness, 
whereas Nietzsche argued the gap was in the explanation, specifically, of certain phenomena 
and actions. It is likely that Nietzsche avoids appealing to ‘meaning’, because he accepts 
that we are able to ‘meaningfully’ describe events in the world while failing to explain them. 
Nevertheless, the world’s significance or the significance of our picture of the world was a 
core theme and concern of both thinkers. 
Nietzsche then agrees with Schopenhauer on the limits of the objective picture of the 
world, but his approach to it is different. It is not in terms of meaning, but explanation. The 
concepts we use to colour the world and supposedly explain phenomena are our inventions 
or conventions, i.e., they are our mirrors. In short, these concepts inevitably lead back to us, 
rather than to a human-independent ‘truth’ or ‘perspective’, as the following quotes suggest:  
“The specifically qualitative aspect for example of every chemical process, still 
appears to be a ‘miracle’, as does every locomotion; no one has ‘explained’ the push. 
And how could we explain! We are operating only with things that do not exist—with 
lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces. How is explanation to 
be at all possible when we first turn everything into a picture—our picture! It is 
enough to view science as an attempt to humanise things as faithfully as possible; we 
learn to describe ourselves more and more precisely as we describe things and their 
succession.” (GS 112) 
 
“Know yourself is the whole of science. — Only when he has attained a final 
knowledge of all things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the 
boundaries of man.” (D 48)  
 
 
                                               
152 Compare this passage with the following: “‘[m]echanistic view’: wants nothing but quantities, yet force is to 
be found in quality; mechanistic theory can thus only describe processes, not explain them.” (WLN 2[76]). Also: 
“[t]hus, in order to sustain the mechanistic theory of the world, we always have to include a proviso about the use 
we are making of two fictions: the concept of motion (taken from the language of our senses) and the concept of 
the atom = unity (originating in our psychological ‘experience’). Its prerequisites are a sensual prejudice and a 
psychological prejudice” (WLN 14[79]). 
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“They took the concept of being from the concept of the I, they posited ‘things’ as 
beings in their own image, on the basis of their concept of I as cause. Is it any wonder 
that what they rediscovered in things later is only what they had put into them in the 
first place? —Even the ‘thing’, to say it again, the concept of a thing, is just a reflex 
of the belief in the I as cause . . . And even your atom, my dear Mr Mechanist and Mr 
Physicist, how many errors, how much rudimentary psychology is left in your atom!” 
(TI, ‘Errors’, 3; some emphasis is mine) 
Nietzsche’s proposition is that we habitually use our first-person experiences to explain 
phenomena and events whereas his predecessor argued that our first-person experience is 
what makes those phenomena and events meaningful. How these two propositions relate to 
his conception of conscious agency will become clearer as we proceed. For the sake of this 
discussion on the will-body identity, however, we should note that the previous provides a 
counterweight to dominant epiphenomenalist readings of Nietzschean agency. Note that he 
does not reject the existence of the self-conscious ‘I’ in favour of some reductionary or 
eliminativist mechanistic or deterministic conception of agency. Rather, as will also become 
clearer below, the explanatory power of mechanistic conceptions we offer as a replacement 
rests on our first-experience of ‘driving for (or towards) something’, which stems from 
willing and so the self-conscious ‘I’. Causal conceptions and their use of ‘lines’, ‘atoms’, 
‘bodies’ etc. have explanatory power in virtue of the first-person experience of ‘driving’ or 
‘willing’ and the unity of the ‘I’ that is a characteristic feature of conscious willing. Thus, 
epiphenomenalist readings are doomed to failure in trying to reduce or eliminate the ‘I’, 
because they require it to ‘make sense of’ or ‘explain’ the mechanistic concept or posit they 
argue the ‘I’ can be reduced to or in favour of which it can be eliminated.153 
In sum, Nietzsche adopts the will-body identity as a conceptual framework stemming 
from Schopenhauer and what he uses to complete his view of and objection to the objective 
picture of the world, which he calls the ‘mechanistic world’. Here, I will focus primarily on 
the use he makes of the identity in agency and so on one aspect of this identity, i.e., the act 
of will or agential action. The latter is a specific action of the body. Accordingly, there is a 
distinction between the ‘will’ and the ‘I’. In other words, there is a difference between some 
vicissitude of the body (e.g., some reflex), which is denoted by the concept of the ‘will’, and 
an ‘agential’ action, which is denoted by the ‘I’. Schopenhauer does not clearly make the 
same distinction, but his defence of the role of deliberation in agency or the individuality of 
deliberate actions implies it. The distinction moves from an ontological reflection on agency 
to their respective conceptions of genuine or distinctly human agency. In other words, the 
distinction moves from how it is possible for a will to bring about changes in the objective 
world into discussing what makes it our will, i.e., what makes us individuals. In short, what 
permits us to claim that what we do is free, responsible or unique? What permits us to claim 
that what we do is attributable to us? The aim for both thinkers was to move from one to the 
other without losing the ontological monism and immanence.  
 
                                               
153 More on this in chapter 2.11. 
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The will-body identity underpins agency and so it is its precondition, but it does not 
tell us what makes us the agents we are or the individuals we are, or what makes us free, 
responsible or unique. The will-body identity is something we have in common with all 
human beings and with any living, striving thing in nature, including what we perceive as 
natural forces. Thus, our ‘individuality’ consists of more than the fact that our will and body 
are identical. The implication is that there are some vicissitudes of our body—or some kinds 
of willing or driving—that are individual and some that are generic. I will first assess 
Schopenhauer’s account of individuality, first, before discussing Nietzsche’s, which, I will 
argue, stems from his objections to Schopenhauer’s account.  
Schopenhauer distinguishes between what ‘I’ (as an individual) can do and what ‘any 
human being’ is (generally) capable of doing. The passage that details this distinction and 
demonstrates his conception of ‘individuality’ is the following: 
“In each one of us, even the best of human beings, there rise up impure, mean, wicked 
thoughts and wishes either from external occasion, from aroused affect or from 
internal annoyance: but he is not morally responsible for these and should not let them 
weigh on his conscience. For they display merely what the human being in general, 
not what he who is thinking them, would be capable of doing. For in his case there 
stand opposed to them other motives that merely do not enter consciousness at that 
moment simultaneously with the others, so that they could never become deeds: thus 
they are like an outvoted minority in a decision-making assembly.” (OBM, 168) 
The distinction between what ‘I think’ (what ‘I think I will’) and what ‘I will’ is grounded 
on the will-body identity. Individuality, for Schopenhauer, is not synonymous with our body 
taken as a whole, nor synonymous with its multifarious vicissitudes. Some bodily processes 
are generic, i.e., all human beings undergo them irrespective of who they are. These generic 
aspects explain on what grounds we are able to bring about an effect or change something 
in the objection world and so in virtue of what we are a part of the objective picture and its 
causal nexus. Nonetheless, these generic aspects do not distinguish human beings from one 
another or distinguish us from another individual. Our conception of agency should track 
not only what makes all human beings agents in the broad sense, but likewise what makes 
a particular human being the individual that she is. For Schopenhauer, a part of us makes us 
individual: the intellect, whose objective correlate is the brain. In short, we are individuals 
and distinguish ourselves from others (people and objects) through our intellect. Yet, other 
human beings and animals also possess an intellect without activing as individually as us. 
Accordingly, it must be some specific function of the intellect that accounts for individuality.  
We should add that, for Schopenhauer, the intellect could not engender an action on 
its own, without contribution from the will. We can endlessly think, wish, promise etc. and 
do so without actually following through, i.e., without acting upon our thoughts, wishes and 
so on. Recall that an action represents our individuality: it is the objective correlate of our 
individual will. What we think, wish or fancy, what we say or promise or even what we say 
we will do not represent our individual will, but certainly not when they fail to correspond 
to an action. Schopenhauer puts it in the following manner: 
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“By means of his capacity for thought the human being can make present to himself 
the motives whose influence on his will he senses, in any order he likes, in alternation 
and repeatedly, to hold them before his will, which is called reflecting: he is able to 
deliberate, and because of this ability has a much greater choice than is possible for 
an animal. Because of this he is indeed relatively free, that is, free from the immediate 
compulsion of objects present in intuition affecting his will as motives, to which the 
animal as such is subjected: he, by contrast, determines himself independently of 
present objects, according to thoughts which are his motives.” (FW, 57)154 
For him, it is the rational or reflective rather than the intuitive part of our intellect that makes 
us individuals in juxtaposition to animals, but also explains why we are not drone-like units 
of our species. All human beings reflect and so reflection itself is insufficient to distinguish 
one human being from another such that this can underpin our individuality. To account for 
this, Schopenhauer introduces self-knowledge, which is one feature of reflection: 
“This closer acquaintance, growing ever more intimate, is properly what we call 
conscience, which for that reason is voiced directly only after the action, prior to it at 
most only indirectly, when it is brought into the picture in deliberation as something 
occurring in the future, perhaps by way of reflection and retrospection upon similar 
cases over which it has already made itself clear.” (FW, 107) 
What we do or undertake in relation to our deliberation based on reflection is a token of the 
human will and distinguishes us from animals. What makes us individuals and distinguishes 
us from other human beings is acting based on our self-image. We can mechanically (re)act, 
but if we reflect on ourselves using our actions as grounds for our reflection, then we acquire 
a self-image and act as individuals. Our self-image enables us to be free and responsible, for 
Schopenhauer. Introducing our self-image our deliberations makes us individuals. Recall 
that our self-image is an ‘objective’ representation of our individual will using our actions 
as their ‘object’. In sum, for Schopenhauer, our individuality is ‘self-conscious thought’ that 
corresponds or leads to action.  
I will suggest that we can distinguish the ‘will-body’ identity from the ‘individual-
action’ identity, which can clarify the above. The individual-action identity we can construe 
also construe as the ‘I’-action identity for brevity. The previous only shows that the ‘I’ refers 
to us as individuals in juxtaposition to something or someone else. The ‘will-body’ identity 
is broader than the ‘individual-action’ identity. The will-body identity is the identity between 
any act of will (sensation, affect etc.) and its corresponding bodily vicissitude. Whereas the 
 
                                               
154 See also: “[t]he capacity for deliberation that arises through that freedom in fact produces nothing other than 
the frequently troubling conflict of motives, over which indecision presides, and whose battle ground is the entire 
mind and consciousness of the human being. For he repeatedly allows the motives to try their force upon his will 
in competition with one another, whereby the will gets into the same state that a body is in when different forces 
work in different directions – until finally the decidedly strongest motive beats the others off the field and 
determines the will, an outcome that is called a resolve, and that occurs with full necessity as the result of the 
conflict” (FW, 58). 
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‘individual’ is a specific kind of bodily movement. In other words, it is a kind of ‘will’ or 
‘willing’. For Schopenhauer, individuality results from deliberate action. We are individuals 
to the extent that we deliberately will something after we have entertained our self-image in 
relation to it, as the following suggests: 
“…only the decision and not merely the desire is a valid token of a person’s character, 
both for himself and for others. But the decision only becomes certain through the 
action, both for himself as for others… desire only expresses the character of the 
species, as in animals, and not the individual, i.e. it merely signifies what human beings 
in general, not the individual who experiences this desire, would be able to do. 
Because it is already a human action, the deed always requires a certain amount of 
deliberation, and because people are generally in control of their reason, which is to 
say they are thoughtful, i.e. they make decisions according to well-considered, abstract 
motives, only the action is the expression of the intelligible maxim of their acting, the 
result of their innermost willing.” (WR, 326f; some of the emphasis is mine) 
As individuals, we are distinct from other human beings by virtue of our deliberate actions 
and self-image. All actions are third-person bridges to the will. An action itself is a bodily 
modification like any other, so what makes a specific action individual is acting thoughtfully 
and taking into account our self-image. He includes self-knowledge in thoughtful action, 
but he is not always clear on this point. Self-knowledge is distinct from self-consciousness 
by being ‘abstract’ or a function of reason rather than intuition; it stems from unification of 
dissimilar actions over time, which yields a self-image. The previous culminates in what he 
calls our ‘acquired character’, which he describes in the following manner: 
“This is nothing other than the greatest possible familiarity with our own 
individuality: it is the abstract and therefore clear knowledge of the invariable 
qualities of our own empirical character, of the dimensions and directions of our 
mental and physical abilities, and thus of the total strengths and weaknesses of our 
own individuality. This enables us to organise the unalterable role of our own person 
in a thoughtful and methodical manner (a role that we had previously acted out 
naturally, without any rules) and under the direction of solid concepts, we can also 
fill gaps in it left by whims or weaknesses. We have now put the ways of acting that 
are necessitated by our individual natures into clear and conscious maxims, maxims 
that are always present to us. We follow these maxims as deliberately as if they had 
been learned, without ever being led astray by a present impression or the fleeting 
influence of mood, without being hindered by the bitterness or sweetness of some 
particular thing that we meet along our way, without hesitating, without wavering, 
without inconsistency.” (WR, 331f) 
The intellect is necessary for our relative freedom and individuality with respect to other 
members of our species, but also for transcending the will to life. It permits us to no longer 
act blindly, so to speak. Accordingly, the will-body identity is a precondition of agency, but 
deliberation using our self-image is a precondition of individuality, for Schopenhauer. 
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We should clarify that the will-body identity grounds the individual-action identity 
and so when we pose it this way the latter does not defy ontological monism and immanence. 
For Schopenhauer, the will-intellect distinction is epistemological rather than ontological. 
They are not two distinct things or objects, but two distinct modes of the same thing, i.e., the 
will. Thus, the intellect is not separate or ‘distinct in kind’ from the will, but an extension 
of the will, i.e., a kind of willing. The ontological conception of the intellect that he commits 
to, but did not explicitly define, is that the intellect is the ‘will to individuality’, ‘separation’ 
and ‘multiplicity’. It is unsurprising that he construes the PSR and the PI as the same thing155 
when we reflect on the previous, or that he thinks the PI accounts for ‘individuality’: 
“Since the will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essential aspect of the world, 
while life, the visible world, appearance, is only the mirror of the will; life will be as 
inseparable from the will as a shadow from its body. And where there is will, there 
will be life and world as well. So for the will to life, life is a certainty, and as long as 
we are filled with life-will, we do not need to worry about our existence, even in the 
face of death. It is true we see the individual come into being and pass away: but the 
individual is only appearance, it exists only for cognition that is caught up in the 
principle of sufficient reason, the principium individuationis. Certainly, for this kind 
of cognition, the individual receives life as a gift, emerges out of nothing, and then 
suffers the loss of this gift through death, returning back into nothing.” (WR, 301) 
Individuality is an illusion, for him, whereas the will to life, which he does not identify with 
any particular individual, is the oomph that makes possible individuation and individuality. 
The ‘oomph’ alone is what is most real, for him. As we will shortly see through Nietzsche’s 
objections, Schopenhauer is not as consistent in preserving the above ontological monism 
and immanence as we initially expect from his distinctions.  
Nietzsche understood and derived something different from the will-body identity in 
terms of method and understanding of individuality than Schoepnhauer. We argued that 
Nietzsche’s conception of self-conscious agency does not assume that the ‘I’ is a distinct 
kind of thing interacting with (or supervening on) the drives, but challenges this assumption. 
Consider what he says about ‘consciousness’, i.e., the defining feature of the intellect, in the 
following passage: 
“Thus, consciousness is properly tyrannised—and not least by one’s pride in it! One 
thinks it constitutes the kernel of man, what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, most original 
in him! One takes consciousness to be a given determinate magnitude! One denies its 
growth and intermittences! Sees it as ‘the unity of the organism’! This ridiculous 
overestimation and misapprehension of consciousness has the very useful 
consequence that an all-too-rapid development of consciousness was prevented. 
 
                                               
155 The PSR and the PI are two distinct perspectives on the same thing. Even the impure subject of cognition 
assumes a stance on the world as an individual looking for what to will and is thus in the thrall of the PI. 
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Since they thought they already possessed it, human beings did not take much trouble 
to acquire it—and things are no different today!” (GS 11)156  
He has a distinct conception of ‘consciousness’ than Schopenhauer, who committed to the 
Idealist doctrine that ‘consciousness’ is that in virtue of which we comprehend the world. 
In short, the ‘self-conscious subject’ is the focal point or limit of a possible experience. Its 
foundational form—the subject-object correlation—is a fixed point whose analysis is futile, 
because the intellect and thus the self-conscious subject enacts this analysis. Nietzsche does 
not arrive at the same conclusion, however. He has a different and revisionist conception of 
‘consciousness’, which will become clearer in ensuing chapters.   
In sum, both philosophers aim to complement the objective picture, but each has a 
different way of doing so. Nevertheless, it is clear that both aim to complement the objective 
picture for aesthetic and ethical reasons. Nietzsche wants a relationship between ‘self-
conscious ‘I’’ and ‘the drives’ which preserves individuality. The objective picture sees us 
as functional parts in a generic whole, which has aesthetic and ethical consequences by 
taking from us what makes us individual. Schopenhauer flirted with the previous idea by 
arguing about the ways in which the species expresses itself through our urges and therefore 
distorts our individuality.  
Schopenhauer’s will-body identity plays a central role in Nietzschean agency. Both 
thinkers use the identity for a conception of individuality, but their conclusions differ. I will 
strive to demonstrate that ‘deliberation’, ‘consciousness’ and the ‘I’ play a central role in 
Nietzschean agency, but not the role Schopenhauer ascribes to them or the role defended by 
the philosophical commentary on Nietzschean agency. Nietzsche has a revisionist account 
of consciousness, which stems from his rejecting the metaphysical or ontological prejudices 
he finds in most philosophical conceptions of it, as he highlights in the following passage: 
“First of all, we must also put an end to that other and more disastrous atomism, the 
one Christianity has taught best and longest, the atomism of the soul. Let this 
expression signify the belief that the soul is something indestructible, eternal, 
indivisible, that it is a monad, an atomon: this belief must be thrown out of science! 
Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up “the soul” itself, and 
relinquish one of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses – as often happens with 
naturalists: given their clumsiness, they barely need to touch “the soul” to lose it. But 
the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and 
concepts like the “mortal soul” and the “soul as subject-multiplicity” and the “soul as 
a society constructed out of drives and affects” want henceforth to have civil rights in 
the realm of science.” (BGE 12) 
 
                                               
156 We should compare this passage with what he says in GS 354. See also Constâncio (2011) for an informative 
discussion on this topic.  
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The ‘I’, for Nietzsche, refers to our individuality, but not exclusively to a ‘conscious thing’ 
or ‘incorporeal soul’. It is limited to referring to what is ‘individual’ in juxtaposition to what 
is ‘generic’ about us.157 The will is identical to the body. Therefore, the body—ranging from 
organ to limb—mirrors the will. There is nothing in the first-person perspective which is 
ontologically distinct from what we perceive in the third-person perspective as our body, 
actions and so on. For Nietzsche, “we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the 
reality of our drives (since thinking is only a relation between these drives)” (BGE 36). The 
‘drive’ is the ontological concept on whose basis he analyses phenomena and thus fills the 
gaps in the objective picture, but note that it plays a revisionist, not a reductionist role.  
Nietzsche does not construe individuality based on incorporeal atomism, which he 
construes as an objectionable and unintended consequence of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of the will. He agrees with Schopenhauer about the will-body identity and thus with his 
foundations, but disagrees with him over how to analyse this identity; also, what conceptual 
tools and philosophical method we can derive from it. Schopenhauer’s distinction between 
the will and intellect led him to conceive of an interaction between them, which brought to 
the conceptual table the phantoms associated with that interaction. This is clear in his ethics 
and aesthetics, where he construes the intellect as interacting with and affecting the will.  
The ‘I think X’ or ‘I will X’, for Schopenhauer, represents our individual will rather 
than the will as thing in itself, namely, the will to life and body as a whole. This representation 
succeeds if and only if the ‘I’ think or ‘I’ will etc. corresponds to bodily action. We can 
‘think’ and claim that we ‘will’ many things, but only those thoughts and claims that result 
in bodily action represent our individuality. There is a difference between the ‘will’ and the 
‘I’, which we can characterise in terms of their respective scope. The ‘will’ is broader in 
scope than the ‘I’. It tracks what is common to all motivation, i.e., it demonstrates the bridge 
between the objective world and our thoughts and inclinations in relation to it. Without it, 
there would be no basis on which our thoughts and inclinations could be ‘effective’ in (or 
‘affect’) the objective world, i.e., bring about changes in it, or even interact with it. In short, 
the will is the body because we need a body to be causally efficacious, in the first place. The 
will-body identity, then, makes agency possible, but it fails to distinguish individuals from 
one another and so it fails to show our freedom and responsibility. For clarity, we can make 
the following distinction between the two conceptions to pick out their differences in scope: 
A) The will-body identity refers to the identity between the first-person and the third-
person perspectives on motivation and action. It shows our ontological limits and 
constitutes the basis on which we can (re)act in first the place.  
B) The ‘I’-action or individual-action identity refers to what motivates individuals 
in juxtaposition to other individuals, or what it means to be an individual or to have 
a self in the first place. It constitutes the basis on which we (re)act as individuals. 
 
                                               
157 We should distinguish the ‘I’ from the self-conscious ‘I’ for the time being. The reason for this distinction will 
become apparent below where we consider Nietzschean individuality. 
  265 
‘A’ is the broad conception that shows us the ontological basis of agency. We can have an 
effect on the objective world (i.e., we are agents of the changes we recognise and can refer 
to) because our will is identical to our body. Our body is a bridge between the objective 
world and our apaprently subjective inclinations, thoughts and reasons. ‘B’, however, refers 
to a narrower conception of agency, namely, individuality. We can construe the latter as our 
freedom and responsibility, or our sense of self. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer worked with 
both ‘A’ and ‘B’, but had differing conceptions, approaches and explanations for both. 
Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, wants to base his conception of individuality on the 
will-body identity, but this identity is insufficient to account for it. For Schopenhauer, the 
intellect’s role is what accounts for our individuality, specifically, its faculty of reason that 
unifies our actions and yields a self-image that then partakes in our deliberation process. 
Our self-image explains our individuality, responsibility and so on.  
Why and how does Nietzsche object to the above? One of his objections aims at 
Schopenhauer’s concept of the will, which he contends is too ‘intellectual’. The following 
passages highlight the previous: 
“… “immediate certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer’s 
superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark naked, 
as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place from either the side of the subject 
or the side of the object.” (BGE 16) 
 
“Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really 
familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have 
always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers 
always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice.” (BGE 19) 
 
“With his assumption that only that which wills exists, Schopenhauer enthroned a 
primordial mythology; he seems never to have attempted an analysis of the will 
because like everyone else he believed in the simplicity and immediacy of all 
willing...” (GS 127) 
These passages can be misleading about what Nietzsche rejects or what he accepts when we 
approach them individually, but taking them together show the emergence of a relatively 
clear picture. I will suggest that the above passages indirectly address the following passage 
from Schopenhauer: 
“Finally, the cognition I have of my will, although it is immediate, cannot be separated 
from that of my body. I do not have cognition of my will as a whole, in its unity, in 
perfect accordance with its essence; rather I cognise it only in its individual acts, 
which is to say in time, time being the form in which my body (like every other object) 
appears: this is why the body is the condition of cognition of my will. Consequently, 
I cannot truly imagine my will without my body.” (WR, 126) 
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Nietzsche does not find objectionable all the propositions in the above passage, however. 
There are two propositions to which, I think, he objects. Firstly, the will as thing in itself is 
‘unified’, but cognition of something through the PSR (and thus the PI) makes it appear 
otherwise. Secondly, cognition of the will as thing in itself is through its dissimilar acts of 
will in time appearing as bodily vicissitudes or actions in relation to differing circumstances. 
The first proposition is therefore ontological and the second is epistemological.  
Schopenhauer construed the will as ‘unified’ and he argued that the intellect was 
responsible for the perspectival illusion of divisibility and individuation via the projection 
of a causal order onto a world of objects. This causal order rests on the effect of something 
seen as external to us on our body. He construed matter as based on bodily sensations that 
we trace to the activity of something on us.158 In short, the so-called unity in essence of the 
will as thing in itself is juxtaposed to the illusory divisibility in appearance of an individual 
will, which appears as actions over time and which we can only unify post hoc through the 
intellect’s faculty of reason.  
For Nietzschean agency, I will focus on what he found objectionable in the above 
propositions in light of his commitment to the will-body identity. His objections do not 
concern the proposition that as an agent “I cannot truly imagine my will without my body” 
(WR, 126), but Schopenhauer’s views on the will as thing in itself and the role of the intellect 
in individuality. 
Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s conception of the will aim at the role he 
gave to the intellect. He objects to Schopenhauer’s analysis of the sense of freedom and 
responsibility we experience with the respect to our actions. The key representation of this 
concern was Schopenhauer’s claim about the supposed inalterability of our character, as the 
following passage demostrates:  
“…Schopenhauer's celebrated doctrines of the primacy of the will over the intellect, 
of the unalterability [sic] of the character and of the negativity of pleasure - all of 
which are, in the sense in which he understands them, errors… even Schopenhauer's 
‘will’ has, in the hands of its originator through the philosopher's rage for 
generalisation turned out to be a disaster for science: for this will has been turned into 
a metaphor when it is asserted that all things in nature possess will…” (HHII 5) 
Notice that his concern was with “the sense in which he [Schopenhauer] understands them” 
or “in the hands of its originator”, not in all senses of the concepts and their relation. He 
 
                                               
158 See, for example: “[T]o recognise the entire essence of matter as such, it is enough to recognise the form of the 
principle of sufficient reason governing the content of the forms of space and time, what makes them perceptible, 
i.e. matter, that is to say, the law of causality: matter is, in its entirety, nothing other than causality, which is 
immediately apparent to anyone who thinks about it. This amounts to saying that for matter, its being is its acting: 
and it is inconceivable that matter has any other being. Only by acting can it fill space and time: its action on the 
immediate object (which is itself matter) is a condition for intuition, and matter can exist only in intuition. We can 
know the result of one material object acting upon another only if the second object now has a different effect on 
the immediate object than it did before – indeed the effect is nothing more than this. The whole being of matter 
therefore lies in cause and effect: for matter, its being is its acting” (WR, 29).  
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accepts the will-body identity and the primacy of the will over the intellect, but modifies 
substantially his conception of the ‘will’ and ‘intellect’. What he objects to is not that we 
identify with our actions, but the independent status or efficacy of the intellect from the body 
or the intellect’s efficacy independent from the drives.  
Schopenhauer is clear in avoiding the conclusion that the intellect has an independent 
effect on the body, but misleadingly speaks as though it does in his metaphysics, aesthetics 
and ethics. He projects the unity of the ‘I’ onto the will as thing itself while ignoring the 
multiplicity of the body, which is the other side of the will-body identity and which mirrors 
the will. He argues that only if abstract cognition motivates us (i.e., is seen as a motive and 
leads to a bodily action) can we claim that it stems from our individuality and is therefore a 
token of our freedom and responsibility. The intellect is impotent on its own.  
Nietzsche nuances the will-body identity by speaking of drives, rather than the will. 
He construes the will as intellectualised under Schopenhauer’s conception because of 
Schopenhauer’s so-called ‘rage for generalisation’ (more on this below) and commitment 
to philosophical Idealism. He does distinguish agential actions from mechanical functions 
of our body, which incite certain reactions, however. Our agential actions are individual, 
whereas mechanical bodily functions are generic; the previous are structures and processes 
common to the other members of our species. The intellect is not what makes us individual 
and distinguishes us from the previous, however. He argues that our actions reveal who and 
what we are and so they are individual irrespective of the role of the intellect or deliberation 
in them, which includes the role of our self-image in deliberation. They are individual for 
different reasons than deliberation. Nietzsche offers a different account of and reason for 
the individuality of our actions.  
In sum, Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s account of the ‘I’-action identity, but he 
accepts the ‘will-body’ identity. The following passages evidence the previous clearly:  
“Essential to start from the body and use it as a guiding thread. It is the far richer 
phenomenon, and can be observed more distinctly. Belief in the body is better 
established than belief in the mind. (WLN 40[15]) 
 
If our ‘I’ is our only being, on the basis of which we make everything be or understand 
it to be, fine! Then it becomes very fair to doubt whether there isn’t a perspectival 
illusion here - the illusory unity in which, as in a horizon, everything converges. Along 
the guiding thread of the body we find a tremendous multiplicity; it is 
methodologically permissible to use the more easily studied, the richer phenomenon 
as a guiding thread to understand the poorer one. (WLN 2[91]) 
What Nietzsche makes of the will-body identity differs from his predecessor. According to 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s accounts of the will and individuality are illegitimate projections 
of the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ onto our body and actions; they ignore the other side of 
the will-body identity. Our individual will is ‘unified’ or a ‘unity’ in itself, for Schopenhauer; 
it appears as disparate bodily actions over time due to the limitations of our intellect. In 
short, the intellect makes the unified will as thing in itself appear as divisible, i.e., a body 
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with processes and parts. In the same manner, the will is a unity that appears as disparate 
‘actions’ (i.e., acts of will) over time by virtue of our intellect’s limitations. Divisibility is 
the intellect’s illusion; it is the ‘veil of Maya’, for Schopenhauer. Nietzsche suggests that 
we should completely reverse the claim that the will as thing in itself is a unity and that 
divisibility of the will is the ‘illusion’. The unity of the will (as thing in itself) is the illusion, 
for Nietzsche. He compares the latter illusion with the apparent convergence of the horizon 
into one ‘focal point’. This focal point is precisely what we cannot transcend, according to 
Schopenhauer, namely, the subject-object correlation.  
Nietzsche has a compelling reason for rejecting the unity of the will as thing in itself 
and a different understanding of this focal point. In accordance with ontological monism 
and immanence we can comprehend the will-body identity and so complement the objective 
picture based on the multiplicity of the body. Nietzsche inverts Schopenhauer’s proposition. 
Both the will-body identity and the individual-action identity represent a multiplicity. What, 
then, grounds the claim that both the ‘will’ and ‘individuality’ are unities? Nietzsche argues 
that Schopenhauer unjustifiably takes the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ as decisive without 
giving a sufficient reason for doing so except that the ‘I’ is the closest and most accessible 
to us. He unjustifiably uses the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ as his departure or reference 
point in understanding the multifarious operations of our body in light of the will-body 
identity. He takes our first-person experience of the world as decisive or as his starting point 
for understanding the objective picture. Let us elaborate on why Nietzsche construes the 
previous starting point as illegitimate.   
Why should we model the objective world (or make it meaningful) based on the unity 
of the self-conscious ‘I’ when its objective correlate represents a multiplicity? We can also 
model it on the diverse actions we perceive without implying they necessarily represent a 
unified, metaphysical ‘thing’, i.e., a thing in itself. Nietzsche doubts Schopenhauer’s right 
to the claim that we know our actions and thus ourselves without any margin for (or degree 
of) error, as he demonstrates in the following passage:  
“Actions are never what they appear to us to be! We have expended so much labour 
on learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be—very well! the case 
is the same with the inner world!” (D 116) 
Compare the above with the following: 
“Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really 
familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have 
always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers 
always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice. Willing strikes me 
as, above all, something complicated, something unified only in a word – and this 
single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whatever minimal 
precautions philosophers might take.” (BGE 19) 
He charges Schopenhauer for projecting the unity of self-consciousness or the ‘I’ onto the 
will and our actions. The claim that the will as thing in itself is ‘unified’ or that individuality 
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and actions represent something unified is a baseless assumption representing a misleading 
observation of the process or activity of willing something (more on this below).  
Schopenhauer confuses what Nietzsche calls the grammatical unity of the ‘I’ for the 
unity of the will or individual (as a thing in itself), which we cannot perceive and thus verify. 
Nietzsche favours a conception of the will composed of a multiplicity (of affects, thoughts 
and drives) that coincide only in action (more on this below). We are wrong to assume that 
the will is ‘unified’ when our body and thus the will’s mirror shows us the exact opposite. 
We should rely on the ‘richer phenomenon’ that is ‘observed more distinctly’. In sum, 
Nietzsche starts with the ‘apparent’ multiplicity of the body and assumes that the will is also 
a multiplicity where his predecessor began with the supposedly ‘real’ unity of the will as 
thing in itself. Nietzsche saw the latter as a groundless projection of the self-conscious unity 
of the ‘I’. In ensuing chapters, we will notice that he conceives the self-conscious ‘I’ as 
something relatively new and late in the development of our species, rather than that on 
which we comprehend everything else, which sounds counterintuitive.  
Nietzsche criticises the claim that ‘individuality’ and ‘multiplicity’ are illusions and 
models the will based on what we perceive about the body, not the body based on what we 
experience in self-conscious ‘willing’, i.e., based on the self-conscious unity of the ‘I’. The 
self-conscious unity of the ‘I’ is not the starting point of his conceptual paradigm. In sum, 
just as Nietzsche invites us to understand willing itself based on the body, he invites us to 
understand individuality based on our actions as a specific modification of the entire body.  
 Following the ‘individual-action’ identity, Nietzsche suggests that our actions 
themselves are the most “personal, unique and boundlessly individual” (GS 354) aspects of 
our experience. They represent our individuality, but do so for different reasons than his 
predecessor argues. His reasons are twofold. Firstly, consciousness is not a thing and it does 
not represent the unity of the organism that we are (cf. GS 11). Secondly, we should construe 
consciousness as arising from a need (i.e., a drive) that the organism had prior to becoming 
conscious of something, which includes its inevitably becoming self-conscious. He grounds 
these claims on what seemingly was becoming a matter of fact in his time, namely, that an 
organism can operate in a purposeful manner without demonstrating that it is conscious and-
or self-conscious: 
“For we could think, feel, will, remember, and also ‘act’ in every sense of the term, 
and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’ (as one says 
figuratively). All of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the 
mirror; and still today, the predominant part of our lives actually unfolds without this 
mirroring — of course also our thinking, feeling, and willing lives, insulting as it may 
sound to an older philosopher. To what end does consciousness exist at all when it is 
basically superfluous? If one is willing to hear my answer and its possibly extravagant 
conjecture, it seems to me that the subtlety and strength of consciousness is always 
related to a person’s (or animal’s) ability to communicate; and the ability to 
communicate, in turn, to the need to communicate.” (GS 354) 
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Individuality is identical with our actions, but like our disparate actions, our individuality is 
not necessarily a ‘unity’, a ‘whole’, something ‘indivisible’ or ‘inalterable’. Equally, the 
organism’s ‘consciousness’ does not necessarily cause its unity. The properties of ‘unity’, 
‘wholeness’, ‘indivisibility’ and ‘inalterability’ are errors based on our grammar, which we 
project onto the objective picture. To understand the previous errors we need a genealogical 
analysis, which Schopenhauer did not access because of his commitment to transcendental 
idealism. Language, for Nietzsche, is a precondition for communication between members 
of a community within a species (more on this below). Consequently, its grammatical 
propositions are not truths about a so-called thing in itself, i.e., metaphysical truths. If we 
can perform an action without being self-conscious, then we cannot associate the ‘unity of 
consciousness’ or of ‘self-conscious thought’ with ‘agential unity’. 
 Consciousness is unnecessary and insufficient for agency; it is not even necessary for 
‘individuality’, according to Nietzsche. Individuality represents what distinguishes us from 
others. We can distinguish one individual from another without appealing to ‘metaphysical’ 
or ‘self-conscious’ unities. Animals can perform actions that individuate them and which 
appear unified, without actually being self-conscious. Accordingly, individuality is not the 
correspondence between deliberate, self-conscious thought and action, for Nietzsche, but 
something else entirely.  
Nietzsche sought a conception of individuality based on the body as a whole, not on 
the unity of ‘self-conscious thought’ and so on the activity of one of its part. Moreover, his 
account of the individual-action identity begins from the body side of the identity. Our body 
is a bridge to the objective world and the cornerstone of motivation; without the body, we 
cannot be agents of change, so it should take priority in our apprehending what makes us 
agents, individuals and, finally, what makes us ‘self-conscious agents’. Nietzsche puts it in 
the following way: 
“And in the end, if belief in the body is only the result of an inference supposing it 
were a false inference, as the idealists claim: is not the credibility of the mind itself 
cast into doubt by its being the cause of such false inferences? Supposing multiplicity, 
and space and time and motion and whatever else may be the presuppositions of a belief 
in corporeality were errors, what mistrust of the mind would be aroused by the thing 
that induced us to reach such suppositions! Enough: for the time being, belief in the 
body is still a stronger belief than belief in the mind; and anyone who wants to 
undermine it will most thoroughly be undermining – belief in the authority of the mind 
as well! (WLN 36[36]; my emphasis) 
What we ‘will’ or ‘claim about ourselves’ must be accountable to bodily modifications, that 
is, it must be mirrored in our actions. He aimed to replace the ‘I’ as spoken, with the ‘I’ as 
done or embodied. He directs his reader’s attention to the ‘I’ as we enact it or as we translate 
it into actions. Thus, he uses our body and actions as his point of reference and departure: 
““I” you say and are proud of this word. But what is greater is that in which you do 
not want to believe – your body and its great reason. It does not say I, but does I.” (Z, 
‘Despisers’, 23) 
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Nietzsche’s proposition is simple: what we ‘claim’ about our values and actions should be 
coherent with what we actually do. The first-person must have its third-person correlate such 
that we can avoid appealing to illusions or phantoms. If our wishes, fancies, desires and 
promises, i.e., our claims about ‘willing(s)’ are genuine representations of our individuality, 
then they should correspond to an action. Therefore, we should model the individual-action 
identity on the will-body identity, not deviate from it.  
Nietzsche uses the body as a whole along with its manifold processes and vicissitudes 
as his departure point into his inquiry on agency, rather than the operation of one of its parts, 
i.e., the brain. If our body consists of a multiplicity of micro-movements and it mirrors the 
will, then the will is also a multiplicity. The will consists of relations between different parts 
that push and pull in different directions. Moreover, if the multiplicity of our actions over 
time in relation to different circumstances mirrors our individual will, then individuality is 
also a multiplicity. Nietzsche is more consistent in adhering to the will-body identity than 
Schopenhauer, who deviates from the identity in various ways, as we saw with his views on 
ascetic resignation and tragedy. 
We should stress that Nietzsche does not reject the claim that actions are individual 
or that we make sense of individuality using our actions. What he rejects is Schopenhauer’s 
claim that our actions represent a unified, unalterable whole that appears divisible because 
of our intellect’s limits. He objects to the implicit claims in passages such as the following:   
“Our character is to be seen as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal and thus 
indivisible and unalterable act of will, or an intelligible character; and this act 
irrevocably determines everything essential, i.e. the ethical content of how we 
conduct our lives, which must express itself as such in its appearance, the empirical 
character.” (WR, 328) 
Nietzsche construes the proposition that ‘our life is the mirror of a unified and unalterable 
predetermined act of will’—which, for Schopenhauer is presumably the act of procreation—
as unfounded and prejudicial. We cannot cognise the intelligible will in its unity, according 
to Schopenhauer. It follows, then, that the unity of the will as thing in itself is an assumption, 
at best. Furthermore, he denies the significance of the intelligible will (and thing in itself)159 
and later argues that it may not even exist160. However, he also states that the same lack of 
significance applies to its opposite, namely, the ‘apparent’ will.161  
Nietzsche, then, rejects the by-fit relationship between the intelligible and empirical 
character that led Schopenhauer to the proposition that character is ‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable’: 
“One can dispose of one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate 
the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful 
 
                                               
159 Cf. HHI 16 & 29; see also GS 335.  
160 Cf. BGE 16; see also EH, ‘Books’, 4.  
161 Cf. TI, ‘Fable’. 
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fruit tree on a trellis… All this we are at liberty to do: but how many know we are at 
liberty to do it? Do the majority not believe in themselves as in complete fully-
developed facts? Have the great philosophers not put their seal on this prejudice with 
the doctrine of the unchangeability of character?” (D 560)162 
It is important to notice that he does not say consciousness or self-conscious thought in 
opposition to ‘unconscious’ drives accounts for this ‘liberty’ over our character. Although 
we initially incline to project ‘conscious agency’ on the ‘we’ in the above passage, I think 
we ought to resist the inclination to give Nietzsche room to convince us about his revisionist 
conception of self-conscious agency. The ‘we’ need not require him to accept the conscious 
identity commitment, but it does require some conception of individuality, even if it does 
not rest on self-conscious thought and does not appeal to unities. In addition, his conception 
of ‘liberty’ in the above passage is not reducible to the opposition between self-conscious 
thought and ‘unconscious’ drives (more on this below). I will argue that Nietzsche operates 
with a different conception of agency and individuality, which escapes the philosophical 
commentary because we often assume a particular conception of it from the outset, that is, 
we assume a self-conscious conception based on the unity of the ‘I’. Nietzsche’s objections 
to Schopenhauer suggest that he is has another approach in mind.  
To avoid confusion and before I elaborate in the coming chapters, I will juxtapose 
the above aphorism with the following: 
“While ‘we’ believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it 
is one drive which is complaining about another; that is to say: for us to become aware 
that we are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of 
another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in 
prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.” (D 109) 
The ‘we’ seemingly refers to ‘unified, unalterable self-conscious subjects of ‘I’ thoughts’, 
but he is eager to debunk this conception without rejecting the fact that we have self-
conscious thoughts. Without the existence of a multiplicity of micro-movements pushing us 
in different directions, we cannot possibly experience a complaint over this or that direction. 
Our ‘complaints’ correspond to, or are representations of, an opposition or conflict between 
different ‘drives’. The ‘desire’ for liberty from a drive, e.g., our drive to change ourselves, is 
part of who and what we are, which indicates a struggle between opposing drives. When we 
complain about a drive, we complain about something we want to do, but perhaps know or 
feel that we should not, because it compromises something else we want to do just as much, 
if not more than what we should do. If we pursue X, then we impede Y and we want to do 
both, which, in turn, opens us up to an internal conflict or struggle. This opposition does not 
make sense based on Schopenhauer’s conception of the will as a unity, since such conflicts 
 
                                               
162 We can compare this quote with the claim Nietzsche makes about the self as an object of artistic creation made 
possible by historical analysis both of our own culture and heritage, but also of our own personal history. This 
permits us, he claims, to construe ourselves as necessary, but also as alterable (cf. HHI 274 & 276).  
  273 
are resolved in advance by the act of procreation and because we are unified and inalterable. 
The latter propositions bred many impasses in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will.  
If our body mirrors the will and it evidences a multiplicity of micro-movements, then 
the proposition that we are an ‘inalterable unity’ independent from what we can perceive in 
the body is a prejudice. Thus, we often postulate the existence of phantoms in making sense 
of our body and our actions, which Nietzsche avidly seeks to avoid: 
“When the natural consequences of an action are not ‘natural’ any more but instead 
are attributed to spectral, superstitious concepts, to ‘God’, to ‘spirit’, to the ‘soul’, as 
exclusively ‘moral’ consequences, as reward, punishment, warning, as a lesson, then 
the presuppositions of knowledge have been destroyed, - and this is the greatest crime 
against humanity.” (A 49) 
He used the will-body identity to debunk various prejudices about individuality.163 These 
prejudices are a common target for Nietzsche’s objections: 
“But we must go further still and declare war – a ruthless fight to the finish – on the 
“atomistic need” that, like the more famous “metaphysical need,” still leads a 
dangerous afterlife in regions where nobody would think to look. First of all, we must 
also put an end to that other and more disastrous atomism, the one Christianity has 
taught best and longest, the atomism of the soul. Let this expression signify the belief 
that the soul is something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, that it is a monad, an 
atomon: this belief must be thrown out of science!” (BGE 12; some emphasis is mine) 
Nietzsche has some version of individuality and so of the ‘I’, but he also (sometimes) rejects 
the ‘I’ by construing it as “a fairy tale, a fiction, a play on words: it has stopped thinking, 
feeling, and willing altogether” (TI, ‘Errors’, 3). By construing it as a fairy-tale, does he also 
reject individuality? Nietzsche has a conception of individuality that aims to overcome the 
objections he raises to Schopenhauer (more on this below).  
We should add in Schopenhauer’s defence that implicit to his claim is that we are 
composed of various mainsprings. He qualifies this proposition by adding that an individual 
is composed of all the mainsprings, which composition is so structured as to yield what he 
calls our ‘temperament’.164 The concept of ‘temperament’ is admittedly vague, but what is 
 
                                               
163 Consider, e.g., what he says about Schopenhauer’s metaphysics: “But in our century, too, Schopenhauer's 
metaphysics demonstrates that even now the scientific spirit is not yet sufficiently strong: so that, although all the 
dogmas of Christianity have long since been demolished, the whole medieval Christian conception of the world 
and of the nature of man could in Schopenhauer's teaching celebrate a resurrection” (HHI 26). A little further in 
the same passage and in spite of his criticism of the Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, he praises Schopenhauer from 
another angle: “One of the greatest, indeed quite invaluable advantages we derive from Schopenhauer is that 
through him our sensibilities are for a time compelled to return to older ways of contemplating the world and 
mankind that once held sway which we would otherwise have no easy access to” (ibid.). Nietzsche did not reject 
his predecessor wholesale, but sought to make his philosophy consistent and overcome its limitations. 
164 There is room for debate on Schopenhauer’s conception of temperament and its relationship to the intelligible 
character. Consider the following quote: “[t]his more profound recognition – which is no longer caught in the 
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clear is that it is essentially a unity, inalterable and predetermined as a fixed ‘quantity’ and-
or ‘arrangement’: 
“…a person’s suffering or wellbeing would not be determined externally at all, but 
instead it would be a function of that pre-set amount or arrangement. It certainly might 
increase or decrease at different times due to physical constitution, but overall it 
would remain the same and be nothing other than what is called temperament, or more 
precisely, as Plato expressed it in the first book of the Republic, the degree to which 
someone might be ευκολος or δυσκολος, i.e. of an easy or difficult nature.” (WR, 342) 
Nietzsche rejects the above by claiming that we can change ourselves, but this change is not 
because of the activity of some unified, inalterable, fixed quantity imposing its unity on a 
multiplicity. Rather, ‘changing ourselves’ is the result of an interaction and thus a resolution 
between various parts in the multiplicity that we are, which do not necessarily represent any 
overarching, metaphysical ‘unity’. Changes in character result from resolutions between the 
opposed or conflicting ‘drives’ we identify with. We can acquire drives and forgo them; we 
change ourselves through the struggle and opposition between our drives (cf. D 109).  
In sum, Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s claim that the ‘will’ and ‘individuality’ 
are inalterable unities and that their representation as multiplicities is an illusion. According 
to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s view srisk construing all changes we experience, also our own 
pain, as resting on an illusion of the intellect, which may explain why he asserted that ascetic 
resignation is the solution to living in an illusory and inherently dissatisfactory world.  
In the next chapter, I assess Nietzsche’s conceptions of individuality and generality, 
which rest on the will-body identity and his objections to Schopenhauerian individuality.  
2.6 Nietzsche on Individuality and Generality following 
the Will-Body Identity 
In this chapter, I aim to show the basis for Nietzsche’s revision of individuality and 
generality. Moreover, I will aim to clarify that his rejection of the role of the self-conscious 
‘I’ in agency is not a rejection of individuality, but the causal efficacy of the self-conscious 
‘I’ as if it is independent from the drives. He rejects the causal efficacy of a ‘thing’ called 
‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’:  
 
                                               
principium individuationis and which gives rise to all virtue and magnanimity – no longer fosters a temperament 
disposed to retribution, a fact to which Christian ethics bears witness, since this ethics blankly forbids evil to be 
repaid with evil and leaves eternal justice to the realm of the thing in itself, which is different from the realm of 
appearance. (‘Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord, I will repay,’ Romans 12:19.)” (WR, 385). How can we ‘foster’ 
a temperament if it is grounded on something outside of space and time (outside the conditions for ‘fostering’), 
i.e., on the intelligible character? I cannot venture into this question here due to its marginal relevance.  
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“There are no mental causes whatsoever! All the would-be empirical evidence for this 
goes to hell! That’s what follows! — And we really botched this ‘empiricism’ — we 
used it to create the world as a world of causes, wills, and minds. The oldest and most 
enduring psychology was at work here, doing absolutely nothing but this: it 
considered all events to be deeds, all deeds to be the result of a will, the world became 
a multitude of doers, a doer (‘subject’) pushed its way under all events. People 
projected their three ‘inner facts’ out of themselves and onto the world — the facts 
they believed in most fervently, the will, the mind, and the I. They took the concept 
of being from the concept of the I, they posited ‘things’ as beings in their own image, 
on the basis of their concept of I as cause. Is it any wonder that what they rediscovered 
in things later is only what they had put into them in the first place?” (TI, ‘Errors’, 3) 
He agrees with Schopenhauer’s proposition that our body mirrors the will; also, that some 
bodily vicissitudes are ‘generic’ and others are ‘individual’. However, unlike Schopenhauer, 
he claims that the body should be the starting point for our understanding of the generic and 
the individual aspects of us, rather than the unified self-conscious ‘I’ or the ‘I will’ of our 
first-person experience of willing and acting:  
“In every era people have believed better in the body as our most certain being, in 
short as our ego, than in the mind (or the ‘soul’ - or the subject, as the language of 
schoolmen now prefers to term it). It has never occurred to anyone to think of his 
stomach as an alien stomach, perhaps a divine one; but as for regarding his thoughts 
as ‘inspired’, his valuations as ‘prompted by a God’, his instincts as mysterious 
activity: for this tendency and taste of man there are testimonies from all the ages of 
mankind… for the time being, belief in the body is still a stronger belief than belief 
in the mind; and anyone who wants to undermine it will most thoroughly be 
undermining – belief in the authority of the mind as well! ” (WLN 36[36]) 
 
“But the awakened, the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and 
nothing besides; and soul is just a word for something on the body. The body is a 
great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, one herd and one 
shepherd. Your small reason, what you call “spirit” is also a tool of your body, my 
brother, a small work - and plaything of your great reason. “I” you say and are proud 
of this word. But what is greater is that in which you do not want to believe – your 
body and its great reason. It does not say I, but does I.” (Z, ‘Despisers’, 23)    
Nietzsche accepts the will-body identity and individual-action identity, but he rejects the 
conception that entails the separation of the ‘will’ (or the ‘self’) from the body and so the 
break with ontological monism and immanence. The ‘will’ and our ‘individuality’ are 
modifications of the body like any other; it must be so if the will has any ‘authority’, as he 
rhetorically puts it in the above passage, or ‘causal efficacy’, as we may clarify. In short, 
just as there is no ‘will’ independent from its representation in the body and its vicissitudes, 
there is no ‘I’ or ‘I will’ or ‘self’ or ‘individual’ independent from the action that corresponds 
to it. At no moment does something independent, which we call ‘mind’, ‘conscious thought’, 
 276 
‘intellect’, or the ‘I’, enter the picture. The latter concepts are—or in principle should be—
construed in terms of (and explained by) the will-body identity, not by the interjection of an 
incorporeal or ineffable thing we call ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ supervening on the ‘body’. The body 
is not a mechanical husk filled by something ethereal like the soul.  
Even if we accept that Nietzsche rejects the independent causal efficacy of the ‘will’, 
the ‘I’ or the ‘mind’, then, as Gardner and Janaway rightly remark, he has to account for the 
fact that we do have ‘I’-thoughts and make ‘I’-claims. Likewise, he has to explain the fact 
that some thoughts and claims correspond to an action of the body. Furthermore, we use the 
‘I’ to refer to ourselves in juxtaposition to something else (including other people) and so 
he must explain why we conceive ourselves as the unified self-conscious subjects of ‘I’-
thoughts. To what do the concepts of the ‘will’, the ‘I’ or the ‘mind’ refer? Do they play any 
role in his philosophy or do we dismiss them as misleading and superfluous? I will argue 
that they play a key role, but he revises their conception in accordance with his commitment 
to ontological monism and immanence, which he derives from the will-body identity.   
Nietzsche is neither sceptical about individuality nor did he reject it. He is revisionist 
about how to distinguish the individual from the generic after committing to and so in light 
of the will-body identity. He construes the ‘individual’ not as one part of the body, which we 
associate with an incorporeal mind (Geist) supervening on the body and its multifarious 
processes, but in terms of the whole body or as an activity of the whole body. Agential actions 
are a modification of the whole body or activity of the whole body, not a part of it. Therefore, 
agential actions represent relations between the various parts of the whole body, not one part 
of the body independent from the others that acts or legislates to the whole body, e.g., the 
brain independently acting or legislating to the rest of the body.165  
Some readings of Nietzschean agency commit to construing humans as generic (or 
as drone-like) members of their species, which entails that human beings are ‘irresponsible’ 
and ‘unfree’. Other readings construe the Nietzschean agent as an individual, independent 
or distinct from her species. These readings consistently fall short of recognising the subtle 
ways Nietzsche tries to marry these two conceptions. He conceives human beings as both 
‘members of a species’ and ‘individuals in their own right’, but for different reasons and in 
different ways than his predecessor. His account of agency precedes the thinking, evaluating 
and reasoning of the self-conscious ‘I’. He aims to assess what ‘conscious agency’ is or it 
 
                                               
165 Consider the following claim: “[b]elow every thought lies an affect. Every thought, every feeling, every will is 
not born of one particular drive but is a total state, a whole surface of the whole consciousness, and results from 
how the power of all the drives that constitute us is fixed at that moment - thus, the power of the drive that 
dominates just now as well as of the drives obeying or resisting it. The next thought is a sign of how the total 
power situation has now shifted again.” (WLN 1 [61]). Admittedly the figurative concepts such as ‘above’, ‘below’ 
and ‘surface’ are misleading by implying that ‘consciousness’ or becoming conscious of something is the same as 
having awareness of something, for Nietzsche. This is misleading because he often construes our becoming 
conscious with being able to communicate or signify our states, aims and actions to other people through concepts 
and words (cf. GS 354); see also Katsafanas (2011). What we should consider is the claim that our thoughts, 
feelings and will is never really one particular drive, but a combination of all of our drives (more on this an ensuing 
chapter).  
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amounts to and, more importantly, from where it emerges (cf. GS 354; BGE 16; D 123 & 
301). The astonishing proposition that stems from Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s 
account is that ‘individuality’ is not inherent to self-conscious thought or the self-conscious 
‘I’. He pulls apart concepts like ‘agency’, ‘reason’, ‘consciousness’ (or self-consciousness). 
Likewise, as we will see more clearly below, his historical method or genealogical analysis 
of philosophical problems and concepts is the bedrock of this account.166 
To assess the passages where Nietzsche distinguishes the individual from the generic 
parts of us, I will employ a distinction he adopts from Schopenhauer, which he revises. 
Recall that Schopenhauer distinguishes between ‘some thought about what we will’ and ‘its 
corresponding action’. The former shows what human beings in general are capable of 
doing, whereas the latter shows what the individual does or is capable of doing (cf. OBM, 
168). Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer that actions reveal who we are, but clarifies that 
our actions do not necessarily arise from what we as individuals think, desire, will and so 
on. Our actions can reveal that we did not act according to our ‘individuality’. Consequently, 
there is a distinction between our ‘identifying’ with our actions and the ‘individuality’ of an 
action. In one sense, then, we are the ones who act or acted in some moment and manner, 
i.e., we are individuals in the sense that we identify with an action: 
“No man has ever done anything that was done wholly for others and with no personal 
motivation whatever; how, indeed, should a man be able to do something that had no 
reference to himself, that is to say lacked all inner compulsion (which would have its 
basis in a personal need)? How could the ego act without the ego?” (HHI 133) 
Everything we do stems from who we are or from what drives us. However, what is driving 
our actions, deliberations and reasons in some moment does not necessarily accord with who 
we are as individuals. In short, an action always stems from us, but it does not necessarily 
represent what is individual about us. It is possible that we inherit an action from elsewhere, 
which we now confuse for what is ‘individual’ about us, according to Nietzsche: 
“All actions may be traced back to evaluations, all evaluations are either original or 
adopted — the latter being by far the most common. Why do we adopt them? From 
fear— that is to say, we consider it more advisable to pretend they are our own — 
and accustom ourself to this pretence, so that at length it becomes our own nature. 
Original evaluation: that is to say, to assess a thing according to the extent to which 
it pleases or displeases us alone and no one else — something excessively rare! — 
But must our evaluation of another, in which there lies the motive for our generally 
availing ourselves of his evaluation, at least not proceed from us, be our own 
 
                                               
166 I submit at the outset that the thoughts herein have caused me great grief. I am unsatisfied with their presentation 
and analytic depth. Unfortunately, because of my constraints, I have to be satisfied with the ensuing discussion, 
presentation and analysis. I hope that, at least, the passages I refer to, the readings I suggest and the arguments I 
make can inspire a more thorough analysis and debate on these topics and approach. What I want to direct our 
attention to as the most important part of my discussion and reading is that Nietzsche attempts a revisionist account 
of the concepts under consideration. 
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determination? Yes, but we arrive at it as children, and rarely learn to change our 
view; most of us are our whole lives long the fools of the way we acquired in 
childhood of judging our neighbours (their minds, rank, morality, whether they are 
exemplary or reprehensible) and of finding it necessary to pay homage to their 
evaluations.” (D 104) 
Our actions indeed reveal who and what we are, as Schopenhauer rightly suggests, but what 
they can also reveal is not what we ourselves as individuals will, reason, think and so on. It 
can also represent our ‘obedience’ to something distinct or independent from us with which 
we confuse ourselves: 
“Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority 
nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for 
the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them 
and has been communicated to them; — as a consequence they all of them dwell in a 
fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical 
evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone 
else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms…” (D 105) 
The same is the case with respect to our feelings. Our feelings do not necessarily demonstrate 
our individuality: 
“To trust one’s feelings—means to give more obedience to one’s grandfather and 
grandmother and their grandparents than to the gods which are in us: our reason and 
our experience.” (D 35)167  
We are individuals, he contends, because of our reason and our experience. We are not so 
because of what we feel in relation to something (in the broad sense), or because of our 
actions alone. The previous can correspond to evaluations that are not our own, but inherited 
or acquired. In short, for Nietzsche, we have inherited feelings and actions. I will call the 
previous the generic aspects of us. We have ‘generic’ drives (ones in common with other 
human beings and-or animals), but also individual (unique) drives. Accordingly, he seems 
to construe individuality as uniqueness.  
Our actions are something we do, but they can also be something we inherit (cf. D 
199). The latter can be something we learn from other people when growing up or we inherit 
it from our ancestors based on how they reasoned and what they did in relation to their 
circumstances. Likewise, the latter actions are partly based on what our ancestors’ ancestors 
reasoned and did etc. down a genealogical chain:168 
“For when the habit of some distinguishing action is inherited, the thought that lies 
behind it is not inherited with it (thoughts are not hereditary, only feelings): and 
 
                                               
167 See also (HHI 612) and “in both cases we are drawing a conclusion: the instincts are filled to the brink with 
accumulated premises” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 20).  
168 For more on how our feeling relate to our ancestors see also Janaway (2003, 268-270).  
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provided it is not again reproduced by education, even the second generation fails to 
experience any pleasure in cruelty in connection with it, but only pleasure in the habit 
as such. This pleasure, however, is the first stage of the ‘good’.” (D 30)  
Nietzsche’s conception of individuality is not reducible to the distinction between thoughts 
and actions, as Schopenhauer argued, or between our feelings and actions. He goes further 
than Schopenhauer by distinguishing individual feelings and actions that are in accordance 
with our reason and experience from feelings and actions we inherit, i.e., from our ancestors, 
our social interactions and by our obedience to authority (or  custom) and so on.  
 Nietzsche’s conception of individuality is thus opposed to Schopenhauer’s in several 
ways. He rejects the claim that our thoughts about doing something are modifications of 
humanity (i.e. the human Idea) whereas our actions are modifications of our individuality 
(i.e., the individual’s Idea). He agrees that our actions reveal our individuality, but modifies 
it by claiming that they can also reveal that we lack individuality or that we are not unique. 
We can lack individuality, but we always identify with our actions. Accordingly, we should 
not confuse identification with individuality. Feelings are not ‘general’ in Schopenhauer’s 
sense; we do not feel what human beings in general are capable of doing. Instead, the limits 
of the generality of our feelings is what our ancestors did or had to do. Our feelings indicate 
how they responded to their circumstances and thus how they flourished, which we inherit.169 
Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘generality’ of our feelings is thus narrower and more limited 
in scope than the metaphysical or essentialist generality Schopenhauer defends, i.e., that our 
feelings represents humanity’s Idea or its ideal representation. Nietzsche has a revisionist 
conception of generality.  
Nietzschean individuality is also narrower and limited. He construes it as originality 
or uniqueness, which is juxtaposed to what is generic. There is a passage where he seems to 
flirt with the ‘Idea of humanity’ and its expression in us, however, which we should briefly 
address: 
“Of course, ‘individuals’, as peoples and philosophers have understood them so far, 
are a mistake: individuals are nothing in themselves, they are not atoms, they are not 
‘links in the chain’, they are not just legacies of a bygone era—each individual is the 
entire single line of humanity up through himself.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 33) 
The above is unsurprising given his commitment to how our ancestors feature in what we 
do and so in what drives us. He rejects Schopenhauer’s juxtaposition between the Idea of 
humanity and our individual Idea, but not the claim that our ancestors feature in our thoughts, 
feelings and actions.170 In addition, scrutinising their differing viewpoints on the conception 
 
                                               
169 For more on how Nietzsche applies his narrower conception of generality see the following passages: D 30, 33, 
35, 102, 110, 247; GS 349, 358, 377; WS 41, 181, 212; BGE 200, 264; WLN 34[67], 35[20], 1[21].  
170 Cf. “Thus, every human being is a particularly determined and characteristic appearance of the will, and can 
even be viewed as his or her own individual Idea” (WR, 156-7). 
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of generality shows that the ‘single line’ Nietzsche refers to is not exempt from change; it 
is not a fixed or a predetermined line. Irrespective of his flirtation with the Idea of humanity, 
Nietzsche’s conception of it is as though it is ‘in time’. Accordingly, this ‘line’ is as subject 
to change(s) as anything else that is in time. Humanity itself is ‘becoming something’ and 
it can succeed or fail in what it is becoming or even change the direction of its becoming.171 
Nietzsche bemoans the so-called “philosopher’s rage for generalisation” (HHII 5), 
which he identifies in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. What is ‘generic’ about our feelings is 
limited to our ancestors; they represent what we inherit. He naturalises Schopenhauer’s 
distinction between ‘feelings (or thoughts)’ and ‘actions’. Feelings are the inherited actions 
of those who brought us into life. They do not result from metaphysical substrata appearing 
as this or that thing or event in the physical world. They do not result from the unfolding of 
a unified and fixed will and its equally unified and fixed ideal. Furthermore, we inherit our 
ancestors’ feelings and their corresponding action-tendencies (i.e., we inherit affects), not 
what our ancestors reasoned and experienced. These feelings represent their responses to 
their circumstances, which do not correspond to our own and which might not necessarily 
make much sense to us now given our circumstances. Thus, we feel what was individual 
about our ancestors; they represent our ancestor’s individuality.172 We do not have direct 
access to their individuality, because we are not and cannot possibly be in the same 
circumstances as they were in when they acted and reasoned in some manner. The previous 
encapsulates Nietzsche’s narrow and naturalised revision of ‘generality’. Our ‘reasons’ for 
feeling X rather than Y extend to our ancestors’s individual experiences and no further. 
However, he recognises that the previous is not the generality often sought by philosophers, 
even if, for him, it is what philosophers can arrive at without committing to a dualism that 
bloats their ontology and introduces a third-person phantom. 
In sum, Nietzsche’s revisionist conception of what is generic about us undercuts the 
‘philosopher’s rage for generalisation’: our ancestors ‘contribute’ to our individuality, but 
we should distinguish their contribution from what is genuinely individual about us. The 
latter is what he calls our own reason and experience, which is admittedly vague.  
Nietzsche does not stop at offering his own conception of generality, however, but 
aims to find the root or source of the philosopher’s ‘generality’. He argues that philosophers 
are ‘seduced’ by language and grammar. We find his core argument against the ‘objectivity’ 
or ‘disinterestedness’ of philosophical reason and thought as understood by philosophers in 
the following passage: 
“I have gradually come to realise what every great philosophy so far has been: a 
confession of faith on the part of its author, and a type of involuntary and unself-
conscious memoir; in short, that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every 
 
                                               
171 Cf. TI, ‘Errors’, 8; see also GS 109.  
172 Passages such as the following are very revelatory: “the unresolved dissonances between the characters and 
dispositions of the parents continue to resound in the nature of the child and constitute the history of his inner 
sufferings” (HHI 379).  
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philosophy constitute the true living seed from which the whole plant has always 
grown. Actually, to explain how the strangest metaphysical claims of a philosopher 
really come about, it is always good (and wise) to begin by asking: what morality is 
it (is he –) getting at? Consequently, I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is 
the father of philosophy, but rather that another drive, here as elsewhere, used 
knowledge (and mis-knowledge!) merely as a tool. But anyone who looks at people’s 
basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as 
inspiring geniuses (or daemons or sprites –), will find that they all practiced 
philosophy at some point, – and that every single one of them would be only too 
pleased to present itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of 
all the other drives. Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try 
philosophising.” (BGE 6) 
He offers a genealogical account of the ‘metaphysical generality’ sought by philosophers, 
who claim that their generality is metaphysical in scope. What they offer at best, according 
to Nietzsche, is an extension of something individual. Their ‘metaphysical generality’ 
represents the “physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life” 
(BGE 3; also, BGE 13; GM III, 7 & GM I, 13). Another revealing passage with respect to the 
philosopher’s generality and its limits is the following: 
“And perhaps the time is very near when we will realise again and again just what 
actually served as the cornerstone of those sublime and unconditional philosophical 
edifices that the dogmatists used to build – some piece of folk superstition from time 
immemorial (like the soul-superstition that still causes trouble as the superstition of 
the subject or I), some word-play perhaps, a seduction of grammar or an over-eager 
generalisation from facts that are really very local, very personal, very human-all-too-
human.” (BGE Pref.) 
According to him, these philosophers project their own reasons or experiences—including 
inherited reasons and experiences—on metaphysical substrata such as the thing in itself or 
‘reality’. Philosophers do not possess a special faculty for ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’; in fact, 
nobody possesses such a faculty, according to him: 
“We simply have no organ for knowing, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or believe or imagine) 
exactly as much as is useful to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here 
called ‘usefulness’ is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that 
supremely fatal stupidity of which we some day will perish.” (GS 354)  
The above ‘usefulness’ does not live up to the universality, objectivity and disinterestedness 
that some philosophers boast of and seek to support their propositions, however. They seek 
metaphysical grounds for moral claims. They seek what underpins morality or what makes 
possible moral actions, i.e., agency and responsibility. The same is the case with moralists 
who ground their moral claims on ‘God’ or ‘nature’. What they offer is something narrow 
and individual. The concept of usefulness is also limited in scope and exclusive to actions 
proved useful ‘historically’ and useful to ‘some’. Accordingly, we cannot settle the concept 
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of ‘usefulness’ as some philosophers argue it can or should be settled, i.e., by grounding it 
metaphysically. He suggests the following as reasons:  
“Even the most harmful person may actually be the most useful when it comes to the 
preservation of the species; for he nurtures in himself or through his effects on others 
drives without which humanity would long since have become feeble or rotten. 
Hatred, delight in the misfortunes of others, the lust to rob and rule, and whatever else 
is called evil: all belong to the amasing economy of the preservation of the species, 
an economy which is certainly costly, wasteful, and on the whole most foolish—but 
still proven to have preserved our race so far. I no longer know whether you, my dear 
fellow man and neighbour, are even capable of living in a way which is damaging to 
the species, i.e. ‘unreasonably’ and ‘badly’… Pursue your best or your worst desires, 
and above all, perish! In both cases you are probably still in some way a promoter 
and benefactor of humanity and are thus entitled to your eulogists — as well as to 
your mockers.” (GS 1) 
In short, according to Nietzsche, the general claims of some philosophers and moralists do 
not extend metaphysically. They are projections of narrower, individual experiences. Even 
those conceptions of agency, responsibility etc. underpinning their claims are projections 
(cf. BGE 21) within a historical context and from a certain viewpoint. We find him making 
similar claims when rejecting Spinoza’s propositions on motivation and self-preservation:  
“It is symptomatic that certain philosophers, such as the consumptive Spinoza, took 
and indeed had to take just the so-called self-preservation instinct to be decisive: — 
they were simply people in distress.” (GS 349)  
He does not limit this claim to philosophers, however, but extends it to natural scientists of 
his day:   
“That today's natural sciences have become so entangled with the Spinozistic dogma 
(most recently and crudely in Darwinism with its incredibly one-sided doctrine of 'the 
struggle for existence' —) is probably due to the descent of most natural scientists: in 
this regard they belong to 'the people', their ancestors were poor and lowly folks who 
knew all too intimately the difficulty of scraping by. English Darwinism exudes 
something like the stuffy air of English overpopulation, like the small people's smell 
of indigence and overcrowding.” (GS 349)  
There is room for debate over Nietzsche rejecting generalisations of the above sort while at 
the same time offering his own: 
“As a natural scientist, however, one should get out of one's human corner; and in 
nature, it is not distress which rules, but rather abundance, squandering — even to the 
point of absurdity. The struggle for survival is only an exception, a temporary 
restriction of the will to life; the great and small struggle revolves everywhere around 
preponderance, around growth and expansion, around power and in accordance with 
the will to power, which is simply the will to life.” (GS 349)  
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We ought to critically assess his rejection of the philosopher’s rage for generalisation. We 
can argue that the previous is what he himself advances with his proposition that the ‘will 
to life’ is the ‘will to power’, that is, he replaces Schopenhauer’s proposition with his own. 
What permits him to claim that we can legitimately subsume all actions under the aim of 
‘power’? What does it mean to claim that power is the final aim of our actions? Moreover, 
there are passages where he admits that he makes his own projection and generalisation, and 
even apologises for it: 
“When I think of the desire to do something, how it continually tickles and goads the 
millions of young Europeans who cannot endure boredom and themselves, I realise 
that they must have a yearning to suffer something in order to make their suffering a 
likely reason for action, for deeds… Were these distress-addicts to feel within 
themselves the power to do themselves good from within, to do something for 
themselves, they would know how to create their very own distress. Their inventions 
could then become more refined and their satisfactions sound like good music, while 
they now fill the world with their clamour about distress, and consequently, all too 
often with the feeling of distress! They do not know what to do with themselves — 
and so they paint the unhappiness of others on the wall; they always need others! And 
continually other others! — Pardon me, my friends, I have ventured to paint my 
happiness on the wall.” (GS 56)173 
Likewise, we should bear in mind that he does not reject the possibility of disinterestedness 
or objectivity in some ‘scholars’ or ‘scientists’ who approach their discipline as their ‘job’, 
‘duty’ or ‘profession’ (more on this below). What he seems to reject is the proposition that 
‘philosophers’ can be ‘disinterested’ in the way they aim or claim to be: 
“Of course: with scholars, the truly scientific people, things might be different – 
“better” if you will –, with them, there might really be something like a drive for 
knowledge, some independent little clockwork mechanism that, once well wound, 
ticks bravely away without essentially involving the rest of the scholar’s drives. For 
this reason, the scholar’s real “interests” usually lie somewhere else entirely, with the 
family, or earning money, or in politics; in fact, it is almost a matter of indifference 
whether his little engine is put to work in this or that field of research, and whether 
the “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist or fungus expert 
or chemist: – it doesn’t signify anything about him that he becomes one thing or the 
other. In contrast, there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philosopher; and 
in particular his morals bear decided and decisive witness to who he is – which means, 
in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand with respect to each 
other.” (BGE 6) 
 
                                               
173 See also: “[g]ranted, this is only an interpretation too – and you will be eager enough to make this objection? – 
well then, so much the better” (BGE 22). 
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The answers to the above questions and the in-depth assessment required to offer a coherent 
picture addressing the themes therein are beyond the scope of the thesis. I point them out to 
the reader for the interest of future analysis and I suggest them as a basis for debate on the 
merits of the propositions and arguments. 
In sum, Nietzsche rejects conceptions of ‘generality’ that extend metaphysically, but 
also offers his own conception of generality. His core proposition is that we can only speak 
of our reasons for acting; the ‘our’ includes those reasons we inherit from ancestors, parents 
and authorities. We can project the previous on a metaphysical substratum or morality, but 
we illegitimately project narrow experiences and reasons onto something broader in scope, 
which thereby infringes on other, different, albeit equally narrower reasons and experiences. 
We project our experiences and reasons on other people. He does not stop there, however, 
but asseses what might permit philosophers or moralists to make such projections. What 
facilitates these extended metaphysical or universal claims and therefore makes possible this 
infringement on other people? Where does the ‘rage for generalisation’ come from and what 
supports it? I suggest the following propositions as answers, which are implicit to his drive 
psychology: 
A) We are driven to generalise as philosophers do because of the will to power, which 
he construes variously as ‘mastery over something’ (GM II, 12) or as ‘becoming 
master of something’ (WLN 2[148]).174  
B) Morality and philosophy are enabled exclusively by language, which express what 
he variously calls ‘custom’ (D 9), ‘herd-instinct’ (GS 149), the ‘need for meaning, 
purpose and will’ (GM III, 28) and so on (more on this below). 
The ‘will to power’ and the manner in which we give vent to it, namely, using ‘language’, 
are central elements of Nietzsche’s assessment of moral and philosophical propositions. 
According to his drive psychology, ‘will to power’ is inherent to every drive and so, by 
extension, individual. Its discharge through moral or (philosophical) authority is something 
we inherit from our ancestors and education, i.e., from customs. Consequently, philosophers 
and moralists infringe on other individuals based on their will to power or overpowering 
whose particular expression they inherit. They exercise this urge through philosophical or 
moral authority, which the use of language and the effects of custom underpin. 
Our ancestors acquired the need for (moral or philosophical) authority by living in 
communities under the pressures of command-obedience relationships, which typified 
 
                                               
174 Other descriptions of the will to power he uses are: as ‘preponderance, growth and expansion’ (GS 349); as a 
‘tyrannical drive’ (BGE 9); to ‘play master’ (BGE 198); to ‘grow, spread, grab, win dominance’ (BGE 259); as ‘an 
instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force’ (A 6); as an ‘unexhausted begetting’, ‘will to be 
master’ or as ‘overcoming’ (Z, ‘Self-Overcoming’), as an ‘insatiable craving to manifest power; or to employ, 
exercise power, as a creative drive etc. (WLN 36[31]); as ‘self-heightening and strengthening’ (WLN 5[63]); to 
‘imprint upon’ (WLN 7 [54]); to ‘violate and to defend oneself against being violated’ (WLN 14[79]). Reginster’s 
illuminating reading of the ‘will to power’ as a self-standing desire for ‘effective agency’ offers us an interesting 
first-person account of what Nietzsche is aiming to capture (cf. Reginster 2013).  
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communal life at those early stages (cf. D 9). People living in a community perpetuate this 
need by their use of language and their cooperation with other members of their community, 
which constitutes custom. We all possess the need for authority, which interacts with other 
needs and, in some cases, discharges as propositions regarding the ‘good’, the ‘true’, and 
the ‘beautiful’ (or ‘sublime’); each one infringes on another person’s life and activities. In 
other words, it discharges in actions and projects relevant for (and valuable or threatening 
to) the community. The bases of these actions and projects are an agent’s individual reasons 
and experiences. The ‘values’ typifying a morality (a core aspect of communal life) aim to 
shape the effort of members of a community (more on this below), but individual members 
determined the values we associate with a morality, i.e., the ‘do’ and ‘do not’ or the ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ (or ‘evil’), which characterises a morality. The same occurs with respect to what 
is ‘true’ (Philosophy and Science), ‘real’ (Metaphysics) etc., each typifies different aspects 
of our communal life.  
In short, according to Nietzsche, common endeavours infringing on other individuals 
are always set up and maintained by those for whom these endeavours are the condition for 
existence and under which they flourish:  
“Every animal, including the bête philosophe, instinctively strives for an optimum of 
favourable conditions in which to fully release his power and achieve his maximum 
of power-sensation; every animal abhors equally instinctively, with an acute sense of 
smell that is 'higher than all reason', any kind of disturbance and hindrance that blocks 
or could block his path to the optimum (- it is not his path to 'happiness' I am talking 
about, but the path to power, action, the mightiest deeds, and in most cases, actually, 
his path to misery.” (GM, III 7) 
Philosophers and moralists will something, perceive a world permitting willing and aim to 
make this world accessible to their will. The philosopher’s rage for generalisation, namely, 
her search for ‘objectivity’ and the ‘disinterested’ judgments emerging from the former, are 
her means of realising her conditions for existence and flourishing. What distinguishes the 
philosopher (or moralist) from other individuals is not that she projects her conditions for 
existence on something she believes will supervene on other individual’s efforts, but what 
she projects, in what manner and how successful she is in doing so. Therefore, a philosopher 
is essentially akin to others in that she wills something, but she differs in what she wills and 
how. Philosophers, then, pursue: 
“…an optimum condition of the highest and boldest intellectuality [Geistigkeit], - he 
does not deny ‘existence’ by doing so, but rather affirms his existence and only his 
existence, and possibly does this to the point where he is not far from making the 
outrageous wish: pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam! [Let the world 
perish, but let philosophy exist, let the philosopher exist, let me exist].” (GM III, 7) 
What distinguishes one individual’s values from another’s is their respective reasons and 
experiences, not always their projecting on something broader in scope than themselves.  
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Nietzsche’s concern over our common endeavours do not aim at the fact that we 
project individual experiences and reasons onto concepts that extend beyond individuality; 
he construes the previous as another way the ‘will to power’ expresses or discharges, albeit 
in individuals living in communities.175 His concerns lie elsewhere, as we will see below.  
The above analysis of ‘individuality’ and ‘generality’ demonstrates that Nietzsche 
envisages a tri-partite distinction with respect what is individual and generic about us and 
our actions, which is something like the following: 
A) Our actions, which represent ourselves, but not necessarily our individuality. 
B) Our ‘feelings’, which represent our inherited judgments, evaluations and drives.  
C) Our ‘herd instincts’, which represent the values of our community or our common 
endeavours and is one kind of inherited drive; he also calls it the ‘herd perspective’ 
(cf. GS 354).  
Our ‘feelings’ and ‘actions’ are the individual parts of our reason and experience; they can 
represent what is individual about us, but also what we inherit and internalise by living in 
communities. Our actions represent what we do and who we are, i.e., we identify with them, 
but they do not necessarily represent what makes us individual. Our community’s values are 
the most generic aspects of our reason and experience and are set up to oppose individuality. 
These values apply to all members of a community irrespective of the feelings or actions of 
any individual member. They are general in the previous sense, for him, which is appealing 
to philosophers and moralists as their sources of power. In sum, the various aspects of us 
interact to give the picture of an agent who has ‘individual’, ‘inherited’ and ‘common’ parts 
(or drives).  
There is more to Nietzsche’s conception of the relationship between the individual 
and the generic than I can assess here. I will analyse his ambiguous use of ‘individuality’, 
because it relates to his conception of sovereign individuality and the ‘lack of fit’, however. 
Sometimes, individuality refers to the ‘originality’ of our drives and at other times to our 
‘identity’ with our drives. I recognise three options premised on this distinction between 
‘originality’ and ‘identification’ against the backdrop of his tripartite distinction: 
1) A person’s ‘individuality’ tracks those drives that represent his originality, 
excluding all other ‘inherited’ drives. 
2) A person’s ‘individuality’ tracks those drives that represent his originality and those 
drives he inherits from his ancestor’s, but excludes the ‘herd instincts’. 
3) A person’s ‘individuality’ tracks all drives.   
Nietzsche uses all three at different times, which will become apparent below. Yet, he uses 
1 and 2 more often than 3. Leaving aside this ambiguity, I will focus on how he believes the 
 
                                               
175 As we will see in a following chapter, he voices the dangerous consequences (or effects) to individuality of one 
such projection. He comprehends this ‘danger’ in terms of an individual’s ‘health’ and, by extension, the health of 
a community. He objects to the ‘ascetic ideal’, but, as we will see, he seems to object to any ideal that fancies itself 
as the only or the highest ideal.  
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so-called ‘herd perspective’ partakes in our actions with the aim of showing why ‘morality’ 
is an integral part of our lives and that we have a need for it.  
In sum, Nietzsche aims for an alternative conception of individuality, which is not 
reducible to self-interest. He complements the previous with an alternative conception of 
generality. He rejects the claim that morality is generic in the sense of applying to something 
broader than the conditions for existence and flourishing of some type, of which there are 
many. Whatever values or reasons we pluck out of our experience (and lack of experience) 
and whatever we project onto something broader or more ‘common’ will not meet the strong 
demands of ‘objectivity’, ‘disinterestedness’ etc. (cf. GM III, 12) that is the preoccupation 
of many philosopher’s and moralists. Consequently, in every morality we find the narrow 
reasons and experiences of ‘individuals’ whom projected onto others, onto the world and 
even onto reality. He encourages his readers to take a closer look at themselves when 
assessing their moral values; to look under their “moral disguise” (GS 352). As Janaway 
rightly claims: “Nietzsche affects the reader as he pursues his philosophical aims” (Janaway 
2007, 3). We can go further and claim that his revaluation of values aims to affect us using 
our moral values and prejudices; he creates a tension between the values of our community 
and individuality, or ‘self’ (more on this below). He does so, I will argue, to reveal the self-
interest inherent to our adhering to the moral values of our community, which are contrary 
to our expectations and are certainly so if those values are ‘selflessness’, ‘disinterestedness’, 
‘compassion’, ‘objectivity’ and so on in the philosopher’s or moralist’s sense. We adhere to 
those values motivated by self-interest, but likewise at the expense of our ‘individuality’. He 
dissects our reasons and shows the incompatibility between what we think about ourselves, 
what we do and what drives us. He challenges our faith in moral values, which prevents us 
from questioning them because of the fear we experience at every attempt; our faith 
ruthlessly pits us against our individuality and thus perpetuates a discord within us. Some 
philosophers have been prolonging and promoting this discord due to a false, unscientific 
and ahistorical analysis of moral sentiments, values and actions: 
“…the errors of the greatest philosophers usually have their point of departure in a 
false explanation of certain human actions and sensations; how on the basis of an 
erroneous analysis, for example that of the so-called unegoistic actions, a false ethics 
is erected, religion and mythological monsters are then in turn called upon to buttress 
it, and the shadow of these dismal spirits in the end falls across even physics and the 
entire perception of the world…‘Moral man’, he says, ‘stands no closer to the 
intelligible (metaphysical) world than does physical man’. This proposition, hardened 
and sharpened beneath the hammer-blow of historical knowledge, may perhaps at 
some future time serve as the axe which is laid at the root of the ‘metaphysical need’ 
of man - whether as more of a blessing than a curse to the general wellbeing, who can 
say? - but in any event as a proposition with the weightiest consequences; at once 
fruitful and fearful and looking out upon the world with that Janus-face possessed by 
all great perceptions.” (HHI 37) 
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He challenge us to live in accordance with our individual values and expectations in this 
life, i.e., to reconcile our inherited with our individual parts. He encourages his readers not 
to sacrifice our individuality for some supposed freedom in another life, world or time that 
transcends this life. Even the distinction between the individual and generic aspects itself 
represents his strategy of aiming to affect us using our moral precepts.  
There is a tension and struggle between the generic and individual aspects of us, in 
Nietzsche’s view. This tension is inescapable because of our participation in communal life. 
Moreover, it can be ruinous for some of us and productive for others. It can spawn new 
moral values that are in accordance with a new image of the moral exemplar of a community 
(more on this below). The sovereign individual represents someone who transcends without 
negating her self-interest; she transcends the shackles to her individuality, which are her 
community’s customs or values. She pursues values over which she claims responsibility 
not only for herself at the expense or in opposition to her community, or in opposition to her 
own ‘herd instincts’, but also for her community and thus inclusive of others and her herd 
instincts (more on this below). 
Nietzsche recognises that our conception of individuality should distinguish us from 
others and from a general conception of human beings as bodies with mechanical functions, 
organs, electro-chemical processes and interactions, which was becoming the dominant 
paradigm of his time. The distinction between ‘actions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘moral values’ 
underpins his conception of individuality and generality. For Schopenhauer, the intellect 
makes possible our freedom through its abstract function and deliberation; it permits us to 
suppress our self-interest, perform noble and moral acts of compassion and so negate the 
will to life. Deliberation does not engender action on its own, however; it is necessary, but 
insufficient for determining what makes us individuals.176 The distinctly human, namely, the 
free and responsible agency we enjoy is a correspondence between deliberation and action, 
for Schopenhauer.177 Nietzsche accepts the emphasis on the identity between our self and 
actions, but he rejects the role of deliberation in determining the individuality of our action. 
If deliberation requires a decisive stamp by the will and thus the body, then why did 
Schopenhauer place a strong emphasis on deliberation as that which explains individuality? 
If deliberation is not enough to engender the action, then why did he employ it to distinguish 
what is generic from what is individual about us? Schopenhauer falls in the trap of 
construing the body and its urges as foreign to ‘individuals’ or as obstacles that we have to 
overcome in reaching for our ‘highest freedom’. Furthermore, if the whole body’s 
interjection through an affect is what makes our ‘wishes, thoughts’ etc. decisive such that 
they engender an action, then why does he give the intellect a central role in individuality? 
If the decisive factor for our individual intentions, wishes, thoughts etc. is the action, then 
 
                                               
176 This picture is more complicated than I have illustrated here because an act of will was paradoxically at the 
basis of ascetic resignation, for Schopenhauer, but he did not construe this as a deliberate act of will.  
177 Here we should note that what he construed as the highest form of freedom, i.e. freedom from the will to life, 
or from the gnawing urge to do something, is a consequence of the relation between the intellect and will, but it is 
not caused by the intellect, or better put, the intellect does not independently engender it (cf. WR, 432).  
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what do we gain by knowing what we intend to do before we do it? ‘Knowing’ our intentions 
in advance seems an unnecessary extension of the action, for Nietzsche. The body could 
operate just as well without our intellect having to represent the different possible avenues 
for action (i.e., the various motives) prior to the action. This objection accords with 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will, because the will is ‘fixed’ and ‘inalterable’. In short, 
our actions stem from relations between mainsprings and ‘preconscious’ processes, because 
our motives correlate to one mainspring or another as a precondition of action. The picture 
of individuality and genuine agency Schopenhauer defends suggests that deliberation has 
its own ‘oomph’ independent from the body, which contradicts his correlation theory of 
cognition. These propositions represent an ambiguous and at times very perplexing trend in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy; the apparently independent efficacy of deliberation lands him 
into conceptual trouble.  
Nietzsche has an alternative and revisionist approach to individuality, self-conscious 
agency, responsibility and freedom using the above tripartite distinction. He offers another 
conception of deliberation and its role in agential actions by reversing Schopenhauer’s 
proposition that deliberation makes our actions ‘individual’. The intellect makes our actions 
appear ‘generic’, according to Nietzsche. It distorts what is individual about us, because it 
emerges from and therefore represents the ‘herd perspective’. He bemoans Schopenhauer’s 
inability or reluctance to recognise the core role that morality and the so-called ‘seductions 
of language’ play in his philosophy of the will at its foundations, i.e., his conception of 
individuality and the so-called ‘struggle’ between the intellect and the will. He also bemoans 
Schopenhauer’s ‘lack of historical sense’ (cf. BGE 204), which apparently prohibits him 
from perceiving the changes our moral values undergo over time, which undermines his 
claim that there is a metaphysical basis for the morality of compassion. Schopenhauer, then, 
confounds one moral principle (of which there are many) for the only moral principle or for 
the basis of morals.  
In the next chapter, I will assess Nietzsche’s account of deliberation and its role in 
our actions. I argue that his conception of individuality inverses Schopenhauer’s proposition 
that deliberation makes us individual, responsible and free. Likewise, I analyse Nietzsche’s 
proposition that ‘deliberation’ makes our actions appear and, over time, become ‘generic’.  
2.7 Nietzsche’s Reversal: Individuality, Deliberation and 
our Self-image 
So far, I argued Nietzsche adopts Schopenhauer’s will-body identity, but rejects his point 
of departure, which is the first-person perspective of willing. The first-person perspective is 
misleading with respect to the individual-action identity. When we take the ‘I’ of our first-
person experience as our starting point, we appeal to ‘unities’ that are without a third-person 
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representation, which constitutes his objection to Schopenhauer’s conception of the will. 
The third-person perspective of the body and its vicissitudes has more explanatory value, 
for Nietzsche. The will is not inherently unified and the body’s multiplicity is not an illusion 
of the intellect. Our will is a ‘multiplicity’ like the body and its modifications. The body 
mirrors the will. To avoid appealing to a ‘unity’ without a third-person representation such 
as the ‘will’ (or ‘I will’), Nietzsche uses the concept of the ‘drive’, which mirrors the 
multiplicity of the body, but still refers to something with first-person content. Likewise, he 
accepts the individual-action identity, but modifies it by changing his conception of 
individuality, which he describes in terms of drives.  
Both thinkers argue that the objective correlate of ‘individuality’ is our actions (or 
our omissions), but they differ on what makes our actions ‘individual’. For Schopenhauer, 
a deliberate action represents what is individual about us. For Nietzsche, our action itself is 
“incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual” (GS 354). As we 
saw previously, however, our actions can actually represent something inherited, generic 
and impersonal. They can represent something we mimic or acquire from others like our 
parents or authority figures within our community (cf. D 26). They can represent a custom 
such as saying ‘thank you’ or a ‘handshake’ after an exchange. Accordingly, he requires a 
different, revised and nuance account of what exactly makes our actions ‘individual’.  
Nietzsche’s account begins by distinguishing our individual from generic features, 
as we saw previously. He designates each one differently in different works and sometimes 
even in aphorisms within the same work. For example, with respect what is ‘generic’, he 
refers to ‘custom’ (D 16; HHI 96; HHII 89), or ‘morality’ (D 3), or ‘authority’ (D 9), or the 
‘herd’ (also, the ‘herd perspective’, ‘herd instincts’ and so on) (cf. GS 116). Each one refers 
to what is generic about an action, reason, affect, drive and so on. He juxtaposes the previous 
to what he variously designates as ‘individuality’ (D 529), ‘sense of self’ (GS 117), ‘real 
ego’ (D 105), or ‘the individual’ (cf. HHI, 286; BGE 188 & 201). The closest he comes to a 
definition of what is generic and what is individual is through the following juxtaposition: 
“Every individual action, every individual mode of thought arouses dread… Under the 
dominion of the morality of custom, originality of every kind has acquired a bad 
conscience; the sky above the best men is for this reason to this very moment gloomier 
than it need be.” (D 9; my emphasis) 
Nietzsche’s approach to making sense of individuality is by arguing that our generic and 
individual features oppose each other, rather than constituting a pre-established harmony. 
The pre-established harmony, we recall, is central to Schopenhauer’s conception of the will 
in the metaphysical sense. Nietzsche’s conception of ‘individuality’ refers to ‘originality’ 
or ‘uniqueness’ and what expresses our uniqueness (or its lack thereof) is our actions, which, 
as we saw previously can also express something generic or customary. There is an impasse 
or ambiguity in the previous, which I will attempt to resolve using the tripartite distinction.   
First, our actions are individual because we are a combination of our parents; we have 
a more diverse set of inherited drives premised on their combined individuality. We may 
include our parents’ parents in this combination and so on. Second, though we inherit some 
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drives, we do not inherit those circumstantial pressures that gave rise to the action and then 
hardenned into a relatively stable behaviour we call a drive. Our own circumstantial 
pressures and conditions for existence permit an individual response and thus new targets 
or expressions for inherited drives. Furthermore, our circumstantial pressures and conditions 
permit the creation of new drives by a synthesis (cf. Richardson 1996, 44-52) of inherited 
drives, or the loss of inherited drives. Third, we constantly drive towards some action (cf. 
GM I, 13), which entails a need to overcome the resistances to our actions we may encounter. 
These resistances often impel us to suspend, delay or forgo our actions and drives (cf. D 
109). In short, they permit us to change ourselves.178  
For Schopenhauer, deliberation allows us to transcend our species constraints and 
the ‘will to life’. The intellect—specifically ‘deliberation’ and the ‘self-image’ stemming 
from its abstract function, which unifies dissimilar acts of will into a unified picture he calls 
our ‘empirical character’—makes us individuals. If our actions are stamps of the unified, 
fixed and inalterable will, then deliberation is an unnecessary extension of the action and 
will. What does ‘picturing what we are going to do before we do it’ contribute to this fixed, 
inalterable and metaphysical unity? Why does picturing what we are going to do in advance 
of the deed make a difference to our decision to do it? Can Schopenhauer coherently argue 
that deliberation makes us ‘change our mind’ over what we will do without jettisoning his 
conception of the will as fixed and inalterable? His conception of the will limits his account 
of deliberation by forbidding him from using it as he does in his aesthetics and ethics. 
Nietzsche inverses Schopenhauer’s conception of individuality. Deliberation and our 
self-image make our already unique and original actions appear generic, for Nietzsche. Yet, 
his explanation of this generality differs from Schopenhauer’s essentialist and metaphysical 
approach.  
There is nothing distinct from (or other-than) the drive-to-X, according to Nietzsche. 
Deliberation is a relation or conflict between drives whose resolution determines whether 
we ‘X’ or ‘not-X’. He commits to ontological monism and immanence and follows through 
by making sense of each concept and event in terms of its relationship to our drives. 
Schopenhauer likewise commits to ontological monism and immanence, but he apparently 
abandons it in his aesthetics and ethics by arguing the intellect controls the will in rare cases. 
The intellect can lead the will to negate itself. This negation is not willed: it “emerges from 
the innermost relation of cognition to willing in human beings, and thus arrives suddenly, as 
if flying in from outside” (WR, 432; my emphasis). As we will see, Nietzsche revises the 
proposition that the ‘intellect controls the will via our self-image’ by revising his conception 
of the ‘intellect’, its ‘control’ and even our ‘self-image’.  
 
                                               
178 The textual evidence for these claims is limited, because Nietzsche did not focus on the conceptual coherence 
of his propositions. So, I cautiously omit that I stretch his claims somewhat, but I hope to have shown that I do so 
using his tripartite distinction. Nevertheless, I believe a critical consideration for the sake of clarity and rigor could 
prove useful here. In this chapter, I will focus on the extent of the opposition between the individual and the generic 
(or herd, morality etc.), however. 
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For both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, deliberation does not only mean considering 
what possible actions we can take in relation toa circumstance, but includes a picture of us 
acting or ‘X-ing’. This picture is inherent to the decision-making process. We do not only 
deliberate on ‘how we can act’, but also what we look like when we do ‘X’ or ‘Y’. We take 
into account how we ‘appear’ when we do something. We consider what the action implies 
about us or our ‘character’. Accordingly, there is more to deliberation than our picturing the 
possible avenues for action prior to acting. However, for Nietzsche, there is also more to it 
than our picturing ourselves acting. If the previous were true and the basis for an action is a 
drive, then we can act without deliberating on our actions prior to undertaking them. We 
need not reflect on our actions (or ourselves), but act in accordance with the drives because 
our drives (and their relations) are identical to the action.  
If we assume the self-conscious ‘I’ is distinct in kind from the drives and impinges 
on them, then committing to the will-body identity seemingly entails that we do not need 
the self-conscious ‘I’ to explain an action. Our drives can unconsciously determine the 
relevant action in each case without our first having to become ‘conscious’ of it. We can act 
without self-consciously deliberating on an action. Does the previosu entail that Nietzsche 
rejects outright the role of ‘deliberation’ and ‘self-conscious thought’ in our actions? I will 
show that he does not. He has a different conception of deliberation and its role in actions.  
For Schopenhauer, our self-image is an integral part of our individuality, culminating 
in the ‘acquired character’. For Nietzsche, however, it demonstrates the participation of an 
atypical drive whose root is how ‘other people’—i.e., their perspective—partakes in our 
actions. Our self-image represents the participation of a drive in the trenches with the other 
drives. He describes this drive as ‘habituation to authority’ (HHI 89), ‘obedience to custom 
or tradition’ (B 9), ‘obedience towards a law’ (HHI 96), ‘innate need to obey’ (BGE 199), 
or ‘herd instinct of obedience’ (BGE 199). For the sake of attuning us to my alternative 
solution to the lack of it, I focus on how this drive fits with his tripartite distinction. It can 
be either ‘individual’ or ‘inherited’. We can develop it from our experiences and reasons, or 
it can be a ‘feeling’ we acquire from our ancestors through our parents, or it can represent 
the values of our community, such as a custom or common endeavour. I will argue that it is 
inherited, but we have two conception of inheritance: our ancestors and our community and 
its values. I will aim to show that it is a combination of both. 
Nietzsche describes this inherited drive most clearly in the following passage, where 
he also juxtaposes it to individuality by remarking how it effects our self-conception: 
“We have an interest in the good opinion of others, firstly because it is useful to us, 
then because we want to give them pleasure (children their parents, pupils their 
teacher, and benevolent people all other people in general). Only where the good 
opinion of others is important to someone quite apart from advantage or the desire to 
give pleasure do we speak of vanity… As a rule, the individual wants through the 
opinion of others to confirm the opinion he has of himself and to ratify himself in his 
own eyes; but our mighty habituation to authority—a habituation that is as old as 
mankind itself—also impels many to rely on authority for their belief in themself, that 
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is to say to acquire it only at the hands of others: they trust the judgement of others 
more than they do their own.” (HHI 89; my emphasis) 
Deliberation is inseparable from a self-image and represents the need to introduce this image 
to our actions. He describes our self-image as placing a mirror in front of us before we 
undertake a course of action (cf. GS 354 & D 301). This implies that we take a perspective 
on our actions that is not our own. What is crucial for my purposes is that it represents the 
activity of a drive; the participation in our actions of what Nietzsche describes as the drive 
‘to obey something that commands’ (cf. D 9). Let me elaborate.  
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche differ in their conceptions of our self-image in two 
respects. First, for Schopenhauer, our self-image is a pure representation of ‘what we will’ 
based on what we did previously; our interests or someone else’s interests do not distort this 
self-image. Since any response to our self-image is by our individual will (or mainsprings), 
our actions following it are individual and distorted by our various interests, however. Thus, 
our self-image is ‘pure’ whereas our ‘response’ to it is not and cannot possibly be. Second, 
the perspective underpinning our self-image is our own and not someone else’s.  
Nietzsche rejects both of the above propositions and argues there is a fundamental 
epistemic boundary between ‘who we are’, i.e., our ‘individuality’, and ‘what we can know 
about who we are’. The emphasis, then, is on the ‘purity’ or ‘limits’ of self-knowledge. The 
following passages detail his views on the previous:  
“Actions are never what they appear to us to be! We have expended so much labor on 
learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be—very well! the case is 
the same with the inner world! Moral actions are in reality ‘something other than 
that’—more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown.” (D 116) 
 
“…as one observes or recollects any action, it is and remains impenetrable; that our 
opinions about ‘good’ and ‘noble’ and ‘great’ can never be proven true by our actions 
because every act is unknowable; that our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is 
good are certainly some of the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions, 
but that in each case, the law of its mechanism is unprovable.” (GS 335) 
 
“Just as in the celestial realm, the track of one planet will sometimes be determined 
by two suns; just as, in certain cases, suns of different colors will shine on a single 
planet with red light one moment and green light the next, and then strike it again, 
inundating it with many colors all at once: in the same way, thanks to the complex 
mechanics of our “starry skies,” we modern men are determined by a diversity of 
morals; our actions shine with different colors in turn, they are rarely unambiguous, 
– and it happens often enough that we perform multi-colored actions.” (BGE 215) 
 
“Today, when we immoralists, at least, suspect that the decisive value is conferred by 
what is specifically unintentional about an action, and that all its intentionality, 
everything about it that can be seen, known, or raised to “conscious awareness,” only 
belongs to its surface and skin – which, like every skin, reveals something but 
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conceals even more? In short, we believe that the intention is only a sign and symptom 
that first needs to be interpreted, and that, moreover, it is a sign that means too many 
things and consequently means almost nothing by itself.” (BGE 32) 
There is a distinction and even a tension between ‘what we do’ and ‘how we comprehend or 
evaluate our deeds’, which made Nietzsche critical of how self-conscious thought features 
in individuality. What we know about who we are (i.e., self-knowledge) stems from what 
we make of our actions, but the self-image arising from reflecting on those actions is already 
shaped by our various interests, values and needs. In short, our drives distort our self-image 
and these drives are not necessarily individual; in fact, the need for a self-image itself is an 
inherited drive set up in opposition to individuality from the outset (more on this below). In 
certain passages, he even argues that “we remain strange to ourselves out of necessity” (GM 
Pref., 1, my emphasis; see also D 115 & 539). It is pertinent to inquire into his conception 
of ‘knowledge’, however. What limits does he place on ‘knowledge’? Adequate answers to 
these questions are beyond the scope of the thesis, but I will suggest some preliminary 
remarks because they inform on his views on individuality. 
Nietzsche’s conceptual tools imply that self-knowledge ideally yields a self-image 
showing what drives us. By implication, what he rejects is that we have knowledge of our 
drives as they are in themselves, that is, independent from their targets and activities at any 
particular moment. To know our drives as they are in themselves is a hopeless endeavour, 
because we are already interested in something when we strive for self-knowledge and this 
debunks the ‘purity’ or independent authority of that knowledge. Our interests and thus, by 
extension, our drives partake in the acquisition of self-knowledge and the formulation of a 
self-image. Something drives us to seek and obtain self-knowledge, which we must factor 
into any analysis of the self-image that is the product of this drive to self-knowledge.179 In 
short, something drives us to know ourselves, which we cannot separate from what we 
recognise about ourselves. This drive(s) distorts self-knowledge and so he rejects its purity. 
Does this mean that he rejects the possibility of self-knowledge? I will argue no. We can 
still have self-knowledge, but at the expense of lowering our expectations and standards in 
respect to that knowledge. Self-knowledge means knowing ourselves in a ‘specific light’. 
We know ourselves correlative to some drive(s) or hierarchy of drives (or drive relations).  
Nietzsche rejects the conditions Schopenhauer placed on knowledge, namely, as the 
cognition of something not distorted by the will. To ‘know’ ourselves independent from our 
drives commits us to a conception of knowledge not as an activity in which we engage, i.e., 
something we are doing or obtain through effort (cf. BGE 45). It commits us to conceiving 
knowledge as a kind of inspiration or a vision that comes instantly and effortlessly. It can 
even commit us to construing it as a privilege bestowed upon us from somewhere outside 
of us and independent from our effort. This flies in the face of our experience of obtaining 
an insight or of arriving at any conclusion, which require some effort and presuppose some 
 
                                               
179 Nietzsche analysis of the scholar is useful towards showing why pure self-knowledge is impossible and that 
what we know about ourselves is shaped by our ‘drives’ to accord with their characteristic behaviours (BGE 6).  
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preliminary activity on our part. The previous effort and activity, in turn, presuppose our 
drives. Accordingly, our drives underpin our effort to attain knowledge, including self-
knowledge; they distort both. We cannot possibly possess ‘pure’, will-less or ‘disinterested’ 
knowledge, according to Nietzsche, at least not in the way Schopenhauer comprehended it.  
We should remark that this is not the position Schopenhauer held over ‘knowledge’ 
due to his correlation theory of cognition. We recall that, according to Schopenhauer, to be 
‘disinterested’ means to project the will on the target of our cognition, i.e., to identify with 
it. What he calls ‘disinterested’ knowledge represents an interest in the target. Where I think 
the two differ is in the proposition that projection of the will gives us what Schopenhauer 
calls the ‘target’s clearest image’. Nietzsche rejects the claim that projection of the will on 
the target of cognition gives us a sort of veracity (more on this below).  
In sum, what underpins our quest for self-knowledge and so explains our interest in 
acquiring self-knowledge can be any drive(s) or drive relation, according to Nietzsche. The 
core proposition showing his views on the limits of ‘knowledge’ is the following: the drives 
(not ‘something else’) underpins (self-) knowledge. This prevents us from possessing a pure 
or clear image of the target, including if the target is ourselves. Therefore, he works with a 
different conception of ‘pure’ objectivity than his predecessor. The following passage shows 
his views on the limits of ‘knowledge’: 
“We simply have no organ for knowing, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or believe or imagine) 
exactly as much as is useful to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here 
called ‘usefulness’ is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that 
supremely fatal stupidity of which we some day will perish.” (GS 354) 
Seemingly, then, Nietzsche does not reject the possibility of knowledge, but examines the 
interest we take in it and how that interest shapes it. This ‘interest’ leads him to reject the 
possibility of ‘pure’ knowledge and argue for an alternative conception: our interests (and 
thus our drives) distort our knowledge. This distortion occurs at the root of cognition; so 
becoming conscious of something itself involves distortion (more on this below).  
To return to our discussion on deliberation and our self-image, Nietzsche’s rejection 
of Schopenhauer’s claim that our self-image represents our perspective on our own actions 
requires extensive analysis. We can formulate the major premise of his rejection via the 
following question: why do we need to reflect on ourselves prior to acting in the first place? 
Why does our self-image matter to our actions? We do not need self-consciousness to act, 
according to him. The fact that our self-conscious thoughts participate in our deliberations 
and actions, when we do not need them to act, is what requires explanation: 
“The problem of consciousness (or rather, of becoming conscious of something) first 
confronts us when we begin to realise how much we can do without it; and now we 
are brought to this initial realisation by physiology and natural history (which have 
thus required two hundred years to catch up with Leibniz’s precocious suspicion). For 
we could think, feel, will, remember, and also ‘act’ in every sense of the term, and 
yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’ (as one says figuratively). 
All of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror; and still 
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today, the predominant part of our lives actually unfolds without this mirroring—of 
course also our thinking, feeling, and willing lives, insulting as it may sound to an 
older philosopher. To what end does consciousness exist at all when it is basically 
superfluous?” (GS 354) 
If we can actually decide and even act without seeing ourselves “in the mirror” (GS 354), 
then what explains self-conscious thoughts and actions? What explains our ‘overestimation’ 
of consciousness with respect to the organism (cf. GS 11)? If the activity (or aim) Z was the 
only factor driving my deliberation, which also leads me to action X, then I do not need to 
consider ‘what I might ‘look like’ if I did X as opposed to Y’ in relation to Z. For example, 
if I deliberate on the aim (i.e., drive or will) to acquire a television independent from other 
considerations, then only its acquisition would matter to my deliberations. Any deliberations 
on how to acquire a television, ceteris paribus, do not need to take into account ‘how I 
appear’ in acquiring it unless my ‘appearance’ played some role in the end of acquiring it. 
Equally, if my ‘appearance’ did matter, but only to me, as Schopenhauer claims, then the 
difference between the following options is down to how I want to appear to myself: ‘stealing 
someone’s television’, ‘purchasing it after saving money’, ‘seeking a disposable one from 
another person’ and so on. The previous is paradoxical, however, since how I want to appear 
to myself is satisfied by Z, i.e., the fact that I want to acquire a television. Nietzsche accepts 
that our appearance partakes in deliberation, but for different reasons and in a different way 
than Schopenhauer suggests, because he had a different conception of consciousness.  
Nietzsche’s conception of ‘consciousness’ is not as a ‘thing’ or as a ‘substance’ that 
is incommensurate with the ‘physical’ world and that it supervenes on that world. Likewise, 
the previous is not the conception Schopenhauer can legitimately defend, but he seemingly 
flirts with it in his views on ascetic resignation. Nietzsche gives an account of consciousness 
commensurate with the ‘physical’ world using the will-body identity and by offering a 
genealogical account of it. He traces the roots of consciousness to something ‘preconscious’, 
i.e., drives. His genealogical account of ‘consciousness’ aims to show that it represents the 
activity of a drive or drive relation. This genealogical account stems from two propositions 
entrenched in the will-body identity. First, ‘how we appear’ (i.e., our self-image) affects our 
actions and represents the activity of a drive(s) or drive relation. Second, ‘how we appear’ 
matters to us, but the perspective they underpin is not our own, but other people’s perspective 
on us.  
After he rejects ‘pure’ knowledge, Nietzsche construes our self-image as the activity 
of a drive or drive relation. Something drives us to formulate a self-image, which is thus in 
the trenches with our other drives. He argues this drive finds its root in (or represents the 
activity of) our ‘obedience to authority’, which he also calls our “habituation to authority—
a habituation that is as old as mankind itself” (HHI 89 & 96). In GM, he argues that we can 
trace it to the most rudimentary forms of society. Seemingly, his major premise and so his 
departure from Schopenhauer is his construing self-conscious agency as the introduction of 
the drive for a self-image into the drive complex. This drive is not mysterious, miraculous 
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or ‘other-worldly’. He explains it genealogically by appealing to the ‘internalisation of man’ 
(GM II, 16; my emphasis).180  
In championing deliberation’s role in determining our individuality, Schopenhauer 
does not note that we add to the decision making process not our perspective on our actions, 
but another’s perspective. Deliberation is not our choosing the most fitting action in relation 
to our will based on our self-image, since this choice does not require self-conscious thought 
and so a self-image. Even if our self-image is our becoming familiar with our will using our 
actions, as he claims, then nothing explains our need to do so. We need this explanation after 
we take into account the fact that we can (re)act without self-consciousness. A mechanism 
with a sufficiently complex algorithm could function in accordance with its programming 
and realise its outcome in relation to certain conditions or within certain parameters. These 
mechanisms are not self-conscious agents, however, and we cannot confuse them for self-
conscious agents. What makes us self-conscious agents, in Nietzsche’s view, is how other 
people’s perspective on us interjects our deliberations and thus affects our actions, but this 
perspective does not make us individual. Accordingly, he defines deliberation as a drive or 
drive relation (cf. GS 333) or as representing the activity of a drive in the trenches with other 
drives. 
We saw previously that the third-person perspective, which makes possible our self-
image, led Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will to an impasse. Nietzsche overcomes this 
impasse by arguing that the third-person perspective on ourselves is not our own, although 
we do sometimes confuse it for our own and explains what accounts for this confusion. His 
predecessors was a culprit of this confusion, according to Nietzsche. Deliberation introduces 
‘how we appear to other people’, which shows the activity of an inherited, unyielding drive 
or a need for ‘authority’ or ‘command’ (cf. D 9). This inherited drive excludes our individual 
perspective at the outset and by definition; in fact, it set up to oppose our individuality.  
Let us pose some key questions that shed light on the insight in Nietzsche’s account 
of deliberation. Why must we consider ‘what would we look like if we did this instead of 
that’? To whom would we ‘appear as doing something’ when we do X instead of Y? Why 
would a self-image matter to us or our needs (i.e., for food or a television), which underpin 
our actions or determine the best course of action? In short, why does it matter if I steal a 
television (if I could do so easily and get away with it), or if I look for one at a scrapyard, 
or if I purchase one, or if I ask someone to offer me their spare one? Why should ‘how I 
look as I go about attaining an end’ feature into the decision-making process in a way that 
(sometimes) affects the end itself? In deliberating on a course of action, why do I have to 
picture myself acting, rather than the consequences of my actions? He puts these questions 
and their corresponding concerns in the following, admittedly more eloquent manner: 
 
                                               
180 The concepts that Nietzsche often uses for this unusual kind drive that is part of our deliberation is ‘vanity’ or 
‘pride’, but likewise ‘shame’. In other occasions, he distinguishes between vanity and pride. For a look into how 
he uses these concepts see especially (HHI 89 & WS 181; see also D 301, 394 & 403; HHI 82, 107, 141, 162, 457, 
545, 574 & 583; HHII 50; WS 31; BGE 261; TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 19 & 47).   
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“Your judgement, ‘that is right’ has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, 
aversions, experiences, and what you have failed to experience; you have to ask, ‘how 
did it emerge there?’ and then also, ‘what is really impelling me to listen to it?’ You 
can listen to its commands like a good soldier who heeds the command of his officer. 
Or like a woman who loves the one who commands. Or like a flatterer and coward 
who fears the commander. Or like a fool who obeys because he can think of no 
objection. In short, there are a hundred ways to listen to your conscience. But that you 
hear this or that judgment as the words of conscience, i.e. that you feel something to 
be right may have its cause in your never having thought much about yourself and in 
your blindly having accepted what has been labeled right since your childhood; or in 
the fact that fulfilling your duties has so far brought you bread and honors—and you 
consider it right because it appears to you as your own ‘condition of existence’ (and 
that you have a right to existence seems irrefutable to you). For all that, the firmness 
of your moral judgment could be evidence of your personal wretchedness, of lack of 
a personality; your ‘moral strength’ might have its source in your stubbornness—or 
in your inability to envisage new ideals.” (GS 335)  
Schopenhauer is silent on these points, because he construes the will as a fixed, inalterable 
unity. The only genuine change to the will he identifies is negation of the will to life based 
on the subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation. Schopenhauer lacks the conceptual 
tools or their refinement to answer the above questions. Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘drive’, 
however, is flexible enough to go further. It permits him to claim that deliberation is a drive 
relation that it differs from other drive relations by the introduction of a new drive into the 
drive complex; one that represents other people’s perspective on our actions. He describes 
it as the ‘need for authority’ or ‘our habituation to authority’, which he traces to the most 
rudimentary form of communal life.  
In sum, deliberation is a drive relation, for Nietzsche. Moreover, the self-conscious 
‘I’ we attribute to self-conscious agency represents the activity of a drive in the trenches 
with other drives. In the next chapter, I look at the origins of the self-conscious ‘I’, which 
he proposes as his solution to the problem of the superfluity of consciousness. This origin 
is crucial, because it forms the bedrock of his views on self-conscious agency, morality and 
his objections to the ascetic ideal.  
2.8 Nietzsche’s Method, the ‘Conceptual Link’ and the 
Origin of Self-conscious Agency 
In the previous chapter, I assessed Nietzsche’s conception of deliberation and our self-image 
in lieu of his rejection of Schopenhauer’s account of individuality. The following three 
propositions summarise the grounds for his rejection. First, our actions are not necessarily 
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‘individual’ because they can express ‘customs’ and so the common actions of a community. 
Nevertheless, only our actions reveal our individuality (or its lack thereof). Second, what 
distinguishes deliberate actions from their counterparts is the introduction of our self-image 
to the deliberation process. He construes our self-image as taking into account the so-called 
‘herd perspective’ on our actions. The herd perspective opposes individuality, in principle. 
Third, deliberation is a drive relation and our self-image represents the activity of a drive in 
the trenches with the other drives. The latter shows Nietzsche’s adherence to the will-body 
identity, but we still have work to do to explain how it fits with his adherence to ontological 
monism and immanence such that it can avoid the so-called phantom.  
In this chapter, I will expand on Nietzsche’s account of self-conscious agency by 
assessing the arguments he formulates with respect to its origin, which will, in turn, explain 
why he construes our self-image and the self-conscious ‘I’ as (representing the activity of) 
a drive. I will also introduce a concept that I think helps us recognise an important element 
of Nietzsche’s methodology and approach to philosophical problems, or to explaining hard 
phenomena like self-conscious agency and ascetic resignation. This element is what he calls 
‘historical philosophising’, which he analyses using his drive psychology.  
Nietzsche makes several claims about historical philosophising in his early work, 
which are crucial for making sense of his solution to the problem of the ‘superfluity of 
consciousness’. I chose this as my entry point into his methodology, because consciousness 
is the defining feature of self-conscious agency.  
Nietzsche’s methodology begins by setting the foundations for a distinction between 
what he calls the ‘historical’ approach to philosophical problems and the ‘metaphysical’ 
approach, which he identifies as the preoccupation of the philosophers of his day. The latter 
was presumably also Schopenhauer’s approach. He aims to demonstrate the value of what 
he calls ‘historical philosophising’ with regard to philosophical questions and problems by 
assessing the origin of the phenomena and concepts that feature in the construction of those 
questions and problems. He distinguishes the two approaches as follows: 
“Almost all the problems of philosophy once again pose the same form of question 
as they did two thousand years ago: how can something originate in its opposite… 
Metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmounted this difficulty by denying that the 
one originates in the other and assuming for the more highly valued thing a 
miraculous source in the very kernel and being of the ‘thing in itself’. Historical 
philosophy, on the other hand, which can no longer be separated from natural science, 
the youngest of all philosophical methods, has discovered in individual cases (and 
this will probably be the result in every case) that there are no opposites, except in the 
customary exaggeration of popular or metaphysical interpretations, and that a mistake 
in reasoning lies at the bottom of this antithesis… All we require, and what can be 
given us only now the individual sciences have attained their present level, is a 
chemistry of the moral, religious and aesthetic conceptions and sensations, likewise 
of all the agitations we experience within ourselves in cultural and social intercourse, 
and indeed even when we are alone…” (HHI 1; some emphasis is mine) 
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Nietzsche treats philosophical problems pertaining to origins via ‘historical philosophising’, 
which in the philosophical commentary we often construe as his genealogy or genealogical 
analysis. What I want to suggest here is that this approach to philosophical problems is built 
on his rejection of the metaphysical or ‘ontological’ opposition between seemingly ‘distinct’ 
things, not his rejection of metaphysics or ontology tout court. Nietzsche’s approach has its 
own metaphysical and ontological commitments, as we saw with his acceptance of the will-
body identity. He even explicitly voices his ontological commitments in his late notebooks: 
“My intention to show the absolute homogeneity in all that happens and the application 
of the moral distinction as only perspectivally conditioned; to show how everything 
that is morally praised is the same in essence as everything immoral and how, like 
every development of morality, it was only made possible by immoral means and for 
immoral ends…” (WLN 10[154]; some emphasis is mine) 
His genealogical method aims to compensate for what he identifies as a prevalent theoretical 
deficiency of the philosophers of his day, which he describes as follows:   
“Lack of historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers; many, without being 
aware of it, even take the most recent manifestation of man, such as has arisen under 
the impress of certain religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from 
which one has to start out. They will not learn that man has become, that the faculty of 
cognition has become; while some of them would have it that the whole world is spun 
out of this faculty of cognition… But everything has become: there are no eternal facts, 
just as there are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed from now on is 
historical philosophising, and with it the virtue of modesty.” (HHI 2; some emphasis 
is mine) 
In other words, ‘historical philosophising’ is his proposed alternative to the ‘rage for 
generalisation’ we saw previously. His concerns over philosophical method are not limited 
to his early writings, however. We find them also in his later work: 
“[Y]ou have to respect the good spirits which preside in these historians of morality! 
But it is unfortunately a fact that historical spirit itself is lacking in them, they have 
been left in the lurch by all the good spirits of history itself! As is now established 
philosophical practice, they all think in a way that is essentially unhistorical; this can’t 
be doubted. The idiocy of their moral genealogy is revealed at the outset when it is a 
question of conveying the descent of the concept and judgment of ‘good’.” (GM I, 2; 
my emphasis) 
Historical philosophising characterises his treatment of philosophical problems. What this 
method amounts to, why he prefers it and how it differs from other philosophical methods 
is not always clear. Unfortunately, I cannot analyse in sufficient detail the merits and limits 
of this method or his reasons for preferring it. Instead, I will focus on his use of it with 
respect to the concepts central to this thesis. First, I assess his use of it to offer a revisionist 
account of self-conscious agency; this will be the focus of the following few chapters, which 
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will pivot on the new term and concept I will shortly introduce, i.e., the ‘conceptual link’. 
Second, I will assess how his method has its own ontological commitments, which will be 
the topic of the chapter in which I present my alternative solution to the lack of fit.  
 Nietzsche recognises a limitation in the philosophical analyses and assessments of 
his day with respect to hard cases or phenomena, especially with respect to the assessment 
of the origin of moral values in light of the natural (or mechanical) world, i.e., the objective 
picture. The dominant philosophical method of his time, according to him, lacked what he 
calls a ‘historical sense’: an understanding of how the phenomena and the concepts we use 
to comprehend them become, grow and undergo changes over time. He aims to overcome this 
apparent limitation while maintaining the inherent aim for the truth. What is relevant for my 
purposes is his use of this method to explain self-conscious agency.  
A central feature of this method is the claim that begins by postulating a so-called 
“chemistry of the moral, religious and aesthetic conceptions and sensations” (HHI 1). There 
are two reasons for my focusing on this claim. Firstly, I think the concept of a ‘chemistry’ 
demonstrates his broader views on agency, which includes self-conscious agency, but also 
his approach to phenomena in general, i.e., as complexes or wholes composed of parts. In 
short, he has a revisionist conception of self-conscious agency as a complex or a compound 
of drives, which replaces the dominant view of self-conscious agency as the operation or 
the interjection of one kind of substance or thing on another kind. Second, it shows why 
‘consciousness’ is a drive or drive relation. Historical philosophising, or so he conjectures, 
offers us a plausible and alternative conception of consciousness as an inherited drive, rather 
than as a ‘thing’ or ‘substance’. Self-conscious agency represents the activity of such a drive 
in its relations with other drives. He explains the origin of this drive by appealing to the so-
called ‘internationalisation of man’ (cf. GM II, 16). Before we analyse the latter, however, I 
assess what he means by the ‘chemistry of concepts and sensations’ using other passages in 
his work and why he thinks we should approach this chemistry historically and therefore as 
something that has become. 
Nietzsche reveals what he means by a ‘chemistry’ in a passage where he discusses 
how we should analyse hard cases or phenomena like ‘holiness’ and ‘asceticism’. He argues 
that we should construe them as having multiple causes, that is, to treat them as possessing 
separable, but entwined parts: 
“The first general probability one arrives at when reflecting on holiness and 
asceticism is that its nature is a complex one: for almost everywhere, within the 
physical world as well as in the moral, the supposedly marvellous has successfully 
been traced back to the complex, to the multiply caused. Let us therefore venture first 
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to isolate individual drives in the soul of the saint and ascetic and then conclude by 
thinking of them entwined together.” (HHI 136; some emphasis is mine)181  
Those he identifies as philosophers and moralists are apparently inclined to construe hard 
cases like character (presumably meaning actions and values) of ascetics as “inexplicable 
altogether unnatural, supernatural, miraculous” (HHI 136). There is a precondition to his 
method, however, which shows us his general approach to philosophy. This precondition is 
to conceive one’s character (but also any phenomenon) as a complex or compound, which 
undergoes changes over time.182 In the philosophical commentary, we often construe this 
complex as composed of heterogeneous parts (or ‘things’); we defend a distinction in kind 
between the (self-conscious) ‘I’ and (unconscious) drives. His ‘historical philosophising’ 
aims to avoid appealing to ontological dualism by proposing that we construe a phenomenon 
as a complex that becomes. Our philosophical task is to analyse, speculate or investigate the 
reasons and conditions under which this complex became and how it might change given a 
change in those reasons and conditions.   
Nietzsche’s own ontological commitments lead him to treat phenomena as composed 
of parts (‘drives’) that entwine to form a whole, not individual ‘things’ that are distinct in 
kind that somehow interact. The method of historical philosophising and so assessing the 
reasons and conditions under which drives entwine over time allows him to preserve his 
commitment to ontological monism and immanence. Likewise it allows him to explain these 
phenomena and hard cases in a different, revisionist manner, whihc escapes the difficulties 
he saw as plaguing the metaphysicians of his day. The ascetic character, for example, is a 
complex of drives, which we can separate conceptually, even though we are obligated to treat 
as entwined or a ‘unity’ that has become. This unity originates or emerges from somewhere, 
i.e., some relations among things or given some conditions that actually exist or existed at 
some time. It grows and develops in different ways over time, given different conditions 
and circumstances. The previous views on the ascetic character apply equally to his views 
on self-conscious agency: it constitutes his approach to philosophical problems and typifies 
his philosophical method.    
What Nietzsche makes of the separate, individual parts of the human character, i.e., 
his thoughts on their interaction and emergence is, I believe, where his philosophical method 
reveals its uniqueness. He conceives of the human character as a complex or compound of 
drives, not things. He deems the concept of a ‘drive’ (and drive relations) as sufficient for 
 
                                               
181 See also his characterisation of ‘English psychologists’: “[t]hese English psychologists - just what do they 
want…what is it that actually drives these psychologists in precisely this direction all the time...a bit of everything, 
a bit of meanness, a bit of gloominess, a bit of anti-Christianity, a bit of a thrill and need for pepper?” (GM I, 1). 
There are other passages wherein Nietzsche points to a similar comprehension and understanding of human agency 
and actions as complex or a compound of drives (see, e.g., HHI 14 & 252; GS 7, 21, 111, 113 & 333; D 38, 115, 
119, 422, & 560; TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 45; EH, ‘Zarathustra’, 6; BGE 6, 12, 19, 20, 36, 201 & 215). 
182 Clark (2015) also rightly recognises this method in Nietzsche: “I have tried to show that much of Nietzsche’s 
work on morality involves prying apart central components of our concept of morality and showing how these 
strands came together in the course of human history” (Clark 2015, 40). This method is Nietzsche’s philosophical 
method.  
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explaining the seemingly inexplicable and miraculous phenomena pertaining to actions and 
values in relation to those phenomena. His conception of self-conscious agency likewise 
proceeds from positing a complex of drives and explains this complex through historical 
philosophising. Based on the latter method, self-conscious agency is not distinct in kind from 
unselfconscious agency, but an offshoot of it. Thus, we can explain the apparent superfluity 
of consciousness without appealing to the intervention or emergence of imaginary entities, 
extraordinary causes or phantoms, which forces us to conclude that the actual phenomenon 
in question is ‘marvellous, inexplicable and-or miraculous’. Self-conscious agency is the 
emergence of a new drive into the complex of drives that we are. This new drive represents 
a smooth transition from unselfconscious bodily movement to self-conscious agency, which 
does not commit him to the introduction of a new substance, but a new drive.  
Nietzsche’s genealogical account of consciousness is a prerequisite step to making 
sense of what he means by self-conscious agency. In elucidating the previous, I will take 
my bearings from his claim that consciousness makes our actions appear “shallow, thin, 
relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark” (GS 354). Previously, I argued that his main 
objection to consciousness is that it appears ‘superfluous’ by comparison to an organism’s 
bodily functions and movements. This does not refute the existence of consciousness or its 
participation in our actions, but marks a step towards a revisionist account of consciousness. 
In other words, that consciousness does participates in our actions—even though it appears 
superfluous following our best theories about the movements of bodies in spacetime and the 
laws that govern those movements—is what requires explanation. The explanation he offers 
is genealogical. It begins by demonstrating that there is what I will call a ‘conceptual link’ 
between ‘consciousness’ and ‘communication’. He distinguishes the various parts inherent 
to becoming conscious of something and then proceeds to analyse them historically using 
his drive psychology. He aims to show how the previous parts became individually and then 
entwined into the complex whole that is the phenomenon in question.  
Self-conscious agency is not the operation of one ‘thing’ on another ‘thing’, but a 
chemistry or compound of things linked conceptually. We can analyse and explain their link 
in terms of the emergence of the part in question and how the phenomenon in question 
became out of relations between the emerging parts. The aim, then, is to analyse and explain 
relations between the parts of a whole historically, rather than confining ourselves to logical 
or metaphysical analyses and explanations of the previous part-whole relationships. He aims 
to achieve this by appealing to ‘drives’, but he likewise speaks of ‘perspectives’, ‘instincts’, 
‘sensations’, and so on, leaving open whether or not he intends us to comprehend each one 
as an extension of the drives. Nevertheless, the essential tenet of this method is to treat a 
phenomenon in question as a whole composed of parts that entwine. We can distinguish the 
parts using conceptual analysis and then apply his method of historical philosophising and 
drive psychology to explain how they emerged and entwined to produce the complex whole 
that is the phenomenon in question.  
There is a ‘conceptual link’ between consciousness and communication, according 
to Nietzsche. The conceptual link captures the proposotition that the previous two concepts 
demonstrate an irreducible relation in that we cannot conceive of one without the other. His 
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understanding of their relation is not metaphysical or ontological, but in terms of ‘ability’ 
or ‘need’, i.e., in terms of his drive psychology. He puts it as follows: 
“…it seems to me that the subtlety and strength of consciousness is always related to 
a person’s (or animal’s) ability to communicate; and the ability to communicate, in 
turn, to the need to communicate. The latter should not to be taken to mean that 
precisely that individual who is a master at expressing his needs and at making them 
understood must also be the most dependent on others in his needs… where need and 
distress have for a long time forced people to communicate, to understand each other 
swiftly and subtly, there finally exists a surplus of this power and art of expression, a 
faculty, so to speak, which has slowly accumulated and now waits for an heir to spend 
it lavishly… Assuming this observation is correct, I may go on to conjecture that 
consciousness in general has developed only under the pressure of the need to 
communicate; that at the outset, consciousness was necessary, was useful, only 
between persons (particularly between those who commanded and those who 
obeyed); and that it has developed only in proportion to that usefulness. 
Consciousness is really just a net connecting one person with another—only in this 
capacity did it have to develop; the solitary and predatory person would not have 
needed it.” (GS 354) 
His observation is that consciousness and communication are ‘conceptually linked’, but his 
account of this ‘link’ is revisionist in that he comprehends it through his drive psychology, 
not ontologically or metaphysically. According to his theory, consciousness arose from the 
need to communicate, i.e., from preconscious drives. Living under circumstantial pressures 
that require coordinated action for one reason or another sharpened the need to communicate 
and, in turn, our consciousness and its abilities.  
Next, Nietzsche introduces language into the above conceptual link, which typifies the 
behaviours that we undertake when ‘communicating’ with others; see the following:  
“For, once again: man, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but does not 
know it; the thinking which becomes conscious is only the smallest part of it, let’s say 
the shallowest, worst part—for only that conscious thinking takes place in words, that 
is, in communication symbols; and this fact discloses the origin of consciousness. In 
short, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of 
reason but strictly of the way in which we become conscious of reason) go hand in 
hand. One might add that not only language serves as a bridge between persons, but 
also look, touch, and gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense 
impressions, our power to fix them and as it were place them outside of ourselves, 
has increased in proportion to the need to convey them to others by means of signs. 
The sign-inventing person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious 
of himself; for only as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself—
he is still doing it, and he is doing it more and more.” (GS 354; some emphasis is 
mine) 
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“Language began at a time when psychology was in its most rudimentary form: we 
enter into a crudely fetishistic mindset when we call into consciousness the basic 
presuppositions of the metaphysics of language — in the vernacular: the 
presuppositions of reason. It sees doers and deeds all over: it believes that will has 
causal efficacy: it believes in the ‘I’, in the I as being, in the I as substance, and it 
projects this belief in the I-substance onto all things — this is how it creates the 
concept of ‘thing’ in the first place…” (TI, ‘Reason’, 5) 
He extends the conceptual link from consciousness and communication into language, but 
language is just a vehicle for communication, for him. What is significant for our purposes 
is that the previous concepts are features of communal life or living and that he does not 
appeal to miraculous occurrences, incorporeal substances, phantoms or imaginary entities 
that somehow interject on the physical or mechanical world. Consciousness originates from 
a ‘need’ or terrible ‘must’, i.e., it originates in something preconscious or unconscious, as 
the following passage suggests: 
“That our actions, thoughts, feelings, and movements—at least some of them—even 
enter into consciousness is the result of a terrible ‘must’ which has ruled over man for 
a long time: as the most endangered animal, he needed help and protection, he needed 
his equals; he had to express his neediness and be able to make himself understood—
and to do so, he first needed ‘consciousness’, i.e. even to ‘know’ what distressed him, 
to ‘know’ how he felt, to ‘know’ what he thought.” (GS 354; some emphasis is mine) 
Communication is conceptually linked to becoming conscious of something, but developed 
out of the need to communicate. A person’s becoming conscious of something arose out of 
her need to communicate; the previous need accounts for the ‘emergence’ of consciousness 
as it does now for its ‘growth’ or ‘refinement’. Notice that he makes sense of the conceptual 
link by referring to or even positing certain circumstantial pressures or events and how an 
individual(s) manages them. The proposition that consciousness did not develop in the so-
called ‘solitary’ or ‘predatory’ person (cf. GS 354) because she did not need it is misleading, 
however. It implies that certain persons, i.e., someone with certain drives, remain essentially 
unconscious. Predatory or solitary persons played a fundamental role in the emergence and 
growth of consciousness and he offers two reasons that demonstrate that key role, which he 
analyses elsewhere. First, he distinguishes consciousness from awareness or attentiveness. 
Second, he distinguishes the origin of something from its final purpose or usefulness. Let 
us look at the first reason before we discuss the second.    
Nietzsche construes consciousness as a property of thought, not as a synonym for 
thought: he distinguishes between conscious and unconscious thoughts. We can elucidate 
this distinction using the implicit distinction between ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’. 
There is a difference between ‘being aware of something’ and ‘knowing what we are aware 
of’, which we can suggest as a candidate for distinguishing conscious from unconscious 
thoughts. For example, I can be aware of a pain I have and even localise it by directing my 
attention to it without ‘knowing what’ my pain is about. I can direct my attention towards 
my right rib cage and be aware of a pain localised there without knowing the pain is my 
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body’s response to a biochemical event in my liver. I can attend to something without 
ascribing the appropriate ‘communication symbol(s)’ to it, as he puts it. I can be aware that 
I am in pain, not that my body is receiving stimuli relayed to my brain via neurotransmitters 
travelling on my spinal column as a result of a biochemical event in my liver. I know the 
third-person correlate of my pain (i.e., its mirror) is something occurring in my liver, but I 
can also be aware of my liver without possessing the previous ‘knowledge’ and thus without 
possession the communication symbol of ‘liver’, ‘brain’, ‘spinal column’ and so on. 
Accordingly, directing my attention to something is different from my ‘knowing what’ that 
thing is. According to him, I am (self) conscious as a result of knowing what something is 
and I can only know by first ascribing a communication symbol, i.e., a concept or word.  
Nietzsche construes knowing (and its cognates) as conceptually linked to ascription 
of a ‘communication symbol’ (or a concept) to a target of my awareness, which he explains 
historically using his drive psychology. We learn or acquire communication symbols under 
the pressures of communal life. Thus, the acquisition and the application of communication 
symbols characterises my becoming conscious of something and it constitutes the difference 
between conscious and unconscious thoughts.   
In sum, ‘becoming conscious of something’ involves knowing what it is that we 
direct our attention towards; it minimally involves my aiming at this knowledge. We ascribe 
a concept or communication symbol to the target of our awareness to become conscious of 
it and so as a precondition for knowledge. According to Nietzsche’s genealogical account, 
awareness of something precedes ‘knowing what’ it is. Knowledge occurs through concepts, 
words or what he calls ‘communication symbols’, which we acquire over time by living in 
communities. Awareness does not place the same burden on us. We can direct our attention 
to things without requiring the ascription of a communication symbol by our drives fixing 
upon something.183 In short, the drives exhibit unconscious features. They represent actions 
or behaviours that do not proceed from ascribing a communication symbol to something we 
are aware of, but bypass this ascription. For example, to know my pain is located in the 
‘liver’ (or to have basic knowledge of anatomy), I have to first ascribe the communication 
symbol of ‘liver’ to a target of awareness and do so correctly; the conditions for correctness 
are set ‘socially’, i.e., by my participation in communal life. I have to first ensure that the 
communication symbol ‘liver’ sticks to the liver rather than to something else; this ‘sticking’ 
is part of a social or a communal process. We can explain this process psychologically, 
which, following his commitments, it means likewise explaining it physiologically. We can 
explain it in terms of our interests and actions, i.e., our drives. The concepts on whose 
ascription to something our ‘becoming conscious of it’ depends cannot possibly exist 
without the drives for the following—though by no means exhaustive—reasons: 
A) We would not direct our attention to anything in the first place without our interests 
and thus our drives.  
 
                                               
183 For more ‘consciousness’ and ‘conceptual content’ in Nietzsche, see Katsafanas (2005). 
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B) We would not focus on it long enough to designate it by a communication symbol, 
in the first place, without our interests and thus our drives.  
C) We would not have that communication symbol X stick to it and it alone against the 
constant pressure to replace it, without our interests and thus our drives.  
Our drives have priority over consciousness for explaining our experiences, because our 
awareness precedes the ascription and ‘sticking’ of a communication symbol to the targets 
of our awareness, on which our ‘becoming conscious of something’ depends. We fix a 
communication symbol on the things that interest us; the targets or activities corresponding 
to our drives. In short, our ‘interests’ precede conscious thought. The previous leads him to 
argue that our drives explain why we ascribe a communication symbol to something, which, 
in turn, explains the emergence of consciousness.  
Nietzsche makes another supposition in his account of the emergence or origin of 
consciousness. To know that some pain represents an occurrence on ‘my body’ requires me 
to assume a perspective on myself other than the first-person perspective: 
“One might add that not only language serves as a bridge between persons, but also 
look, touch, and gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense impressions, 
our power to fix them and as it were place them outside of ourselves, has increased in 
proportion to the need to convey them to others by means of signs. The sign-inventing 
person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious of himself; for only 
as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself—he is still doing it, 
and he is doing it more and more.” (GS 354; some emphasis is mine) 
The proposition that we place our sense impressions ‘outside of ourselves’ presumably 
means that we construe them as consequences of the stimulation of our organs, which, in 
turn, we see as objects among other external objects, i.e., Schopenhauer’s objective picture. 
Our self-conception as a body that interacts with other bodies or things finds its root in the 
need to communicate, Nietzsche argues. The will-body identity, which represents the insight 
of self-consciousness, is not miraculous or inexplicable. Contra Schopenhauer, who deems 
it as the “miracle par excellence”, Nietzsche argues that we can explain it as a complex that 
becomes. He breaks the complex up into its individual parts and analyses them historically; 
he considers their origin using his drive psychology: 
“My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an 
individual but rather to the community and herd-aspects of his nature; that 
accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or 
herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the world to 
understand ourselves as individually as possible, ‘to know ourselves’, will always 
bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is ‘non-individual’, that 
which is ‘average’; that due to the nature of consciousness — to the ‘genius of the 
species’ governing it — our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted 
and translated back into the herd perspective.” (GS 354) 
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The conceptual link between the ‘herd perspective’ and becoming conscious of something, 
i.e., the need for communication and ascription of communication symbols to the targets of 
awareness, implies that consciousness arose from communal life and thus its characteristic 
features and pressures.  
In sum, there is a difference between ‘directing our attention to something’ and our 
‘knowing what we are direct our attention towards’, which he explains genealogically. This 
makes sense of the claim that the solitary or predatory person does not need consciousness. 
It is true that a solitary person can attend to something and (re)act without having to ascribe 
a communication symbol to the target of her awareness. Nevertheless, he must explain why 
she did acquire it all the same. I think he has a way of convincing his readers of the previous 
using his distinction between the emergence (or origin) of something and its usefulness or 
final purpose therefrom. Unlike those who need to communicate to survive, i.e., those who 
need it for adaptive, passive or reactive reasons, the solitary person ascribed and then later 
appropriated the communication symbols for wholly active reasons, i.e., to overpower, 
command, overcome, dominate, master and so on. 
 Although the so-called solitary person did not need consciousness, because he did not 
need to communicate, Nietzsche can explain how she was nonetheless instrumental in the 
acquisition of consciousness and how she acquires it for herself, all the same. To elucidate 
the previous, we have to turn our attention to his distinction between the origin of something 
and its final purpose or usefulness: 
“[T]he origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical 
application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that 
anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, 
requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior 
to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, 
dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-
interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning’ [Sinn] and 
‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. No matter how 
perfectly you have understood the usefulness of any physiological organ (or legal 
institution, social custom, political usage, art form or religious rite), you have not yet 
thereby grasped how it emerged… every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to 
power has achieved mastery over something less powerful… the whole history of a 
‘thing’, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, 
continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need 
not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and 
replace one another at random.” (GM II, 16) 
The emergence of consciousness is not restricted to people who needed to communicate ‘to 
survive’. Consciousness can also emerge in those who do not need it to survive or overcome 
circumstantial pressures. In short, ‘adaptation’ is a limited concept that does not capture all 
the distinct ways that something can emerge. Thus, adaptaion is not the only explanation 
available to us when trying to explain the emergence of something.  
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Solitary persons can acquire consciousness for different reasons and thus put it towards 
different ends than survival. The end that Nietzsche has in mind is that of power in the active 
sense. It is possible that the solitary and predatory person engendered the circumstantial 
pressures encountered by the individuals who had to adapt to communal life or encountered 
the need to communicate. Accordingly, the predatory persons can explain the preconditions 
for the emergence of consciousness. His genealogical analysis of what he calls the most 
rudimentary forms of community, i.e., the original ‘state’ formations, claims that predatory 
persons played a fundamental role in their formation.  
In Nietzsche view, the need to communicate stems from our ancestors being forced 
into living in communities and forced to accord to the command-obedience relationships of 
these early communities. Presumably, this meant not contesting the leader and so physically 
stronger member(s) of the community. Their transgressions from the community (and so 
their going against the leaders) resulted in severe retribution or punishment, which he 
construes as the infliction of ‘pain’ (cf. GM II, 4). The previous underpins the ‘terrible must’ 
and sets the conditions in place for the emergence, growth and reliance on ‘consciousness’. 
Some of the conditions he identifies are as follows: 
A) Imprinting of memory by inflicting pain (cf. GM II, 3).  
B) Sharpening the need to communicate and need for reason(s) (cf. GS 354 & GM II, 
16). 
C) Internalising cruelty or the instincts for freedom (GM II, 16).  
I will analyse further these conjectures on the origin of the community in the next chapter 
where I assess morality’s role in self-conscious agency. For now, however, I will focus on 
the supposition that the conditions for consciousness, i.e., the circumstances wherein the 
need to communicate flourished, did not arise from nowhere. Furthermore, these conditions 
were not arbitrary or idiosyncratic natural occurrences to which we passively adapted. They 
arose from the active and expansive will to power of human beings. 
Consciousness emerges against the backdrop of certain conditions and pressures that 
can be ‘uncomfortable and unpleasant’ to ‘more elderly ears’ (cf. GM II, 12), according to 
Nietzsche. We often understand the emergence of something by postulating circumstantial 
pressures and concluding that ‘adaptation’ brought about the behaviour, custom or organ. 
With respect to consciousness, these pressures sharpened the need to communicate and so 
gave rise to the organ that represents consciousness in the organism, for example, the brain 
or a specific function of it. Consciousness arose for the sake of survival or so the common 
naturalist theories proclaim. Nietzsche rejects the proposition that ‘survival’ is the modus 
operandi or driving force of nature that then explains the emergence of anything. Rather, the 
so-called kernel of nature, which we must use to make sense of the emergence or origin of 
something, is what he calls the ‘will to power’. Adaptation is thus a by-product of the ‘will 
to power’.  
Nietzsche rejects the general approach to historical philosophy and insight into the 
emergence of something that relies on ‘adaptation’, but note that, once again, his approach 
is revisionist. It does not reject ‘adaptation’ itself as a phenomenon to which we point and 
 310 
about which we conjecture, but suggests a different conception of the phenomenon. His 
reason for arguing that adaptation is a by-product of the ‘will to power’ is that—contra to 
the theories to which he objects—he construes the will as inherently active and not passive 
or reactive: 
“The democratic idiosyncrasy of being against everything that dominates and wants 
to dominate… the pressure of this idiosyncrasy forces ‘adaptation’ into the 
foreground, which is a second-rate activity, just a reactivity, indeed life itself has been 
defined as an increasingly efficient inner adaptation to external circumstances 
(Herbert Spencer). But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, its will to power, 
we overlook the prime importance that the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, re-
interpreting, re-directing and formative forces have, which ‘adaptation’ follows only 
when they have had their effect; in the organism itself, the dominant role of these 
highest functionaries, in whom the lifewill is active and manifests itself, is denied.” 
(GM II, 12) 
The preconditions for the emergence of consciousness stem from an act of will proper, i.e., 
overpowering, dominating, mastering and so on. In short, the conditions that sharpened the 
need to communicate are contemporaneous with forming a community, which happened by 
an expansive act of will and so through the discharge of willpower, i.e., the ‘will to power’. 
Self-conscious agency follows from what makes a community possible. It follows from that 
which organises people. This organisation brings about the preconditions for sharpening the 
need to communicate, which precedes self-conscious thought. Thus, we should not put the 
cart before the horse in assessing the emergence of consciousness. The need to communicate 
arises from circumstantial pressures, but we cannot ignore the emergence of the previous 
pressures themselves or argue that they arise arbitrarily or are idiosyncratic. These pressures 
did not arise ex nihilo. They are rooted in acts of will: in the overpowering, dominating etc. 
of something or someone by something or someone else. Adaptation follows from or derives 
from these acts of will. The circumstantial pressures that permit adaptation are themselves 
consequences of acts of will.  
Nietzsche’s proposal then is that a community—and the pressures and adaptations 
associated with it—stem from the will to power embodied in individuals who engender the 
preconditions for that community, i.e., they organise people into groups. These individuals 
also bring about the conditions for ‘maintaining’ the previous organisation, as he suggests 
in the following: 
“[T]he shaping of a population, which had up till now been unrestrained and 
shapeless, into a fixed form, as happened at the beginning with an act of violence, 
could only be concluded with acts of violence, - that consequently the oldest ‘state’ 
emerged as a terrible tyranny, as a repressive and ruthless machinery, and continued 
working until the raw material of people and semi-animals had been finally not just 
kneaded and made compliant, but shaped… Whoever can command, whoever is a 
‘master’ by nature, whoever appears violent in deed and gesture - what is he going to 
care about contracts! Such beings cannot be reckoned with, they come like fate, 
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without cause, reason, consideration or pretext, they appear just like lightning 
appears, too terrible, sudden, convincing and ‘other’ even to be hated. What they do 
is to create and imprint forms instinctively, they are the most involuntary, unconscious 
artists there are: - where they appear, soon something new arises, a structure of 
domination [Herrschafis-Gebilde] that lives… They do not know what guilt, 
responsibility, consideration are, these born organisers; they are ruled by that terrible 
inner artist’ egoism which has a brazen countenance and sees itself justified to all 
eternity by the ‘work’, like the mother in her child.” (GM II, 17; some emphasis is 
mine) 
We should attend to Nietzsche’s description of the progenitors’ character. The adverbs and 
adjectives he uses to describe them are revealing: they ‘can command’, they are ‘master by 
nature’, they are ‘violent in deed and gesture’, they are ‘like fate’, they are ‘sudden’, they 
‘create and imprint forms instinctively’, and they experience ‘no guilt, responsibility or 
consideration’.184 The origin of consciousness is an act of will proper. It stems from an 
unconscious urge to overpower, dominate, overcome and so on. Nevertheless, he also warns 
against construing this character’s actions as a reaction to resistance or as an adaptation to 
circumstantial pressures. He describes the creative character as active, rather than reactive: 
the will “grows spontaneously” (GM I, 10) in them. An overwhelming irritability impelling 
an outlet seems to assail them, in Nietzsche’s view. The previous individuals actively seek 
something on which they can imprint, form, overpower, overcome, master and so on.  
In sum, there is a ‘conceptual link’ between consciousness, communication and 
language, according to Nietzsche. He separates consciousness into its constituent parts and 
then traces its root to the most rudimentary form of community, where members experience 
a need to communicate for coordinated action against the backdrop of certain circumstantial 
pressures. He nuances this genealogical account by tracing this need to the formation of a 
community, whose root, or so he claims, was an act of will, i.e., an overpowering, mastering, 
dominating and so on. Accordingly, the acts of will of violent individuals, which form and 
shape a community, i.e., the progenitors of a community who organise people into groups, 
engendered circumstantial pressures that invoked and sharpened the need to communicate. 
They were responsible for that ‘terrible must’ (cf. GS 354) to which he refers.  
In the next chapter, I assess his introduction of morality to the conceptual link, which 
plays an arguably more substantial role in his philosophy. This element is more pertinent to 
the conceptual link and sheds more light on his account of individuality and self-conscious 
agency. Likewise, it sheds more light on how solitary and predatory persons underwent the 
circumstantial pressures of their own invention; those same pressures that they engendered 
to shape communities out of individuals.  
 
                                               
184 Compare these descriptions with the nobles in the first essay: they have “a desire to overthrow, crush, become 
master, to be a thirst for enemies, resistance and triumphs” (GM I, 13; see also GM I, 11).   
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2.9 Self-conscious Agency and the Origin of Morality 
In the previous chapter, I assessed Nietzsche’s views on the origin of consciousness and I 
argued that there is a conceptual link between consciousness, language and communication, 
which we should comprehend using his distinctive method of ‘historical philosophising’. 
He argues that consciousness arises from the need to communicate and thus represents the 
internalisation of communal life, which I will define and refine in this chapter. Moreover, 
communal life arose from an act of will, which plays an irreducible role in explaining the 
emergence of the circumstantial pressures responsible for the emergence of consciousness. 
The previous also explains how solitary and predatory persons partake in the emergence of 
consciousness without necessarily needing to communicate. I will assess how Nietzsche’s 
genealogical analysis goes further than the emergence of consciousness. I will show that he 
introduces morality or moral responsibility into the conceptual link between consciousness, 
communication and language. I begin by identifying the relevant passages demonstrating 
the previous addition to the conceptual link and then assess what he derives from it about 
self-conscious agency.  
Nietzsche introduces ‘morality’ into the conceptual link between consciousness, 
language and communication by demonstrating the explanatory limits and thus the value of 
our linguistic grasp of the world and experiences. As we saw previously, language grows 
out of and represents the need to communicate, so it is persepctive limited what is common 
or communal, i.e., to what we can communicate about our experiences, rather than extending 
fully to our experiences themselves as a whole: 
“Language and the prejudices upon which language is based are a manifold hindrance 
to us when we want to explain inner processes and drives: because of the fact, for 
example, that words really exist only for superlative degrees of these processes and 
drives; and where words are lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation 
because exact thinking there becomes painful; indeed, in earlier times one 
involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased the realm of existence 
ceased also. Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain—all are names for 
extreme states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which 
are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our 
character and our destiny.” (D 115)185 
In the above passage, he suggests that the limits of language are synonymous to those of 
conscious thought. Later in the same passage, however, he adds that the limits of conscious 
 
                                               
185 Compare this quote to the following: “due to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can 
become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world turned into generalities and thereby debased to its 
lowest common denominator, — that everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, 
relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, 
falsification, superficialisation, and generalisation” (GS 354). 
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thought and the limits of language are concomitant with the limits of responsibility. In other 
words, there is a conceptual link between consciousness, communication, language, and 
responsibility: 
“We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which 
alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame…” (D 
115; some emphasis is mine) 
We are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, for Nietzsche, not for who we actually are, 
which is essentially unknowable, but for who we ‘appear’ to be. Compare the above claim 
about the limits of responsibility with the following about the limits of self-knowledge: 
“No one who judges, ‘in this case everyone would have to act like this’ has yet taken 
five steps towards self-knowledge. For he would then know that there neither are nor 
can be actions that are all the same; that every act ever performed was done in an 
altogether unique and unrepeatable way, and that this will be equally true of every 
future act; that all prescriptions of action (even the most inward and subtle rules of all 
moralities so far) relate only to their rough exterior; that these prescriptions may yield 
an appearance of sameness, but only just an appearance; that as one observes or 
recollects any action, it is and remains impenetrable; that our opinions about ‘good’ 
and ‘noble’ and ‘great’ can never be proven true by our actions because every act is 
unknowable; that our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good are certainly 
some of the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions, but that in each 
case, the law of its mechanism is unprovable.” (GS 335) 
Compare the above passage with the following prescription: 
“Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and value 
judgements and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our own: 
let us stop brooding over the ‘moral value of our actions’! Yes, my friends, it is time 
to feel nauseous about some people’s moral chatter about others. Sitting in moral 
judgement should offend our taste. Let us leave such chatter and such bad taste to 
those who have nothing to do but drag the past a few steps further through time and 
who never live in the present — that is, to the many, the great majority!” (GS 335) 
Seemingly, he envisages a sense of responsibility based on the first-person perspective, thus 
on one’s individual experience. To understand the significance of morality in self-conscious 
agency, we should juxtapose it to his so-called “history of the origins of responsibility” (GM 
II, 2).  
Nietzsche breaks down the concept of responsibility into its constituent parts and 
applies his method of historical philosophising to offer an account of it. He does not give a 
clear presentation of these parts, and perhaps we should not expect such a presentation from 
him, but his descriptions are nevertheless illuminating in their own right: 
“[M]an must first have learnt to distinguish between what happens by accident and 
what by design, to think causally, to view the future as the present and anticipate it, 
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to grasp with certainty what is end and what is means, in all, to be able to calculate, 
compute - and before he can do this, man himself will really have to become reliable, 
regular, necessary, even in his own self-image, so that he, as someone making a 
promise is, is answerable for his own future!” (GM II, 1; some emphasis is mine) 
Responsibility requires us to assume a perspective on the world and on ourselves, which is 
synonymous to the objective picture. Unlike Schopenhauer, however, Nietzsche suggests a 
historical understanding of the objective picture as something that has become and therefore 
as emerging from somewhere. He naturalises the explanation of ‘objective picture’ of the 
world along with its subjective correlate, i.e., the impure subject of cognition, and does so 
using his drive psychology. Note that the objective picture requires us to become objective 
ourselves, first, according to Nietzsche. The individual has to view herself objectively, as a 
precondition for her viewing the world objectively or for her attaining the objective picture. 
Schopenhauer comprehends the objective picture in terms of the correlativity between the 
subject and the object (or target) of cognition; so, he does not conceive the subject as having 
become ‘objective’ herself or as having become ‘pure’ by a series of events, pressures and 
her responses to them. Thus, he appeals to logic and metaphysics to explain the correlativity. 
Nietzsche suggests a genealogical explanation. Our self-image has to change before our 
worldview changes. This change makes possible the projection of ourselves onto the targets 
of our awareness. In other words, we have to first become objective before we can project 
‘objecthood’ on the target, which yields the ‘objective (or mechanical) picture’. Therefore, 
making ourselves ‘objective’ is a precondition of perceiving an objective world, according 
to Nietzsche. Moreover, these preconditions also explain how we can change ourselves using 
our self-image (more on this below). Nevertheless, the main proposition is that there are 
preconditions to our acquiring a self-image, in the first place, which he aims to reveal. 
A precondition of our self-image is, as we saw previously, our assuming another’s 
perspective on our actions. Using Nietzsche’s philosophical method, then, we can recognise 
that the previous perspective conceptually links to consciousness, communication, language 
and morality. He calls it the ‘herd perspective’ and argues that ‘historical philosophising’ 
reveals how a human being becomes accustomed to it or acquires it by virtue of communal 
life. We do not just possess it, which is tantamount to claiming that it comes from nowhere. 
Likewise, he does not construe it as the ‘miracle par excellence’, which was Schopenhauer’s 
conception. We acquire it, according to Nietzsche: 
“That particular task of breeding an animal with the prerogative to promise includes, 
as we have already understood, as precondition and preparation, the more immediate 
task of first making man to a certain degree necessary, uniform, a peer amongst peers, 
orderly and consequently predictable. The immense amount of labour involved in 
what I have called the ‘morality of custom’, the actual labour of man on himself 
during the longest epoch of the human race, his whole prehistoric labour, is explained 
and justified on a grand scale, in spite of the hardness, tyranny, stupidity and idiocy 
it also contained, by this fact: with the help of the morality of custom and the social 
straitjacket, man was made truly predictable.” (GM II, 2; some emphasis is mine) 
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Other passages support the proposition that there is a conceptual link between the so-called 
‘herd perspective’, morality and responsibility: 
“You are willing to assume responsibility for everything! Except, that is, for your 
dreams! What miserable weakness, what lack of consistent courage! Nothing is more 
your own than your dreams! Nothing more your own work! Content, form, duration, 
performer, spectator — in these comedies you are all of this yourself! From this I 
conclude that the great majority of mankind must be conscious of having abominable 
dreams. If it were otherwise, how greatly this nocturnal poetising would have been 
exploited for the enhancement of human arrogance!” (D 128)186 
He identifies a conflict between our individual perspective and the herd perspective. In most 
cases, the herd perspective wins the conflict and succeeds in suppressing our individuality 
and the drives that underpin it.  
We notice how the above conflict plays out in the so-called ‘egoism’ of the majority, 
who construe their ‘ego’ as representing their ‘individuality’, but often confuse individuality 
for what they consciously think of themselves, which is a generic representation of who and 
what they are, according to Nietzsche: 
“Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority 
nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for 
the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them 
and has been communicated to them; — as a consequence they all of them dwell in a 
fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical 
evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone 
else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms — which at the same 
time knows how to put on so sober an appearance! ” (D 105) 
In accordance with his rejection of our claims to self-knowledge, he also rejects the claim 
that most of us practice genuine ‘egoism’, which, in the same passage, he describes in the 
following manner: 
“This fog of habits and opinions lives and grows almost independently of the people 
it envelops; it is in this fog that there lies the tremendous effect of general judgments 
about ‘man’ — all these people, unknown to themselves, believe in the bloodless 
abstraction ‘man’, that is to say, in a fiction; and every alteration effected to this 
abstraction by the judgments of individual powerful figures (such as princes and 
philosophers) produces an extraordinary and grossly disproportionate effect on the 
great majority — all because no individual among this majority is capable of setting 
up a real ego, accessible to him and fathomed by him, in opposition to the general 
pale fiction and thereby annihilating it.” (D 105)  
 
                                               
186 Compare this passage with the following: (D 116; BGE 21; WLN 10[83]). 
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He recognises an opposition or conflict between our individuality and the herd perspective, 
which conceptually links to communication, language, consciousness, morality and 
responsibility. Where does this need or imperative to outweigh the herd perspective over our 
individuality come from? Why must we assume the ‘herd perspective’, at all? What grounds 
the need to ‘see ourselves as from without’? Why must we consider another’s perspective 
on our actions, especially prior to our acting as we saw with deliberation and self-conscious 
agency? Why must we allow it to dictate the limits of what we may think, reason or discuss? 
Why do we allow it to distort our individuality and actions? He aims to answer this question 
historically, of course. Where does this need originate; under what conditions and pressures 
did it emerge? What are the drives that underpin its emergence? He rejects Schopenhauer’s 
supposition and the impasses that plagued it. He objects to the claim it originates in the will’s 
fundamental and immutable relation to itself. Where, then, does it originate? 
Nietzsche links the above to morality and construes it in terms of its juxtaposition to 
individuality. Morality is the battleground between an individual and her community and it 
represents the interests of a community. It opposes the ‘individual’ interests of its members:  
“Wherever we encounter a morality, we find an evaluation and ranking of human 
drives and actions. These evaluations and rankings are always the expression of the 
needs of a community and herd: that which benefits it the most — and second most, 
and third most — is also the highest standard of value for all individuals. With 
morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to 
himself only as a function.” (GS 116; my emphasis) 
Other passages show the same account of morality as opposing individuality or subsuming 
it under its ends: 
“The reproach of conscience is weak in even the most conscientious people compared 
to the feeling: ‘This or that is against the morals (die gute Sitte) of your society. Even 
the strongest person still fears a cold look or a sneer on the face of those among whom 
and for whom he has been brought up. What is he really afraid of? Growing solitary! 
This is the argument that refutes even the best arguments for a person or a cause.” 
(GS 50) 
 
“Since the conditions for preserving one community have been very different from 
those of another community, there have been very different moralities; and in view 
of essential changes in herds and communities, states and societies that are yet to 
come, one can prophesy that there will yet be very divergent moralities. Morality is 
herd-instinct in the individual.” (GS 116) 
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The so-called ‘herd instinct’ is our internalising187 the community’s ‘evaluation and ranking 
of human drives and actions’ of which the individual is a member (more on this below). His 
claim is that our community’s values and perspective (i.e., its interests) oppose individuality 
and that they are entrenched in self-conscious thought.  
What Nietzsche calls our individual drives are often in tension or in conflict with our 
‘herd instincts’, i.e., the internalised ‘herd’ or so-called ‘herd perspective’. We internalise 
our community’s values: 
“To be a self, to estimate oneself according to one’s own measure and weight—that 
was contrary to taste in those days. The inclination to this would have been considered 
madness, for every misery and every fear were associated with being alone 
(Alleinsein). Back then, ‘free will’ had bad conscience as its closest neighbour. The 
more unfreely one acted, the more the herd instinct and not the sense of self spoke 
through the action, the more moral one considered oneself. In those days, everything 
that hurt the herd, whether the individual had willed it or not, gave the individual 
pangs of conscience—and his neighbour as well; indeed, the whole herd!” (GS 117)188  
His conception of ‘free will’ is representative of his conception of individuality: freedom of 
will is our acting in accordance with our reason and experience; it means transcending the 
moral values of our community. I will argue in the next chapter that by ‘transcending’ moral 
values, he does not mean negating or rejecting morality or moral values outright. He means 
the weaker or moderate proposition of moral reform or critique of morality. While striving 
for ‘freedom’, however, we experience an internal resistance or reproach of conscience (cf. 
GS 50) and external resistance(s) in the form of our cohabitants or the penal system (cf. GS 
117), which are significant to our analysis. His ‘sovereign’ individual is free from both: 
“…the morality of custom, an autonomous, supra-ethical individual (because 
‘autonomous’ and ‘ethical’ are mutually exclusive) in short, we find a man with his 
own, independent, enduring will, whose prerogative it is to promise… The ‘free’ man, 
the possessor of an enduring, unbreakable will, thus has his own standard of value: in 
the possession of such a will…this rare freedom and power over himself and his 
destiny, has… become an instinct, his dominant instinct: - what will he call his 
dominant instinct, assuming that he needs a word for it? No doubt about the answer: 
this sovereign human being calls it his conscience. . .” (GM II, 2)  
 
                                               
187 More research into Nietzsche’s conception of ‘internalisation’ could help disambiguate this central concept. It 
was first introduced in GM, but passages from other works likewise describe the internalisation of an independent 
authority, and then argue that this constitutes the basis of our conscience and need for morality. Human beings, for 
Nietzsche, internalise the need for an independent authority (or standard) by virtue of their prehistory—a need he 
associates with the herd instinct, which we express by our having to take into account our self-image in deliberating 
on a course of action or by our sense of responsibility as opposed to mere indentity with our actions. The concept 
of an independent authority is an integral part of our self-conception, i.e. the self-conscious ‘I’, which means the 
herd instinct in us has become active and is partaking in our actions. 
188 See also (HHI 243). 
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Notice that Nietzschean ‘individuality’ is not reducible to self-interest, or morality reducible 
to selflessness. Morality represents the interests of the progenitors and thus the leaders of a 
community. To be a ‘sovereign individual’ is not to act in accordance with our self-interest, 
i.e., for the sake of self-preservation (more on these claims below). The latter would mean 
that we should not act in discordance with our community’s evaluations, because it is the 
larger power that threatens our existence or flourishing. Therefore, it is in accordance with 
self-interest to suppress or oppose our individuality, namely, to prevent ourselves from acting 
in such a way that suggests ‘immorality’. Self-interest drives conformity to moral values, 
which oppose our individuality. With the previous, we are in a better position to notice the 
origin of the herd perspective and how it links conceptually to consciousness, language, 
responsibility, but also to morality.  
Nietzsche’s assessment of the origin of the herd perspective starts with psychological 
observations about the limits of language and conscious thought, but it does not stop there.  
He notices a psychological association between ‘pain’ and ‘attempting to overstep the limits 
of what we are able to express linguistically’, i.e., in words and presumably communication 
symbols: 
“[W]here words are lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation 
because exact thinking there becomes painful; indeed, in earlier times one 
involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased the realm of existence 
ceased also…” (D 115) 
Conscious thought compels and thus binds us to what is communicable to other people, i.e., 
words, signs or ‘communication symbols’: pain motivates this compulsion. This compulsion 
is not in accordance with our individual interests, but it might be in accordance with our self-
interest, because the agent who inflicts the pain (or promises to do so) is stronger than the 
individual. The interest of a community or our interest as members of a community, but not 
our ‘individual’ interests underpin the previous. In fact, the pain we experience when we try 
to overstep its limits is set up to oppose ‘individuality’ and thus ‘individual’ interests. Before 
we proceed, I assess Nietzsche’s approach to responsibility and morality in juxtaposition to 
Schopenhauer to show the divergence in their approaches and reasons, but also accentuate 
their distinct philosophical methods. 
Schopenhauer construes actions as stemming from an imperceptible thing in itself, of 
which we have no ‘complete’ or ‘pure’ representation and which he calls the ‘will’. Our 
cognition of it is always through the PSR whose fundamental form is the subject-object 
correlation. This leads him to distinguish between the ‘thing in itself’ (intelligible character) 
from its ‘appearance’ (empirical character). We perceive the effect of an imperceptible thing 
that appears as perceptible actions in a causal order and as subordinate to causal relations, 
as our will. We reassemble these actions using the faculty of reason and so construct a self-
image. Note that his account also permits us to argue that the imperceptible ‘thing’ causes 
our actions or—as he claims when he later introduces his ethical viewpoint—it is responsible 
for their appearance. He rejects the application of causality to the will-body identity, but he 
likewise takes seriously the claim that we are within the causal order like any other object 
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we perceive. He also takes seriously the claim that moral responsibility lies ultimately with 
the will as thing in itself for begetting the world itself and us, by extension. We are subject 
to its laws and necessity.  
Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s approach to causality and necessity. He replaces 
it with a genealogical approach and conception of causality and necessity, which sets their 
explanatory limits. In short, he naturalises them in his sense of the term, which we find in 
the following passage: 
“We should not erroneously objectify “cause” and “effect” like the natural scientists 
do (and whoever else thinks naturalistically these days–) in accordance with the 
dominant mechanistic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it 
“effects” something; we should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts, which 
is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, 
not explanation.” (BGE 21)  
He ascribes a use to the concept of ‘causality’, namely, ‘description’ or ‘communication’ of 
phenomena rather than their explanation. By using ‘communication’ as the primary purpose 
of a causal account, he refers to the conceptual link whose root is the herd perspective. Thus, 
there is an implicit distinction between what we do and how we rationalise, conceptualise, 
describe and thereby communicate our deeds. Causal accounts are limited to what we can 
communicate. He also naturalises Schopenhauer’s distinction between the ‘intelligible’ and 
‘empirical’ character and replaces it with ‘what we as individuals aim for’ and ‘how we 
appear to others in performing the correlative action to our individual aims’. The latter’s 
role in our actions characterises self-conscious agency, for Nietzsche. Schopenhauer’s 
distinction between the urge to do something and the cognition of an object or motive that 
corresponds to that urge does not capture this conflict or opposition between ‘what we as 
individuals aim for’ and ‘how we appear when we perform the correlative action to our 
aims’. According to Nietzsche, the need to communicate opposes individual needs, which 
may be incommunicable or, as we will see shortly, even ‘immoral’. 
Nietzsche strives to avoid the conclusion that the opposition is between our self-
conscious thoughts and the drives (or between reason and passion), which leads us to argue 
that the former are distinct kinds. According to his ontological monism and immanence, 
conscious thought represents the activity of a drive(s) or drive relation. To explain how we 
can ascribe the property of ‘conscious’ to a ‘drive’ he breaks apart consciousness into its 
individual parts and enacts his method of historical philosophising. This method shows that 
consciousness is not ontologically unique with respect to the organism: it refers to certain 
actions or behaviours conceptually linked to communication, language and so on, which he 
explains genealogically. Consciousness is rooted in the drives and stays rooted in them. His 
genealogical analysis leads him to the most rudimentary form of a community, its assembly 
and the means by which its leaders maintained it. Its origin, however, is an act of will or an 
alternative outlet for the will to power.  
More research, critical assessment and debate can go into the above conceptual link 
between language, communication, self-conscious thought and morality; certainly more 
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than I can provide.189 An assessment of these themes and maybe even the approach I suggest 
can prove invaluable for arriving at a clearer picture of Nietzsche’s Weltanschauung. This 
assessment is beyond the scope of my thesis, however. I will focus instead on his conception 
of individuality, morality, objectivity and self-conscious agency against the backdrop of 
Schopenhauer’s conceptions. I hope this will inspire us sufficiently to pave the way for a 
more thorough analysis of these themes and concepts.  
Thus far, I assessed his conception of the origins of consciousness. Now, I will assess 
how self-conscious agency fits with this renewed version of the conceptual link. I will focus 
specifically on the relation between responsibility, morality and self-conscious agency.  
Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche argues, “we can think many, many more things than 
we can do or experience” (D 125).190 Our conscious thoughts over our actions or conscious 
reasons for acting are distinct from the action itself, but not for the same reasons that his 
predecessor suggested. According to Nietzsche, ‘conscious thoughts’ distort individuality. 
If conscious thoughts affect an action, then they are set up to oppose our individuality. They 
achieve their distortion and opposition using our self-image; he summarises it as follows: 
“… there neither are nor can be actions that are all the same; that every act ever 
performed was done in an altogether unique and unrepeatable way, and that this will 
be equally true of every future act; that all prescriptions of action (even the most 
inward and subtle rules of all moralities so far) relate only to their rough exterior; that 
these prescriptions may yield an appearance of sameness, but only just an appearance; 
that as one observes or recollects any action, it is and remains impenetrable; that our 
opinions about ‘good’ and ‘noble’ and ‘great’ can never be proven true by our actions 
because every act is unknowable; that our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is 
 
                                               
189 A text that considers some of these themes at length is Constâncio and Branco (2012). See also Constâncio, 
‘On Consciousness: Nietzsche’s departure from Schopenhauer’ (2011). In developing his views on consciousness, 
we ought to note that ‘communication’ is not limited to language and so to words or letters. It extends to any signs 
we use to refer to something. We should consider his concept of ‘sign’ as extending to all forms of communication, 
as the following passage suggest: “not only language serves as a bridge between persons, but also look, touch, and 
gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense impressions, our power to fix them and as it were place 
them outside of ourselves, has increased in proportion to the need to convey them to others by means of signs. The 
sign-inventing person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious of himself; for only as a social 
animal did man learn to become conscious of himself—he is still doing it, and he is doing it more and more” (GS 
354; see also HHI 216). Nietzsche’s distinction between a sign and a word is a distinction between a broader and 
narrower vehicle for communication—what he also calls the ‘bridge between persons’—makes his claims about 
the role of morality in our lives more all-encompassing. It is not only what we think about ourselves in words that 
he targets for criticism, but also how we do so and that we picture ourselves in the first place. 
190 See also: “[t]he problem of consciousness (or rather, of becoming conscious of something) first confronts us 
when we begin to realise how much we can do without it; and now we are brought to this initial realisation by 
physiology and natural history (which have thus required two hundred years to catch up with Leibniz's precocious 
suspicion). For we could think, feel, will, remember, and also ‘act’ in every sense of the term, and yet none of all 
this would have to 'enter our consciousness' (as one says figuratively)” (GS 354).  
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good are certainly some of the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions, 
but that in each case, the law of its mechanism is unprovable. (GS 335)191 
Contra epiphenomenalist-eliminativist readings, conscious thought does partake in our 
actions. The conceptual link suggests that the ‘herd perspective’ underpins it: our “opinions 
about ‘good’ and ‘noble’ and ‘great’” are, he claims, “powerful levers in the machinery of 
our actions” (GS 335). What we consciously think of ourselves and thus how our actions 
‘appear’ makes a substantial difference to the actions that we undertake. 
The opposition Nietzsche sets up is not between conscious thoughts and the drive 
complex, but between two or more drives. He identifies the ‘drive’ towards our individual 
ends (or individual drives) and the ‘drive’ to communicate our ends to other individuals and 
members of our community (i.e., the herd instincts or herd perspective), along with what is 
implied or follows this communication. Consciousness or becoming conscious of something 
is a drive or it represents the activity of a drive, i.e., the drive to communicate. It introduces 
a self-image distorted or shaped by our community’s needs and values to the ‘machinery of 
our actions’. Accordingly, it undermines our reasons and experiences. Individuality does 
not arise from self-conscious thought and we cannot attribute it to self-conscious thought. 
Our experience and reason, which he calls “the gods which are in us” (D 35) constitute our 
individuality. They refer to actions we can and do undertake in relation to the circumstances 
we are in and thus in accordance with our understanding of them, but also to our will to 
power and its limits (cf. HH Pref., 6). Let us look at the textual evidence that offers an insight 
into and disambiguates these claims.  
In certain passages, Nietzsche introduces what calls the ‘image of the action’ in a 
discussion on his views on responsibility. The ‘image of the action’ refers to how the action 
appears to the third-person onlooker, i.e., the herd perspective; it refers to our self-image. 
Furthermore, it represents how our community’s values partake in the ‘machinery’ of our 
actions; it does so by impelling us to assess whether or not our action depicts a moral or an 
immoral character and so how our cohabitants might or will react to it. He describes it as 
follows: 
“But thought is one thing, and deed another, and the image of a deed yet another. The 
wheel of motive does not roll between them. An image made this pale human pale. 
He was equal to his deed when he committed it, but he could not bear its image once 
he had done it. From then on he always saw himself as the doer of one deed. I call this 
madness: the exception reversed itself to the essence. A streak in the dirt stops a hen 
cold; the stroke he executed stopped his poor reason cold – madness after the deed I 
call this.” (Z, ‘Criminal’, 26; my emphasis)  
 
                                               
191 See also: “[a]ctions are never what they appear to us to be! We have expended so much labour on learning that 
external things are not as they appear to us to be — very well! the case is the same with the inner world! Moral 
actions are in reality 'something other than that' — more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown” 
(D 116).  
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The ‘image of the action’ does not mean our reason for acting or the action itself; it refers 
to how our action ‘appears’ as from a perspective other than our own. In the same passage, 
he describes the other side of this relation, which sheds further light on the ‘image’: 
“Listen, you judges! There is still another madness, and it is before the deed. Oh, you 
did not crawl deeply enough into this soul! Thus speaks the red judge: “Why did this 
criminal kill? He wanted to rob.” But I say to you: his soul wanted blood, not robbery. 
He thirsted for the bliss of the knife! But his poor reason did not comprehend this 
madness and it persuaded him. “What does blood matter?” it said. “Don’t you at least 
want to commit robbery in the process? Take revenge?” And so he listened to his poor 
reason, like lead its speech lay upon him – and he robbed as he murdered. He did not 
want to be ashamed of his madness. And now the lead of his guilt lies on him again, 
and again his poor reason is so stiff, so paralysed, so heavy.” (Z, ‘Criminal’: 26; my 
emphasis) 
His introducting ‘shame’ into his picture of self-conscious agency is not idiosyncratic to the 
above point and example, but, I will argue, fundamental to his views on the moral features 
of self-conscious agency. Let us elaborate on the above.    
To aid us with recognising the above, recall how Schopenhauer thinks our self-image 
partakes in our actions. He recognises its role in our conscience; specifically, in the remorse 
or guilt we experience over what we have done, which thus becomes a motive against future 
actions. The memory of past actions can potentially become a motive for future actions, for 
Schopenhauer. Nietzsche accepts the premise that memory of past actions affects our future 
actions, but he has a different explanation of it.  
Nietzsche breaks down ‘shame’ into its constituent parts and analyses it similarly to 
what he does with consciousness. I will follow this strategy and approach to philosophical 
problems throughout my reading of his propositions and arguments. I will draw a tripartite 
distinction based on the above to demonstrate his genealogical account of shame. Firstly, 
the claim that we are ‘equal’ to our actions purportedly means we identify with them as our 
own. Moreover, he clarifies elsewhere that our actions refer to a need we have even if the 
need is not individual, i.e., ‘unique’ or ‘original’. Compare ‘being equal to our actions’ with 
the following passage:   
“No man has ever done anything that was done wholly for others and with no personal 
motivation whatever; how, indeed, should a man be able to do something that had no 
reference to himself, that is to say lacked all inner compulsion (which would have its 
basis in a personal need)? How could the ego act without the ego?” (HHI 133; some 
emphasis is mine)   
We are ‘equal’ to our actions means we ‘identify’ with them and recognise them as ours; 
they refer exclusively to us as opposed to someone or something else. This differs from our 
‘thoughts’ even if the target of a thought is an action we undertook. Nietzsche distinguishes 
thoughts from actions presumably using the supposition that not all thoughts correspond or 
lead to an action: ‘we can think more than we can do’ (cf. D 125). He also distinguishes two 
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kinds of ‘thoughts’. First, thought refers to immediate appraisals of circumstances or things, 
i.e., aversions or inclinations aimed at something. These thoughts do not require us to ascribe 
a ‘communication symbol’ to the target; they are not conscious. Secondly, ‘thoughts’ can 
also refer to conscious thoughts and so follow from ascription of a ‘communication symbol’ 
or ‘concept’ to the target. In short, conscious thoughts represent what we are able or driven 
to communicate about something; they represent what we are able or driven to communicate 
about ourselves in relation to something.  
Following what we said about the conceptual link, we can construe conscious thoughts 
as our introducing the herd perspective to our thoughts and actions. The difference between 
them is therefore their ‘communicability’. In sum, we can respond to a circumstance or thing 
in two ways, according to Nietzsche:  
A) We can respond immediately without ascribing a communication symbol to targets 
of awareness.  
B) The herd perspective can mediate or partake in our response, which means ascribing 
a communication symbol to them.  
The above distinction between two kinds of thoughts often leads us to conclude that B 
represents a distinct kind of activity from the drives that we cannot explain in terms of the 
drives. I endeavoured to demonstrate that Nietzsche rejects this conclusion, in principle and 
in accordance with his ontological commitments. Likewise, I tried to show that B represents 
an ‘acquired’ activity explicable in terms of drives. The affect that follows ‘how we appear 
in doing something’—e.g., the feeling of ‘shame’—implies the activity of a drive, which 
we inherit from our ancestors and the pain they endured when adjusting to and learning to 
thrive in communal life. We feel the pain they felt when they acted against a community’s 
interests or conversely the pleasure they felt when they benefitted their community. 
Nevertheless, ‘contrary to or in accordance with their masters’ is a more apt description of 
the grounds on which our ancestors felt this pleasure and pain, according to his genealogical 
perspective. It describes the agents who inflicted this pain on our ancestors or who bestowed 
them with freedoms and rights (i.e., the powers), which were not enjoyed by others.  
In comparing Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s approaches to guilt, we notice that 
Schopenhauer overlooks an important consideration that may be useful for resolving his 
impasse in ascetic resignation. We can portray this consideration via the following question: 
if the will responds to its own self-image and makes a motive of its own past actions, then 
what accounts for the guilt we feel over what we will? To make sense of guilt in accordance 
with Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will, we have to presuppose another part of the will 
that aims at its own negation, that is, the will to be someone else. Schopenhauer construes 
guilt as representing dissatisfaction with our character following our self-knowledge. We 
recognise that ‘we are what we will’ and are fated to will it indefinitely. From this recognition 
grows (somehow) the dissatisfaction and self-negation that typifies guilt. Schopenhauer 
struggles to explain where this dissatisfaction comes from or what grounds it, using his 
philosophy of the will without paradox. Such an explanation is beyond the limited scope of 
his concepts, because he construes the will (and one’s temperament) as fixed quantities that 
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permit no change. The will-body identity is the “miracle par excellence” (WR, 126) that we 
cannot explain by appealing to something other than this identity. He sometimes construes 
it as self-abolition of the will and not its abolition by the intellect or by something else. The 
previous confuses his readers about the distinction between the will and intellect. Nietzsche, 
however, believes that adherence to ontological monism and immanence entails that it can 
only emerge from the ‘will’, but revises the concept ‘will’ to refer to a complex of competing 
drives. Following his revised conception, he argues that genealogical analysis explains this 
‘will to be someone else’.  
Schopenhauer’s ‘rage for generalisation’ and thus his ‘metaphysical need’ prevents 
him from considering a genealogical explanation of conscience and what sorts of actions, 
attitudes and moods arise from it, i.e., guilt, remorse, pride, shame, responsibility and so on. 
The core element of this genealogical account is the introduction of a new concept, which 
aims to demonstrate how actionsthat arise from circumstantial pressures or from the internal 
pressures of the will to power, become drives over time. He calls it the ‘internalisation of 
man’. The clearest definition of it I found is as follows:  
“All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards—this is what I call the 
internalisation of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his 
‘soul’. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two 
layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height 
in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man’s instincts was 
obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organisations protected 
themselves against the old instincts of freedom - punishments are a primary instance 
of this kind of bulwark - had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving 
man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of 
pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying—all this was pitted against the person 
who had such instincts…” (GM II, 16) 
In earlier passages, he describes the above as the process whereby action becomes a custom 
and lastly a drive, which an individual’s offspring or a community’s successors presumably 
inherit:   
“In conditions obtaining before the existence of the state the individual can act harshly 
and cruelly for the purpose of frightening other creatures: to secure his existence 
through such fear-inspiring tests of his power. Thus does the man of violence, of 
power, the original founder of states, act when he subjugates the weaker. His right to 
do so is the same as the state now relegates to itself; or rather, there exists no right 
that can prevent this from happening. The ground for any kind of morality can then be 
prepared only when a greater individual or a collective individuality, for example 
society, the state, subjugates all other individuals, that is to say draws them out of 
their isolation and orders them within a collective. Morality is preceded by 
compulsion, indeed it is for a time itself still compulsion, to which one accommodates 
oneself for the avoidance of what one regards as unpleasurable.  Later it becomes 
custom, later still voluntary obedience, finally almost instinct: then, like all that has 
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for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with pleasure—and is now 
called virtue.” (HHI 99; some emphasis is mine)  
He speculates that, at some point, human beings were what he calls ‘semi-animals’. These 
‘semi-animals’ were organised forcibly into a state or community by stronger individuals 
who were prone to outbursts of will to power, which drove them to imprint themselves on 
something or someone else. This forced organisation made possible the emergence of the 
state and finally consciousness, but also the so-called ‘bad conscience’.192  
The ‘bad conscience’ is Nietzsche’s revised conception the self-negating parts of our 
conscience, namely, our shame, remorse, guilt and even ascetic resignation (or negation of 
the will to life). His account of it is genealogical. It emerges from circumstantial pressures:  
“It must have been no different for these semi-animals, happily adapted to the 
wilderness, war, the wandering life and adventure than it was for the sea animals when 
they were forced to either become land animals or perish - at one go, all instincts were 
devalued and ‘suspended’. Now they had to walk on their feet and ‘carry themselves’, 
whereas they had been carried by the water up till then: a terrible heaviness bore down 
on them. They felt they were clumsy at performing the simplest task, they did not 
have their familiar guide any more for this new, unknown world, those regulating 
impulses that unconsciously led them to safety - the poor things were reduced to 
relying on thinking, inference, calculation, and the connecting of cause with effect, that 
is, to relying on their ‘consciousness’, that most impoverished and error-prone organ! 
I do not think there has ever been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden 
discomfort, - and meanwhile, the old instincts had not suddenly ceased to make their 
demands! But it was difficult and seldom possible to give in to them: they mainly had 
to seek new and as it were underground gratifications.” (GM II, 16; my emphasis) 
‘Internalisation’ is the process by which we acquire new drives from those actions we are 
forced or urged to undertake due to circumstantial pressures and-or our inherent and active 
will to power. My focus henceforth will be on whether or not internalisation can explain 
how we acquire the herd perspective.  
Nietzsche’s supposition is that communal life brought with it limitations or resistances 
to our ancestors’ individual drives. Some of their drives represented the inherited actions of 
their nomadic lives prior to becoming organised into a community. These were contrary to 
their community and endangered its maintenance, flourishing or survival. Their individual 
actions gave rise to conflicts that required resolution to preserve the community and ensure 
that it flourished. These conflicts were resolved in the interest of the community, excluding 
the ‘individual’ interests of the conflicting parties. As we will see below, his conception of 
a community’s ‘interest’ is more nuanced than the previous.  
Our ancestors underwent a process that meant they were forced into communal life. 
Part of adjusting into this life entailed forgoing some of their actions and thus blocking their 
 
                                               
192 For more on Nietzsche’s concept of ‘bad conscience’ see Risse (2001).  
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drives. If they did not forgo these actions and learned to discharge those drives in a different 
manner, i.e., sought alternative outlets for them, they risked the infliction of pain, the loss 
of their property (or their life) or the loss of their place in the community and the benefits it 
afforded (cf. GM II, 3-5). The previous painful consequences of their individual actions were 
demonstrated regularly to them. They served as signs representing what follows if and when 
one acted contrary to the community and its interests. Thus, there emerged a psychological 
association between doing ‘X’ and ‘feeling pain’.  
Nietzsche, then, speculates that an ‘interest’ in opposing one’s individual drives was 
“burnt in” (GM II, 3), or certain psychological associations led them to redirect some of their 
drives to other targets and activities: 
“‘How do you give a memory to the animal, man? How do you impress something 
upon this partly dull, partly idiotic, inattentive mind, this personification of 
forgetfulness, so that it will stick?’… ‘A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the 
memory: only something that continues to hurt stays in the memory’ - that is a 
proposition from the oldest (and unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on 
earth…When man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened 
without blood, torments and sacrifices: the most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits (the 
sacrifice of the first-born belongs here), the most disgusting mutilations (for example, 
castration), the cruellest rituals of all religious cults (and all religions are, at their most 
fundamental, systems of cruelty) - all this has its origin in that particular instinct 
which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics.” (GM II, 3) 
Adjusting to their community entailed undergoing the process of acquiring memory, which, 
as we see by his description, happened through enduring pain or violence. He is also quick 
to point out this memory’s relationship to asceticism: 
“[T]he whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas have to be made ineradicable, 
ubiquitous, unforgettable, ‘fixed’, in order to hypnotise the whole nervous and 
intellectual system through these ‘fixed ideas’ - and ascetic procedures and lifestyles 
are a method of freeing those ideas from competition with all other ideas, of making 
them ‘unforgettable’.” (GM II, 3) 
It is not too farfetched to suggest that such statements further demonstrate the direction he 
takes in revising Schopenhauer’s conceptions and in overcoming his impasses.   
The community, then, praised the ‘good’ and punished—inflicted pain or torment 
on—the ‘bad’. Our ancestors internalised this process of praise and punishment—or, as we 
will shortly see, command and obedience—but what they internalised was not only a process 
of praising and punishing, but equally what the community—meaning its leaders—praised 
as good and punished as bad. They internalised the targets that the leaders denoted as ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ as well as the activity of praising and punishing. What they praised and punished 
was not ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for the individual, but (presumably) for the community. It was what 
the community assumed was good and bad for it, which formed the content of punishment 
and praise, i.e., what determined its values and what it identified with as its conditions for 
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existence or flourishing. We should not assume that old communities operated with some 
abstract conception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for all, that is, that they had egalitarian conceptions 
of a community’s interests. They did not determine what was to count as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
in accordance with the interests of its members, which it first construed as an aggregate of 
individuals. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ was not democratically determined, according to Nietzsche. 
What then determined its values?  
Nietzsche’s claim is that the so-called ‘noble’ or ‘despotic’ individuals imprinted 
themselves and set the foundation of a community, its values and the system through which 
they praised and punished individual members. These despotic individuals also set in place 
the conditions needed to preserve the previous values. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ for the community 
represented what was in accordance with the noble, ruling or despotic individual(s) who set 
themselves up as superior in rank and maintained their superiority by strength, conquest, 
the preferential treatment of some members and the infliction of pain on others. Thus, they 
commanded through acts of violence and through an in-group systems of punishment and 
reward. These initial communities, along with their values, were copies of the conditions for 
existence or flourishing of the warring, noble, ruling, violent and despotic ‘semi-animals’ 
that founded them. Accordingly, the origin of a community is this imprinting of oneself on 
something, including imprinting on others, as is the origin of morality. Nietzsche construes 
a morality as an extension of a community’s values:  
“Man, in whatever situation he may find himself, needs a kind of valuation by means 
of which he justifies, i.e., self-glorifies, his actions, intentions and states towards 
himself and, especially, towards his surroundings. Every natural morality is the 
expression of one kind of man’s satisfaction with himself: and if one needs praise, 
one also needs a corresponding table of values according the highest esteem to those 
actions of which we are most capable, in which our real strength expresses itself. 
Where we are strongest is where we wish to be seen and honoured.” (WLN 35[17]) 
 
“Morality is the doctrine of the order of men’s rank, and consequently also of the 
significance of their actions and works for this order of rank: thus, the doctrine of 
human valuations in respect of everything human. Most moral philosophers only 
present the order of rank that rules now; on the one hand lack of historical sense, on 
the other they are themselves ruled by the morality which teaches that what is at 
present is eternally valid. The unconditional importance, the blind self-centredness, 
with which every morality treats itself wants there not to be many moralities, it wants 
no comparison and no criticism, but rather unconditional belief in itself.” (WLN 35[5]) 
Individuals create, preserve and internalise a community’s values, which derive from the 
actions of those who organised it, shaped it and maintained it. Morality is the internalisation 
of the rank order of values of a community. The following passage reveals further the origin 
of morality, i.e., its creators, organisers and rulers: 
“Instead it has been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-
placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as 
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good, I mean first-rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and 
plebeian. It was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create 
values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern! The 
standpoint of usefulness is as alien and inappropriate as it can be to such a heated 
eruption of the highest rank-ordering and rank-defining value judgments: this is the 
point where feeling reaches the opposite of the low temperatures needed for any 
calculation of prudence or reckoning of usefulness, - and not just for once, for one 
exceptional moment, but permanently. The pathos of nobility and distance, as I said, 
the continuing and predominant feeling of complete and fundamental superiority of a 
higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to those ‘below’ - that is the origin of 
the antithesis ‘good’ and ‘bad’. (The seigneurial privilege of giving names even 
allows us to conceive of the origin of language itself as a manifestation of the power 
of the rulers: they say ‘this is so and so’, they set their seal on everything and every 
occurrence with a sound and thereby take possession of it, as it were).” (GM I, 2) 
Equally, he makes the same proposition, but without the same rhetorical or descriptive terms 
like ‘nobles’, ‘rulers’, ‘might’ etc. in his earlier work: 
“…morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, of 
whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving 
and evaluating… Judged by the standard of these conditions, if an action is performed 
not because tradition commands it but for other motives (because of its usefulness to 
the individual, for example), even indeed for precisely the motives which once 
founded the tradition, it is called immoral and is felt to be so by him who performed 
it: for it was not performed in obedience to tradition. What is tradition? A higher 
authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because 
it commands.” (D 9) 
Morality is rooted in our ancestors’ first internalising the command-obedience relationship 
underpinning a community and then being able to obey with the need for a command. The 
community’s values represent the individual interests of despotic, founding, commanding, 
ruling, mastering, organising and maintaining individuals, which are then transferred into a 
morality. He puts it in the following way: 
“…the oldest ‘state’ emerged as a terrible tyranny, as a repressive and ruthless 
machinery, and continued working until the raw material of people and semi-animals 
had been finally not just kneaded and made compliant, but shaped. I used the word 
‘state’: it is obvious who is meant by this - some pack of blond beasts of prey, a 
conqueror and master race, which, organised on a war footing, and with the power to 
organise, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace which, though it might 
be vastly greater in number, is still shapeless and shifting. In this way, the ‘state’ 
began on earth: I think I have dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a 
‘contract’. Whoever can command, whoever is a ‘master’ by nature, whoever appears 
violent in deed and gesture - what is he going to care about contracts!” (GM II, 17) 
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The origin of a community is found in command-obedience relationships: the ‘punishment’, 
‘violence’, ‘war’, ‘force’, ‘command’, ‘shaping’, ‘imprinting’ etc. on something (or 
someone) that characterises such relationships. The enforcement of compliance on those 
who are currently unable (or unwilling) to comply characterises the foundations and even 
the means of preservation of these rudimentary communities. Thus, morality represents the 
community’s interest, albeit it is a ‘late fruit’ of the latter.  
Using the conceptual link, we notice how and why Nietzsche speculates that the 
‘enforcement of compliance’ in the early forms of a community is likewise what gave rise 
to communication, coordinated action, language, self-conscious thought and self-conscious 
agency. In addition, it gave rise to responsibility and morality in the way we—meaning the 
Europeans of his day—had begun to understand it, namely, as acting in accordance with the 
compassion rooted in our nature as demonstrated by the benevolent principles which guide 
our conscience.  
In sum, once the community is established, the ruling or despotic individuals who 
shaped it had to maintain it, which they succeeded using psychological associations between 
infliction of pain and some actions. The previous forced individual members to redirect their 
drives inwardly, which enabled the herd perspective and what stems from it: consciousness, 
deliberation, a self-image and so on. He describes it as follows:  
“The worse man’s memory has been, the more dreadful his customs have appeared; 
in particular, the harshness of the penal law gives a measure of how much trouble it 
had in conquering forgetfulness, and preserving a few primitive requirements of social 
life in the minds of these slaves of the mood and desire of the moment.” (GM II, 3) 
 
“Those terrible bulwarks with which state organisations protected themselves against 
the old instincts of freedom - punishments are a primary instance of this kind of 
bulkwark - had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were 
turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, 
raiding, changing and destroying - all this was pitted against the person who had such 
instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’.” (GM II, 16; my emphasis) 
One such action, which an individual had to avoid for his community’s sake, is the one we 
recognise in our current communal lives: violent, physical aggression aimed at another 
member of a community. The community did not forbid aggression itself, but the aggression 
that stemmed from one’s individual interest. They forbade some members from hurting other 
members of a community for their own interest and punished those who did. Nevertheless, 
it permitted some of its members to perform violent acts and thus discharge their aggression, 
albeit in accordance with the community’s interests or the customary ways of violating other 
members. The previous represents the emergence of a cleft between the community and the 
individual. This cleft typifies his ongoing objections to morality and its consequences to our 
lives, which he describes in the following manner: 
“Every individual action, every individual mode of thought arouses dread; it is 
impossible to compute what precisely the rarer, choicer, more original spirits in the 
 330 
whole course of history have had to suffer through being felt as evil and dangerous, 
indeed through feeling themselves to be so. Under the dominion of the morality of 
custom, originality of every kind has acquired a bad conscience; the sky above the 
best men is for this reason to this very moment gloomier than it need be.” (D 9; some 
emphasis is mine) 
The above ‘dread’ represents the activity of a drive whose origin is what our ancestors 
underwent before they finally internalised their customs; before they finally learned to obey 
willingly after they were forced to obey via infliction of pain. When an individual internalises 
forced obedience to custom, she then associates her own aggression—prior to enacting it as 
violent actions—with the reciprocity of violence by someone or something else (e.g., ‘God’, 
‘state’, the ‘law’, the ‘masters’ etc.). She blocks an impending aggressive action after she 
recognises or becomes conscious of it. What motivates her to do this is the memory of past 
actions and therefore the pain she endured after having acted in a specific way. Instead, she 
now discharges the aggression on herself in anticipation of the pain she will endure if she 
aims it at another. Let us use one of Nietzsche’s examples to elucidate the previous, which 
is admittedly difficult to follow.  
Nietzsche’s proposition is that our ancestors associated the urge to hurt something 
with hurt itself, i.e., with pain. They felt pain with every urge to hurt something that sprung 
after they became ‘conscious’ of the urge to hurt against or contrary to the customary ways 
of hurting that typifies their community. Effectively, this means they redirected their ‘urge 
to hurt something’ to the source of their urges, i.e., to themselves and so to their body. They 
hurt themselves after they became conscious of the urge to hurt something or someone. They 
may not recognise they hurt themselves to avoid the hurt meted out by their community if 
they discharged their aggression on one of its members for their individual interest. What 
they are doing once they internalise the command-obedience relationship may be simply re-
enacting or replaying this relationship within themselves. They copied their relationship to 
their masters and, then, did to themselves what their masters did to them after discharging 
their urge to hurt something or someone ‘wrongly’, meaning aiming it at their masters or in 
opposition to them. Nietzsche was not clear on the previous, but I think his propositions 
imply it. How do the previous speculations relate to his account of self-conscious agency? 
To demonstrate this relationship we have to relate the above to the ‘conceptual link’. To do 
so effectively, I briefly return to his tripartite distinction. 
Nietzsche’s views on agency can be broken down into the relationship between three 
distinct concepts: the ‘action itself’, the ‘thought about the action’ and the ‘image of the 
action’. We should read the ‘thought about the action’ as the inclination to act in a specific 
manner, which represents an activity and so a relation between drives. The ‘image of the 
action’ refers to how an action appears as from the herd perspective. To demonstrate how 
the previous fits with our discussion on self-conscious agency, I will analyse his example 
of the so-called ‘pale criminal’: 
“Listen, you judges! There is still another madness, and it is before the deed. Oh, you 
did not crawl deeply enough into this soul! Thus speaks the red judge: “Why did this 
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criminal kill? He wanted to rob.” But I say to you: his soul wanted blood, not robbery. 
He thirsted for the bliss of the knife! But his poor reason did not comprehend this 
madness and it persuaded him. “What does blood matter?” it said. “Don’t you at least 
want to commit robbery in the process? Take revenge?” And so he listened to his poor 
reason, like lead its speech lay upon him - and he robbed as he murdered. He did not 
want to be ashamed of his madness. And now the lead of his guilt lies on him again, 
and again his poor reason is so stiff, so paralysed, so heavy. If only he could shake 
his head, then his burden would roll off - but who could shake this head?” (Z, 
‘Criminal’: 26; my emphasis) 
The affect of ‘shame’ plays a substantial role in Nietzsche’s comprehension of how morality 
features in our actions, especially after its basis in God, the afterlife and the free will, have 
become untenable to him. The previous constitutes his revisionist account of the foundations 
of morality and the grounds for its continued effect on us. He identifies the drive that shame 
represents and, subsequently, inquires into its origin. His supposition follows the principle 
that actions represent or they refer to a ‘personal need’, that is, they represent the activity or 
the existence of a drive (cf. HHI 133).  
Notice in the above passage that the ‘pale criminal’ decides to rob his victim after he 
experiences the urge to murder her. He changes his initial action by blocking the drive that 
impels him to murder her; he blocks it long enough to consider the action ‘to rob’ her. What, 
then, impels the criminal to change his urge to murder by performing a seemingly senseless 
action in light of this urge to murder? He sought to ameliorate his shame after recognising 
he feels ‘bliss at the knife’, which presumably means he ‘enjoys killing’. The pale criminal 
performs a senseless action with respect to his urge to kill to ameliorate his shame over his 
enjoyment of killing. He ‘thirsted for the bliss of the knife’, but he is ashamed of it. Why 
would he be ashamed of something that he wants to do? Shame is linked conceptually to a 
perspective on ourselves that is not our own, that is, it does not stem from our ‘individuality’. 
It stems from how we appear by virtue our actions and urges. It represents the activity of 
the herd perspective and herd instincts in our deliberations. He is ashamed of partaking in 
the ‘madness’ or ‘immorality’ attached to individuals who feel ‘blissful’ when murdering 
another. Consequently, he complements his urge to kill with an action that appears to third-
person observers or to the bystanders as something other than the immorality or madness of 
killing for joy. By doing son, he made it possible for others to perceive and conceive of his 
action not as aiming to murder, but as aiming to rob. He permits others to construe his 
murder as ‘accidental’ to his urges, not as fundamental to them. His shame over recognising 
that he finds pleasure in killing underpins his decision to rob the individual he wants to kill. 
He robs her to rationalise or justify his urge to kill. Yet, the previous is not strictly limited 
to how others perceive him, because after he internalises the herd perspective, he can assume 
that perspective is his own and confuse it for his own. Accordingly, to prevent ‘himself’ 
from recognising that he de facto finds bliss in killing, or to ameliorate the painful feeling 
of shame at recognising his apparent bloodlust, he resorts to self-deception.  
Nietzsche’s drive psychology construes the pale criminal actions and self-deceptions 
as as reflecting how competing drives resolve their conflict: the drive to kill competes with 
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the drive to appear moral or sane. The affect of shame represents the competition between 
the previous two drives.193 However, the drive that explains why he is ashamed of what he 
wants to do is conceptually linked to the herd perspective.  
Why should the pale criminal be interested in ‘how he appears’ if the primary 
perspective on his actions that is of any consequence to him is his own, i.e., the perspective 
of someone who finds killing blissful? He seemingly would not. Yet, ‘how he appears’, that 
is, his self-image, does concern him enough to alter his action, but it does not reflect his own 
perspective on his actions. It reflects another’s perspective on him. Accordingly, we can ask 
why is another’s perspective an integral part of his own, such that he even confuses it for 
his own perspective, especially when he ‘rationalises’ his urges. Why does this perspective 
harbour such authority over his own perspective as an individual?  
The central claim is that shame represents the herd perspective that has become herd 
instinct in him. Nietzsche explains the previous using his concept of ‘internalisation’: the 
pain associated with doing something against one’s community (or masters) was burnt into 
the pale criminal’s ancestors, which he inherited and which has become instinct in him, i.e., 
the herd instinct. His ancestors endured considerable pain prior to acquiring the memory of 
pain, which finally permitted them to block and redirect drives associated with the actions 
whose reactions by the masters were the infliction of ‘pain’. Where they failed to redirect a 
drive to external objects, they redirected it toward themselves; they aimed them at their own 
bodies. Consequently, his analysis of guilt is more nuanced and far richer in psychological 
content and insight than is Schopenhauer’s, but at the expense of being highly speculative. 
His account requires more effort to defend.  
The affect of ‘shame’194 (also vanity and pride) is a recurring aspect of Nietzsche’s 
account of morality and self-conscious agency. The focus of the philosophical commentary 
on this emotion in Nietzsche is insufficient, in my view. Its significance to him is clear when 
he voices his concern over how morality affects us as individuals, albeit he focuses primarily 
on the ascetic ideal that underpins the particular morality in question:  
“The heavens darkened over man in direct proportion to the increase in his feeling 
shame at being man… - I mean the sickly mollycoddling and sermonising, by means 
of which the animal ‘man’ is finally taught to be ashamed of all his instincts.” (GM 
II, 7; my emphasis)  
 
                                               
193 Nietzsche has an alternative approach to how our self-conception affects our actions and choices that is less on 
the side of the criminal, but still self-deceptive. See for example, “How many actions have been done, not because 
they were chosen as the most rational, but because when they occurred to us they in some way tickled our vanity 
and ambition, so that we stuck with them and blindly carried them out! In this way they increase our belief in our 
own character and our good conscience, and thus in general our strength: while the choice of the most rational 
course keeps alive scepticism towards us and to this extent a feeling of weakness” (D 301).   
194 There are three aphorisms in GS where Nietzsche asks himself three questions, i.e., ‘what is humane?’, ‘whom 
do you call bad?’ and ‘what represents freedom?’, and for each one he gives an answer with respect to ‘shame’ 
(cf. GS 273-5). Shame is a central, but underappreciated aspect of Nietzsche’s normative views on agency and 
ethics. For more on ‘shame’ see especially the following passages (HHI, 81 & 100; HHII, 69; D 364, 366 & 539; 
GS 76, 77 & 359; BGE 40 & 65; NCW 239; WLN 10[33], 10[45], 10[47], 10[53] & 10 [145]). 
  333 
Compare the above with what he says about the so-called ‘healthy’ who are subjected to the 
pangs of conscience based on the morality of compassion and the ascetic ideal:  
“Doubtless if they succeeded in shoving their own misery, in fact all misery, on to the 
conscience of the happy: so that the latter eventually start to be ashamed of their 
happiness and perhaps say to one another: ‘It's a disgrace to be happy! There is too 
much misery!’” (GM III, 14; my emphasis).  
His critique of morality targets its effect on individuality. Human beings internalise the 
values of a community through the psychological associations engendered by the infliction 
of pain. Using their body as a target, they now re-enact what they underwent while becoming 
accustomed to communal life. Internalisation, then, is the movement from an action based 
on its circumstantial pressures, to a custom and finally a drive. Later, the agent confuses her 
community’s interest for her individual interest. 
Our self-image stems from and represents our community’s interest, but only if we 
continue to be passively obedient to it, according to Nietzsche: 
“Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority 
nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for 
the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them 
and has been communicated to them; — as a consequence they all of them dwell in a 
fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical 
evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone 
else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms — which at the same 
time knows how to put on so sober an appearance! This fog of habits and opinions 
lives and grows almost independently of the people it envelops; it is in this fog that 
there lies the tremendous effect of general judgments about ‘man’—all these people, 
unknown to themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction ‘man’, that is to say, in 
a fiction.” (D 105)  
One example of this is our identifying with a profession. Note that not all rationalisations or 
justifications of events or actions are in accordance with the interests of our community. We 
do not always passively accept the dictates underpinning the shame (or the pride) we feel 
with respect to our self-image. We can question these dictates, analyse them, overcome them 
and final replace them (more on this below). Nevertheless, our conscious rationalisations 
and justifications always fall within the domain of our community’s interests. Accordingly, 
what we replace them with will concern our community by definition and from the outset. 
They cannot be exclusively individual. Recall that conscious justifications or reasons are 
ones we can communicate, i.e., can express in words, concepts, ‘signs’ and ‘images’: 
“In short, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of 
reason but strictly of the way in which we become conscious of reason) go hand in 
hand. One might add that not only language serves as a bridge between persons, but 
also look, touch, and gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense 
impressions, our power to fix them and as it were place them outside of ourselves, 
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has increased in proportion to the need to convey them to others by means of signs. 
The sign-inventing person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious 
of himself; for only as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself 
— he is still doing it, and he is doing it more and more.” (GS 354; some emphasis is 
mine) 
Nietzsche envisages other kinds of reasons and justifications than those concerned with 
turning a target into a sign for others. To what does he juxtapose conscious or communicable 
reasons and justifications? Does he believe that we can simply do away with the effect of 
conscious thought on our actions of the kind he has described, i.e., the moral kind? To 
answer this question, I think we have to look at his views on the ‘sovereign individual’ and 
his alternative for morality, which I will address in the subsequent chapter. For now, I will 
nuance the conceptual link between morality, consciousness and self-conscious agency.  
According to Nietzsche, the ‘image of a madman’—which makes the pale criminal 
ashamed of his urge to kill—is the conscious (‘moral’, ‘communicable’ etc.) rationalisation 
or justification of his actions. In short, self-conscious thought represents the activity of the 
herd perspective via the herd instinct, which introduces a self-image to his deliberation and 
reflection over his actions. This self-image enables him to evaluate his actions according to 
the interests of his community. The previous evaluation is not only of his actions after he 
has undertaken them, however. The pale criminal changes his course of action by deciding 
to rob in addition to killing, which refers to what Nietzsche construes as ‘madness before 
the deed’. In cases where an agent shows ‘madness before the deed’, his evaluation is of his 
urge to do something, rather than the action itself after the fact.  
For self-conscious thoughts to affect our actions, they must be in the trenches with 
the drives or represent the activity of something drive-like or a drive relation. Nietzsche is 
obstinate in pointing out this proposition to us, but in a characteristically unclear manner, 
which makes a coherent analysis on our part rather difficult: 
“Assuming that our world of desires and passions is the only thing “given” as real, 
that we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality of our drives (since 
thinking is only a relation between these drives) – aren’t we allowed to make the 
attempt and pose the question as to whether something like this “given” isn’t enough 
to render the so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as 
well?” (BGE 36) 
He qualifies his assumption by rejecting Schopenhauer and Berkeley’s views on the relation 
between the reality of our affects and the world that we perceive, before finally adding: 
“In the end, we are not only allowed to make such an attempt: the conscience of 
method demands it. Multiple varieties of causation should not be postulated until the 
attempt to make do with a single one has been taken as far as it will go (– ad absurdum, 
if you will). This is a moral of method that cannot be escaped these days; – it follows 
“from the definition,” as a mathematician would say.” (BGE 36) 
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Our self-image, then, is “in the trenches with the drives” as Richardson (2009, 137) rightly 
claims. This entails that it too is a drive, or that it at least represents the activity of drives or 
drive relations. Shame implies that the agent’s self-image has activated a drive(s) or that it 
represents such a drive. We cannot possibly be ashamed before our perspective, but only as 
a result of a perspective on us that is not and cannot be possibly be the same as the drive or 
drive relations whence the action arose.  
Nietzsche states that the pale criminal’s shame is due to his actions appearing ‘mad’. 
To whom does the action appear mad, however? Can it appear mad to him? If so, then why 
would his own urge—with which he identifies, because, according to Nietzsche, we identify 
with our actions and thus drives by definition—appear ‘mad’ to him, namely, the originator 
and possessor of this urge? His urge to kill appears mad as from a perspective other than his 
own, i.e., the herd perspective. The pale criminal accredits this perspective and confuses it 
for his own because the madness associated with it represents something punishable. In other 
words, the madness is psychologically associated with a forthcoming pain; his shame over 
his urge to kill represents the internalisation of punishment. The pain associated with this 
punishment produced a memory in him that psychologically associated that particular action 
with pain. The memory is activated and partakes in his decision-making process via his self-
image, i.e., by portraying how he ‘appears’ to others in performing some action. 
It is tempting to argue that the pale criminal feels shame because his urge (or action) 
itself is shameful, but I think we are obligated to avoid the previous when reading Nietzsche. 
The urge to kill cannot possibly be shameful in itself. The concept of ‘shameful in itself’ is 
psychologically and empirically untenable and forces us to accept that something arises ex 
nihilo. We can conceive of a time and place where individuals perceive the urge to kill as 
something that is actually worthy of pride. Some community at some time in human history 
has celebrated this urge and its corresponding activity, according to him. There have been 
examples of its customary and acceptable discharge, e.g., in some Roman coliseum or war. 
Accordingly, the proposition that the pale criminal’s shame expresses the drive to ‘avoid 
experiencing hurt in return’ is more explanatory than the concept of something shameful in 
itself. It explains his ensuing decision to enact something relatively surplus to requirement 
or an irrelevant act of robbery on top of his urge to kill. His subsequent decision to rob aims 
to diminish the pain, but, essentially, it involves the redirection of his initial urge by altering 
its intentional object. His self-image pushes and pulls in a different direction than the action 
based on his urge to kill. His shame stems from the fear of punishment psychologically 
associated with disobedience to his community, which is expressed in how his self-image 
partakes in his deliberations and actions.195  
In sum, the ‘herd perspective’ is a drive(s) in the trenches with our other drives or it 
represents the activity of a drive(s). We recognise it by analysing how our self-image affects 
our actions. The pale criminal assumes the herd perspective as his own and reacts to it as if 
 
                                               
195 We can possibly include the consequences of this punishment to his capacity to discharge his other drives. 
Other drives will have contributed to preventing the action or redirecting it in some way for the sake of their own 
discharge. I will look more closely at the relationship between drives, actions and the ‘I’ below. 
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it is his own. Nonetheless, this perspective represents how his actions appear to others, i.e., 
to the herd perspective. The herd perspective interjects his decision-making process through 
his self-image. It redirects his urge to kill by changing the intentional object of its activity: 
to rob his victim as he murders her. Nietzsche construes our self-image variously: e.g., our 
‘ego’, ‘the opinion of ourselves’, ‘conscience’, ‘vanity’ etc. We can compare his analysis of 
the pale criminal’s madness with his analysis of the pale criminal’s attitude towards himself 
earlier in the same passage:  
““My ego is something that shall be overcome: my ego is to me the great contempt for 
mankind,” so speak these eyes. That he condemned himself was his highest moment: 
do not allow the sublime one to return to his baseness! There is no redemption for one 
who suffers so from himself, unless it were the quick death.” (Z, ‘Criminal’: 26; my 
emphasis)196  
Compare his conception of the pale criminal’s ‘ego’ or ‘self-image’ with an earlier passage 
that discusses our ‘opinion’ of ourselves: 
“We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which 
alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those 
cruder outbursts of which alone we are aware make us misunderstand ourselves, we 
draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we 
misread ourselves in this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of 
our self. Our opinion of ourself, however, which we have arrived at by this erroneous 
path, the so-called ‘ego’, is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our 
character and our destiny.” (D 115)  
He argues that ‘what we consciously think of ourselves’ is likewise ‘what is general or can 
be made generic about us’. Our conscious evaluations are generic even if their target is our 
individuality. Nevertheless, there are limits to the extention of these generalisations.197 They 
extend to other people or a community, i.e., to their perspective as represented in their values 
and precepts, which are narrower than humanity, but still opposed to us as individuals.  
We are accustomed to a world-view whose limits are determined by language, for 
Nietzsche. This world-view represents a perspective on things and ourselves that shapes us 
by evaluating us and our actions in relation to interests other than our interests as individuals. 
We are accustomed to not drifting too far from this perspective due to the pain our ancestors 
endured, internalised and finally we inherited both through them and through the institutions 
they erected in place to preserve those interests and ensure that internalisation continued. 
The previous explains the psychological link between not being able to put something into 
words and feeling pain:   
 
                                               
196 Nietzsche’s analysis of the pale criminal can be juxtaposed to what he says about health and sickness with 
respect to the criminal more broadly (cf. D 202 & TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 45).  
197 One noteworthy limit is evident in his scepticism over the ground of concepts like humanity (cf. D 108 & 303). 
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“Language and the prejudices upon which language is based are a manifold hindrance 
to us when we want to explain inner processes and drives: because of the fact, for 
example, that words really exist only for superlative degrees of these processes and 
drives; and where words are lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation 
because exact thinking there becomes painful; indeed, in earlier times one 
involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased the realm of existence 
ceased also.” (D 115; some emphasis is mine)  
What grounds Nietzsche’s speculation that we feel pain, which deters us from self-conscious 
thought when we try to think about something for which we have no words? The activity of 
a drive(s) alone accounts for why we direct our attention to something, including directing 
it to something for which we have no words. Why do we feel pain when we become aware 
of the existence of one of our own drives based on the activity of another drive? He explains 
this ‘pain’ through ‘historical philosophising’. There is a psychological association between 
‘being in the presence of something unfamiliar, novel or different’ and feeling ‘pain’.198 We 
internalised a process of experiencing pain with respect to the unfamiliar, the novel etc.; its 
origin is in our becoming accustomed to communal life. The development of communal life 
and language occur side-by-side, according to Nietzsche; language is a branch in the stem 
representing the perspective and interests of a community and even communal life itself. It 
represents its interest over our interests as individuals.  
Nietzsche avoids what he calls the ‘philosopher’s rage for generalisation’ by arguing 
that our actions and self-conscious thoughts represent activities of the bodily as a whole. 
They originate in a drive that represents the circumstantial pressures our ancestors overcame 
to survive and flourish along with the means by which they did so.199 Accordingly, he revises 
the opposition between self-conscious thought and the drives (cf. BGE 2) by claiming the 
former is an activity of the drives themselves (cf. BGE 36). ‘Consciousness’ is indeed a 
property of ‘thought’, but this property arises from our habituation to communal life, which 
he derives from a genealogical analysis of the conceptual link. He construes the opposition 
between self-conscious thought and the drives as an opposition between drives themselves. 
Next, I will briefly go through what I observe to be the steps of his genealogical analysis as 
clearly as I can, before I proceed. My hope is that it will provide a relatively clearer picture 
of the steps and direction of his thoughts than I could provide previously. However, I omit 
that this picture requires much scrutiny and debate, certainly more than I will provide here.  
The most rudimentary community arose from the command-obedience relationships 
and the rank order this formed between individuals premised on strength. This ‘rank order’ 
 
                                               
198 There are many passages where Nietzsche analyses the conceptual link between individuality, conscious 
thought and pain. See for example (HHI 18, 104, 107 & 142; HHII 311; D 9, 11, 15, 18, 30, 38, 107, 109, 114, 
187 & 429; GS 50, 116-7, 149, 296, 318, 335, 347 & 380; BGE 188, 199 & 230). 
199 Nietzsche construes survival as a weaker degree or form of the urge to flourish: “above all, a living thing wants 
to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power –: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most 
frequent consequences of this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous teleological principles! – 
such as the drive for preservation (which we owe to Spinoza’s inconsistency –). This is demanded by method, 
which must essentially be the economy of principles” (BGE 13).  
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(cf. GM I, 2 & 11) was established and maintained by violence and the infliction of pain and 
fear. These relationships later transitioned to creditor-debtor or contractual relationships (cf. 
GM II, 8), which he observes from how ‘compromise’ conceptually links to ‘obligation’ (or 
debt etc.). In turn, obligations (debts etc.) conceptually links to pain (harm, loss etc.). The 
transition happened when compromise had to be struck between the ‘individuals’ that were 
relatively equal in power, but could not decide upon an end to their quarrelling such that the 
victor emerged and the ‘rank order’ was restored (cf. D 112). The passage I found that details 
this transition from ‘command-obedience relationship’ to ‘contractual relationship’ is the 
one where he assesses the concept of equilibrium and its role in ‘justice’ and the ‘law’: 
“The community is originally the organisation of the weak for the production of an 
equilibrium with powers that threaten it with danger. An organisation to produce 
preponderance would be more advisable if the community could thereby become 
strong enough to destroy the threatening power once and for all: and if it were a matter 
of a single powerful depredator this would certainly be attempted… Equilibrium is 
thus a very important concept for the oldest theory of law and morality; equilibrium 
is the basis of justice.” (WS 22)200 
Out of command-obedience relationship emerged contractual relationships. What explains 
the transition from command-obedience to contractual relationship—or, to put it differently, 
from ‘pain’ to ‘custom’—is initially a quarrel between two (or more) individuals (or groups) 
relatively equal in strength. The memory of pain (injury, loss etc.) arose from such quarrels 
and motivated the transition. We can compare the above passage with this one: 
“…the germinating sensation of barter, contract, debt, right, duty, compensation was 
simply transferred from the most rudimentary form of the legal rights of persons to 
the most crude and elementary social units (in their relations with similar units), 
together with the habit of comparing power with power, of measuring, of calculating. 
Now the eye was focused in this direction in any case: and with the ponderous 
consistency characteristic of the ancients’ way of thinking, which, though difficult to 
get started, never deviated once it was moving, man soon arrived at the great 
generalisation: ‘Every thing has its price: everything can be compensated for’ the 
oldest, most naive canon of morals relating to justice, the beginning of all ‘good 
naturedness’, ‘equity’, all ‘good will’, all ‘objectivity’ on earth. Justice at this first 
level is the good will, between those who are roughly equal, to come to terms with 
each other, to ‘come to an understanding’ again by means of a settlement - and, in 
connection with those who are less powerful, to force them to reach a settlement 
amongst themselves.” (GM II, 8) 
There is thus a transition from the rank order of strength, to that of ‘custom’, ‘duty’, ‘debt’, 
‘promise’ and so on. He does not explain this transition by appealing to new ‘substances’ 
 
                                               
200 See also WS 190. 
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or ‘things’, which are distinct in kind from previous substances or things. He construes the 
transition as the emergence of a new drive through the process of internalisation.  
The violence humans endured in rudimentary communities motivates internalisation 
and so makes possible the transition from command-obedience relationships to contractual 
relationships, along with the corresponding difference in ‘rank order’ to each relationship. 
He describes it as follows: 
“…we must certainly seek the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening 
of intelligence, in a lengthening of the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less 
trusting, to go about things more circumspectly from now on, in the recognition that 
one was, once and for all, too weak for many things, in a sort of improvement of self-
assessment. What can largely be achieved by punishment, in man or beast, is the 
increase of fear, the intensification of intelligence, the mastering of desires: 
punishment tames man in this way but does not make him ‘better’, - we would be 
more justified in asserting the opposite.” (GM II, 15) 
We can understand this transition as the emergence of the ‘herd perspective’ in members of 
a quasi-stable communities. The members internalise the command-obedience relationships 
between the master and slave, or between ruler and subject; they play out this relationship 
within themselves without the master’s direct, violent and thus punishing intervention. This 
internalisation makes an agent do something based on the memory of pain associated with 
not doing it, or, given that Nietzsche has an active conception of the will, based on the pain 
that comes from ‘not refraining’ from doing it.201 Accordingly, this is how that limited sense 
of self and responsibility that are preconditions of morality arose. 
Command-obedience relationships establish rudimentary communities and maintain 
them through a rank order premised on violence and strength. Over time, these relationships 
became internalised and thus contractual relationships emerged, which were maintained by 
‘custom’, ‘duty’, ‘debt’ etc. and were enforced by legal punishment. Both are hierarchical, 
but how that hierarchy obtains differs in each case. Pain and one’s urge to avoid it motivates 
the actions representing one’s ‘obedience’ to one’s masters, rulers etc. After the emergence 
of contractual relationships, the rulers, masters etc. became one’s ‘customs’, ‘duties’ etc. In 
short, ‘customs’ or ‘duties’ motivated through the memory of pain following disobedience. 
Internalising actions that arose from the command-obedience relations means doing X or 
refraining from Y without the direct intervention, i.e., without the overpowering hand of the 
stronger, more violent individuals who established and maintained the community by using 
violence and strength. The customs, duties etc. maintained and underpinned the new rank 
 
                                               
201 See for example how he describes early versions of punishment: “[t]hroughout most of human history, 
punishment has not been meted out because the miscreant was held responsible for his act, therefore it was not 
assumed that the guilty party alone should be punished: - but rather, as parents still punish their children, it was 
out of anger over some wrong that had been suffered, directed at the perpetrator, - but this anger was held in check 
and modified by the idea that every injury has its equivalent which can be paid in compensation, if only through 
the pain of the person who injures” (GM II, 4). 
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order, but the memory of pain following disobedience of the masters motivated the actions 
that reflect obedience to customs, duties and so on.  
Following the above transition from the hierarchical relationship based on strength 
to one based on custom, a community preserves its rank order with minimal intervention, 
i.e., without (or comparatively little and infrequent) actual infliction of pain on its members. 
The individual internalises their masters’ commands and assumes the ‘herd perspective’ by 
acting by obedience to ‘custom’, ‘duty’, ‘debt’ etc. rather than by obeying his masters. The 
masters shift from an individual or group to our psychologically associating them and their 
actions with customs, duties and so on. Accordingly, command-obedience relationships are 
not replaced by a new kind of relationship, i.e., something distinct in kind. Rather, they 
become subtler and harder to recognise over time (cf. WS 114), because their target of our 
obedience has changed by virtue of the ongoing process of internalisation. They become 
habits and finally drives. Nonetheless, there are still some traces of this transition, which is 
clear in the fear, pain and shame we experience when we try to overstep the limits that our 
language and customs place on us, i.e., when we attempt to act ‘individually’.  
Initially, then, individuals feel the urge to X or refrain from Y based on the pain they 
endured when they acted otherwise (cf. GM II, 3-7; D 3, 9 & 107-8). Once they internalise 
this process, they acquire the memory of pain, which becomes sufficient to urge them to X 
and refrain from Y without the actual infliction of pain. In addition, they experience certain 
benefits with respect to their individuality and freedom by comparison to others, which they 
receive by being part of the group of X-ers and so by virtue of their partaking in the actions 
of their masters. These benefits and freedoms partake in enforcing further their actions and 
creating further psychological associations between their ‘self-image’ and their ‘obedience 
to custom’: 
“You live in a community, you enjoy the benefits of a community (oh, what benefits! 
sometimes we underestimate them today), you live a sheltered, protected life in peace 
and trust, without any worry of suffering certain kinds of harm and hostility to which 
the man outside, the ‘man without peace’, is exposed - a German understands what 
‘misery’, elend [literally ‘other country’ i.e. banishment, exile], originally means -, 
you make pledges and take on obligations to the community with just that harm and 
hostility in mind.” (GM II, 9) 
Once we internalise X-ing, we act based on the memory of pain (violence, harm etc.) which 
we endured from our not-X-ing or based on our Y-ing rather than X-ing. This explains 
continuing to X without the need for infliction of pain upon us by someone else to force us 
to X. We can comprehend the previous in a less daunting and affective manner, e.g., as our 
no longer needing the intervention of others to perform an action. After a while, and once it 
becomes habit, so to speak, we can perform it on our own with minimal intervention from 
another.   
In Nietzsche’s view, there is a psychological link between those command-obedience 
relationships based on pain, (violence, harm etc.) and the contractual relationships based on 
‘custom’, ‘debt’, ‘duty’ etc., which is motivated by the memory of pain (violence, harm etc.). 
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He explains this link through his method of historical philosophising, but let us assess where 
morality fits in this picture.   
The transition from one stage to the next by the process of internalisation resulted in 
the emergence of ‘common’ actions and values. Individuals begun performing ‘common’ 
actions and adhering to ‘common’ values, motivated by a memory of violence, harm or pain 
and so on. Nietzsche construes the previous as showing the emergence or origin of morality. 
It demonstrates the most rudimentary form of morality: 
“This is, for example, already the case with the chief proposition: morality is nothing 
other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may be; 
customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating. In things in 
which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by 
tradition, the smaller the circle of morality… What is tradition? A higher authority 
which one obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it 
commands. —What distinguishes this feeling in the presence of tradition from the 
feeling of fear in general? It is fear in the presence of a higher intellect which here 
commands, of an incomprehensible, indefinite power, of something more than 
personal — there is superstition in this fear.” (D 9) 
He uses different concepts to describe this transition, e.g., ‘spiritualisation’ or ‘sublimation’, 
but, in my observation, these are distinct in degree from ‘internalisation’. We can construe 
them as later stages in the process of internalisation, but not as representing a wholly new 
process. They describe the process of blocking an urge through pain, acquiring a memory 
of that pain, which then urges us to seek alternative outlets or discharges for it.  
The emergence of the ‘herd perspective’ is conceptually linked to the emergence of 
‘contractual’ relationships. Prior to such contractual relationships, individuals related based 
on strength, violence and the ‘rank order’ arising from violent relationships. Internalising 
command-obedience relationships means an individual commands herself to do X and to 
refrain from Y. Nietzsche explains the previous by appealing to the memory of pain, which 
motivates her to block, suppress and redirect her drives. People therefrom begun relating by 
‘measuring’, ‘evaluating’, ‘trading’, ‘customs’, ‘punishment’ (no longer by ‘overpowering’, 
‘violating’, ‘hurting’ etc.) and so on. From contractual relationships emerged a limited sense 
of responsibility, which we associate with self-consciousness; punishment for disobedience 
enforced it and the benefits of being part of the in-group enhanced it. The infliction of pain, 
injury and loss based on breaking contractual relationships—rather than offending, violating 
and challenging their masters—requires a limited sense of responsibility, sense of self and 
self-consciousness, which Nietzsche calls our ‘conscience’. Therefrom emerged the ‘bad’ 
conscience, which he describes in the following manner:  
“Those terrible bulwarks with which state organisations protected themselves against 
the old instincts of freedom - punishments are a primary instance of this kind of 
bulwark - had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were 
turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, 
raiding, changing and destroying - all this was pitted against the person who had such 
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instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’. Lacking external enemies and 
obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man 
impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself 
no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his 
cage and who is supposed to be ‘tamed’; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with 
homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a 
torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness - this fool, this prisoner 
consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of ‘bad conscience’.” (GM 
II, 16) 
Our conscience becomes ‘bad’ when we cannot find an alternative discharge for our blocked 
individual drives. This meant that we had to discharge blocked drives—which he describes 
above as ‘cruelty’, ‘animosity’ etc.—inwardly. We use our body as the target upon which to 
discharge blocked drives because it was not encapsulated by our community’s rank order of 
values. In short, the more and longer we suppress or attempt to redirect our drives (i.e., the 
longer we prevent them from finding an external discharge motivated by the pain of doing 
so or the memory after having done so) the more likely we are to redirect them to ourselves.  
Nietzsche does not introduce any new concepts to distinguish the internalisation that 
made possible the emergence of bad conscience from contractual relationships. We can see 
how the bad conscience is a further stage in the process of internalisation by juxtaposing it 
to what he calls the ‘good’ or ‘clear’ conscience (more on this below). In the early stage, 
one blocks or redirects individual drives to acquire and so prioritise ‘common’ actions over 
individual actions in accordance with the ‘rank order’ dictated and enforced by the masters 
of the community. This engendered a limited sense of responsibility. In later stages and in 
individual cases, however, these blocked drives find an outlet or discharge on the individual 
herself using her body as a target. The limited sense of responsibility and so the individual’s 
ability to assume the ‘herd perspective’ makes possible this discharge. I think Nietzsche’s 
reason for not introducing a new concept to explain the previous is that the latter stages 
effectively describe the blocking of individual drives motivated by pain (or memory of pain) 
and the search for an alternative outlet based on the drives’ continued activity and urge for 
discharge. Consequently, one initially blocks and redirects individual drives and later finds 
an outlet for them on oneself, assuming an external outlet is wanting. Let us assess how he 
purports to explain the previous transition by assessing the differences between the ‘good’ 
(or ‘clear’) and the ‘bad’ conscience.  
A ‘good’ conscience is distinct in degree from a bad conscience; the difference is not 
in what drives us, but in its ‘target’. Individuals find different outlets for blocked individual 
drives, which, in turn, determines whether their conscience is ‘good’ (‘clear’) or ‘bad’. The 
‘good’ or ‘clear’ conscience finds an ‘external’ outlet presumably through a custom, societal 
function or a profession etc., which outlet accords with one’s contractual relationships and 
thus ‘morality’. Likewise, I suspect that the emotions he associates with having a ‘good’ or 
‘clear’ conscience would be ‘pride’ and its cognates. Bad conscience did not emerge in these 
individuals, but in those who were unable to find an alternative and external discharge that 
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accorded with their community. It emerged in individuals who had to turn fully inward and 
discharge their drives on themselves. He describes it as follows:  
“The active, aggressive, over-reaching man is still a hundred paces nearer to justice 
then the man who reacts; he simply does not need to place a false and prejudiced 
interpretation on the object of his attention, like the man who reacts does, has to do. 
In fact, this explains why the aggressive person, as the stronger, more courageous, 
nobler man, has always had a clearer eye, a better conscience on his side: on the other 
hand it is easy to guess who has the invention of ‘bad conscience’ on his conscience, 
- the man of ressentiment! Finally, just cast your eye around in history: in what sphere, 
up till now, has the whole treatment of justice, and the actual need for justice, resided? 
With men who react, perhaps? Not in the least: but with the active, the strong, the 
spontaneous and the aggressive.” (GM II, 11) 
The difference between the ‘clear’, ‘better’, or ‘good’ conscience and ‘bad’ conscience is 
not the constraints of communal life or blocked individual drives, but how one copes with 
them, how one discharges one’s blocked individual drives. Those with a ‘bad conscience’ 
find an internal outlet for their blocked drives; they discharge on themselves. Nonetheless, 
both types of ‘conscience’ emerge from internalising command-obedience relationships. 
The good conscience impels one to conform to one’s community and thus act in accordance 
with ‘common’ values, norms and customs. The bad conscience actively resists or reacts to 
a community’s values, norms and customs, which explains his introduction of ressentiment 
to describe individuals in whom emerges ‘bad’ conscience. The process of ‘internalisation’ 
is the same in each case, even if it exhibits different stages or turns. It is important to note 
that he sometimes uses different terms to designate this process, for example, ‘sublimation’ 
or ‘spiritualisation’202. These effectively describe the blocking, redirecting and the seeking 
of an alternative outlet or a discharge for ‘individual’ drives.203  
Contractual relationships underpin and enable the emergence of ‘bad’ conscience. In 
other words, ‘bad’ conscience conceptually links to contractual relationships and their by-
products such as ‘indebtedness’, but also ‘duty’, ‘obligation’, ‘responsibility’, ‘shame’ (as 
we saw with the pale criminal) and so on. It is one outcome of blocking people’s drives for 
the sake of organising them into communities and thus maintaining that community through 
contractual relationships rather than violence, strength and thus direct intervention into the 
members’ actions and lives. The defining feature of ‘bad’ conscience is our redirecting and 
 
                                               
202 Some passages that show Nietzsche’s use of ‘sublimation’ are as follows, (HHI 1, 107 & 261; WS 181; D 4, 
202 & 248; GS 357; BGE 58, 189; WLN 7[3] & 14[111]; GM II, 7 & 10; GM III, 27). Some passage detailing his 
use of ‘spiritualisation’ are as follows: (cf. D 60; GS 3; A 20; TI, ‘Morality’, 1, 3; BGE 198, 219, 229, 252 & 271).  
203 I suspect that with further scrutiny, we can distinguish these terms based on their reference to different stages. 
They could also show Nietzsche’s attempt to redefine, revise and offer alternatives to concepts such as ‘spirit’ or 
‘spirituality’ and ‘sublime’ or ‘sublimity’. I was unable to explore the previous considerations further due to the 
limitations of the thesis.  
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discharging blocked drives on ourselves, whereas its precondition is acquisition of a limited 
sense of self or self-image and responsibility:  
“This instinct of freedom, forcibly made latent - we have already seen how - this 
instinct of freedom forced back, repressed, incarcerated within itself and finally able 
to discharge and unleash itself only against itself: that, and that alone, is bad 
conscience in its beginnings. (GM II, 17)204 
‘Bad’ conscience is a species of ‘responsibility’ whereby an agent discharges those blocked 
drives representing actions deemed ‘uncustomary’, ‘uncommon’, ‘immoral’, or ‘against the 
community’s interest’ etc., on her body using her self-image. The memory of pain and the 
continued activity of the blocked drives motivate her to discharge them on herself. There is 
more to the relationship between the ‘clear’ or ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘guilty’ conscience than I 
can assess at length here.205 What is crucial for my purposes is that agents can only possess 
a ‘bad’ conscience if they first possess a self-image. 
 In sum, we internalise command-obedience relationships through pain and violence, 
which makes possible contractual relationships. We preserve those contractual relationships 
through the same method by which we formed them, i.e., the infliction of violence, injury, 
and loss, which we now construe as punishment for forgoing the contract. This punishment 
further imprints the memory of pain and entrenches the value of preserving the contractual 
relationships, which leads to ‘custom’, ‘duty’, ‘morality’, ‘profession’ and so on. These 
contractual relationships mean we acquire a herd perspective on our actions, a limited sense 
of responsibility and self-image, which partakes in our decision-making process via self-
conscious thought. As the internalisation process progresses, we acquire the need for such a 
self-image as a precondition of communal life and thus to guarantee our ability to accord 
with customs, debts, obligations and so on. For clarity, we can comprehend the need for a 
self-image as an extension of the herd perspective and morality. The need for a self-image 
conceptually to links morality (cf. GS 347; GM II, 16-18) by showing how we evaluate an 
action according to something other than our individuality. Moreover, the need for morality 
is most salient in those individuals whose self-image becomes desirable in itself (cf. D 90 & 
115; BGE 199).  
The above is not a definitive picture of the conceptual link between communal life, 
language, conscious thought, self-conscious agency and morality in Nietzsche. Nonetheless, 
I hope it will at least inspire an analysis and closer assessment of these propositions, themes 
and approach. An aspect of his approach I regret not exploring at length is his analysis of 
how ressentiment relates to the ‘bad’ conscience and how bad conscience relates to the guilty 
 
                                               
204 What Nietzsche means by the ‘instinct of freedom’ is explained in the next passage, “instinct for freedom (put 
into my language: the will to power)” (GM II, 18). I believe we would not be wrong to argue that, according to 
Nietzsche, it is the same will that directs individuals to establish command-obedience relationships, then 
contractual relationships and in turn leads them the ‘bad’ conscience. It represents his commitment to ontological 
monism and immanence. 
205 For an alternative analysis on Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘bad conscience’, but likewise on how he relates it to 
‘guilt’, see Janaway (2007).  
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conscience. What I attempt to demonstrate is that he explains our community’s role in our 
actions genealogically: he traces its origin to command-obedience relationships. Moreover, 
morality begins with a conflict between ‘individual interests’ that develop into the ‘interests 
of a community’ after an individual internalised the command-obedience relationships. The 
‘internalisation of man’, which he conceptually links to the ‘soul’ (cf. GM II, 16), is thus a 
by-product of the previous conflicts, which gives rise to what he calls the ‘herd perspective’ 
and, finally, ‘herd instinct(s)’. The latter shape our actions using our self-image, but enforce 
and motivate us like the command-obedience relationship does: i.e., through pain, albeit its 
memory. Moreover, they operate in a similar manner as a command-obedience relationship: 
they enforce one action at the expense of another action. Nevertheless, ‘pain’ is the operative 
or motivating factor behind obedience and what follows from it; it enforces actions deemed 
as ‘common’ at the expense of (or in opposition to) ‘individual’ actions.  
I will summarise Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of the transition from the action 
(and so drive), to obedience, to custom and finally to morality based on our conscience via 
the process of internalisation and thus the emergence of a new drive as follows: 
1) His theory begins by postulating individuals who form semi-organised populations 
or groups based on partially stable command-obedience relationships, which are 
organised by strength and violence along with and the ‘rank order’ arising from this 
organisation (cf. GM I, 5 & GM II, 17).  
2) The blocking of drives by stronger individuals who violently shape and organise 
others into ‘states’ through the infliction of pain aim initially at disobedience over 
a command (cf. GM II, 17). This infliction entrenched a despotic rule and its ‘rank 
order’, which meant that a limited number of individuals were able to discharge 
their drives freely and permit this free discharge for others. Their permission was 
given in accordance with what we can describe as an in-group mentality (cf. GM I, 
2) and so a mutual recognition of value and authority. This seemingly captures what 
Nietzsche means by the ‘pathos of distance’ of ‘nobles’ (cf. GM I, 2 & 11). 
3) One’s obedience to authority is a precondition for the emergence of contractual 
relationships. The memory of pain that stems from forcing individuals to obey 
enables contractual relationships, but it also underpins obedience at the expense of 
individual drives, with comparatively less intervention from without. 
4) The maintenance of a community through customs etc. is enforced by punishment, 
which psychologically underpins concepts like ‘debt’, ‘duty’ etc. (cf. D 9). This 
punishment further imprints obedience to authority. Following contractual 
relationships, our obedience changes its target from despotic leaders to customs etc. 
Members of communities now relate through contractual relationships, rather than 
an in-group mentality, which follows despotic rank order. Contractual relationships 
allows the discharge of blocked drives in accordance with custom etc., rather than 
the master’s permission. It begun with despots’ permission and then transitioned to 
functions of the state or community: ‘duty’, ‘profession’ etc. (cf. GM II, 3 & 7).  
5) The permission to discharge blocked drives according custom likewise constitutes 
the basis on which the ‘herd perspective’ emerges in opposition to ‘individuality. It 
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typifies what Nietzsche calls ‘voluntary obedience’ (cf. HHI 99). We forgo our 
individuality to discharge blocked individual drives in obedience to masters etc., 
initially, and in obedience to our ‘function’, ‘duty’, ‘office’ etc.  
6) The final step I identify in his genealogical analysis is ‘internalisation’ of voluntary 
obedience, which leads us to acts based solely on our ‘conscience’. In earlier texts, 
he construed this phenomenon as ‘virtue’ (cf. HHI 99) and ‘vanity’ (cf. HHI 89). 
We forget that what partakes in deliberations is not our individual perspective, but 
the herd perspective, and that ‘our’ conscience represent the herd. Thus, we conflate 
the herd perspective with our individual perspective. 
7) Finally, we should note that self-conscious thought emerges from infliction of pain 
by individuals that violently shape others into communities. The memory of pain 
motivates self-conscious thought and gives it priority in actions and deliberations. 
The priority grows as one’s obedience to customs emerges and continues growing. 
Fundamentally, the previous are rooted in obedience and the memory of pain that 
underpins it.  
To comprehend how the above proceeds from one stage to the next, we must take seriously 
his philosophical method as an alternative to metaphysics and logic for assessing morality; 
specifically, for assessing how morality partakes in our actions and reasons. He calls for this 
analysis most notably in GM (cf. GM I, 17 note). I tried to point us in this direction here, but 
I omit my dissatisfaction with the above presentation, the depth of its analysis and even the 
potential coherence of my many propositions. Nevertheless, I hope my reflections are a step 
in the right direction for, at least, assessing Nietzsche’s views on morality and self-conscious 
agency, but also for shedding light on his philosophical method. In the next chapter, I will 
assess his view on morality more directly and utilise what we learned in the current chapter 
to suggest what I think his normative views on morality consist of.  
2.10 Nietzsche’s Evaluation of Morality: Egoism and the 
Sovereign Individual 
“Your judgement, ‘that is right’ has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, 
aversions, experiences, and what you have failed to experience; you have to ask, ‘how 
did it emerge there?’ and then also, ‘what is really impelling me to listen to it?’” (GS 
335)   
In this chapter, I will focus on unpacking the above quote, which, I think, shows Nietzsche’s 
evaluation or critique of morality. As the quote implies, his critique of morality, which he 
construes as seeing “morality as a problem” (GS 345), has two different inquiries and 
methods, which I will attempt to demonstrate here.   
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We saw previously that Nietzsche inquires into the origin of morality or our moral 
propositions, which constitutes the descriptive part of his critique. He attempts to attune his 
readers to his evaluation of morality using the previous method. He construes this evaluation 
as a ‘new demand’ that arises from insight into the origin of moralitty. The two methods, 
then, are a) ‘attunement’ through genealogical analysis of morality and the naturalisation of 
it and its propositions, and b) the evaluation of morality, which is the ‘new demand’. He 
describes this ‘new demand’ in the following manner: 
“So let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value 
of these values should itself, for once, be examined - and so we need to know about the 
conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and 
changed (morality as result, as symptom, as mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as 
misunderstanding; but also morality as cause remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison), 
since we have neither had this knowledge up till now nor even desired it. People have 
taken the value of these ‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning; up till 
now, nobody has had the remotest doubt or hesitation in placing higher value on ‘the 
good man’ than on ‘the evil’, higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and 
prosperity for man in general (and this includes man’s future).” (GM Pref., 6) 
He gives a naturalised conception of morality using his method of historical philosophising, 
but his aim is to attune and prepare his readers for the task of evaluating morality. Recall 
that he posits a conceptual link between communal life, consciousness, self-conscious 
agency and morality, which he analyses and explains genealogically. Each part of the link 
emerges out of the other under certain circumstantial pressures and our ancestors’ responses 
to them. Morality originates in contractual relationships that emerge in rudimentary 
communities whose rank order shifts from relations between individual members premised 
on strength and violence to relations premised on laws, duty, customs and so on. Contractual 
relationships require a limited sense of responsibility and ‘sense of self’, which communities 
enforced by inflicting pain as punishment for breaking with one’s responsibilities and so on. 
He explains the previous by appealing to psychological associations between the infliction 
of pain and forgoing ‘responsibility’ (and equally the memory of that pain one experiences 
when they forgo it). The psychological association between forgoing a responsibility to the 
masters and their inflicting pain on us transfers from the masters to morality, which yields 
moral responsibility.  
He also uses genealogical analysis to make sense of what he calls the philosophers’ 
‘rage for generalisation’ or ‘metaphysical need’. This ‘rage’ usually impels philosophers to 
posit theories explaining moral values and actions either by appealing to distinct ontological 
‘kinds’ (substances, things etc.) or entrench moral values and actions into ‘reality’ (or the 
‘truth’) without critically evaluating them and thus offering a reason for our accepting them. 
He criticises the unreflective agreement over what counts as ‘moral’ or ‘morally right’: 
“As strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been missing from 
every “science of morals” so far: there was no suspicion that anything was really a 
problem. Viewed properly, the “grounding of morals” (as philosophers called it, as 
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they demanded it of themselves) was only an erudite form of good faith in the 
dominant morality, a new way of expressing it; as such, it was itself already situated 
within the terms of a certain morality. In the last analysis, it even constitutes a type 
of denial that these morals can be regarded as a problem. But, in any event, it is the 
opposite of an examination, dissection, interrogation, vivisection of precisely this 
article of faith.” (BGE 186; some emphasis is mine) 
The method he bemoans does not ‘critique’ morality (cf. BGE 186), but entirely bypasses 
this critique. It entrenches moral propositions and thus makes a critique of morality more 
difficult. Such approaches are not ‘critical’ of morality, but affirmative of it without even 
comprehending the reasons for doing so. Likewise, these methods represent an activity of 
drives on the part of philosophers themselves. Recognising the previous, Nietzsche claims, 
is key to any ‘treatment’ of ‘morality as a problem’. Morality is not concerned with the 
‘true’ and ‘false’ (‘real’ or ‘illusory’) propositions, but with actions resulting from drives. 
Although we can discern the particular morality that typifies a community’s rank order, the 
fundamental claim is that no moral proposition is eternally legitimate or binding within a 
community: 
“Truly, I say to you: good and evil that would be everlasting–there is no such thing! 
They must overcome themselves out of themselves again and again.” (Z, ‘Self-
Overcoming’, 90; my emphasis) 
Nevertheless, he implores his readers not to confound his rejection of the legitimacy of some 
moral proposition or theory (namely, entrenching morality in ‘truth’ or ‘reality’) for his 
evaluation of the explanandum, i.e., a particular morality or moral proposition. They are two 
separate considerations that follow from treating morality as a ‘problem’. He puts it in the 
following manner:  
“The mistake of the more subtle among them is that they uncover and criticise the 
possibly foolish opinions of a people about their morality, or of humanity about all 
human morality — opinions about its origin, its religious sanction, the myth of the 
free will and such things — and then think they have criticised the morality itself. But 
the value of the injunction ‘Thou Shalt’ is still fundamentally different from and 
independent of such opinions about it and the weeds of error that may have overgrown 
it — just as surely as the value of a medication for someone sick is totally independent 
of whether he thinks about medicine scientifically or the way an old woman thinks 
about it. A morality could even have grown out of an error, and the realisation of this 
fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value” (GS 345)206  
 
                                               
206 For a complimentary passage, see (D 44). See also how Nietzsche construes the philosopher’s approach to 
moral matters: “I leave to one side the actual fight of the philosophers against the feeling of lethargy, which always 
has taken place at the same time - it is interesting enough, but too absurd, too trivial in practice, too prone to 
gathering cobwebs and loafing around, as when pain is supposed to be proved to be an error, using the naive 
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What explains morality is not the same as what evaluates it. He uses genealogical analysis 
to attune his readers’ thoughts about morality and so what explains the fact that we perform 
those actions we dub moral. His evaluation of morality follows a different route and method, 
however. It relies on his genealogical attunement, but it is not synonymous to it. I will aim 
to demonstrate how he utilises his genealogical analysis towards his evaluation of morality 
using a stage in the process of internalisation. I construe the previous stage as what he calls 
the ‘sovereign individual’.  
What Nietzsche’s evaluation consists of is difficult to pinpoint, but we can identify 
a method he uses in criticising moral values that demonstrates a general approach and points 
us in the right direction. We find his general approach in a change in perspective on morality 
and its propositions. I am grateful to Janaway’s reading for aiding me in identifying this 
perspective, especially, his emphasis on Nietzsche’s style of writing, which he describes as 
follows: 
“To treat Nietzsche’s ways of writing—explicitly or implicitly—as mere modes of 
presentation, detachable in principle from some elusive set of propositions in which 
his philosophy might be thought to consist, is to miss a great part of Nietzsche’s real 
importance to philosophy. Nietzsche simply does not behave as a conventional 
philosopher. He is not averse to putting forward hypotheses—candidates for 
acceptance as true—or even to presenting an argument sometimes where necessary. 
But more often than not he uses a wide range of rhetorical effects that appear to 
persuade, coax, or tempt the reader by quite other means, or to play with our attitudes 
to an extent that pushes us to the brink of bafflement. Nietzsche’s way of writing 
addresses our affects, feelings, or emotions. It provokes sympathies, antipathies, and 
ambivalences that lie in the modern psyche below the level of rational decision and 
impersonal argument. I argue that this is not some gratuitous exercise in ‘style’ that 
could be edited out of Nietzsche’s thought.” (Janaway 2009, 4) 
I benefitted greatly from Janaway’s suggestion that we cannot separate Nietzsche’s writing 
style from his approach to philosophy. Likewise, he rightly claims that his style plays an 
indispensable role in his evaluation of morality: 
“[F]or Nietzsche to have proceeded as the paradigmatic philosopher, excluding 
personal emotions from the investigation, seeking to persuade by impersonal rational 
considerations alone, would in his eyes have risked failure to grasp the true nature of 
our values and loss of an opportunity to call them into question. Without the rhetorical 
provocations, without the revelation of what we find gruesome, shaming, 
 
                                               
premise that pain would have to vanish as soon as the error it contains is recognised – but lo and behold! it refused 
to vanish . . .” (GM III, 17). In short, morality is not concerned with matters of truth or reality even though it 
utilises those matters towards its ‘moral’ ends or the end of overpowering by subsuming things under its system 
of ends, for Nietzsche.   
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embarrassing, comforting, and heart-warming, we would neither comprehend nor be 
able to revalue our current values.” (Janaway 2009, 4) 
However, I think there are propositions underpinning his style and approach to morality 
even though we cannot separate them from his evaluation of morality. To show the previous, 
I will inquire into Nietzsche’s positive evaluation of morality. What can morality be or what 
should it be in hope of arriving at these propositions. To succeed in this, I will assume that 
Nietzsche has a method that informs his rhetoric and style. This method must be based on 
certain reasons and have certain aims, otherwise we must conclude that his style and rhetoric 
are just a poetic or artistic exercise, at best, or an attempt to be contrarian for the sake of it, 
at worst. 
Nietzsche probes his readers’ conscience and challenges their self-knowledge (cf. D 
18). He does so by revealing or engendering an opposition between their virtues or values 
(cf. GS 21). Likewise, he challenges his readers’ reasons for ascribing to a virtue or value 
(cf. HHII 91). He encourages them to reflect on their individual reasons for ‘accepting’ as 
true some moral judgment or proposition without critically reflecting on it. One assumption 
of the previous method is that, hitherto, we have not critically reflected on and evaluated 
our moral judgements or even morality itself. If we translate the previous into his drive 
psychology and thus construe it in accordance with his attunement, then we can comprehend 
our ‘faith’ in moral values as the herd instinct(s) dominating the rank order of drives that 
constitute our character. We often approach morality solely as from the herd perspective, 
but given that morality conceptually links to the herd perspective, we have to assume a 
perspective other than the herd perspective to be able to evaluate morality. Furthermore, this 
perspective has to be one of equal value to us as the herd perspective. Only then are we able 
to reasonably challenge our rank order of values. It is important to note also that we can only 
succeed in evaluating morality internally, i.e., by recourse to individual interests, wishes, 
desires and so drives. Thus, he makes possible an evaluation of it by probing his readers’ 
conscience and by encouraging them to reintroduce their individual perspective into their 
rationalisations, justifications and deliberations.  
Nietzsche’s critique of morality starts by reintroducing our individual perspective 
into moral judgments and propositions. The previous engenders a tension in his readers 
between ‘what they actually desire’ and ‘what they want207 to appear as desiring’. The 
clearest example of this that I found is in the following passage: 
“But that you hear this or that judgement as the words of conscience, i.e. that you feel 
something to be right may have its cause in your never having thought much about 
yourself and in your blindly having accepted what has been labelled right since your 
childhood; or in the fact that fulfilling your duties has so far brought you bread and 
honours — and you consider it right because it appears to you as your own ‘condition 
 
                                               
207 Although, that we ‘want’ to appear as desiring something, given what we discussed previously, i.e., given the 
conceptual link, ‘wanting to appear as something’ derives from what he calls the ‘terrible must’ (cf. GS 354). It 
conceptually links to our habituation to communal life and the circumstantial pressures associated with it. 
  351 
of existence’ (and that you have a right to existence seems irrefutable to you).” (GS 
335) 
Notice that he distinguishes the thought ‘X is right’ from what drives us to accept the 
proposition that ‘X is right’ (or ‘moral’). He implores his readers’ to reflect on what ‘drives’ 
them to accept ‘X’ is right or what underpins their ascribing a truth-value to ‘X is right’. A 
‘blind obedience’ or ‘self-interest’ may be driving them to accept it as true and so to act in 
accordance with it. They may ascribe to a moral value based on a lack of self-knowledge, 
but not necessarily a lack of knowledge about what is right. In pointing to ‘what is right’ we 
identify what is ‘right’ now and not what is ‘right’ as such, for Nietzsche. We correctly claim 
that ‘X is right’ (or ‘moral’), but the criteria for correctness, in this instance, are that we 
identify what is ‘right’ (or ‘moral’) in a limited scope of time and place. Thus, we identify 
what we accept as ‘right’ now, without identifying a reason(s) for its being right now or for 
our accepting it as ‘right’, in the first place.  
To identify a ‘reason’ requires us to become critical with respect to what we accept 
as right and treats as an article of faith. It also requires us to juxtapose this article of faith to 
another and place them on equal footing. Accordingly, he encourages and challenges his 
readers to consider their reasons for ascribing to a moral value or proposition and assess its 
consequences (or effects) on their lives. He implores them to reflect on their moral values 
as from their individual perspective in addition to the herd perspective, which has dominated 
their reflections on morality hitherto and even conflated the two perspectives (cf. D 105). 
They may be ascribing to a morality without knowing or considering why they do so, but to 
be capable of enacting this consideration, they need a perspective other than that which 
dominates morality. This means challenging the ‘herd perspective’ and the moral values and 
propositions to which they ascribe based on that perspective. It is due to the dominance of 
the herd perspective that we cannot begin evaluating our morality and its propositions, some 
of which may not be as valuable as they seem. As we will see below, this shift in perspective 
is the first step and not the conclusion to Nietzsche’s task of evaluating morality.   
 In sum, Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality begins from the following descriptive 
proposition: ‘morality opposes individuality, in principle’. This proposition demonstrates 
the perspective that he requires to make possible the evaluation morality: the one perspective 
morality is set up to oppose. He inquires into what sorts of individuals suffer under the 
hammer of the ‘herd perspective’ and on what grounds.  
The above does not entail that Nietzsche rejects all morality, however. As Ansell-
Pearson rightly contends, Nietzsche is not “advocating the overcoming of all possible forms 
of morality” (Ansell-Pearson 2011, 197). Furthermore, he does not avow the opposite of 
morality, i.e., immorality or amorality. However, there is textual evidence that supports the 
conclusion that he avows immorality, to which we should respond. See, e.g., the following 
passage: 
“I am by far the most terrible human being who has ever existed; this does not mean 
that I will not be the most charitable. I know the joy of destruction to a degree 
proportionate to my strength for destruction, — In both cases I obey my Dionysian 
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nature, which does not know how to separate doing no from saying yes. I am the first 
immoralist: which makes me the destroyer par excellence. (EH, ‘Destiny’, 2) 208  
Nevertheless, there is also considerable textual evidence suggesting he rejects immorality: 
“I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but 
there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny — unless 
I am a fool — that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or 
that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged — but I think the one should 
be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn 
to think differently — in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more to feel 
differently.” (D 103) 
Similarly, he explains the apparent contradiction between the previous two passages by 
arguing that he resigns to the fact that his analysis of morality will lead to his being labelled 
‘immoral’. What he aims for, however, is not to propound immorality, but to ‘dissect’ 
morality, which I have construed as his attempt to attune to and prepare his readers for his 
evaluation of morality:  
“Because they dissect morality, moralists must now be content to be upbraided as 
immoralists. But he who wants to dissect has to kill; yet only for the sake of better 
knowledge, better judgement, better living; not so that all the world shall start 
dissecting.” (WS 19; my emphasis)  
Moreover, when he explains why he accepts the label ‘immoralist’, he defines ‘immorality’ 
as follows: 
“My word immoralist essentially entails two negations. First, I am negating a type of 
person who has been considered highest so far, the good, the benevolent, the 
charitable; second, I am negating a type of morality that has attained dominance and 
validity in the form of morality as such, — decadence morality or, to put it plainly, 
Christian morality. The second opposition may be considered decisive, since in 
general I see the overestimation of goodness and benevolence as a consequence of 
decadence, as a symptom of weakness, as incompatible with an ascending and 
affirmative life: negation and destruction are conditions of affirmation.” (EH, 
‘Destiny’, 4) 
He rejects ‘a type’ of morality, which declares itself as ‘morality as such’ (EH, ‘Destiny’, 3; 
BGE 202; TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 32) and it is on the premise of this rejection alone that he accepts 
the label of an immoralist. He is not an immoralist as such, but he will seem as an immoralist 
to the particular morality that champions itself as morality as such. Therefore, he resigns to 
 
                                               
208 See also (D Pref. 4; HH Pref., 1; WS 19; GS 346; EH, ‘Untimely’, 2; EH, ‘Destiny’, 3, 6; TI, ‘Arrows’, 36; TI, 
‘Morality’, 6; TI, ‘Errors’, 7).  
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the fact that individuals who ascribe to such a morality and thus accept its claim over being 
morality as such will perceive him as ‘immoral’.  
Nietzsche’s immorality is a complex topic, which the proposition that he rejects 
morality as such does not clarify. Clark rightly claims that making sense of Nietzsche’s 
immorality forces us to make sense of his concept of morality first (cf. Clark 2015, 28), 
which, she—correctly, in my view—construes as referring to those “codes for evaluating 
human beings and their conduct” (Clark 2015, 25). Clark’s definition accords with my 
reading of Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of morality as representing the community’s 
rank order of values. I argued that it emerges from contractual relationships, which replaced 
command-obedience relationships premised on strength, but its psychological associations 
and genealogical origins remain rooted the violence inherent to the first relationships, albeit 
by means of memory. Nonetheless, it reflects the rank order that emerges from a group of 
‘individuals’. Accordingly, its ‘codes’ represent what distinguished or preserved the group 
from violent or peaceful encroachment by other groups or individuals: 
“Morality is the doctrine of the order of men’s rank, and consequently also of the 
significance of their actions and works for this order of rank: thus, the doctrine of 
human valuations in respect of everything human. Most moral philosophers only 
present the order of rank that rules now; on the one hand lack of historical sense, on 
the other they are themselves ruled by the morality which teaches that what is at 
present is eternally valid.” (WLN 35[5])  
What determines the ‘codes for evaluating human beings and their conduct’ is the ‘rank 
order’ of a particular community. Moral imperatives reflect what individuals of higher rank 
imprinted upon a community.209 The two propositions that remain constant in his descriptive 
analysis of morality is that it a) refers to some community’s ‘rank order’ and b) it opposes 
‘individuality’. Nietzsche is not an immoralist in the sense that he advocates the overcoming 
of all morality. The question of ‘what morality does he espouse’ is, therefore, pertinent.  
It is often accepted by the philosophical commentary that his primary objections to 
morality aim at the morality of Mitleid and its affinity for the ascetic ideal. I will argue here 
that his objections are not limited to a particular morality, but aim at morality itself in the 
way we understand it as from the dominance of the herd perspective. To understand his 
objections to morality, we have to note the grounds for his objections and so the perspective 
from which he enacts them. All moralities demonstrate a propensity for the ‘ascetic ideal’, 
for Nietzsche, because they dictate or punish actions based on (the memory of) pain. To flesh 
out the previous proposition and demonstrate what grounds it we should turn to an important 
passage where he discusses the effects of construing actions as ‘blameworthy’. First, he 
argues that construing ‘egoism’ as blameworthy or reprehensible harms us: 
 
                                               
209 Nietzsche likewise understands morality as the outcome of oppositions between individuals whom are roughly 
equal in strength and whom could not settle their dispute. A third party finally settle the dispute through a 
compromise of mutual opposition to their respective individuality out which emerge a rank order based on 
contractual relationships (cf. WS 190). 
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“Surely the creed concerning the reprehensibility of egoism, preached so stubbornly 
and with so much conviction, has on the whole harmed egoism (to the advantage of, 
as I will repeat a hundred times, the herd instincts!)—above all, by depriving egoism 
of its good conscience and telling us to seek in it the true source of all unhappiness. 
‘Your selfishness is the reason your life is miserable (Unheil)’—that was preached 
for millennia and, as I said, harmed selfishness and deprived it of much spirit, much 
cheerfulness, much inventiveness, much beauty; it made selfishness stupid and ugly 
and poisoned it!” (GS 328; my emphasis)  
Nevertheless, a little further in the same passage, we find that the same ‘harm’ applies to 
construing ‘stupidity’ as ‘reprehensible’ or ‘blameworthy’:  
“Ancient philosophy, by contrast, taught a quite different main source of misery 
(Unheil): from Socrates onwards these thinkers never tired of preaching, ‘Your 
thoughtlessness and stupidity, your way of living according to the rule, your 
subordination to the opinion of your neighbour is the reason why you so seldom 
achieve happiness—we thinkers are, as thinkers, the happiest.’ Let us not decide here 
whether this sermon against stupidity had better reasons on its side than the sermon 
against selfishness; what is certain, however, is that it deprived stupidity of its good 
conscience—these philosophers harmed stupidity.” (GS 328) 
To understand the above connection between morality, the ascetic ideal and how both 
‘harm’ us, we should, once again, turn to his genealogical analysis and attune ourselves to 
what he means by ‘misery’ and ‘harm’ in the above passage. I cannot offer a detailed 
understanding of his insights into this misery and harm, but I will aim to point us in the right 
direction. He construes this ‘misery’ variously, i.e., as ‘bad conscience’ (GM II, 17), a 
‘physiological feeling of obstruction’, ‘lethargy’ (cf. GM III, 16) ‘depression’ (GM III, 18). 
Given that his approach to phenomena is fundamentally through his drive psychology, the 
previous are affects, which represent the activity of drives or drive relations. Consequently, 
we should consider to which drives or drive relations he refers.  
My proposition is that the above ‘misery’ represents the activity of those drives that 
we block as a trade-off for communal life: the drives that are inimical to communal life or 
go against the rank order characterising our community. The affect is, therefore, by-product 
of communal life and the constraints on our actions and urges that comes with it. He argues 
that it has various ‘sources’ or ‘causes’ (cf. GM III, 16), but he identifies one and focuses 
on how communities manage it. The latter focus is as a result of his commitment to the will-
body identity, which entails that all affects represent the activity of a drive(s), which seeks 
discharge or is being blocked. Therefore, someone who ‘suffers’ has a blocked drive that 
seeks discharge. They seek an alleviation through action, but the language Nietzsche uses 
to describe the means by which a sufferer seeks alleviation is revealing in another respect: 
“For every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress; more exactly, for a 
culprit, even more precisely for a guilty culprit who is receptive to distress, - in short, 
for a living being upon whom he can release his emotions, actually or in effigy, on 
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some pretext or other: because the release of emotions is the greatest attempt at relief, 
or should I say, at anaesthetising on the part of the sufferer, his involuntarily longed 
for narcotic against pain of any kind.” (GM III, 15) 
One’s affects represent the activity of drives, which correspond to an action, but the kind of 
action suggested by the sufferer in question is a ‘social’ or ‘moral’ one. The above sufferer 
alleviates her distress on ‘someone’ or a ‘living thing’, which reveals a conflict between the 
herd perspective and the individual perspective and their respective rank order. The previous 
implies that the blocked drive in question that impels discharge is actually blocked by social 
or communal life and seeks discharge in accordance with the community’s rank order, i.e., 
it seeks discharge on the ‘guilty’.  
Communal life impels us to block or redirect certain drives in accordance with the 
communitty’s rank order of values. Nevertheless, it also manages our need to discharge their 
blocked drives. Morality is one of the ways it manages the need to discharge blocked drives, 
for Nietzsche. Recall that morality emerges from the contractual relationships in accordance 
with customs, obligations, debts, etc., so, it is an extension of that community and its rank 
order. It represents this ‘rank order’ and so impels individuals to block drives in accordance 
with it. Moreover, it motivates individuals using the memory of pain and thus anticipation 
of punishment rather than the direct infliction of pain that motivates custom, obligations and 
so on. Accordingly, we undergo an unavoidable trade-off with communal life and, in turn, 
with morality, which plays a key role in compelling us to block and redirect certain drives.  
Living in a community and ascribing to its morality entails blocking some drives and 
seeking outlets for them in accordance with its rank order. If we are unable to find such an 
outlet and cannot forgo these drives outright, then they continue impelling discharge: they 
push and pull towards their characteristic activity and intervene on other drives. Nietzsche’s 
example of the person who suffers from some illness demonstrates the previous. However, 
blocked drives can and often do lead us to redirect them towards ourselves, i.e., to discharge 
them inwardly. This inward discharge can happen for different reasons, but the primary 
reason he identifies is the moral authority of ascetic priests and their use of that authority to 
redirect ‘bad conscience’ etc. inwardly: 
“But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, says to him, ‘Quite right, my sheep! Somebody 
must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame 
for it, you yourself alone are to blame for yourself’ . . .” (GM III, 15) 
The above demonstrates how we transition from the ‘bad conscience’, i.e., blocking our 
drives as a trade-off with communal life, to the ‘guilty conscience’, i.e., redirecting blocked 
drives inwardly. What I want to suggest is that the previous redirection of blocked drives 
constitutes the root of the ‘ascetic ideal’, but it is not synonymous with it. Moreover, we can 
construe ‘blaming’ our other actions for our bad conscience (misery etc.) as another 
expression this ideal. We can discharge a blocked drive at ourselves by redirecting it at our 
other drives, which happens by the guidance of moral authority. The latter construes our 
other drives and their corresponding actions as ‘sources of our misery’. What motivates us 
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to accept that authority is what he calls the ‘obedience to custom’ (D 9), which transfers first 
from our masters to contracts and obligations and then from contracts to moral authorities 
of a community, e.g., priests. This ‘obedience’ emerges from habituation to communal life 
and is rooted in the memory of pain associated with going against the command, direction 
or propositions of an ‘authority’. The pain stems from our disobeying a ‘command’ in the 
early stages of our habituation to communal life.  
For clarity, blocked drives do not necessarily lead to our discharging them inwardly. 
We can temporarily suspend, redirect and change the target of our drives in accordance with 
a community’s rank order of values. He describes the previous the “innocent means” (GM 
III, 19) of managing our bad conscience. Nevertheless, by ‘blaming’ our ‘misery’ on other 
drives, e.g., blaming stupidity or egoism etc. for our ‘misery’, we discharge the blocked 
drives representing that misery inwardly by redirecting them at our other drives, namely, at 
ourselves. He calls the previous the “‘guilty’ means” (GM III, 19) of managing our bad 
conscience (misery etc.). When we decry that some drive is morally reprehensible (i.e., 
‘blameworthy’ for our ‘misery’) or accept such decrees on grounds of ‘faith’ (or 
‘obedience’) on a moral authority, then we redirect blocked drives to the ‘blameworthy’ 
drives. This has the undesirable outcome of blocking the latter drives while discharging the 
former. In so doing, we discharge initially blocked drives on ourselves and unwittingly add 
to our misery while we give the initial drive an outlet. We give an outlet to one drive(s) at 
the expense of another, which engenders pressure for a new discharge for the new drive and 
thus produces a new misery.  
Nietzsche cautions his readers over specific methods of managing ‘bad conscience’. 
Likewise, he cautions over making an ideal of discharging blocked (antisocial) drives on 
ourselves, which enhances our ‘bad conscience’ by making it desirable or morally worthy. 
The ‘ascetic ideal’ is this ‘inward discharge of blocked drives’ turned into something 
‘morally worthy’, which typifies a community’s rank order. In short, the inward discharge 
of blocked drives can turn into a morality. Let me expand on the previous and clarify some 
of the propositions with a view to showing how they link to his evaluation of morality.  
Ansell-Pearson’s observation that Nietzsche practices a ‘moral therapy’ (cf. Ansell-
Pearson 2011, 182) as opposed to offering a moral theory has been instrumental to my 
reading of Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality. Contra Ansell-Pearson’s suggestion, 
however, I will argue that Nietzsche’s ‘moral therapy’ is not limited to his thoughts in 
Daybreak, but demonstrates his evaluative approach to morality throughout his works. It 
reveals his evaluation of morality, why he sees an evaluation of it as pressing and what he 
aims to achieve through it. The previous hinge on the concept of ‘health’ closely associated 
with what Ansell-Pearson’s suggestion of ‘moral therapy’. 
In later works, Nietzsche raises concerns over how morality affects an individual’s 
‘health’ or the so-called ‘healthy’ (cf. GM III, 14-17 & 22). We can compare his remarks on 
health and the healthy with the ‘decadence’ he construes as the basis of ‘some moralities’ 
(cf. A 6; EH, ‘Tragedy’, 2; EH, ‘Daybreak’, 2; TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 35). Although he notes how 
past ages coped with the effects of morality on ‘health’ by managing ‘bad conscience’ more 
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effectively (cf. GM II, 23), he does not commit to an alternative morality: to some healthier 
or less ‘decadent’ morality (cf. GM II, 24).  
Ansell-Pearson also makes a crucial observation about Nietzsche’s moral task that 
reveals Nietzsche’s reasons for not suggesting an alternative to morality. The negative side 
of his reason is that moral imperatives risk leading to the ascetic ideal, as we saw previously. 
There is likewise a positive side to his reasons, however. Although he does not suggest an 
alternative ‘morality’, he does suggest an alternative way of dealing with the problems that 
morality addresses, such as, bad conscience. In short, Nietzsche is, once again, suggesting 
a revisionist approach. Let us expand on the previous.  
According to Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche seeks to “restore a good conscience to 
egoism and encourage his readers to practice a care of self” (Ansell-Pearson 2011, 197) in 
Daybreak. Recall that his descriptive analysis of morality as operating through our ‘herd 
instincts’, suggests that the herd instincts can distort our ‘ego’ (cf. D 105 & GS 354), which, 
in turn, can distort egoism and likewise the practice of the care of ‘self’. Moreover, how he 
comprehends his moral task in Daybreak is broader than Ansell-Pearson’s suggestion allows 
and more revealing with respect to his revisionist method of dealing with morality: 
“My task, preparing for humanity’s moment of highest self-examination, a great noon 
when it will look back and look out, when it will escape from the domination of 
chance and priests and, for the first time, pose the question ‘why?’, the question ‘what 
for?’ as a whole —, this task follows necessarily from the insight that humanity has 
not put itself on the correct path, that it has absolutely no divine governance, that 
instead, the instinct of negation, of corruption, the decadence-instinct, has been 
seductively at work, and precisely under humanity's holiest value concepts. The 
question of the origin of moral values is a question of the first rank for me because it 
determines the future of humanity.” (EH, ‘Daybreak’, 2) 
Nietzsche aims to restore ‘good conscience’ in a broader and different sense than espousing 
‘modest egoism’ or ‘practicing a care of self’ (cf. Ansell-Pearson 2011, 199). Nevertheless, 
Ansell-Pearson’s reading of Nietzsche as aiming to restore good conscience to ‘egoism’ and 
‘care of self’ is not wrong as such. Ansell-Pearson’s reading of Daybreak largely agrees with 
Nietzsche’s understanding of it. He states that in “Daybreak I first took up the fight against 
the morality of ‘unselfing’” (EH, ‘Daybreak’, 2).  
I will argue that Nietzsche’s revaluation of egoism is a preparatory step in the direction 
of restoring ‘good conscience’ in a broader sense and that his fight against the morality of 
‘unselfing’ is not solely against Mitleid, but against the ascetic ideal. Daybreak is a first step 
in that direction. Thus, Ansell-Pearson rightly emphasises the resorting good conscience to 
egoism as central to Nietzsche’s moral therapy, but I think we are obligated to go further 
than this limited proposition to understand his evaluation of morality. Ansell-Pearson’s 
proposition is instrumental to his method, but not its telos. To notice how ‘restoring a good 
conscience to egoism’ is instrumental to Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality, we should 
firstly distinguish ‘egoism’ from ‘individuality’, and both from ‘sovereign individuality’.  
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We discussed previously Nietzsche’s distinction between egoism and individuality, 
but not his distinction between ‘egoism’ and ‘sovereign individuality’. The following 
passage, which rejects of Schopenhauer’s conception of the ‘will to life’, reveals the grounds 
for the latter distinction:  
“Indeed, the one who shot at truth with the words ‘will to existence’ did not hit it: this 
will – does not exist! For, what is not cannot will; but what is in existence, how could 
this still will to exist! Only where life is, is there also will; but not will to life, instead 
– thus I teach you – will to power! Much is esteemed more highly by life than life itself; 
yet out of esteeming itself speaks – the will to power!” (Z, ‘Self-Overcoming’, 90; 
some emphasis is mine) 
The ‘self’ is not fixed. It is subject to change or becoming, also overcoming. The ‘self’ the 
sovereign individual ‘takes care of’ is what she respectively overcomes or creates beyond (cf. 
Z, ‘Despisers’, 24). To take care of something that changes (or that we are driven to change) 
leads to a paradox.  
Ansell-Pearson rightly emphasises the role of ‘experimentation’ in Nietzsche (cf. 
Ansell-Pearson 2011, 183), but we must understand ‘experimentation’ in light of his views 
on the changeability of the ‘self’. The latter constitutes a central objection to Schopenhauer. 
Experimentation surpasses the impetus of self-preservation: experimentation threatens the 
‘self’. Our pursuit of ‘sovereign individuality’ can be ruinous to the ‘self’, because it implies 
creativity or overcoming, which include creativity with respect to the self or self-overcoming 
(cf. Z, ‘Prologue’, 3-6).  
I suggest that Nietzsche aims to restore a good conscience to egoism for different 
and broader reasons than Ansell-Pearson suggests. His suggestion is a preparatory and thus 
a necessary step, but Nietzsche’s true aim is to loosen morality’s hold on individuality with 
the aim of liberating those characteristics applicable to his practical exemplar (cf. GS 107) 
and, in turn, permit a genuine evaluation of morality. Only individuals who ‘transcend’ 
morality are capable of Nietzsche’s evaluative task and these individuals are ‘egoistic’, but 
in a difference sense than we can grasp by the impetus for ‘self-preservation’, a moral view 
of ‘egoism’ or by its associated ‘care of self’. Nietzsche defines sovereign individuals as 
possessing an artist’s egoism (more on this below). His early concerns with ‘egoism’ are 
preparatory steps for his moral task and, as we saw previously, serve as an attempt to 
challenge the dominance of the morality of Mitleid, but he does not stop there. He aims to 
prepare us for transcending morality such that we can be capable of genuine critique and 
scrutiny over its propositions and precepts. We can argue that egoism is a necessary, albeit 
also an insufficient part of Nietzsche’s moral task or his evaluation of morality.  
Nietzsche’s sovereign individual, his moral exemplar, has a so-called artist’s egoism; 
he strives for creativity and overcoming. The latter two transcend egoism and its cognates. 
Other properties he uses to describe sovereign individuality are ‘responsibility’ (cf. BGE 21, 
210 & 272), ‘belief in oneself’ (HHI 261), ‘self-respect’ (BGE 261), the ‘prerogative to 
promise’ (GM II, 1), also ‘(self) mastery’, a ‘strong will’, an ‘artist’s egoism’. The following 
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passage reveals the characteristics that he believes an agent requires for undertaking his 
evaluation of morality:  
“Whoever can command, whoever is a ‘master’ by nature, whoever appears violent 
in deed and gesture—what is he going to care about contracts! Such beings cannot be 
reckoned with, they come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration or pretext, 
they appear just like lightning appears, too terrible, sudden, convincing and ‘other’ 
even to be hated. What they do is to create and imprint forms instinctively, they are 
the most involuntary, unconscious artists there are: — where they appear, soon 
something new arises, a structure of domination [Herrschafis-Gebilde] that lives, in 
which parts and functions are differentiated and related to one another, in which there 
is absolutely no room for anything that does not first acquire ‘meaning’ with regard 
to the whole. They do not know what guilt, responsibility, consideration are, these 
born organisers; they are ruled by that terrible inner artist’s egoism which has a brazen 
countenance and sees itself justified to all eternity by the ‘work’ like the mother in 
her child.” (GM II, 17) 
We cannot describe sovereign individuality as a kind of virtuosity in egoism or egoism with 
a ‘good conscience’, even though sovereign individuals are egoistic. Not all egoists have 
‘(self) mastery’, a ‘strong will’ etc., but all sovereign individuals—who have ‘(self) mastery’, 
‘strong will’—are egoistic. There is a part-whole relationship between egoism and the 
sovereign individual. His analysis of King Viçvamitra’s, who apparently aimed to build a 
‘new heaven’ (cf. D 113 & GM III, 10), offers insight into the difference between ‘sovereign 
individuality’ and ‘egoism’.  
We can compare King Viçvamitra’s case with the ‘pathos of distance’ of warrior-like 
or ‘noble’ individuals, whom he credits for forming communities and so laying the ground 
for morality (cf. GM I, 2; GM II, 17). Compare the above passage to the following: 
“Every smallest step in the field of free thought, of a life shaped personally, has 
always had to be fought for with spiritual and bodily tortures: not only the step 
forward, no! the step itself, movement, change of any kind has needed its innumerable 
martyrs through all the long path-seeking and foundation-laying millennia which, to 
be sure, are not what one has in mind when one uses the expression ‘world history’—
that ludicrously tiny portion of human existence…” (cf. D 18; my emphasis)  
Moreover, we should not comprehend his objections to the morality of Mitleid, which he 
calls the ‘slave’ morality, as implying that it did not emerge from strong willed individuals, 
i.e., sovereign individuals. The morality of Mitleid aims to preserve and affirm a type. It 
represents a rank order of values set up and maintained by ‘strong willed’ individuals. The 
‘priestly’ reversion of values using the slaves’ revolt driven by ressentiment represents an 
act of ‘strong will’: 
“This type of man needs to believe in an unbiased ‘subject’ with freedom of choice, 
because he has an instinct of self-preservation and self-affirmation in which every lie 
is sanctified.” (GM I, 13; my emphasis) 
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In short, even the morality of Mitleid “occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and 
gives birth to values” (GM I, 10; some emphasis is mine). Even the morality of the so-called 
‘weak’ stems from the strong will and the creative actions of so-called ‘priestly aristocracy’ 
or a ‘clerical caste’, which he credits with the actions of setting a new rank order of values. 
The following compliments the above passage: 
“For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules, that 
of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will that wants to be master, not over something in 
life, but over life itself and its deepest, strongest, most profound conditions; here, an 
attempt is made to use power to block the sources of the power; here, the green eye 
of spite turns on physiological growth itself, in particular the manifestation of this in 
beauty and joy; while satisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, 
misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation 
and self-sacrifice.” (GM III, 11; some emphasis is mine) 
The opposition between egoism and compassion can thus be misleading when we try to 
make sense of Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality, because he makes positive cases for both, 
but for different reasons than what might be called ‘moral reasons’.  His reasons are with 
respect to health and so reveal his reintroduction and use of the individual’s perspective.  
Given the above, we can distinguish ‘self-affirmation’ from ‘affirmation of life’. 
Egoism is the broader concept and refers to ‘self-affirmation’. An Egoist can affirm herself 
while negating life, as Nietzsche’s analysis of the priestly inversion of values suggests (cf. 
GM I, 13). Correspondingly, an egoist can negate herself while affirming life, which we note 
by his claims on ‘self-overcoming’ (Z, ‘Self-Overcoming’, 90) and the ‘artist’s egoism’ of 
state-builders.210 He does not explicitly make the previous distinctions, but his conception 
of different types of ‘egoism’, some of which negate life and others affirm life make these 
distinctions apposite, if not necessary. Accordingly, we can argue that he aims to restore a 
good conscience with respect to life and not one specific action or set of actions in life, which 
may explain why he hesitates about offering an alternative, ‘healthier’ morality. The concept 
of health is too individual to settle on ‘moral’ (and so universal) grounds, according to him. 
Restoring a good conscience to life means transcending morality’s shackles such that we 
can be in a position to comprehend and evaluate its role in our lives in a non-moral, but not 
anti-moral way.211  
 
                                               
210 There is a case to be made about making sense of self-overcoming in terms of his drive psychology, specifically, 
in terms of Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power. In a sense, then, we can construe the above as Nietzsche’s 
attempt to reconcile the demands of the will to power with those of morality or communal life; we have internalised 
and inherited the latter demands and now we have to cope with and integrate them into our lives. For an interesting 
and compelling account of the relationship between affirmation of life and self-overcoming, albeit with a specific 
focus on art, see Reginster (2014). 
211 A useful passage in this regard and that details his account of a good conscience is the following: “‘saying yes 
to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the 
sacrifice of its highest types—that is what I called Dionysian, that is the bridge I found to the psychology of the 
tragic poet. Not to escape horror and pity, not to cleanse yourself of a dangerous affect by violent discharge—as 
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Nietzsche shows caution over moral imperatives because they risk pitting our drives 
against one another, which thereby undermines his project of genuinely evaluating morality. 
The previous, I believe, leads him to construe the ascetic ideal and finally morality itself as 
from the perspective of individuality and health. A passage that shows his disinclination to 
offer his own moral imperative (or ideal) is the following: 
“‘Is an ideal set up or destroyed here?’ you might ask me . . . But have you ever asked 
yourselves properly how costly the setting up of every ideal on earth has been? How 
much reality always had to be vilified and misunderstood in the process, how many 
lies had to be sanctified, how much conscience had to be troubled, how much ‘god’ 
had to be sacrificed every time? If a shrine is to be set up, a shrine has to be destroyed: 
that is the law - show me an example where this does not apply! . . . We moderns have 
inherited millennia of conscience-vivisection and animal-torture inflicted on 
ourselves: we have had most practice in it, are perhaps artists in the field… For too 
long, man has viewed his natural inclinations with an ‘evil eye’, so that they finally 
came to be intertwined with ‘bad conscience’ in him.’ (GM II, 24)  
Ansell-Pearson rightly contends that Nietzsche “does not intend to lay down precepts for 
everyone” (Ansell-Pearson 2011, 197), but we can go further using the unavoidable trade-
off with communal life and morality that Nietzsche describes. We can argue that his intends 
not to offer an alternative morality. Though we can decide how to manage the previous trade-
off, we cannot decide not to manage it. His broader evaluative task lays the ground for the 
individuals who can determine other, more effective ways of managing ‘bad conscience’, 
as he suggests in the following passage:  
“A reverse experiment should be possible in principle - but who has sufficient 
strength? - by this, I mean an intertwining of bad conscience with perverse 
inclinations, all those other-worldly aspirations, alien to the senses, the instincts, to 
nature, to animals, in short all the ideals which up to now have been hostile to life and 
have defamed the world… For that purpose, we would need another sort of spirit than 
those we are likely to encounter in this age: spirits who are strengthened by wars and 
victories, for whom conquest, adventure, danger and even pain have actually become 
a necessity; they would also need to be acclimatised to thinner air higher up, to winter 
treks, ice and mountains in every sense, they would need a sort of sublime nastiness 
[Bosheit] itself, a final, very self-assured willfulness [sic] of insight which belongs to 
great health, in brief and unfortunately, they would need precisely this great health! . 
. .” (GM II, 24; some emphasis is mine) 
Leaving aside Nietzsche’s proposed experiment, I think we should focus on the ‘spirit’ 
required by those tasked with performing it. His moral therapy strives to nurture this spirit 
in his readers with the aim of preparing them for opening morality up to genuine scrutiny 
 
                                               
Aristotle thought—: but rather, over and above all horror and pity, so that you yourself may be the eternal joy in 
becoming, —the joy that includes even the eternal joy in negating . . .” (TI, ‘Ancients’, 5). 
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and critique. We cannot reduce Nietzsche’s broader evaluation of morality to the imperative 
to cultivate some specific drive or set of drives, because it would endanger other drives and 
lead to the ascetic ideal, by another route. His analysis of the consequences of blaming 
‘egoism’ and ‘stupidity’ reveals to us the sort of ‘spirit’ he tries to cultivate by its negation. 
When we construe our ‘egoism’ or ‘stupidity’ blameworthy, we harm their ‘cheerfulness’, 
‘inventiveness’, ‘spirit’ and ‘beauty’ (cf. GS 328), according to him. I will argue that these 
concepts signify the sublimation or overcoming of ‘egoism’ or ‘stupidity’, which becomes 
clearer when we construe them through his drive psychology.  
In sum, we can explain the above in two steps. Firstly, he changes our perspective 
from the ‘herd’ to the ‘individual’. Secondly, he evaluates actions not in ‘moral’ terms, that 
is, he does not espouse individuality and its correlate actions, which would bring us back to 
the herd perspective he aims to critique. He focuses on an individual’s ‘health’, instead.  
Nietzsche’s concept of ‘health’ is not easy to pinpoint, but two propositions stand 
out that help us make sense of his use of the concept.212 Firstly, we cannot determine or 
propose a universally valid concept for which objects or activities are healthy or unhealthy; 
what is ‘healthy’ for one individual can be ‘unhealthy’ for another (cf. HHI 286). I construe 
the previous as his attempt to prevent the ‘herd perspective’ intervening to provide a ‘moral’, 
rather than a ‘medical’ conception of ‘health’. Secondly, he describes ‘health’ or ‘becoming 
healthy’ as unity among drives, which reflects the agent’s ability (re)act effectively (cf. WLN 
14[157]). Therefore, health is the ability to (re)act effectively, which, in turn, represents the 
unity of our drives.  
There is more to his conception of ‘health’ than I can assess here.213 A thorough 
analysis of ‘health’ and his extensive use of it can help us make sense of his evaluation of 
morality and it can show his revisionist approach to moral problems or, alternatively, the 
problems that we task morality with managing. As a preliminary, I want to emphasise that 
his conception of health is as from an individuality’s perspective or includes this perspective, 
rather than strictly the moral or herd perspective. Accordingly, health becomes a legitimate, 
if not the main concern of those who aim to genuinely evaluate morality, i.e., as from a non-
moral standpoint. Health must include the individual’s perspective or account for someone’s 
individuality (i.e., their diverse ‘drives’, but also how blocking these drives and-or pitting 
against one another affects us), because we can only know whether or not a person is healthy 
by assessing them, rather than by reverting or appealing to some moral or universal concept. 
Health, then, works as his middle ground, which allows his to ‘dissect’ morality not from 
another moral viewpoint and not by espousing immorality. It is the concept that legitimates 
 
                                               
212 See, e.g., the following passages that explicitly or implicitly purport to offer something like a definition of 
health or attempt to demonstrate his use of it (WLN 2[97], 14 [157] &18[11]; A 51; EH, ‘Wise’, 2; EH, 
‘Zarathustra’, 1 & 2; BGE 154; HH Pref. 4; HHI 224, 286; HHII 356; GS 120 & 382; D 202). I am indebted to 
Reginster’s reading of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, which suggests that Nietzsche is less concerned with the 
‘truth-value’ of a morality or some moral proposition than with what might be called its ‘medical’ value (cf. 
Reginster 2013). The emphasis on health or healthy is a central, but often overlooked feature of Nietzsche’s critique 
of morality.  
213 For a summary of these two propositions on ‘health’, see (GS 120). 
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a critique of morality by offering a potential challenger to the dominant herd perspective 
and its internalisation. 
Making drives ‘blameworthy’ risks preventing us from sublimating or overcoming 
them, according to Nietzsche. Whether or not this ‘blame’ is an explicit or implicit aspect 
of morality and its imperatives, is of little consequence. What matters is redirecting blocked 
drives inwardly. His aim to restore good conscience takes into account the consequences of 
any morality and any moral imperative. He does not advocate ‘individuality’ at the expense 
of the ‘herd perspective’, but in spite of the herd instincts. He strives to loosen morality’s 
hold on individuals, not to espouse individuality at the expense of the herd. Thus, restoring 
a good conscience to egoism is a preparatory step, because morality opposes individuality, 
in principle, according to him, but not the apotheosis of his critique.   
My reading of Nietzsche’s broader evaluation of morality hinges on the herd 
perspective’s status in his drive psychology; he construes it as a drive, drive relation and as 
represented by the activity of the ‘herd instincts’. One’s herd instincts require discharge like 
any other drive(s), including those drives a morality opposes. Accordingly, he encourages 
his reader to unify her various and conflicting drives and construes this unification as having 
a single project (cf. GS 8, 39 & 190) or ‘wholeness’ (more on this below). Sovereign 
individuals should aspire to “own up to their physis and to heed its demands down to its 
subtlest tones” (GS 39); these subtlest tones include the ‘herd instincts’ and, in turn, the herd 
perspective that underpins them.  
In sum, Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality utilises his genealogical account to attune 
us to how morality affects our ability to discharge our drives. He legitimates the assessment 
required for the previous by looking at how it affects one’s ‘health’, which he construes as 
wholly determined by our individuality in such a way that includes our herd instincts. It is 
misleading to construe him as espousing ‘individuality’ at the expense of the ‘herd 
perspective’, because this would lead him to contend that redirecting our ‘bad conscience’ 
to ‘herd instincts’ is the right way to restore someone’s health. For example, in the case of 
the morality of Mitleid, opposing Mitleid by espousing the moral value of egoism will harm 
and prevent Mitleid’s overcoming. It would harm our ability to unify Mitleid with our other 
drives and dent our capacity for social interactions or sociability. Furthermore, if we read 
Nietzsche as simply negating (some) morality to espouse individuality, this would bypass 
his “critique of moral values” (GM Pref., 6) by turning individuality into a new moral value 
or ideal. He resists the previous by arguing that his moral exemplar transcends morality.  
One of Nietzsche’s central objections to morality aims at the propensity of moral 
imperatives to appear as permanent and universal, i.e., incapable of (or even resistant to) 
criticism, which means they function as ‘ideals’ (more on this in the closing chapter). His 
objections to the ascetic ideal are not on ‘moral’ grounds, however, but on grounds of its 
effect on an individual’s ‘health’. The latter, as we saw, stems from his reintroducing the 
individual’s perspective into his critique; the standpoint of individuality and its cognate 
‘health’ also allows him to argue for ‘praiseworthy’ by-products of blocking drives and 
redirecting them inwardly. To identify the previous praiseworthy by-products, we have to 
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firstly distinguish an ascetic ‘action’ from an ascetic ‘ideal’; ‘ascetic’ denotes the inward 
redirection and discharge of blocked drives.  
There is a difference between discharging blocked drives inwardly and construing 
this discharge as ‘morally worthy’ or an ‘ideal’. The latter means turning an ascetic action 
into a moral imperative, i.e., into praiseworthy as from the herd perspective. In short, it 
means including ascetic actions into a ‘rank order’ that characterise our community and its 
corresponding morality. The ascetic action is solely our discharging the drive responsible 
for our ‘misery’ (bad conscience etc.) inwardly without turning it into a ‘privilege’ or into 
‘something praiseworthy’. Nietzsche identifies the positive some outcomes of redirecting 
bad conscience etc. inwardly, but nothing positive about making an ideal of it. The inward 
discharge of bad conscience is instrumental to what he construes as self-discipline or self-
mastery, which are features of sovereign individuality. They are prerequisites of a so-called 
‘prerogative to promise’ (or ‘responsibility’), which characterises sovereign individuality, 
but also key features of that individual’s creativity and self-overcoming.  
Self-mastery plays a key role in Nietzsche’s conception of sovereign individuality. I 
will also argue that it plays a key role in his broader evaluation of morality, which is evident 
after we relate them to ascetic actions. To notice how self-mastery relates to ascetic actions 
we have to, once again, refer to his attunement and so his genealogical analysis of morality. 
This shows the conditions under which ‘self-mastery’ emerged. Habituation to communal 
life is a precondition of self-mastery. Recall that despots mastered our ancestors, before our 
ancestors mastered themselves. They first learned obedience through the pain their masters 
inflicted upon them when commanding them to act in a manner opposed to their individuality 
or freedom (cf. D 9 & GM II, 18).214 They achieved self-mastery by internalising obedience 
and acquiring the herd perspective, first. The herd perspective and actions it impels, we can 
recall, are motivated by the memory of pain. Tus, they learned to behave in accordance with 
custom without having someone enforce this behaviour directly by inflicting pain on them. 
They learned to master themselves using their self-image; the memory of pain motivated this 
self-mastery. In short, they learned self-mastery after despots mastered them through the 
process of ‘internalisation’. He demonstrates the previous clearly in GM, where he discusses 
the origin of moral responsibility: 
“In order to have that degree of control over the future, man must first have learnt to 
distinguish between what happens by accident and what by design, to think causally, 
to view the future as the present and anticipate it, to grasp with certainty what is end 
and what is means, in all, to be able to calculate, compute - and before he can do this, 
man himself will really have to become reliable, regular, necessary, even in his own self-
image, so that he, as someone making a promise is, is answerable for his own future!” 
(GM II, 1; some emphasis is mine) 
 
                                               
214 The means by which we acquired self-mastery has also proved costly by driving many individuals mad, 
according to Nietzsche (cf. D 14).  
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The process of making someone ‘reliable, regular, necessary’ etc. happens by a persistent 
infliction of pain, which generates memory and, in turn, a new behaviour or habit; violent, 
despotic individuals who organise states (cf. GM II, 17) are the progenitors of the previous 
reliability. The memory of pain made our ancestors act in accordance with custom, but also 
paved the way for sovereign individuality. The latter, however, means transcending customs 
and behaving in accordance with our self-image or ‘conscience’.  
In other words, memory is a precondition for the self-image that characterises the 
responsibility and the prerogative to promise he attributes to the sovereign individual, for 
Nietzsche:  
“‘A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory: only something that 
continues to hurt stays in the memory’ - that is a proposition from the oldest (and 
unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on earth… When man decided he had to 
make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices: 
the most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits (the sacrifice of the first-born belongs here), 
the most disgusting mutilations (for example, castration), the cruelest rituals of all 
religious cults (and all religions are, at their most fundamental, systems of cruelty) - 
all this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most 
powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here: 
a few ideas have to be made ineradicable, ubiquitous, unforgettable, ‘fixed’, in order 
to hypnotise the whole nervous and intellectual system through these ‘fixed ideas’ - 
and ascetic procedures and lifestyles are a method of freeing those ideas from 
competition with all other ideas, of making them ‘unforgettable’.” (GM II, 3) 
The reason Nietzsche gives for the pain we encounter when we direct our conscious thought 
to the individual or unfamiliar (cf. D 115) is located in our moral history, i.e., in what our 
ancestors had to endure as a trade-off for the benefits of living in a community. Additionally, 
this is what now we are enduring through our institutions, morality and ‘blind obedience’, 
which we inherit from what our ancestors underwent.  
What our ancestors endured allowed us to inherit responsibility, which is a central 
requirement of a communal life based on contracts, debts, obligations etc. This responsibility 
taught us self-mastery, which now permits us to transcend the harmful costs of contracts, 
debts, obligations etc. and have ‘freedom’ in Nietzsche’s sense. His critique of morality 
implies we have to first throw off the yoke of this teaching and thereby become sovereign, 
responsible, free and individual, in his sense. We can utilise self-mastery towards something 
other than the obedience to custom once we learn to harmonise or unify that obedience with 
our other drives: we should aim for health, not moral virtue. We have to do so to avoid the 
ascetic ideal and the effects on our health that follows our blind obedience to morality.  
In sum, self-mastery is only possible using our self-image, which emerges from our 
habituation to communal life. It partakes in the decision-making process by altering the 
intentional object of a drive(s) and thus redirecting the original drives we block as a trade-
off for communal life. Hitherto, the customs of our community rather than our individuality 
have shaped and dominated our self-image and dictated to us how we should redirect our 
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originally blocked drives. Contrary to Schopenhauer, our self-image does not necessarily 
make us individual. It is not an access point to reality from an illusory world whose illusion 
is determined by the limits of our intellect. According to Nietzsche, it is a “fellow worker 
in the construction of our character and our destiny” (D 115). It affects our actions and 
partakes in our inherent urge to overcome and self-overcome. Finally, or so his propositions 
imply, we need our self-image and morality. They are drives we cannot relinquish without 
relinquishing communal life itself or without the costly internal conflict that will eventually 
lead many of us to suffering and ruin.  
We remember that the pale criminal’s shame arose from his rationalising his actions 
and not just from his ‘thoughts’. It is what he consciously makes of his actions and not his 
‘intention’ to act in some way or his ‘thoughts’ about having acted some way, which makes 
him ashamed before his action. Nietzsche puts it in the following manner: 
“Whoever grows ill now is befallen by the evil that is evil now; he wants to hurt with 
that which makes him hurt. But there have been other ages and another evil and good. 
Once doubt was evil and the will to self. Back then sick people became heretics and 
witches: as heretics and witches they suffered and wanted to cause suffering. But this 
does not want to get to your ears: it harms your good people, you say to me. But what 
matter your good people to me! There is much about your good people that makes me 
disgusted, and verily not their evil. I wish they had a madness from which they would 
perish, like this pale criminal! Indeed, I wish their madness were called truth or 
loyalty or justice – but they have their virtue in order to live long and in pitiful 
contentment.” (Z, ‘Criminal’: 27; my emphasis)  
Notice the following two propositions. Firstly, ‘whoever grows ill now is befallen by the 
evil that is evil now’. Secondly, ‘there have been other ages and another evil and good’. He 
commits to plurality of moral evaluations of action, which I interpret as the proposition that 
moral values are transient. He agrees with Schopenhauer that our conscience represents the 
morality to which ‘we’ ascribe, but he rejects the proposition that the basis of morality itself 
is Mitleid. Rather, the Europeans of his day morally evaluated their actions based on the 
agent’s compassion, selflessness and so on: 
“…popular superstition of Christian Europe which people keep repeating so naively 
to this day, that what is characteristic of morality is selflessness, self-denial, self-
sacrifice, or sympathy (Mitgefiihl) and compassion (Mitleiden)” (GS 345) 
Although Nietzsche accepts the above as a fact about how the Europeans of his day morally 
evaluate an action, he rejects that we can justifiably elevate their evaluations to a principle 
that transcends a historical context, which is what Schopenhauer aims to do by arguing that 
compassion is the basis of morality itself. The criterion for determining the moral worth of 
an action at a particular moment in time is not derived sub specie aeternitatis, for Nietzsche, 
but as from our current Judeo-Christian values that have dominated historically and become 
custom. These values arose from particular circumstances and pressures, but also from a 
particular community’s responses to those pressures and circumstances.  
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Our Judeo-Christian values are not eternal or eternally binding. They emerge from 
what he calls the “slaves’ revolt in morality” (GM I, 7). They evidence one among different 
ways a community can respond to the ‘oppression’ (the misery, depression, lethargy, bad 
conscience etc.) of its members. The proposition that Europeans of his day morally evaluate 
actions in relation to how Mitleid features in them is a matter of fact pertaining to historical 
context and so represents transient moral precepts. It does not transcend such a context and 
it is not a matter of fact about an eternally binding moral precept. There have been other 
moral perspectives and precepts in history and there will be others, which means different 
criteria for how we morally evaluate people’s actions.  
Moreover, Nietzsche argues that the moral yardstick of Mitleid evidences Europe’s 
break with its European moral history, which he supports by referring to philosophers and 
their views on its value: 
“This predilection for and overvaluation of compassion [Mitleid] that modern 
philosophers show is, in fact, something new: up till now, philosophers were agreed 
as to the worthlessness of compassion. I need only mention Plato, Spinoza, La 
Rochefoucauld and Kant, four minds as different from one another as it is possible to 
be, but united on one point: their low opinion of compassion.” (GM Pref., 5)  
It is also misleading and hasty to argue that he aims primarily at Christian morality, because 
he acknowledges that even within Christian morality itself there have been different ideals, 
perspectives and-or imperatives: 
“Even during the era of Græco-Roman splendour…the simplicity and vanity of 
Christian agitators - we call them Church Fathers - dared to decree: ‘we have our own 
classical literature, we don’t need that of the Greeks’, and so saying, they proudly 
pointed to books of legends, letters of the apostles and apologetic little tracts, rather 
similar to the way the English ‘Salvation Army’ today fights Shakespeare and other 
‘heathens’ with similar literature. I do not like the New Testament, you have worked 
that out by now…The Old Testament - well, that is something quite different: every 
respect for the Old Testament! I find in it great men, heroic landscape and something 
of utmost rarity on earth, the incomparable naïvety of the strong heart; even more, I 
find a people. In contrast, in the New Testament I find nothing but petty sectarian 
groupings, nothing but rococo of the soul, nothing but arabesques, crannies and 
oddities, nothing but the air of the conventicle, not to forget the occasional breath of 
bucolic sugariness which belongs to the epoch (and to the Roman province) and is 
neither Jewish nor Hellenistic.” (GM III, 22) 
He construes Christianity as laying the ground for morally praising the ‘bad conscience’, 
which is what spawned the ‘ascetic ideal’. It redirected one’s blocked drives inwardly by 
making one’s body their target, but it did not stop there. It turned ‘redirecting blocked drives 
inwardly’ into something morally praiseworthy, that is, into a moral imperative. In typically 
prophetic moments, he sees a change in moral values and standards for Europeans: 
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“…without a doubt, from now on, morality will be destroyed by the will to truth’s 
becoming-conscious-of-itself: that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe 
in the next two centuries, the most terrible, most questionable drama but perhaps also 
the one most rich in hope . . .” (GM III, 27) 
We should distinguish the need for morality from the object or target of that need. Most 
importantly, we should not confuse the need for morality for the need for some particular 
morality, for example, the morality of Mitleid, thus excluding others. Moral philosophers 
fail to distinguish the need for morality from the legitimacy of a particular morality or set 
of moral values, which renders their attempts to offer anything like a first step towards a 
critique of morality dubious. They make a common mistake, which he describes as follows: 
“Their usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some consensus among peoples, at 
least among tame peoples, concerning certain moral principles, and then conclude 
that these principles must be unconditionally binding also for you and me—or, 
conversely, they see that among different peoples moral valuations are necessarily 
different and infer from this that no morality is binding—both of which are equally 
childish.” (GS 345) 
The need for morality is untouched by any arguments for or against one set of moral values, 
since, according to the conceptual link we discussed, the means by which we reflect on (and 
the basis on which we argue about) moral matters is conscious thought and language. Both 
lead us to entertain and therefore legitimate the herd perspective. Therefore, we can shft the 
intentional object or target of our need for morality without changing the need itself:  
“For that is how man is: an article of faith could be refuted to him a thousand times; 
as long as he needed it, he would consider it ‘true’ again and again, in accordance 
with that famous ‘proof of strength’ of which the Bible speaks.” (GS 347) 
Moral philosophers, then, commonly strive to take a photograph of the moral state of affairs 
in some time and attempt to reproduce its content ad infinitum, both in affirming and negating 
it; what drives them is the need for morality. This need shows itself both in affirming a set 
of moral values X or in negating X.  
Nietzsche proposes a different strategy for dealing with the transience of our moral 
values as juxtaposed to the apparent permanence of our need for morality, i.e., the sovereign 
individual, who shows creativity with respect to moral values. Restoring this creativity 
requires us to acknowledge two approaches to moral matters as represented by two types of 
individuals, however. The following passage reveals what those individuals are, which he 
calls them ‘believers’ and ‘free spirits’: 
“Faith is always most desired and most urgently needed where will is lacking; for 
will, as the affect of command, is the decisive mark of sovereignty and strength. That 
is, the less someone knows how to command, the more urgently does he desire 
someone who commands, who commands severely—a god, prince, the social order, 
doctor, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience… Once a human being arrives 
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at the basic conviction that he must be commanded, he becomes ‘a believer’; 
conversely, one could conceive of a delight and power of self-determination, a 
freedom of the will, in which the spirit takes leave of all faith and every wish for 
certainty, practised as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and 
dancing even beside abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence.” 
(GS 247) 
We can cope with the need for morality by acknowledging that some individuals among us 
create, project and preserve moral values, while others seek to accord to them. Essentially, 
our moral values represent our will, our actions, our works and our achievements. Nietzsche, 
firstly, attunes us to the previous using his genealogical analysis and, secondly, strives to 
restore our ‘good conscience’ with respect to creativity in moral matters. He aims to restore 
it for both the so-called ‘believers’ and the ‘free spirits’. Accordingly, he shifts the ground 
of moral propositions from something outside the moral agent (i.e., the ‘masters’, the ‘herd’, 
the ‘community’, ‘custom or duty’, ‘God’, ‘virtue’, ‘nature’ etc.) to the individual and thus 
the moral agent herself. The following quotes demonstrate this strategy and aim:  
“You shall learn to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against, injustice 
as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the sense of perspective and its 
injustice. You shall above all see with your own eyes where injustice is always at its 
greatest: where life has developed at its smallest, narrowest, neediest, most incipient 
and yet cannot avoid taking itself as the goal and measure of things and for the sake 
of its own preservation secretly and meanly and ceaselessly crumbling away and 
calling into question the higher, greater, richer - you shall see with your own eyes the 
problem of order of rank, and how power and right and spaciousness of perspective 
grow into the heights together. You shall' - enough: from now on the free spirit knows 
what ‘you shall’ he has obeyed, and he also knows what he now can, what only now 
he - may do . . .” (HH Pref., 6) 
 
“Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and value 
judgments and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our own: 
let us stop brooding over the ‘moral value of our actions’! Yes, my friends, it is time 
to feel nauseous about some people's moral chatter about others. Sitting in moral 
judgment should offend our taste. Let us leave such chatter and such bad taste to those 
who have nothing to do but drag the past a few steps further through time and who 
never live in the present — that is, to the many, the great majority! We, however, 
want to become who we are — human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, 
who give themselves laws, who create themselves!” (GS 335) 
 
“To recommend a goal to mankind is something quite different: the goal is then 
thought of as something which lies in our own discretion; supposing the 
recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in pursuit of it also impose upon itself 
a moral law, likewise at its own discretion. But up to now the moral law has been 
supposed to stand above our own likes and dislikes: one did not want actually to 
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impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to take it from somewhere or discover it 
somewhere or have it commanded to one from somewhere.” (D 108) 
 
“Away from these fable songs I steered you when I taught you: ‘The will is a creator.’ 
All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a grisly accident – until the creating will says to 
it: ‘But I will it thus! I shall will it thus!’” (Z, ‘Redemption’, 112) 
 
“But men are capable of consciously resolving to evolve themselves to a new culture, 
whereas formerly they did so unconsciously and fortuitously: they can now create 
better conditions for the propagation of men and for their nutrition, education and 
instruction, manage the earth as a whole economically, balance and employ the 
powers of men in general.” (HHI 24; my emphasis) 
Morality can potentially hinder individuality (cf. D 107) in favour of the herd perspective 
and have ‘harmful’ consequences, but the same applies if we proposed a morality that 
espouses individuality, albeit with respect to the drives representing the herd perspective or 
our herd instincts. He proposes a balancing act by treating the herd perspective as drives 
requiring discharge, but cautions us not to undermine our need for morality. He encourages 
readers to strive to unify, harmonise and co-operate with their need for morality (cf. GS 39 
& 290), albeit in conjunction with rather than at the exclusion of their individuality. I have 
understood the previous as espousing ‘health’.  
We should create a ‘self-image’ (cf. HHII 366), take responsibility for it (HH Pref. 
6; D 105) and promote it, according to Nietzsche. He encourages a special few to undertake 
the responsibility for creating their own rank order of values through their actions, rather 
than waiting to have a rank order imposed on them from without. The previous, however, 
requires him to encourage the non-privileged to learn from and follow them, which we rarely 
notice. The core aspect of his attunement is to lead his readers to recognise that they have 
inherited the moral values to which they ascribe. They are remnants representing the actions 
and values of the individuals who preceded them, which they often support by an uncritical 
commitment to them. This uncritical and unreflective support comes at the risk of being a 
detriment of individuality and health, but likewise to our species, which he evidences in the 
following passage: 
“Even the most harmful person may actually be the most useful when it comes to the 
preservation of the species; for he nurtures in himself or through his effects on others 
drives without which humanity would long since have become feeble or rotten. 
Hatred, delight in the misfortunes of others, the lust to rob and rule, and whatever else 
is called evil: all belong to the amasing economy of the preservation of the species, 
an economy which is certainly costly, wasteful, and on the whole most foolish — but 
still proven to have preserved our race so far.” (GS 1) 
The pursuit of our individual ends are not necessarily opposed to the interest of our species. 
The opposition is between morality (or the herd) and individuality, not between the species 
and the individual. The individual is necessarily included within the species, irrespective of 
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whether or not she is included in her ‘herd’: “each individual is the entire single line of 
humanity up through himself” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 33; my emphases). His proposition is that 
we should cultivate a good conscience with respect to creating our own values, which need 
not be opposed (or reactions) to our current morality and its values. Many will inevitably 
experience the inclination to defend and champion our current moral values, not undertake 
to create their own values, but they should do so by including their individual perspective 
into their reflections over why they defend them. They can only achieve that after the critical 
and non-moral reflection over those values he proposes. Let us look more closely at what 
exactly he proposes by assessing his famous and, in my view, important example of Goethe. 
Nietzschean sovereign individuality means taking ‘responsibility’, but, of course, he 
means this in a revised sense. He construes it in the sense of having:  
“…an enduring, unbreakable will, thus has his own standard of value: in the 
possession of such a will: viewing others from his own standpoint, he respects or 
despises; and just as he will necessarily respect his peers, the strong and the reliable 
(those with the prerogative to promise)… so he will necessarily be ready to kick the 
febrile whippets who promise without that prerogative, and will save the rod for the 
liar who breaks his word in the very moment it passes his lips.” (GM II, 2) 
His analysis of Goethe demonstrates how sovereign individuals transcend morality without 
negating it. It demonstrates what he aims to attain by loosening morality’s hold on egoism 
and individuality, but also what he aims at with his avowal of ‘sovereign individuality’215: 
“What he wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, 
feeling, will (— preached in the most forbiddingly scholastic way by Kant, Goethe's 
antipode), he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself ... In the middle of 
an age inclined to unreality, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said yes to everything 
related to him, — his greatest experience was of that ens realissimum [the most real 
thing] that went by the name of Napoleon. Goethe conceived of a strong, highly 
educated, self-respecting human being, skilled in all things physical and able to keep 
himself in check, who could dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of 
naturalness, who is strong enough for this freedom; a person who is tolerant out of 
strength and not weakness because he knows how to take advantage of things that 
would destroy an average nature; a person lacking all prohibitions except for 
weakness, whether it is called a vice or a virtue…” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 49) 
He praises Goethe for the courage of going beyond his age after describing it as inclined to 
unreality.216 He then describes Goethe as seemingly opposed to his age or as a ‘convinced 
 
                                               
215 For more of Goethe’s influence on Nietzsche see Del Caro (1989). For more on the relationship between Goethe, 
health, agency and morality see Risse (2007, 78-80). 
216 Nietzsche makes clear what he understands by going beyond one’s age and his own relationship to it in the 
following passage: “[w]hat does a philosopher demand of himself, first and last? To overcome his age, to become 
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realist’. The previous can be misleading if we read it as Goethe reacting to his age, for his 
own sake or interest. If he created himself simply for himself, his interest and pleasure, then 
he would resemble the pale criminal, a hermit or be immoral. The previous did not drive 
Goethe, who disciplined himself into ‘wholeness’. 
Nietzsche praises Goethe’s self-discipline while clarifying that it demonstrates his 
commitment to the self-image of “a strong, highly educated, self-respecting human being, 
skilled in all things physical and able to keep himself in check” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 49; my 
emphasis). Recall, there is a conceptual link between one’s self-image and self-discipline 
or self-mastery. Our self-image is an expression of the herd perspective, however, and so it 
conceptually links to the herd perspective. Goethe changed the intentional object of his need 
for morality. He did not block that need. He conceived of a ‘human being’ and resolved to 
become that human being. He did not conceive of himself without juxtaposition to others. 
What we ‘conceive’, ‘know’, ‘consciously’ decide necessarily has moral consequences. In 
other words, it is broader than our self, in principle (cf. GS 354-5).217 The previous claim is 
true even if our actions are apparently for ourselves and on ourselves. 
In sum, Nietzsche’s conception of sovereign individuality is developmental; it shows 
a particular stage in our moral development, which he aptly summarises as follows: 
“What is essential and invaluable about every morality is that it is a long 
compulsion… Everything there is, or was, of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, or 
masterly assurance on earth, whether in thinking itself, or in ruling, or in speaking 
and persuading, in artistic just as in ethical practices, has only developed by virtue of 
the “tyranny of such arbitrary laws.” … I will say it again: what seems to be essential 
“in heaven and on earth” is that there be obedience in one direction for a long time. In 
the long term, this always brings and has brought about something that makes life on 
earth worth living – for instance: virtue, art, music, dance, reason, intellect – 
something that transfigures, something refined, fantastic, and divine… Slavery, in 
both the crude and refined senses of the term, seems to be the indispensable means of 
disciplining and breeding even the spirit… “You should obey someone, anyone, and 
for a long time: or else you will deteriorate and lose all respect for yourself ” – this 
seems to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is clearly neither 
 
                                               
‘timeless’… In fact the thing I have been most deeply occupied with is the problem of decadence, — I have had 
my reasons for this. ‘Good and evil’ is just a variant of this problem. Anyone who has kept an eye open for signs 
of decline understands morality as well, — understands what is hiding under its holiest names and value-formulas: 
impoverished life, the will to the end, the great exhaustion. Morality negates life . . . I needed a particular form of 
self-discipline for a task like this: — to take sides against everything sick in myself, including Wagner, including 
Schopenhauer, including the whole of modern ‘humaneness’. — A profound alienation, a profoundly cold and 
sober attitude towards everything timely, time-bound: to want more than anything else an eye like Zarathustra’s, 
an eye that looks out over the whole fact of humanity from a tremendous distance, — that looks down over it . . . 
Would any sacrifice be too much for a goal like this? Any ‘self-overcoming’! Any ‘self-denial’!” (CW Pref., 233). 
217 See, (WLN 34[46), 34[124], 35[35], 37[4], 38[1], 40[21], 40[27], 40[28], 40[38], 41[11], 1[28], 5[22], 5[65], 
5[68], 7[63], 11[113], 14[122]; BGE 16,-17, 20, 23; TI, ‘Errors’, 5; D 107, 133, 564; HHI, 228, 608; HHII, 90; GS 
21).   
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“categorical,” as the old Kant demanded it to be (hence the “or else” –), nor directed 
to the individual (what does nature care about the individual!), but rather to peoples, 
races, ages, classes, and above all to the whole “human” animal, to the human.” (BGE 
188) 
Goethe is an example of a particular stage in our moral development. When we arrive at 
that stage, we aim to set a new moral ideal by amending and building upon the ideal of our 
age. Moreover, we learn to assume responsibility for realising this ideal. We overcome rather 
than oppose the morality of our time. In Goethe’s case, the morality of the time ostensibly 
espoused ‘selflessness’, ‘self-denial’ and ‘unreality’, which he transcended. He disciplined 
himself to represent moral values that other individuals could likewise aspire to.218 Goethe’s 
self-discipline would possess no moral significance or would be immoral without his self-
image of a whole ‘human being’. His actions represent what a human being can be, not what 
only Goethe can be. Accordingly, he strove to be a ‘strong, highly educated, self-respecting 
human being’, not to be ‘himself’. He harmonised his individual drives and herd instincts 
by creating a ‘self’ using his self-image and, thus, by assuming responsibility for realising 
this self-image through actions and works.219 Goethe, then, strove unwittingly for ‘health’. 
His harmony culminated in someone who contributed to his community and morality, not 
in someone who reacted to or opposed them. ‘Wholeness’—in the remarkable co-existence 
and cooperation between ‘individuality’ and the ‘herd’—typifies Nietzsche’s sovereign 
individual. She transcends and so replaces her morality, not all morality; she contributes to 
it critically and creatively.  
Nietzsche gave morality the status of a need or drive that requires discharge and so 
integration into our lives. The herd perspective plays a fundamental and inescapable role as 
“some of the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions” (GS 335). He implores 
readers to recognise that human beings create their own moral values: 
“My ego taught me a new pride, I teach it to mankind: no longer bury your head in 
the sand of heavenly things, but bear it freely instead, an earthly head that creates a 
meaning for the earth! I teach mankind a new will: to want the path that human beings 
have travelled blindly, to pronounce it good and no longer sneak to the side of it like 
the sick and the dying-out.” (Z, ‘Hinterworldly’, 21; some of the emphasis is mine) 
 
                                               
218 We often find Nietzsche placing himself on the latter camp of people who seek to set moral trends (cf. BGE 32 
& 226; TI, ‘Arrows’, 36; TI, ‘Anti-Nature’, 3 & 6; TI, ‘Errors’, 7).  
219 I am indebted to Katsafanas’ analysis of the relationship between Nietzsche and Schiller’s account of agency 
for the concept of ‘harmony’: “Nietzsche, with Schiller, conceives a harmony between the various aspects of the 
soul” (Katsafanas 2011, 102). I agree with him that unity in terms of harmony describes Nietzsche’s conception 
of agency. Nevertheless, the independent causal efficacy of conscious thought requires us to conceive of this 
‘harmony’ based on the effectiveness of something distinct from the drives, which we call ‘self-conscious thought’. 
It tempts us to posit a phantom, which Nietzsche must avoid to make good on his commitment to ontological 
monism and immanence. He can do so by conceiving ‘self-conscious thought’ as a drive or as representing the 
activity of a drive(s). The latter has been the approach to Nietzschean agency I have attempted to defend using 
what he calls historical philosophising. 
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The new values they create need not be reactions, threatening or even opposed to the ‘herd 
perspective’, but contribute to it (cf. D 107-8). This developmental account of sovereign 
individuality entails she creates her own ‘moral’ values by mastering and overcoming her 
community and so its moral values, not by opposing or reacting to them. Thus, sovereign 
individuality is a stage in the habituation to communal life, not a break with or an opposition 
to this process:  
“Let us place ourselves, on the other hand, at the end of this immense process where 
the tree actually bears fruit, where society and its morality of custom finally reveal 
what they were simply the means to: we then find the sovereign individual as the ripest 
fruit on its tree, like only to itself, having freed itself from the morality of custom, an 
autonomous, supra-ethical individual (because ‘autonomous’ and ‘ethical’ are 
mutually exclusive), in short, we find a man with his own, independent, enduring will, 
whose prerogative it is to promise—and in him a proud consciousness quivering in 
every muscle of what he has finally achieved and incorporated, an actual awareness 
of power and freedom, a feeling that man in general has reached completion.” (GM 
II, 2; some emphasis is mine) 
The sovereign individual is not free in the sense of free from the community’s values, but 
free by mastering and finally overcoming those values. Her good conscience with respect to 
creating new values shows both her freedom and her mastery over those values. She can 
only conceive of what a ‘human being’ can strive to become and assume responsibility for 
it after she masters those values. Afterwards, she uses that mastery to discipline herself to 
become it.  
The above demonstrates my reading of Nietzsche’s evaluation of morality, which, I 
strove to keep consistent with his genealogical analysis and the will-body identity. Nietzsche 
is clear about the basis of his evaluation: the need to reintroduce the individual perspective 
to our deliberations, rationalisations and actions. He encourages us to evaluate morality as 
from a ‘medical’ point of view and so take seriously its effect on our ‘health’. Nevertheless, 
he is not as clear about what he suggests should replace Judeo-Christian morality or morality 
itself, after he argues that they are ‘unhealthy’ or ‘decadent’. Instead, he suggests assessing 
morality’s effect on health and espousing his sovereign individual, which he champions as 
a model for transcending morality. Using Ansell-Pearson’s helpful suggestions and reading, 
I argued Nietzsche’s normative proposition is that we should cultivate a good conscience 
with respect to moral creativity and experimentation. Thus, he leaves us with a model for 
how to proceed and the reasons for doing so without showing us the limits of its application. 
In the next chapter, I will propose my alternative solution the lack of fit, which aims 
to offer a theoretical ground for what we have been discussing so far. 
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2.11 The Bridge: An Alternative Solution to the Lack of 
Fit  
Recall that the ‘lack fit’ of Nietzschean agency is between the following: 
A) His conception of persons and actions as representations of drives.  
B) His description of practical agency as free, responsible, having control and 
ownership over the drives.  
In this chapter, I will propose my alternative solution to the ‘lack of fit’, which, I will argue, 
helps resolve it without producing what we recognised previously as the ‘phantom’ in the 
third person perspective and without bloating his ontology. 
Nietzsche’s conception of the will-body identity challenges the mind-body dualism. 
I will argue that he rejects atomism or materialistic reductivism, as well. These ontologies 
struggle to coherently explain the causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’ or self-conscious 
thought and deliberation. I will show the grounds on which he rejects these explanations as 
I defend my reading of what I think is Nietzsche’s partially worked-out explanation of the 
causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’. I will call the previous the ‘bridge’. I will start with 
his rejection of Schopenhauer’s account of the causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’ to 
lay the ground for both his alternative, revisionist account and show his reasons for rejecting 
other explanations.  
Nietzsche objects to Schopenhauer’s account of the causal efficacy of the intellect, 
but accepts his will-body identity. Recall that Schopenhauer limits causal explanations of 
events, however. He construes them as the intellect’s representation and the intellect is the 
will’s ‘slave’ (for the most part). The will’s relation to the world is not causal, but identical; 
only the will is ‘real’ or ‘effective’ and so ultimately ‘responsible’ for how the world appears 
to us. The ‘apparent’ world, i.e., the world we perceive is the will’s mirror. Therefore, we 
perceive what is (or what can be) in our interest and that interest is based on the mainsprings 
of our actions and how these hang together. The world itself is wholly will, not will and 
intellect, which means he ascribes to some form of ontological monism. 
Schopenhauer has good grounds for construing the intellect as a kind of will, but, in 
his ethics and aesthetics, he flirts with a dualism or opposition between the intellect and the 
will at the expense of forgoing the consistency of his philosophy. The consequences of this 
approach are recognisable in the paradoxes plaguing his views on ascetic resignation. What 
did Nietzsche make of the previous?  
In less quarrelsome moments, Nietzsche champions Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but 
he rages against the effects of Schopenhauer’s personality on that philosophy:  
“Schopenhauer’s mystical embarrassments and evasions in those places where the 
factual thinker let himself be seduced and corrupted by the vain urge to be the 
unriddler of the world…these and other such excesses and vices of the philosopher are 
always what is accepted first of all and made into a matter of faith—for vices and 
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excesses are the easiest to imitate and require no extensive preparatory practice.” (GS 
99; some emphasis is mine) 
The reference to a ‘vain urge’ in the above passage is not accidental or rhetorical, but refers 
to a drive. It refers to the internalisation of the ‘herd perspective’ and so to Schopenhauer’s 
herd instincts, which, we recall, appears as our ‘self-image’ in deliberation. Schopenhauer 
wants the intellect to have a real effect, but he does so at his philosophy’s expense. He wants 
it to bring about an action whose driving force is purely ‘intellectual’. He did not settle for 
construing the intellect’s apparent effect on the world and that it is ‘apparent’ because the 
intellect is another part of the will. Rather, he sought to show how the intellect can have a 
miraculous effect on the world wholly independent from the insatiable will and it does so 
by changing or thwarting the will. He wants the intellect to oppose the will, but ignores the 
proposition that this real effect is another kind of willing or will, i.e., the ascetic kind, which 
would preserve the consistency of his philosophy. Although, he even flirts with the previous 
proposition, which is evident in his views on tragedy. What seems like the effect of the 
intellect on the will represents the effect of another kind of will and, in turn, another kind of 
world. He argues tragedy makes us conscious of something within us that attunes us to the 
following thought: “for a different kind of willing there must be a different kind of existence 
also” (WRII, 435). In the supplementary essays, he is also adamant to stress the intellect is 
secondary to the will or metaphysically dependent on the will: 
“Accordingly with me the intellect belongs to the mere phenomenon, and therefore 
shares its fate; the will, on the contrary, is tied to no special organ, but is everywhere 
present, is everywhere that which really moves and forms, and consequently 
conditions, the whole organism. In fact, the will constitutes the metaphysical 
substratum of the whole phenomenon, and thus is not, like the intellect, a posterius, 
but the prius, of the phenomenon; the phenomenon depends on it, not it on the 
phenomenon. The body, however, is reduced even to a mere representation, since it 
is only the way in which the will exhibits itself in the perception of the intellect or 
brain.” (WRII, 270) 
If we accept the above passage as delineating his ontological principle and so it determines 
the limits of what there is, then, coherently, he can only settle for the intellect’s ‘apparent’ 
effect on our actions and the world. The ‘intellect’ has no real effect at all. At bottom, it is a 
different kind (or direction) of the will that expresses itself through the changes in the world 
we ascribe to the intellect. In short, only the will is effective. What he calls negation of the 
will to life is another kind of affirmation of the will to life, or an affirmation of another kind 
of life premised on a different kind of willing, but it is still willing. His philosophy can only 
achieve the latter, at best. He is not clear on this point, however, and Nietzsche apparently 
notices it. He argues that Schopenhauer’s personality—and, specifically, his romanticism— 
distorted his ontological principles and deviated him from the foundations of his philosophy.  
Nietzsche aims for an alternative, non-dualistic conception of self-conscious agency 
that will account for the deceptions (or self-deceptions) inherent to aesthetics and ethics that 
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Schopenhauer’s philosophy revealed. It is important to note from the outset that Nietzsche’s 
commitment to avoiding a dualistic ontology does not mean he commits to a reductionist or 
causal-mechanistic account of self-conscious agency. He rejects readings that construe self-
conscious thoughts as causally determined by drive relations and that these relations are also 
causal. As we saw, the previous reading commits him to a conception of drives as ‘entities’, 
‘quantities’ or ‘things’ rather than ‘urges’ or ‘movements’ toward something.  Drives are not 
‘things’. We cannot understand them according to concepts or in terms of relations which 
obtain between things. Let us assess why he does not conceive the drives as ‘things’ and 
their relations as relations between things, e.g., as causal or mechanical relations. 
Nietzsche is skeptical over causal explanations, because of the explanatory value of 
causal relations with respect to some phenomena, i.e., self-conscious agency. His skepticism 
stems from what he perceives as the explanatory backdrop or the ground of causal relations, 
which he identifies as a belief or faith in self-conscious agency or conscious willing. Causal 
accounts of events, i.e., X caused Y, requires the belief that ‘(self-conscious) willing suffices 
for action’, according to him. This belief or faith is a precondition of the explanatory value 
of causal ‘explanations’:  
“People have always believed that they knew what a cause was: but how did we get 
this knowledge — or, more precisely, how did we get this belief that we have 
knowledge? From the famous realm of ‘inner facts’, none of which has ever proven 
factual. We believed that our acts of will were causally efficacious; we thought that 
here, at least, we had caught causality in the act. Nobody doubted that consciousness 
was the place to look for all the antecedentia of an act, its causes, and that you would 
be able to find these causes there as well—under the rubric of ‘motives’: otherwise 
the action could hardly be considered free, and nobody could really be held 
responsible for it. Finally, who could deny that thoughts have causes? that the ‘I’ is 
what causes thoughts? . . . Of all these three ‘inner facts’ that together seem to 
guarantee causation, the first and most convincing is that of will as causal agent; the 
conception of a consciousness (‘mind’) as cause, and then that of the I (the ‘subject’) 
as cause are just latecomers that appeared once causality of the will was established 
as given, as empirical . . .” (TI, ‘Errors’, 3) 
Causality ‘explains’ because we already believe (or have faith) in conscious agency. The 
proposition ‘X caused Y’ is meaningful or acquires significance from the first-person insight 
into what it means to will X and then do it. Accordingly, we have first-person insight into 
being ‘responsible’ for something, i.e., some event or action, which underpins our belief or 
faith in causality and the objective or mechanistic picture stemming from it. Responsibility 
and causality are intrixacably and conceptuality linked, according to Nietzsche; his account 
of the explanatory value we ascribe to causal relations is, therefore, genealogical.  
Previously, I analysed his revisionist account of responsibility, which contends that 
we acquire a limited sense of responsibility under the circumstantial pressures of communal 
life from which emerged a limited sense of self. Using the previous, we can argue there is a 
conceptual link between causality, responsibility and the first-person experience of willing 
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something. The previous conceptual link underpins his arguments about what limits causal 
explanations. Here, I will focus on the limits of ‘causal explanations’ with respect to self-
conscious agency and thus the (self-conscious) thought-action relationship without moving 
to other phenomena we comprehend or explain causally, which would send me far afield.  
We model causal accounts on our first-person experience of willing, for Nietzsche. 
His objections to causal accounts aim at their explanatory limits, which he contends is self-
conscious agency. We cannot apply causality to explain self-conscious agency, because, by 
doing so we risk circular reasoning. We causally explain what we use as a precondition for 
causal explanations, namely, that in virtue of which ‘causality’ has explanatory value. His 
objections to ‘causal explanations’ of the will are not new, however. Schopenhauer makes 
a similar objection in discussing the limits of scientific explanations: 
“All the branches of science that deal primarily with knowledge of cause and effect 
are true aetiologies: these teach us how one state of matter necessarily gives rise to 
another determinate state according to an infallible rule: how one determinate 
alteration necessarily conditions and gives rise to another: and this account is what 
we call an explanation.” (WR, 121) 
This approach does not render meaningful the ‘necessary rise’ of ‘another determinate 
state’, or the reasons for the relationship between the two states, according to Schopenhauer: 
“But this does not shed any light at all on the inner essence of any of these 
appearances: this inner essence is called a natural force, and lies outside of the ambit 
of aetiological explanation; what aetiology calls a natural law is the unchanging 
constancy with which such a force expresses itself, whenever its known conditions 
are present… These explanations consist in specifying faithfully and with 
mathematical precision how, where and when each force expresses itself, and tracing 
each appearance that mechanics comes across back to natural forces… Consequently, 
even the best aetiological explanation of the whole of nature would really be nothing 
more than a catalogue of inexplicable forces and an authoritative specification of the 
rule according to which they emerge, succeed one another, and displace one another 
in space and time: but it must always leave unexplained the inner essence of the forces 
that thus appear, and content itself with appearances and their arrangement.” (WR, 
121-2) 
We require another approach to grasp what it means for ‘state X’ to ‘necessarily give rise’ 
to ‘state Y’. Schopenhauer found this meaningfulness (or significance) in ‘willing’. In his 
view, the concept of necessity acquires meaningfulness (or significance), i.e., that in virtue 
of which it has explanatory value (in Nietzsche’s view), from the first-person experience of 
willing.  
Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer that causal accounts cannot explain our self-
conscious agential actions. They tell us X ‘brought about’ Y, without explaining what this 
‘bringing about’ means. As we saw, Schopenhauer argues that willing serves an explanatory 
role; it completes the objective picture. Nietzsche disagrees that ‘willing’ is best suited for 
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the explanation, however. ‘Willing’ is too intellectual; so, he uses the concept of the ‘drive’ 
instead. He sought this concept to have the same purpose of ‘explaining’, ‘completing’ or 
making ‘meaningful’ the objective picture.  
When we suggest that self-conscious thoughts cause actions, we do not explain the 
relationship between thoughts and actions, but rely on it to make sense of that relationship. 
We use a belief or faith in self-conscious willing when we should explain the basis for this 
belief or faith. The previous is self-defeating. Nietzsche puts it as follows: 
“We call it ‘explanation’, but ‘description’ is what distinguishes us from older stages 
of knowledge and science. We are better at describing—we explain just as little as all 
our predecessors. We have uncovered a diverse succession where the naive man and 
investigator of older cultures saw only two different things, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, as 
they said; we have perfected the picture of becoming but haven’t got over, got behind 
the picture. The series of ‘causes’ faces us much more completely in each case; we 
reason, ‘this and that must precede for that to follow’—but we haven’t thereby 
understood anything. The specifically qualitative aspect for example of every 
chemical process, still appears to be a ‘miracle’, as does every locomotion; no one 
has ‘explained’ the push.” (GS 113)220 
Though he seeks to limit the explanatory value of causal accounts of phenomena, i.e., self-
conscious agency, Nietzsche still values causal accounts. Causal accounts are more useful 
than moral or religious accounts. Thus, causality has instrumental, but not explanatory value. 
They are instrumental for dispelling or demystifying221 imaginary entities inherent to moral 
or religious ‘explanations’. They are especially apt for dispelling those accounts thhat argue 
self-conscious agency represents the causal efficacy of a non-empirical entity, whether that 
is God, ‘(free) will’ or the (self-conscious) ‘I’. Nonetheless, the previous dispelling does not 
necessarily amount to their offering an alternative or more useful explanation. The following 
passages reveal the imaginary entities he believes that causality demystifies or debunks, but 
also where it falls short:  
“What lies farthest from this primeval stage of the logical is the notion of causality: 
even now, indeed, we believe at bottom that all sensations and actions are acts of free 
will; when the sentient individuum observes itself, it regards every sensation, every 
change, as something isolated, that is to say unconditioned, disconnected: it emerges 
out of us independently of anything earlier or later. We are hungry, but originally we 
 
                                               
220 See also: “As Germans, we doubt with Kant the ultimate validity of the discoveries of the natural sciences and 
altogether of everything that can be known causaliter—what is knowable already seems to us of less value on that 
account” (GS 357). 
221 I agree with Ridley’s reading of Nietzsche’s relationship to scientific knowledge (cf. Ridley 2007A: 67 & 71-
2). Nietzsche’s own conception of ‘science’ is unobvious. Since I am unable to venture into a debate about this 
here, I aim to speak only of his thoughts on the value and limitations of causal-mechanistic accounts of events in 
the world, focusing primarily on self-conscious agency. I imply, however, that many if not most scientific theories 
of phenomena or ‘scientific knowledge’, in Nietzsche’s view, preferred a causal-mechanistic model to other 
models.  
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do not think that the organism wants to sustain itself; this feeling seems to be asserting 
itself without cause or purpose, it isolates itself and considers itself willful.” (HHI 18) 
 
“In the same measure as the sense for causality increases, the extent of the domain of 
morality decreases: for each time one has understood the necessary effects and has 
learned how to segregate them from all the accidental effects and incidental 
consequences (post hoc), one has destroyed a countless number of imaginary 
causalities hitherto believed in as the foundations of customs—the real world is much 
smaller than the imaginary—and each time a piece of anxiety and constraint has 
vanished from the world, each time too a piece of respect for the authority of custom: 
morality as a whole has suffered a diminution.” (D 10) 
 
“In the “in-itself” there is nothing like “causal association,” “necessity,” or 
“psychological un-freedom.” There, the “effect” does not follow “from the cause,” 
there is no rule of “law.” We are the ones who invented causation, succession, for-
each-other, relativity, compulsion, numbers, law, freedom, grounds, purpose; and if 
we project and inscribe this symbol world onto things as an “in-itself,” then this is the 
way we have always done things, namely mythologically.” (BGE 21) 
 
“Even the ‘thing’, to say it again, the concept of a thing, is just a reflex of the belief 
in the I as cause… And even your atom, my dear Mr Mechanist and Mr Physicist, 
how many errors, how much rudimentary psychology is left in your atom! Not to 
mention the ‘thing-in-itself’, the horrendum pudendum of metaphysicians! The error 
of thinking that the mind caused reality!” (TI, ‘Errors’, 3) 
Causal-mechanistic accounts of conscious agency are not radical enough for dispelling our 
reliance on the causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’. They cannot possibly do so, because 
the first-person experience of willing is a precondition of causal explanations. The belief or 
faith in willing (or that willing suffices for action) is unyielding. He seeks another model, 
which avoids the circular reasoning under which a causal account of self-conscious agency 
is trapped.  
Causal accounts attempting to debunk self-conscious agency by not appealing to free 
will, God, the self-conscious ‘I’ etc., do not succeed in ousting imaginary entities that plague 
moral or religious accounts. His reason is that they contain fundamnental concepts whose 
explanatory value equally relies on belief in willing and its sufficiency for action. Typically, 
he construes the belief in the sufficiency of willing for action as a need and so as a drive that 
can (and does) spring up anywhere: 
“As far as materialistic atomism goes: this is one of the most well-refuted things in 
existence...Copernicus convinced us to believe, contrary to all our senses, that the 
earth does not stand still, Boscovich taught us to renounce belief in the last bit of earth 
that did “stand still,” the belief in “matter,” in the “material,” in the residual piece of 
earth and clump of an atom: it was the greatest triumph over the senses that the world 
had ever known... But we must go further still and declare war – a ruthless fight to 
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the finish – on the “atomistic need” that, like the more famous “metaphysical need,” 
still leads a dangerous afterlife in regions where nobody would think to look. First of 
all, we must also put an end to that other and more disastrous atomism, the one 
Christianity has taught best and longest, the atomism of the soul.” (BGE 12; some 
emphasis is mine) 
Causal-mechanistic accounts fail to debunk the efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’ by adhering 
to the concept of a ‘thing’, ‘atom’ or ‘matter’. They indirectly commit to imaginary entities, 
and to the very things they aim to debunk, because concepts like ‘thing’, ‘atom’ etc. have 
explanatory value only through the ‘belief’ or the ‘faith’ in ‘willing suffices for action’. We 
think we can make something happen by willing it and project this belief onto the world, its 
events and our causal explanations of those events using concepts like ‘atoms’, ‘things’ and 
so on. In other words, in seeking the cause of a state of affairs X, we project onto the target 
of cognition our ordinarily seeking the X responsible for a change in us, which yields the 
mechanistic or objective picture. Thus, the proposition ‘everything happens because of the 
effectiveness of something else’ originates in (or is conceptually linked to) the proposition 
and corresponding belief that ‘someone is responsible for a change in me’, according to 
Nietzsche. The former has explanatory value by virtue of the latter, which we accustom to 
by living in communities.   
According to Nietzsche, then, causality emerges out of a belief in the causal efficacy 
of the self-conscious ‘I’, which he explains genealogically. Causal-mechanistic accounts are 
useful for dispelling some imaginary entities (i.e., ‘God’ or ‘free will’), but they are still 
committed to a way of thinking that creates imaginary entities (such as matter, atom, thing 
etc.). We construe these entities as ‘causally efficacious’ in a subtler, more elusive manner: 
“Language began at a time when psychology was in its most rudimentary form: we 
enter into a crudely fetishistic mindset when we call into consciousness the basic 
presuppositions of the metaphysics of language—in the vernacular: the 
presuppositions of reason. It sees doers and deeds all over: it believes that will has 
causal efficacy: it believes in the 'I', in the I as being, in the I as substance, and it 
projects this belief in the I-substance onto all things—this is how it creates the concept 
of ‘thing’ in the first place . . . Being is imagined into everything—pushed under 
everything—as a cause; the concept of ‘being’ is only derived from the concept of ‘I’ 
. . . In the beginning there was the great disaster of an error, the belief that the will is 
a thing with causal efficacy,—that will is a faculty… Even the Eleatics’ adversaries 
succumbed to the seduction of the Eleatic concept of being: Democritus, for instance, 
when he invented his atom . . . ‘Reason’ in language: oh, what a deceptive old woman 
this is! I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in 
grammar . . .” (TI, Reason in Philosophy, 5)222 
 
                                               
222 See also (GS 109) for the same stance against causal-mechanistic accounts, but also their opposite, which shows 
us he aims to revise our conceptions. 
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Causal-mechanistic accounts do not break with the so-called ‘assumptions of rudimentary 
psychology’. Accordingly, their alternative to the causal efficacy of the self-conscious ‘I’, 
i.e., causal relations between material ‘things’, permits the ‘I’ they attempt to debunk entry 
by the backdoor through the uncritical belief in ‘matter’, ‘atoms’ or ‘things’ etc. The latter 
belief derives from the same way of thinking that spawned the ‘I’, ‘God’ etc. and commits 
to what grounds them: the belief or faith that ‘willing suffices for action’. 
Nietzsche seeks an account that radically breaks with the appeal to imaginary entities 
and he begins by rejecting the use of ‘causality’ to explain (at least) some phenomena: those 
that bestow explanatory value to something in the first place, i.e., ‘agency’. Causality cannot 
explain everything and has no metaphysical application; it is an anthropomorphic (cf. GS 
109) or anthropocentric (cf. WLN 14[122]) account of phenomena. We should not 
underestimate the value of anthropocentric accounts, but we should likewise recognise their 
explanatory limits.  
How, then, does Nietzsche explain self-conscious agency without appealing to 
imaginary entities? How does he explain the apparent causal efficacy of self-conscious 
thoughts? He commits to the proposition that the thought-action relationship is not causal. 
He rejects idealist conceptions of the causal efficacy of self-conscious thoughts; the world 
is not the ‘product’ of thoughts, perceptions, intuitions or ideas, i.e., the ‘intellect’. He puts 
it in the following manner: 
“To study physiology with a good conscience, we must insist that the sense organs 
are not appearances in the way idealist philosophy uses that term: as such, they 
certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as a regulative principle, 
if not as a heuristic principle. —What? and other people even say that the external 
world is the product of our organs? But then our body, as a piece of this external 
world, would really be the product of our organs! But then our organs themselves 
would really be—the product of our organs! This looks to me like a thorough reductio 
ad absurdum: given that the concept of a causa sui is something thoroughly absurd. 
So does it follow that the external world is not the product of our organs—?” (BGE 
15) 
This passage can be misleading, because it seemingly rejects idealism, but remains silent 
about the explanatory value of its opposite, i.e., physicalism or materialism, which implies 
that he rejects the former out of commitment to something like the latter. I will argue that 
he also rejects the opposite of idealism. He intends another point in the above passage, which 
becomes apparent if we juxtapose it to the following: 
“We should not erroneously objectify “cause” and “effect” like the natural scientists 
do (and whoever else thinks naturalistically these days—) in accordance with the 
dominant mechanistic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it 
“effects” something; we should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts, which 
is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, 
not explanation. In the “in-itself” there is nothing like “causal association,” 
“necessity,” or “psychological un-freedom.” There, the “effect” does not follow 
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“from the cause,” there is no rule of “law.” We are the ones who invented causation, 
succession, for-each-other, relativity, compulsion, numbers, law, freedom, grounds, 
purpose; and if we project and inscribe this symbol world onto things as an “in-itself,” 
then this is the way we have always done things, namely mythologically.” (BGE 21) 
Note that his use of ‘push’ and ‘shove’ aims to link ‘causing something’ with the first-person 
experience of ‘willing something’. He limits the application of causality to phenomena that 
do not pertain to willing. Causality can ‘describe’ relations between objects. However, its 
explanatory value relies on an entirely different relationship than that which obtains between 
‘objects’. Accounts ascribing causal efficacy to thoughts assume that thoughts cause actions 
without demonstrating that thoughts, rather than something else, cause actions. Likewise, 
the proposition that a bit of matter (or that relations between matter) cause actions (by first 
causing thoughts or otherwise) operates with the conception of causality relying on the same 
belief that ‘(self-conscious) thoughts cause actions’. He rejects both alternatives, because of 
his commitment to ontological monism and immanence. Casual relationships require us to 
posit two (or more) distinct things to conceive of a causal relationship, because nothing can 
cause itself: 
“The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of 
logical rape and abomination. But humanity’s excessive pride has got itself 
profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense… Suppose 
someone sees through the boorish naiveté of this famous concept of “free will” and 
manages to get it out of his mind; I would then ask him to carry his “enlightenment” 
a step further and to rid his mind of the reversal of this misconceived concept of “free 
will”: I mean the “un-free will,” which is basically an abuse of cause and effect.” 
(BGE 21)223 
Causality does not apply to ‘willing’, which includes self-conscious agency, because causal 
relations commit to a distinction in ‘object’ or ‘thing’ between the cause and its effect. What 
he means by ‘objectifying’ cause and effect is precisely our positing two (or more) distinct 
‘objects’ relating to one another, which relies on belief in the sufficiency of willing for action.  
In sum, if we claim self-conscious thoughts cause actions, then we commit to a belief 
that a thought is a distinct thing from an action, which we are inclined to construe as distinct 
in kind. We forgo the possibility that it is a different degree of the same kind of thing, i.e., 
an action. Applying causality commits us to dualistic accounts, which risks reintroducing 
imaginary entities or phantoms by the backdoor. The accounts of self-conscious agency we 
analysed previously, both when they defended and debunked the causal efficacy of the self-
conscious ‘I’, were plagued by such phantoms. Their attempts helped us summarise the lack 
 
                                               
223 See for example, “mechanistic language is just a sign language for the internal factual world of quanta of will 
that struggle and overcome each other? all the presuppositions of mechanistic language - matter, atom, pressure 
and impact, gravity - are not ‘facts-in-themselves’ but interpretations aided by psychological fictions” (WLN 
14[82]). 
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of fit through the following questions. How is self-conscious agency possible at all? Are 
self-conscious thoughts causally efficacious; do they cause actions? Are ‘thoughts’ thereby 
distinct kinds of ‘things’ from actions?  
Nietzsche aims for an alternative and revisionist account of self-conscious agency. 
His alternative adopts a two-step process. Firstly, he limits the application of causality, i.e., 
he does not permit its applications to the thought-action relation. In other words, thoughts 
do not cause actions. Secondly, he revises the thought-action relation. His premise is that 
thoughts are on the ‘same plane of reality’ as the basic units for action, namely, as our drives 
and affects. Self-conscious thought represents the activity of a kind of drive, i.e., that drive 
whose particular activity is language or ‘communication’. Thus, he revises self-conscious 
agency by replacing causal accounts with an account based on the drives and drive relations.  
I omit Nietzsche does not have a fully worked-out account, but he commits to what 
I call the ‘bridge’ between the first and third person perspective. This account begins by 
assessing his critique of the ‘I’ and ‘I’-thoughts evidenced in the following passages: 
““When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition ‘I think,’ I get a whole set 
of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish,—for instance, that 
I am the one who is thinking, that there must be something that is thinking in the first 
place, that thinking is an activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, 
that there is an ‘I,’ and finally, that it has already been determined what is meant by 
thinking,—that I know what thinking is. Because if I had not already made up my 
mind what thinking is, how could I tell whether what had just happened was not 
perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? Enough: this ‘I think’ presupposes that I compare my 
present state with other states that I have seen in myself, in order to determine what 
it is: and because of this retrospective comparison with other types of ‘knowing,’ this 
present state has absolutely no ‘immediate certainty’ for me.”—” (BGE 16) 
 
“I will not stop emphasising a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to 
admit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, 
a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate 
“think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I”—well that is just an 
assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty.” 
In fact, there is already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” contains 
an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. People are 
following grammatical habits here in drawing conclusions, reasoning that “thinking is 
an activity, behind every activity something is active, therefore—.” Following the 
same basic scheme, the older atomism looked behind every “force” that produces 
effects for that little lump of matter in which the force resides, and out of which the 
effects are produced, which is to say: the atom.” (BGE 17) 
We can compare the above with the following claim that the ‘will’ is in need of ‘analysis’: 
“With his assumption that only that which wills exists, Schopenhauer enthroned a 
primordial mythology; he seems never to have attempted an analysis of the will 
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because like everyone else he believed in the simplicity and immediacy of all 
willing—whereas willing is actually such a well-practiced mechanism that it almost 
escapes the observing eye. Against him I offer these propositions: first, in order for 
willing to come about, a representation of pleasure or displeasure is needed. Secondly, 
that a violent stimulus is experienced as pleasure or pain is a matter of the interpreting 
intellect, which, to be sure, generally works without our being conscious of it (uns 
unbewuflt); and one and the same stimulus can be interpreted as pleasure or pain. 
Thirdly, only in intellectual beings do pleasure, pain, and will exist; the vast majority 
of organisms has nothing like it.” (GS 127; some emphasis is mine) 
Notice he argues that conscious thought, willing and agency are not ‘simple’, but complex 
and in need of analysis; linguistic habits make them ‘simple’. His reference to grammatical 
habits is essential to understanding what I call the ‘bridge’.  
Nietzsche’s concept of a drive is broad enough to avoid dualism, but narrow enough 
to demonstrate why self-conscious agency represents the activity of drives or drive relations. 
Recall that he does not comprehend the relationship between a self-conscious thought and 
action as between two distinct things that somehow interact, which, in turn, is what permits 
us to apply causality. The same is the case with understanding a relationship between self-
conscious thoughts and (unconscious) drives. He construes the relationship between self-
conscious thoughts and drives as one of identity, rather than interaction. Let us elaborate on 
this conception and introduce some textual evidence that supports it.  
In the following passages, he expresses his views on the thought-action relation, but 
likewise on the strategy he adopts to resolve the lack of fit: 
On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and 
the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of 
compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and motion that generally start right after the 
act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and 
deceiving ourselves about this duality (Zweiheit) by means of the synthetic concept of 
the “I”. As a result, a whole chain of erroneous conclusions, and, consequently, false 
evaluations have become attached to the will, – to such an extent that the one who 
wills believes, in good faith, that willing suffices for action. (BGE 19)224  
The interpretation of the above passage I will defend is unusual, but useful for my alternative 
solution to the lack of fit.225 There is a lack of fit between his views on first-person practical 
agency and his third-person theoretical perspective on (self-conscious) agency. This lack of 
fit rests on our use of the ‘I’, however; our use of something that seems to refer to our body 
and actions, but has no third-person representation. Notice, however, that he does not object 
 
                                               
224 It can be useful to compare this passage with the following: (WLN 38[8]).  
225 For an alternative analysis of this passage and its implications for morality see Lampert (2001, 49-50). For one 
that comes very close to the bridge but unfortunately does not avoid the homunculi problem see Clark & Dudrick 
(2012, 255-257). 
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to the use of the ‘I’, but to how it affects our conceptions of agency and selfhood, along with 
our self-conception or our self-image. It commits us to a conception of the (self-conscious) 
thought-action relation that spawns phantoms. By ‘will’, in the above passage, he means 
‘conscious willing’, or self-conscious thoughts about what we aim to do, including our 
deliberation on a course of action.226 He does not discuss the relationship between the ‘I’ 
and drives, but between our will and its corresponding actions. The relationship he analyses 
is between willing and acting, and how the use of the ‘I’ affects our conception of ‘willing’. 
I understand the previous as the claim that using the ‘I’ conceals the bridge between the 
first-person and third-person, which becomes apparent in analysising what follows after we 
will something. What follows is a distinct kind of activity that he describes it as a command-
obedience relationship between two or more things. We observe the previous activity in the 
first-person and the third-person perspectives. It shows what I call the ‘bridge’.227 
In the first-person, it is a command-obedience relation played out within the person, 
i.e., within us. When ‘I’ deliberate about undertaking an action or I am undecided about a 
course of action, or when ‘I’ struggle to maintain a course of action in light of a temptation, 
or when ‘I’ reason or resolve to attend to this as opposed to that, or when ‘I’ deviate from 
or forgo some course of action to undertake a new one. In each case I overcome my own 
temptation, I change the course of action, I feel the resistance when I want to act contrary 
to my values or aims, and I am overwhelmed by my temptation. There is just me in the first-
person perspective of willing something, which reflects an identity relationship between 
what happens within me, what I do and me. In other words, what happens within me refers 
to me. It demonstrates my identity with what happens within me without suggesting anything 
more or anything other than this identity. I am the one who experiences changes in thoughts, 
 
                                               
226 Katsafanas (2014B), rightly shows that Nietzsche transitions between various uses of the word will. Often, in 
the earlier period of his writing, he construes the will’s freedom in relation whether or not it is causally determined. 
In later writings, he alters his criterion and construes the will in terms of whether or not it can overcome some 
resistance (internal or external), which arises with respect to the willed activity, i.e., whether it is strong or weak. 
His later approach to the will shows us that Nietzsche has in mind an alternative account of agency. He requires a 
story that explains why and how “passion and reason are both efficacious” (Katsafanas 2014B, 209), however. 
This is because if we run with the separation of reason from the passions by virtue of their nature or activity, we 
end up with causal interaction between two distinct things that somehow do not meet on a common ground, which 
brings about the kind of phantom we tried to illustrate. This reveals a core philosophical problem, which he can 
escape through the bridge between the first-person and third-person perspectives. The bridge does not rely on 
causal interaction, but on correlation or identity. Also, if he argues for an understanding of the self that is no longer 
misleadingly construed as a subject of sorts (premised on grammar and language), but as an activity, then we have 
resolved the problem of interaction: there is no interaction. The ‘I’ and the drives are not different things, but two 
different perspectives or descriptions of the same thing, or better yet, they are the same activity of willing an end 
and following through in action.  
227 Nietzsche reasons based on the possibility and inevitability of a bridge between the two perspectives on other 
passages, as for example the following: “‘[k]now yourself’ is the whole of science. – Only when he has attained a 
final knowledge of all things will man come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man” (D 48). 
He does not draw a boundary between the first-person and the third-person, but argues we can attain self-
knowledge and self-mastery through the third-person perspective on ourselves and others (cf. BGE 32), namely, 
the herd perspective. Again, this is not the claim that our ‘true’ self lies in the third-person and so the first-person 
is superfluous, but that it is useful for self-mastery, i.e., for willing a course of action and following through (what 
is required for contractual relationships). His contention is that we do not necessarily find or perceive a self, but 
will a self (cf. HHII 366). See also GS 333 for more on Nietzsche’s commitment to what I am calling the bridge.  
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affects, urges etc. and I undertake an action based on the ‘content’ of my thoughts, affects 
etc. Notice that my mere use of the ‘I’ does not imply ownership or control, but identity.  
Agency, whether it is self-conscious or not, represents a multiplicity that our theories 
should not ignore, according to Nietzsche. There is no conscious, deliberate willing or action 
without this multiplicity. Conscious or deliberate actions evidence a command-obedience 
relationship between two or more units we overlook, because of our use of the ‘I’ to refer to 
ourselves in our first-person experience of willing. Using the ‘I’ to refer to ourselves is a 
grammatical habit that conceals the multiplicity we are and experience, but, also, it conceals 
the command-obedience relationships underpinning this multiplicity. The use of the ‘I’ does 
not represent the operation (or causal efficacy) of another kind of substance or thing, which 
is independent from the multiplicity of thoughts, affects etc. and their command-obedience 
relations. Nietzsche’s reference to the ‘I’ as a grammatical habit or “unified only in a word” 
(BGE 19) means that it represents the activity of a drive or drive relation, namely, the herd 
perspective and herd instincts, which seems to operate independently from the other drives. 
Accordingly, the first person experience of the command-obedience relationship is as of 
between two or more avenues for action(s) or activities ‘I’ resolve to do, ‘I’ am inclined 
towards or ‘I’ value. However, the I is not what is operative or causally efficacious. The ‘I’ 
represents what is operative or efficacious; it identifies or tracks what is efficacious and, 
sometimes, I may not be efficacious, but my temptation is with which I identify after I have 
acted on its basis.  
In the third-person perspective, however, we can construe the same phenomena listed 
above as command-obedience relations between drives and their rank order (BGE 6). This 
‘rank order’ refers to the drives’ unity (or disunity); how they are fixed and thus aim at some 
action in relation to some circumstance. The third-person perspective alters our conception 
of agency by shifting the basic unit of resolve, but our reference to the person or agent does 
not. For example, when we are undecided about some course of action, this indecision 
corresponds to an unresolved conflict between our ‘drives’. Our deviation from a decision 
corresponds to a disruption of the initial rank order formerly settled about a course of action. 
Our hesitance or resistance with respect to an activity represents a drive(s) becoming active 
and opposing other drives by gaining a foothold in the rank order etc. What we experience 
represents a state of affairs in the drives; conscious thought is itself a drive or represents the 
activity of a drive, i.e., the herd perspective.  
Closer analysis of the activity of resolving to undertake a course of action reveals a 
bridge between the first-person and the third-person perspective, which is the act of willing, 
overpowering, overcoming etc. and their corresponding action.228 According to Nietzsche, 
 
                                               
228 Welshon (2004, 152-156) rightly emphasises Nietzsche’s conception of the act of will or willing as useful for 
resolving the lack of fit. Conceiving of an interaction between consciousness and drives, as he argues, makes it 
difficult for Nietzsche to have a plausible and coherent solution. I read the passages where Nietzsche describes the 
interaction between the drives and consciousness as probative and critical of conceptions of agency that rest on 
the assumption that genuine agency is determined wholly by the self-conscious ‘I’. Accordingly, instead of an 
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we should analyse what follows our willing something, rather than analyse the relationship 
between the ‘I’ and drives. The latter leads us to assume an interactive relationship between 
before we have proved it, whereas the former commits us to describing what happens when 
we will something, which reveals the bridge. What, then, is ‘willing’, for him?  
Far from being simple, “willing is actually such a well-practised mechanism that it 
almost escapes the observing eye” (GS 127; my emphasis), according to Nietzsche. Of 
course, he analyses this ‘mechanism’ genealogically. He breaks it down into its constituent 
parts and inquires how each part emerges from another over time. The major premise of his 
analysis of willing, however, is that willing (including self-conscious agency) is drive-like 
or a drive relation. Therefore, the opposition between the ‘I’ and the drives collapses under 
investigation and analysis of the act of will or what ensues when we will something. The 
self-conscious ‘I’ represents an activity of the drives; it demonstrates the introduction of the 
drive to express ourselves linguistically and so introduce the herd perspective into the drive 
complex. It is a grammatical habit we acquire from our communal life; he conceptually links 
this habit (and our use of language to express ourselves) to his account of consciousness as 
emerging from habituation to communal life, the pressures associated with this habituation 
and the internalisation of the herd perspective that characterises the previous. Willing, then, 
is an activity of the drives and so the ‘I’ represents the habit of addressing, presenting and-
or expressing ourselves linguistically, i.e., it is itself a drive among the other drives. 
It is also important to approach Nietzsche’s propositions with extensive caution. The 
interplay between thoughts, affects etc., which characterises the deliberation process, does 
not represent some drive or a set of drives. It represents the total state of our drives at some 
moment. It shows how our drives fix, i.e., establish a rank order, upon a course of action: 
“Every thought, every feeling, every will is not born of one particular drive but is a 
total state, a whole surface of the whole consciousness, and results from how the 
power of all the drives that constitute us is fixed at that moment—thus, the power of 
the drive that dominates just now as well as of the drives obeying or resisting it. The 
next thought is a sign of how the total power situation has now shifted again.” (WLN 
1[61]) 
We should compare the above passage with the following, which implies the same relation 
between conscious thoughts and the drives: 
“The course of logical thoughts and inferences in our brains today corresponds to a 
process and battle of drives that taken separately are all very illogical and unjust; we 
usually experience only the outcome of the battle: that is how quickly and covertly 
this ancient mechanism runs its course in us.” (GS 111; my emphasis)  
 
                                               
interaction between the ‘I’ and the drives, Nietzsche requires an interaction between the ‘I’ and the actions (in the 
first-person), or between drive relations and corresponding actions (in the third-person). Both of the previous refer 
to the same thing or activity, i.e., the act of will or the activity of willing, overpowering and so on.  
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What differentiates the self-conscious ‘I’ from the drives without committing us to construe 
the former as a distinct kind of ‘thing’ is the conception of conscious thought as an activity 
of what we can call the social drive(s). Consciousness represents the drive to communicate, 
which is inherent to communal or social life. It introduces a self-image to our agency, which 
translates into actions attuned to another’s perspective on us. Consequently, self-conscious 
agency includes the drive for a self-image. If we did not need to communicate for survival 
or flourishing, then our drives would fix and an action would ensue without the interjection 
of a self-image, which mediates between the total state and the correlative action of this total 
state. In short, what we may also call the ‘social drive’ partakes in the rank order of drives 
and yields self-conscious agency. Our drives can fix and an action ensue without this self-
image, however. If what I call the bridge characterises his conceptual framework, which 
resolves the lack of fit, then the self-conscious thoughts, which seemingly cause actions, 
actually represent the position or introduction of ‘social drive(s)’ in the rank order of drives.  
Nietzsche uses the concept ‘drive’ as a substitute for explaining psychic phenomena 
and circumventing the imaginary entities that plague conceptions of self-conscious agency. 
He revises the conception of self-conscious agency and encourages us to analyse ‘I’-claims 
in relation to our actions. He does not aim to eliminate or debunk the ‘I’, but to demonstrate 
the dangers of construing the ‘I’ as a ‘thing’ with causal efficacy. Accordingly, he offers a 
revisionist account of the thought-action relation based on an analysis of willing, which he 
complements with a genealogical analysis of the self-conscious ‘I’. 
Before moving on, I will assess an alternative suggestion for how to resolve the lack 
of fit, which differs from my suggestion of the bridge between first-person and third-person. 
Constâncio argues we can resolve the lack of fit by ascribing ‘perspectives’ to the drives, in 
accordance with what he calls the “continuum model” (Constâncio 2011, 21-26):  
“…as perspectival valuations, the drives are always changing and adapting to their 
surroundings—so that at every moment the “total state” of the organism is a cluster 
of perspectival relations, not an aggregate of mechanical, causal relations among 
atomic parts” (Constâncio 2011, 23)  
We can resolve the lack of fit by claiming there is continuity between the drives and a full-
fledged self-conscious agent, which commits us to construing the drives as perspectival 
valuations of things or circumstances. I agree, in principle, with what Constâncio calls the 
‘continuum model’, but I disagree with his application of the model.  
Nietzsche aims for a so-called ‘continuum’ between the self-conscious ‘I’ and drives, 
because he conceives of no other way to comprehend the world than through our drives and 
affects: “the mechanistic world as belonging to the same plane of reality as our affects 
themselves—as a primitive form of the world of affects” (BGE 36; my emphasis). 
Constâncio rightly claims that Nietzsche rejects the causal interaction between the ‘I’ and 
the drives. Nietzsche’s rejection stems from his commitment to avoiding a kind of atomism 
that permits entry through the backdoor of the belief or the faith in the causal efficacy of the 
phantoms and imaginary entities that plagued religious and moral interpretations of certain 
phenomena. I read it as his rejection of the interaction theory between the ‘I’ and the drives. 
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Nevertheless, I disagree with the claim that Nietzsche replaces causal interactions between 
drives for ‘perspectival’ interactions; or that he aims to ascribe ‘perspectives’ to the drives. 
Ascribing a perspective to the ‘drives’ is misleading and introduces the homunculi problem, 
which Katsafanas (cf. Katsafanas 2014A, 4-8) rightly challenges Nietzsche to answer and 
suggests that he should avoid.  
Constâncio’s proposition that we should construe conscious mental state as the ‘total 
state’ of the organism helps resolve the lack of fit and supports the solution I defend. We 
must make sense of this ‘total state’ of the drives cautiously, however. Not each drive has a 
‘perspective’. The ‘total state’ of the drives and how this it fixes in some moment constitutes 
a perspective, which we, as agents, take on something. The ‘we’ refers to the agent and her 
first-person experience, which, I argue, is the total state of the drives and is revealed in her 
words, thoughts, reasons and actions. 
Moreover, Nietzsche does not claim we should replace causal-mechanistic relations 
between drives with ‘perspectival’ relations, but with ‘power relations’.229 This accords with 
my solution and it is more apt to avoid the homunculi problem, because it makes sense of 
power relations by appealing to genealogy. A drive(s) does not assume a perspective. Also, 
the total state of the drives does not take a perspective. The ‘total state’ corresponds to such 
a perspective, i.e., it is identical to it, which we as self-conscious agents or subjects of ‘I’ 
thoughts assume on something. Changing a perspective on something means the total state 
(or rank order) of drives has changed. A persepctive represents our first-person experience, 
whereas the total state or rank order of drives represents a third-person perspective on us.  
As from the first-person, a perspective changes when our priorities or aims in relation 
to something change. Our priorities or aims (i.e. our values) correspond to our drives. We 
must not project the unity of the ‘I’ onto a (single) drive and expect it to behave as a full-
fledged agent composed of a complex or ‘chemistry’ of drives. Nevertheless, we commit to 
the previous when we argue that the drive(s) assume a perspective. A drive is not unified in 
the same way a self-conscious agent is unified, that is, as composed of many parts pushing 
and pulling in different directions. A self-conscious agent entertains a self-image and so he 
is aware that he assumes a perspective. What what would ‘assuming a perspective’ be like 
 
                                               
229 One of worry over suggesting ‘power’ instead of ‘perspectival’ or ‘causal’ relations is that the only conception 
of ‘power’ we have is political and saturated with agential language that risks the reintroduction of the homunculi 
problem through the backdoor. Katsafanas (cf. Katsafanas 2014A, 6-7) critically assesses this worry. It is inevitable 
that we will project something of our way of acquiring power onto power-relations between drives, and that we 
must do so for there to be a bridge between ‘ourselves’ and ‘the (objective) world’, i.e., projection makes the world 
meaningful to us. Nonetheless, we can avoid projecting what individuates or distinguishes human power relations 
from other power relations (e.g., between plants or between animals) by projecting something broader than what 
can only be ascribed to human beings and their characteristic form of power, which, for Nietzsche, is concerned 
with ‘order’ (cf. GS 109). I think we can achieve this if project the oomph inherent to our willing something and 
following his analysis of willing, which Nietzsche perhaps misleadingly construes as a command-obedience 
relationship, because the only experience of command-obedience relationships we have are likewise political. I 
believe there are grounds for understanding this appeal to command-obedience relationships genealogically, i.e., 
as his referring to the most rudimentary forms of community and the rank order that erected it and in turn preserved 
it. I wanted to assess the previous genealogical account of power-relations, but I was unable due to the limitations 
of my research. 
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without our knowing we are doing so, but also without knowing there is potentially another 
perspective we can take, even if we do not presently have access to it? Can we ascribe the 
previous ‘knowledge’ to a ‘drive’? The total state of our drives plays a fundamental role in 
what we do, think, value etc. by corresponding to a ‘perspective’. Our perspective is the total 
state of our drives and represents their power relations, that is, how they fix upon something 
in some moment, which cannot be a property of a particular drive or drive relation. 
Nietzsche is careful not to overestimate the unity of the self-conscious ‘I’ with 
respect to the unity of the whole organism (cf. GS 11). The self-conscious ‘I’ is a linguistic 
or grammatical unity that implies the existence of drive-independent things or perspectives 
on something. However, there is no perspective distinct from the correlation between the 
self-conscious ‘I’ and the total state of our drives, for Nietzsche and his revisionist account.  
Our drives participate in the formation of what we call a perspective by pushing or 
pulling us toward different targets and-or activities, i.e., through their relationship with other 
drives. The rank order of drives is how the complex fixes on a course of action and correlates 
to what we call a perspective. Moreover, it is misleading to claim that drives adapt to their 
surroundings for two reasons. First, it is only ‘I’ or persons who adapts to their surroundings; 
a rank order of drives ‘changes’ or ‘shifts’. Our surroundings affect our drives, but not as 
they affect ‘us’. Secondly, the rank order can also shift independent from the surroundings, 
given Nietzsche’s active conception of the will and so, by extension, its cognates. Recall his 
caution over of the concept of ‘adaptation’ when we apply it to describe willing or the drives 
and their relations. He describes adaptation as: 
“…a second-rate activity, just a reactivity, indeed life itself has been defined as an 
increasingly efficient inner adaptation to external circumstances (Herbert Spencer). 
But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, its will to power, we overlook the 
prime importance that the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, re-interpreting, re-
directing and formative forces have, which ‘adaptation’ follows only when they have 
had their effect; in the organism itself, the dominant role of these highest 
functionaries, in whom the lifewill is active and manifests itself, is denied.” (GM II, 
12) 
The rank order of drives then reorders or changes based on external circumstances, but also 
what he construes as the urge to overcome (or self-overcome), namely, the will to power. 
Adaptation reflects the previous reordering or changing. What explains rather than describes 
the reordering or shift in the rank order of the drives is not ‘adaptation’, but the will to 
power. We ought to be cautious over what we mean when we claim some particular ‘drive’ 
changes, as Constâncio suggests. If such a change in a drive were possible, then how could 
we possibly recognise or determine its change? The claim that a drive changes, implies that 
drives fix upon any activity they may fleetingly desire or that might be required, rather than 
on the specific activity that defines them. It implies that a particular drive fixes upon any 
activity irrespective of its characteristic activity, which undercuts the definition of drives as 
stable tendencies towards a particular, active behavior.  
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Furthermore, even if a change in a particular drive ‘X’ has occurred, it would be 
impossible to identify X as having in some way changed to Y without assuming Y is a new 
drive entirely. In addition, it is impossible to know if X is still part of the drive complex, 
but is currently inactive or has lost its position in the rank order. In short, to defend the claim 
that drives change, we should first explain why the acquisition of a new drive is impossible. 
The previous undermines Nietzsche’s concept of ‘internalisation’, which is the process that 
explains how we acquire new drives based on circumstantial pressures and the blocking of 
drives. Assuming that a drive did change, what can possibly stay the same when X turns into 
Y apart from the fact that Y is also a drive? Can we coherently argue that Y is a new version 
of X without first showing how it is still X, but with some different outletfor example? 
Moreover, the transition from X to Y does not support the claim that X no longer exists. 
How can we prove the non-existence of a drive? We can argue that X has moved down the 
rank order and so lost its priority, but what would the non-existence of a drive look like and 
how could we verify it? Given our overall ignorance of the drives (cf. D 119) it is safer to 
claim that a drive does not change, but that we acquire new drives or that an older drive has 
changed the target of its particular activity by combining with other drives. What does 
change, however, is the total state (i.e. the rank order or power relations between the drives). 
Even safer than the previous is the claim that people change their priorities or perspectives 
on things. Therefore, the individual and her perspective change, which correlates to a change 
in the rank order of her drives and not to a change in one or more of her particular drives. 
Both the first-person and the third-person perspective contain the same activity we 
ascribe to agency or willing, whether it is self-conscious or not. The difference between the 
two is that of a perspective on willing something and its correlative action. It is a matter of 
perspective whether we construe ‘willing something’ as the identity between a ‘thing’ and 
its ‘modifications’ or between a ‘multiplicity of things’ and the ‘rank order’ emerging from 
it. We refer to the same thing, event or activity from different perspectives, neither of which 
is right or wrong, since both refer to the relationship between the basic preferred unit of will 
(be it the ‘I’ or the ‘drive’) and its correlative action or representation in a movement of the 
body. Nietzsche prefers the drives and their rank order over the ‘I’ (self-conscious thoughts, 
desires, values etc.) for analysing self-conscious agency and actions, but he still has to think 
of an action as a unified bodily movement or expression. His reason is that he aims to revise 
a rudimentary psychology that spawns religious and moral interpretations of phenomena, 
which operate on a belief in the causal efficacy of imaginary entities or phantoms. Likewise, 
he uses it to shed light on the ascetic ideal and thus life-negating morals underpinning these 
interpretations.  
The lack of fit stems from attributing the unity of the ‘I’ inherent to first-person 
practical agency to its modifications, i.e., to its actions over time; or when we construe the 
previous unity as more than just a practice, but an actual ‘thing’ in the world that we search 
for. The lack of fit also arises when we do the reverse and eliminate the unity of the self-
conscious ‘I’ for relations between drives without offering a coherent replacement for what 
it represents and thus construing the drives as mechanical or as subject to causal relations. 
Epiphenomenalist readings encounter parallel problems when they begin apply the unity of 
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a multiplicity to the first-person experience of agency. Consequently, eliminating the ‘I’ is 
results from the attempt to dissociate the two perspectives from their bridge, i.e., the act of 
will (or the activity of willing something) and what follows from it, i.e., its correlate action. 
This elimination is akin to claiming that inspection over its composition suggests a chair is 
not a chair at all, because what we perceive is an arrangement of subatomic motions. We 
should jettison all talk of chairs and speak only of some particular subatomic motion, which 
is patently absurd. That this chair ‘X’ is this composite of subatomic motions ‘Y’, so X is 
Y, is not threatened or debunked by referring to Y as X and vice versa. The same reasoning 
applies to the relation between the ‘I’ and the complex of drives. The ‘I’ as a practice of 
expressing ourselves in language is untouched by our understanding what we do, reason and 
resolve in different terms, i.e., as relations between the drives. Placing something under a 
microscope, whether it is an object or a person, need not lead to our having to replace the 
object or person entirely with a different, magnified description of it that loses sight of the 
fact that it is the same object or person which we placed under the microscope, not something 
else entirely. Also, we need not construe our practice of placing people under a microscope 
as somehow robbing them of their dignity, i.e., their sense of self, responsibility and agency. 
Nietzsche implores us to revise our conception of X only if what we recognise under the 
microscope (and thus about Y) does not accord with our conception of X, i.e., if we find a 
mismatch between X and Y. The microscope should take priority, for Nietzsche, because it 
is more apt at dispelling imaginary entities, which we habitually use to explain things. The 
microscope is only useful for dispelling such entities. We may revise our conception of X, 
but to eliminate or reduce X is needless and sometimes absurd; see, for example, his revision 
of the concept of the ‘soul’ for a representation of this strategy (cf. BGE 12).  
 Nietzsche evaluates agency based on how ‘I’-claims relate to their corresponding 
action(s), and not the ‘I’-claims themselves independent from such actions. He offers an 
account of conscious agency through analysis of what we say we will in relation to what we 
do. His introduction of the concept of a drive aims to entrench the previous. We can construe 
our actions as representing the activity of a drive or drive relation, however. We can likewise 
construe self-conscious agency as unity of the drives.230 Where a self-conscious agent seems 
unresolved about his or her action, or conflicted, or apparently resolves to perform an action, 
but fails to execute it, then we can explain this by appealing to changes in her rank order of 
drives; her rank order is fleeting as opposed to persistent. Since we have no representation 
of a drive independent from its correlate activity or action, then only our actions reveal the 
fleeting or persistent unity of our rank order.  
Nietzsche objects to the role of the ‘I’ in our actions in an attempt to debunk our 
assumptions about causality, which commit us to the proposition that phantoms interact with 
the world. How we analyse the will and so how we determine what kind of a will it is, i.e., 
strong or weak, self-conscious or unselfconscious, he no longer attempts to explain through 
 
                                               
230 For a discussion on the relationship between the unity of drives and genuine agency see, Anderson (2006, 89-
115), Gemes (2009, 33-50), May (2009, 89-106); Richardson (2013, 190). 
 394 
‘I’-claims alone, because they are not premised on distinct things or independent ‘faculties’. 
‘I’-claims alone that do not necessarily correlate to actions, they do not demonstrate genuine 
self-conscious agency, but could also show acrasia. Genuine self-conscious agency is our 
possessing a consistent relationship between our ‘I’-claims and correlate actions; it is self-
knowledge (in his sense of knowing oneself in a particular light) and self-mastery (in his 
sense of wholeness or unifying our various drives through our self-image). A ‘strong will’ 
reflects an enduring rank order of drives. Equally, the ‘I’ refers to the whole self, but this 
reference does not determine its unity or disunity. Therefore, a strong will reflects a unity of 
the self in the relationship between our ‘I’-claims and actions. The same applies to the rank 
order of drives. The relations between the drives in the rank order is not necessarily unified 
or does not necessarily yield an enduring unity. It describes how to determine whether a will 
is strong or weak, according to his drive psychology.  
There is a bridge between that perspective whose basic unit of will is the ‘I’ and the 
one whose basic unit is the drive. It is in willing a course of action that the will appears as 
an activity discernible in both perspectives. The bridge shows that he is not committed to 
construing an action as the modification of a unified subject that passes its inherent unity to 
the action or that causes unity in a multiplicity of drives. Unity is the result of an ‘activity’ 
that can and often does yield unified action; this activity is discernible in both perspectives. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily unified, certainly not in the enduring manner we are led to 
‘believe’ or have ‘faith’ in based on what he calls the errors of language or seductions of 
grammar. Sovereign individuality must yield unified action in an enduring manner and it 
typifies his prescription for ‘genuine self-conscious agency’. However, most people cannot 
attain sovereign individuality. They remain “unified only in a word” (BGE 19). The key 
philosophical point, for him, is that unified action is not caused by the inherent unity of the 
‘I’ or the drive complex: it is identical to an activity that can be described both in ‘I’-terms 
and in ‘drive’-terms. This activity evidences power relationships or command-obedience 
relationships between the ‘I’ and its ‘desires, wishes etc.’ or the ‘drives’. In short, the first-
person and the third-person are different perspectives on the same activity; neither can claim 
metaphysical or epistemic superiority over the other.  
What conception of the thought-action relation is Nietzsche advancing? His picture 
is not complete, but we can propose ways that he could complete it given some of his claims. 
The claim that conscious thoughts are identical to relations between drives, but correspond 
to the ‘total state’ (WLN 1[61]) of the drives, is useful. Elsewhere, he construes them as the 
‘outcome’ (GS 111) of relations between drives, but this can be misleading by implying a 
causal relationship, which then forces us to construe the agent as the ‘I’ and the ‘I’ as an 
independent ‘thing’ from the drives. The interaction is not between an agent and her drives, 
but between her desires (thoughts, wishes etc.) themselves and, by extention, the drives. In 
short, he does not construe drives relations as causal or perspectival. Such conceptions are 
misleading and commit us to causally efficacious phantoms or imaginary entities. Conscious 
thoughts correspond to power relations between drives. The relationship between conscious 
thoughts (wishes, desires, etc.) and drives is one of identity. Conscious thoughts (wishes, 
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desires etc.) correspond to drive relations. They are not the effects or products of these drive 
relations.  
Since I defend this solution to the lack of fit, what conception of the ‘drives’ am I 
ascribing to Nietzsche? Notwithstanding my admittedly interminable defence of the identity 
relationship between the ‘I’ and the drives, my conception of the drives mostly agrees with 
Janaway’s and Katsafanas’ definition: drives are stable tendencies toward active behaviour. 
I am cautious with respect to some of their adjacent and alternative propositions about the 
relationship between self-conscious thoughts and drives, however.  
I am cautious about Janaway’s claim that drives operate outside a person’s conscious 
control, because of the implicit conception of ‘conscious control’ as drive-independent. If 
we follow Janaway’s definition of the drives, we commit to construing ‘conscious thoughts’ 
not only as things, but also as distinct in kind from the drives. The previous introduces an 
unwarranted dualistic conception of the ‘I’-drive relationship, which I think Nietzsche tries 
to avoid and so my account seeks consistency with his views on the will-body identity. 
Likewise, I exercise caution over Katsafanas’ proposal that those drives which lead 
to immediate actions or to actions without the mediation of reflection, operate mechanically: 
“In short, an instinct might operate purely mechanically, by producing a series of 
behaviors; or it might operate at one remove, by producing internal states, such as 
emotions, desires, and urges, which then strongly dispose the organism to pursue 
some end. The animal acting on these internal states may be aware of its progress 
toward the nest, its pursuit of its prey, and so forth. But it remains ignorant of 
something else: the purpose of the action, or the ultimate end at which its action is 
directed.” (Katsafanas 2013A: 738) 
‘Mechanical activity’ means that something operates without the influence of reflection, 
deliberation and conscious thought. My concern over this characterisation of the drives (or 
instincts) is twofold. Firstly, it undermines Nietzsche’s will-body identity by making 
‘consciousness’ and its modes, i.e., knowledge, reflection and deliberation as behaviours or 
operations distinct in kind from drives and drive relations. Secondly, it implies drives only 
ever operate non-mechanically when they undergo the trial and jury of the previous modes 
of consciousness.  
My worry over the mechanical conception of the drives stems from my reading 
Nietzsche as aiming to resist casual descriptions of the ‘drive-action’ and ‘thought-action’ 
relation. Drives and their rank order do not cause actions in any sense. Drives are relatively 
stable tendencies toward active behaviour, and so their relationship to an action is one of 
identity; drives are a kind of action, or a basic unit of willing, but construed as from the third-
person perspective, because they force our gaze to actions for determining what they are as 
opposed to reflection. Consequently, their relationship to action is logical, not causal. The 
immediacy we experience with respect to the action we resolve to undertake is not ‘causal’; 
we are not speaking about two distinct things that interact. This ‘immediacy’ represents the 
outcome of willing, overcoming, overpowering etc., whose activity we can construe in two 
ways: a) as choosing to do X instead of Y, or, b) as the rank order of drives fixing upon X 
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instead of Y. The first renders ‘causality’ meaningful for us; we project willing on the 
objective world to render its changes meaningful. We cannot apply causality to that which 
we use to explain causal relations or render causal relations meaningful without appealing to 
circular reasoning.  
Nietzsche rejects a mechanical account of the drives, because it fails to provide an 
insight into conscious agency, but rathertakes this agency for granted. It relies on a faith or 
a belief in the independent efficacy of consciousness. Thus, the mechanical conception does 
not do enough to avoid phantoms and imaginary entities. If ‘drives’ are the only explainers 
for an action, then what does it mean for an organism to ‘know’ the purpose of its activity 
and how does this ‘knowledge’ make any difference to that activity? Knowledge makes a 
difference if and only if it is on the same plane of reality as the drives and, so, if it represents 
the activity of a drive in the trenches with other drives. The previous typifies Nietzsche’s 
solution to the problem of the possibility of self-conscious agency, which he underpins by 
appealing to the will-body identity and the process of ‘internalisation’.  
It is misleading to argue the relationship between the ‘I’ and the drives is one of 
mutual efficacy, because we conceive of this efficacy on causal terms. I think we can accept 
that both are (or that both can be) efficacious, but note that the conception of this efficacy as 
‘mutual’, i.e., as efficacious on one another, leads us to conceive of some causal interaction 
between them. The interaction theory of the thought-drive relation is problematic, because 
it bloats Nietzsche’s ontology and overlooks the labour he expended on his genealogical 
analysis, but also the psychological nuance and depth of his explanation. Accordingly, I 
agree with Katsafanas that there is some relationship between ‘drives’ and so-called ‘internal 
states’. I also agree that conscious states are ‘efficacious’. I disagree that the relationship 
between the drives and conscious states is causal, however. The drives do not ‘produce’ or 
‘effect’ conscious states. Correspondingly, conscious states do not affect the drives without 
actually being drives themselves or on an equal footing with the drives. Rather, conscious 
states represent the activity of an internalised drive, which mixes with and thereby relates to 
other drives in the rank order and fixes upon something, i.e., upon an activity. Self-conscious 
thoughts are efficacious, but for different reasons and in a different manner than Katsafanas 
proposes.  
Nietzsche seeks to preserve the will-body identity foundational to his analysis of 
agency and so we should avoid the temptation to isolate drives from their rank order or total 
state. It is arbitrary, and perhaps for this reason impossible, for us to isolate one drive from 
another and thus suggest that this drive X produces that state or action Y. With considerable 
caution we can say what drive may be at the forefront of the rank order in some moment and 
thus commands our entire body along with the other drives. We cannot find drives isolated 
from their rank order and so their relations with other drives, however. We can conceptually 
isolate a part of the body or a drive from the complex,231 but not commit to the existence of 
 
                                               
231 Here we should look at parts of the body and our organs in the way that he inherited from Schopenhauer’s 
conception of them, as objectified wills, i.e. as drives; (cf. TI, ‘Errors’, 8). 
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such a thing as a drive independent from the body and its rank order. What would a drive 
that roams about freely and independently from the rest look like? A drive is part of the 
complex and in constant relations with other drives. Each change or activity of the part is a 
change or activity of the whole irrespective of the magnitude of the change or activity, which 
sometimes we may not be able to measure (cf. D 115). Thus, internal states correspond to 
the rank order of drives, drive relations and interactions, which means there is a relationship 
of identy between them.  
Where it seems as if some drive X is impelling us towards some behaviour Y, it is a 
combination of all the drives and their rank order. The rank order may evidence the priority 
of drive X, but drives do not operate independently from the others. When a drive is at the 
forefront of a rank order, it changes the character of the whole by assuming a priority in 
relation to the other drives; it commands, overpowers the other drives.232 Nevertheless, in 
doing so, the drive does not somehow lose its relation to the rest or isolate itself. We should 
consider what it would be like for a drive to act without the body and thus the other drives, 
which are constantly urging the whole in some direction or other. It is also useful to compare 
this with what it would be like for the brain or stomach to act without the kidney, the liver, 
the heart, which invariably support the whole system of which the brain is a relatively small 
part irrespective of how we evaluate it according to our anatomical sciences and practices. 
It is correspondingly useful to consider as from the first person perspective how strange it 
would be if, when we are hungry, we forgot everything else we want to do that have nothing 
to do with eating. Compare the previous with what happens to conscious thoughts when we 
are literally starving; notice that deep sleep that journeys us into death and that ensues such 
moments of extreme starvation.  
The above conception is likewise more apt in making sense of Nietzsche’s ‘one taste’ 
(cf. GS 290). It is the enduring or recurrent priority of one rank order of drives, which we 
may characterise as the recurrent priority of an aim, a project or set of values, which agents 
assume and accord with their actions. The relationship of correspondence or identity between 
the rank order of drives and self-conscious agents I defend has the benefit of resolving the 
lack of fit by preserving Nietzsche’s insistence on taking seriously the ‘same plane of reality’ 
and ‘conscience of method’. It sidesteps interactions between the ‘I’ and the drives, which 
commits us to construing them as two distinct things. We are, I believe, seduced into the 
interaction theory of the I-drive relationship by a misleading conception of the conscious-
unconscious distinction, but also by the need to explain everything causally. Both of these 
are premised on language and grammar, which represent the priority of what Nietzsche calls 
the need to communicate and thus the herd perspective.  
Agency, whether it is conscious or unconscious, is the relation between one’s resolve 
and its corresponding action.233 Harbouring many resolves towards different ends makes 
 
                                               
232 Nietzsche’s adamant to prevent us from taking seriously any drive-independent or transcendent perspective, 
i.e., a perspective that somehow stands apart or outside the whole and the relations between each part in it, (cf. TI, 
Errors, 8; see also GM III, 12).  
233 For more on this conception of agency see Ridley (2007B, 212-217). 
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possessing an enduring and recurrent rank order of drives (i.e., sovereign individuality) 
difficult, but not impossible (cf. BGE 200). The previous difficulty is unnoticed and 
unappreciated if and when we approach actions as consequences of a unified self-conscious 
subject of I-thoughts; or if we construe them as the effects of relations between things, i.e., 
‘atoms’ or ‘atomic’ motions. We can appreciate this difficulty more readily if we analyse 
conscious agency itself and consider what it involves. In doing so, we recognise that 
considerably more than what we assumed is required from us to successfully will a course of 
action in the presence of changing circumstances. What we call ‘self-conscious’ agency 
accords with ‘unconscious’ agency by being determined by and so conceivable in terms of 
the relationships between one’s resolve and one’s actions.  
The difference we should pay attention to is that between a strong and weak will, and 
not between ‘willing’ and ‘not-willing’, according to Nietzsche. He sees ‘not-willing’ as 
synonymous to death, because, like Schopenhauer, he works with an extended conception 
of ‘willing’, which he explains by appealing to the will-body identity. Self-conscious agency 
can be weak-willed or strong-willed, because consciousness is just the introduction of the 
drive to communicate into the rank order of drives. This introduction need not necessarily 
lead to a ‘weak will’. Consequently, his concern is not over consciousness itself, but our 
overestimation of it, i.e., his concern is ‘moral’:  
“One takes consciousness to be a given determinate magnitude! One denies its growth 
and intermittences! Sees it as ‘the unity of the organism’! This ridiculous 
overestimation and misapprehension of consciousness has the very useful 
consequence that an all-too-rapid development of consciousness was prevented.” (GS 
11) 
In conscious agency, the urge to entertain a self-image shapes our actions in the interest of 
the herd perspective, i.e., for the sake of communication and thus the consequences of such 
communication or its lack thereof, which for him are moral. Our self-image is how morality 
shapes our actions. Thus, the difference between conscious and unconscious agency is the 
priority we afford to the drive to communicate in the rank order by virtue of having to live 
with other people; this priority reflects the role of morality in our lives.  
Previously, we illustrated that Nietzsche construes our self-image as representing the 
role of morality in our actions; self-conscious thought immediately places us within the 
moral sphere. This sphere is inescapable because we live in a social world. Many of us may 
not be inclined towards social interaction due to how it constricts our individual expression, 
i.e., how it impedes our other, individual and distinct, if not opposing, drives. Those of us 
who find ourselves disinclined towards society can do little about it. We have to live with 
others and its costs to our individuality. Therefore, he does not want to undermine or reject 
our needing or possessing a self-image, but assess and cooperate with it.  
Before I turn to Nietzsche’s concern with the moral value of compassion and its 
relationship to the ascetic ideal, I will assess his views on aesthetics following his objections 
to Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. I will focus mainly on what he adopts from Schopenhauer’s 
views and what he leaves behind. My aim is to further cement the proposition that Nietzsche 
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believes ‘projection’ to be the cornerstone of the human intellectual involvement with the 
world. I will aim to demonstrate that he agrees with Schopenhauer’s aesthetics more than 
he often willingly admits or makes clear. Schopenhauer’s claim that aesthetic contemplation 
is a projection of willing onto the world is central to Nietzsche’s philosophy, too. Although, 
they disagree on how to conceive of this ‘projection, but likewise on the correct conception 
of willing and, in turn, the conception of aesthetic contemplation that follows from it.  
2.12 Nietzsche on Objectivity and Aesthetic Contemplation 
In this chapter, I assess Schopenhauer’s influence on Nietzsche’s aesthetics and the arts. I 
will argue that they agree on the conception of aesthetics and the arts as a human activity 
whichdistorts ‘natural’ objects, but disagree over how to construe aesthetic contemplation 
and objective reflection. Before I analyse their similarities and differences in detail, I will 
briefly summarise Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. 
 There is an implicit distinction between art and aesthetics, according to Schopenhauer. 
Art is a human activity whose product is a class of objects we call ‘artworks’ (or ‘artefacts’), 
which captures how human beings distort natural objects using their reason and imagination. 
We construe this activity as ‘creativity’, which is a willful activity, in Schopenhauer’s sense. 
An artist’s aims or reasons for distorting natural objects can vary, however. Their creativity 
can be variously inspired. Furthermore, a spectator’s experience and enjoyment of artworks 
can also vary irrespective of the artist’s inspiration. The two main inspirations for artworks, 
according to him, are aesthetic or non-aesthetic. Only aesthetic inspiration interests him.234 
Thus, his analysis of the arts concerns ‘aesthetic contemplation’ only and its particular form 
of creativity and inspiration.  
Aesthetic contemplation is a kind of cognition of something, which I comprehended 
using the ‘correlation theory of cognition’. Ordinary cognition yields an object for a willing 
subject, but aesthetic contemplation yields cognition of something as a willing, striving etc. 
‘thing’, i.e., a Schopenhauerian Idea. Asethetic contemplation has its own ‘subjective 
correlate’, however. We cognise Ideas by assuming the disinterested stance in relation to a 
target of cognition. Disinterestedness does not entail the absence of interest or apathy (cf. 
Came 2009, 95), but a change in our interest corresponding to the projection of willing onto 
 
                                               
234 Denham makes a similar remark: “[g]reat art can leave us cold. Such occasions are often mentioned as 
counterexamples to ‘aesthetic attitude’ theories, as evidence that even unequivocally great art can fail to elicit any 
distinctive form of psychological engagement. They are of no interest here, however, because they play no part in 
the positive phenomenologies of art offered by either Schopenhauer or Nietzsche: neither thinker has any interest 
in dispassionate, detached, or casual spectatorship. Their concern is with aesthetic creation and appreciation 
‘proper’—namely, acts and experiences which are focused, fully attentive, and wholly involved… Neither thinker 
offers an explicit argument for demarcating the territory of the aesthetic in this way, but it is clearly assumed by 
most of what each has to say” (Denham 2014, 171).  
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the target. Thus, perceiving the target’s Idea reflects a change in the nature of our cognition 
and interest. It represents the target’s ideal representation and aesthetically inspired artists 
create artworks aiming to incite the previous ‘change’ in the spectator and thereby facilitate 
cognition of an Idea in them.  
Aesthetic contemplation is also the only candidate for cognition of the target as it is in 
itself, according to Schopenhauer, because it provides us with its so-called ‘clearest image’. 
It intimately relates to the target’s ‘truth’ or ‘reality’, i.e., it is the closest possible cognition 
of what it is independent from the effects other things have on it, which we can have. Thus, 
the disinterested stance yields a veracious cognition of the target that better represents it at 
it is in itself compared to its counterpart cognitions. Those distorted objects we call artworks, 
which are inspired by aesthetic contemplation and thus aim to incite it in their spectators by 
making it appear ‘sublime’ or ‘beautiful’, are more veracious than their natural and-or non-
aesthetic counterparts (cf. WR, 220 & WRII, 387). 
Schopenhauer’s psychological observations on aesthetics and so what motivates and-
or causes us to project willing on the target of cognition was also a crucial element of his 
viewpoint. What drives aesthetic contemplation is ‘suffering’, i.e., a thwarted will.235 What 
causes or motivates us (in Schopenhauer’s sense) to project willing onto the target is 
twofold. Either the object is more suitable for representing its Idea (i.e., what it wills as a 
whole) than its counterparts are, or it is more threatening (or hostile) than human beings can 
overcome. The previous represent the two principal aesthetic properties of objects (whether 
they are natural or artificial), i.e., beauty and sublimity. His correlation theory of cognition 
does not allow us to separate what ‘motivates’ from what ‘causes’ aesthetic contemplation, 
however, because how a target appears reflects our subjective stance in relation to it. 
Therefore, motivation and causation are two distinct perspectives on the same event seen as 
from ‘within’ (‘motivation’) or as from ‘without’ (‘causation’). The urge to do something 
explains why we perceive something as beautiful or sublime, i.e., why it motivates aesthetic 
contemplation. This urge explains why we project willing onto a target of cognition when 
we suffer. It offers us something to do and so a way to alleviate suffering or boredom by 
distraction or redirecting our focus to something else, i.e., something other than our situation 
and interest. These psychological observations suggest that aesthetic contemplation—but 
also artistic creativity itself—are different ways in which we vent the urge to do something, 
anything whatsoever.  
In sum, Schopenhauer makes three fundamental propositions on aesthetics and arts. 
Firstly, aesthetic contemplation is more veracious than its counterpart cognitions; it provides 
 
                                               
235 Following the distinction between art and aesthetics, we can argue that irrespective of the artist’s inspiration, 
suffering is what motivates art. What distinguishes all artistic activities from the aesthetic kind of artistic activity 
is what we do following our suffering using our reason and imagination. Aesthetics leads us to project willing onto 
the target of cognition and thereby, for a moment, we forget our suffering by focusing on the target entirely while 
producing artworks unrelated to the suffering that motivated it. Non-aesthetically inspired creativity focuses on a 
target in light of its relation to our suffering and produces artworks directly or indirectly related to that suffering.  
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a ‘meaningful’ view of the world and so it has veridical value. Secondly, ‘suffering’ (i.e., a 
thwarted will) drives aesthetics and the arts by enabling an alternative ‘pleasure’ (i.e., or an 
alleviation of pain) and thus another way to vent the urge to do something. Thirdly, aesthetic 
contemplation has moral value and a value for life, because projecting the will allows us to 
act wholly for another’s sake.236 The previous contributes to the negation of the will to life, 
which represents our ‘genuine freedom’ (cf. WR, 327-8), by revealing the necessity and the 
extent of suffering in the world and our inability to alleviate it. Thus, the kind of cognition 
that is aesthetic contemplation is the foundation of the evaluative aspect of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy.  
Nietzsche rejects two key components of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. First, he rejects 
the proposition that the ‘will’ projected on the target is unproblematic, i.e., that it is ‘given’, 
‘unified’ or ‘veridical’ (cf. BGE 16 & 19). As we saw previously, he argues for a different 
conception of ‘willing’. I will argue here that he utilises this conception to inform his views 
on aesthetics and the arts. Second, he rejects the claim that aesthetic contemplation yields a 
veracious cognition of the target. The ‘Idea’ does not reflect what it wills, but what or how 
the artist wills it to be. Schopenhauer’s psychological observations were invaluable to 
Nietzsche’s aesthetics, however. He agrees that the arts help manage suffering, but how they 
do so differ because of his approach through historical philosophising. Correspondingly, he 
accepts aesthetics can have moral value, but his account of ‘morality’ and the role aesthetics 
plays in it differ substantially from Schopenhauer.  
Nietzsche’s approach to aesthetics and the arts undergoes changes throughout his 
work. For example, in BT he utilises Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will, his metaphysics 
and pessimism. He demonstrates Schopenhauer’s errors on the artistic genre of tragedy and 
sets the stage for a concept that resurfaces in later works, i.e., the Dionysiac. Moreover, his 
historical method and his views on ‘health’ in connection with creativity and myth are 
prominent in this early work (cf. BT 23). To make sense of his aesthetics, however, I think 
we are obligated to note and avoid the mistakes he concedes in BT. His philosophical and 
artistic influences, he argues, mislead him about the appropriate methodology, terminology 
and approach to the problems that he raises. In later work, he uses a different method, set of 
propositions, concepts and arguments for addressing the same problem of pessimism, value 
and health he raises in BT. His self-criticism in the ‘Preface’ to BT proved useful to me for 
making sense of the direction of his views on aesthetics and the arts, but also for how they 
fit with his broader evaluative aims. It is difficult to ignore passages such as the following: 
“I find it an impossible book today. I declare that it is badly written, clumsy, 
embarrassing, with a rage for imagery and confused in its imagery, emotional, here 
and there sugary to the point of effeminacy, uneven in pace, lacking the will to logical 
 
                                               
236 Denham rightly distinguishes Schopenhauer’s phenomenology of the aesthetic experience from his subsequent 
use and evaluation of that experience (cf. Denham 2014, 166; see specially her note on the same page). However, 
as we will see below, she is wrong to ascribe that same phenomenology to Nietzsche’s account of aesthetics. Also, 
she does show clearly enough how entrenched Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is in his phenomenological account 
of the aesthetic experience.  
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cleanliness, very convinced and therefore too arrogant to prove its assertions, 
mistrustful even of the propriety of proving things…an arrogant and wildly 
enthusiastic book which, from the outset, shuts itself off from the profanum vulgus of 
the ‘educated’ even more than from the ‘common people’...” (BT Pref., 3) 
 
“I now regret very much that I did not yet have the courage (or immodesty?) at that 
time to permit myself a language of my very own for such personal views and acts of 
daring, labouring instead to express strange and new evaluations in Schopenhauerian 
and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran counter to both the spirit 
and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer… Setting aside all the premature hopes and the 
erroneous morals applied to the most contemporary things with which I ruined my 
first book, however, the great Dionysiac question it remains (with regard to music, 
too) as valid as ever: what would music be like if it were no longer Romantic in its 
origins, as German music is, but Dionysiac? (BT Pref., 6)  
Nietzsche’s declarations that he ‘ruined’ his first book are hard to ignore, because he rarely 
shows such an attitude towards his work. Also, we cannot ignore the concept of ‘Dionysiac’, 
which, as he claims in EH, characterises his entire philosophy: 
“I have the right to understand myself as the first tragic philosopher—which is to say 
the most diametrically opposed antipode of a pessimistic philosopher. Nobody had 
ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: tragic wisdom was 
missing… The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a 
Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a 
radical rejection of the very concept of ‘being’—all these are more closely related to 
me than anything else people have thought so far.” (EH, ‘BT’, 3) 
The above quote guides my approach to Nietzsche’s philosophy; especially, the following 
claim: “saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection of the very 
concept of ‘being’” (EH, BT, 3). I use the previous as the reference point for elucidating his 
philosophical aims and I continue to let this guide me now into his account of aesthetics and 
the arts.237  
I will assess Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic contemplation and 
aesthetic objectivity using primarily his later writings. Similar to his views on morality, his 
aesthetics has a descriptive and evaluative component. Initially, he construes the activities 
and inspirations of artists in terms of the drives, i.e., Apolline and Dionysiac drives.238 The 
 
                                               
237 For more on BT, but also on how Nietzsche’s views relate to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics see, (Ridley 2007A, 
9-33), (Young 1999, 25-57), (Nussbaum 1991), (Han-Pile 2006) and (Janaway 2007). For more recent analyses of 
BT see the collection of essays in Came (2014), to which I will also refer in the current chapter. 
238 See, for example: “[t]hese two very different drives (Triebe) exist side by side, mostly in open conflict, 
stimulating and provoking (reisen) one another to give birth to ever-new, more vigorous offspring in whom they 
perpetuate the conflict inherent in the opposition between them, an opposition only apparently bridged by the 
common term ‘art’ - until eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic ‘Will’, they appear paired and, in 
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descriptive component, then, attunes his readers using ‘historical philosophising’, before he 
suggests his evaluation of aesthetics and the arts, i.e., what he thinks the value of aesthetics 
and the arts consists in. I will focus on the descriptive component by critically assessing the 
differences between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s accounts of ‘aesthetic contemplation’ 
and ‘objectivity’. I will argue that the differences between them hinge on what it means to 
‘idealise’ (or ‘transfigure’) the target of cognition. For Schopenhauer, ‘idealisation’ is an 
exercise in perceiving the most veridical representation of the target using the most veridical 
representation of ourselves by analogy. For Nietzsche, idealisation is a bodily state and thus 
an essentially creative exercise of the entire body. Let me elaborate on the previous.  
Schopenhauer distinguishes aesthetic contemplation from reflection, but he likewise 
distinguishes ‘aesthetic’ objectivity from its non-aesthetic counterpart. Aesthetic objectivity 
conceives a target as willing, striving and so on, whereas non-aesthetic objectivity conceives 
it as something permitting our (or someone else’s) willing, i.e., it yields an object for a 
willing subject or one that permits willing. Therefore, aesthetic contemplation has veridical 
value, because its representation is as close to what the target is in itself as is possible given 
the limits of our intellect. I call this the ‘veridical account’ of aesthetic contemplation. I will 
argue that Nietzsche’s staunchest objections to Schopenhauer aim predominantly at this 
account of aesthetic contemplation.  
The veridical account echoes in recent readings of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. For 
example, Came’s reading of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics argues the following: 
“…aesthetic and moral experience brings us much closer to the reality of things, to 
the essence of existence.” (Came 2009, 99; my emphasis)   
See also, Denham’s reading of Schopenhauer’s aesthetic contemplation as a sort of aesthetic 
‘attunement’, which shows an affinity for the veridical account by describing ‘attunement’ 
as follows: 
“First, it is a state in which the subject ceases to consider how the target is causally 
or conceptually related to other things (regarding it ‘outside’ of the principle of 
sufficient reason). Secondly, it is a state in which the character and content of the 
subject’s first-personal experience is wholly determined by the target. And finally, in 
this state the subject ceases to be aware of himself as distinct from the object—he is 
no longer a subject of self-conscious thought nor (accordingly) self-directed agency.” 
(Denham 2014, 175) 
Denham rightly distinguishes the description of an experience from the use or implications 
of that experience (cf. Denham 2014, 176). Hence, we incorrectly associate Schopenhauer’s 
phenomenology with his metaphysics (cf. Denham 2014, 166). His account is, indeed, rich 
 
                                               
this pairing, finally engender a work of art which is Dionysiac and Apolline in equal measure: Attic tragedy.” (BT 
1, 14) 
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in phenomenological insight even though it is metaphysically flawed. Nevertheless, I think 
we will struggle to dissociate his phenomenological insights from the metaphysical or the 
veridical implications of his description and-or the descriptive terms on which these insights 
rely. We notice the reasons for the previous in her claim that aesthetic contemplation entails 
that our ‘first-personal experience is wholly determined by the target’ (my emphasis).239 If 
we describe what Denham calls ‘aesthetic attunement’ as ‘wholly determined’ by the target, 
then we make substantial implications with respect to the veracity of the cognition. In short, 
we assume that veracity is a central feature of that experience. This does not only allow 
metaphysical propositions and considerations to reenter the phenomenological account via 
its description, but unwittingly supports a proposition that an aesthetic experience is more 
veridical than its counterpart experiences. The reason is that, unlike its counterparts, a target 
wholly determines the aesthetic experience, which puts aesthetics at the heart of metaphysical 
and epistemological concerns, but it also characterises the experience as wholly ‘passive’ 
or ‘receptive’ to the target. Furthermore, Schopenhauer implicitly distinguished arts from 
aesthetics. The arts themselves are not necessarily concerned with the veracity of a target’s 
representation in an artefact. An artefact can be concerned with the veracity of its subject 
matter, but whether or not it does so depends wholly on the artist’s inspiration and aims, not 
on the ‘target’ or the mere fact that it is an artefact. Nevertheless, Denham’s reading captures 
Schopenhauer’s conception of aesthetic contemplation and his account of the Ideas, but we 
have reason to argue that her reading falls short of capturing Nietzsche’s views on aesthetics 
and the arts. Nietzsche conceives of the aesthetic experience as a wholly active and creative 
engagement with the target of cognition; the aesthetic contemplator wholly determines the 
target’s representation, which includes what counts as its ‘ideal’ representation in an artwork 
or artefact. 
In sum, the veridical account conflates the phenomenological description of our 
experience with the veridical implications of its subject matter. Schopenhauer conflates the 
target’s veracity with aesthetic contemplation, because he aims to associate it with morality 
and ascetic resignation; he aims to derive his evaluative framework from it. He achieves the 
previous by grounding the ‘Idea’ and its subjective correlate (i.e., ‘disinterestedness’) on 
 
                                               
239 Denham’s reading likewise shows an ambiguity, which we can recognise when we inquire how it is possible 
for ‘objects’ to ‘wholly determine’ our first-personal experience while, simultaneously, “the distinction between 
the subject and the object is phenomenologically mitigated” (Denham 2014, 172). We cannot hold together these 
two propositions without losing sight of or abandoning the distinction between the phenomenological description 
and the veridical representation, which reintroduces metaphysical implications. The reason is that if, as she claims, 
a distinction between us and the object is ‘phenomenologically mitigated’, then we seize to perceive it as an object, 
which, in turn, means we do not ascribe to it properties we would ascribe to ‘objects’—our whole experience has 
changed in this instance. Therefore, once the distinction between subject and object is ‘mitigated’, the claim that 
the object ‘wholly determines’ our perception becomes meaningless. Denham is on the right track, but falls short 
because she uses metaphysical lexicon to describe the aesthetic experience while at the same time aiming to 
sidestep any metaphysical implications. Schopenhauer did not avoid the metaphysical implications (or veridical 
representation of a target of cognition) of his aesthetic experience. He conflated phenomenology with metaphysics 
and construed this conflation as the hallmark of his philosophy. He argued that through his philosophy of the will, 
we could make the world—especially scientific discoveries including metaphysical propositions—meaningful or 
significant.  
  405 
truth or reality. This conflation is a hallmark of his philosophy, which aims to give us the 
‘truest’, ‘clearest’ and ‘most meaningful’ world-view. We cannot ascribe this conflation to 
Nietzsche, because he has an active and creative account of aesthetic contemplation and the 
aesthetic experience.  
Neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche believe we can possibly know what a target of 
cognition is in itself. For Schopenhauer, however, we can know what we are (in ourselves) 
and, by the faculty of imagination and reason, we can ‘project’ this knowledge on the target 
of cognition to acquire an approximate insight into what it is in itself, albeit in accordance 
with the limits of possible cognition. Nietzsche accepts that artists ‘project’ on the target of 
cognition, but his conception of the veracity or epistemic status of this projection differ from 
his predecessor. Furthermore, he has a different phenomenological account of the projection 
that avoids concerns over its veracity and epistemic status.  
When we project ‘willing’ onto the target, we humanise or anthropomorphise it (cf. 
GS 109 & 112), according to Nietzsche. We do not cognise it as it is in itself; our projection 
does not constitute a veracious representation of it. We render it ‘meaningful’ to us and for 
us, not in itself. The target’s meaningfulness corresponds to our interest(s). He leaves open 
whether this ‘interest’ reflects our individuality, the herd, our species or some combination 
thereof. Nevertheless, nothing corresponds to an interest in the target as it is in itself and for 
itself, because no such interest exists. The ‘disinterestedness’ Schopenhauer describes is not 
an interest in the target itself, i.e., the subjective correlate of perceiving what it is in itself or 
what it wills, for Nietzsche. What drives the artist to proclaim she is disinterested is multiple, 
but what is common in each case is that it is unrelated to the target itself. Nietzsche lists the 
following interests, which clearly relate to the artist’s self-image: she may have an interest 
in appearing ‘holy’ (cf. EC, ‘Destiny’, 8), or ‘moral’ (cf. A 9), or ‘as belonging to a higher 
order of things’ (cf. A 12). In short, her interest is in the herd perspective, which, therefore, 
distorts her self-conception. Let me elaborate. 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation and the 
activity of artists requires us to attune to and introduce his distinct conception of willing, 
consciousness and the herd instincts, i.e., the conceptual link. I cannot provide an exhaustive 
picture of how aesthetics features in the conceptual link without further and more substantial 
deviation from the central topic. Moreover, he did not work out this relationship sufficiently 
or clearly enough by comparison to what we saw with his account of morality. Accordingly, 
my propositions principally rely on inferences from passages and arguments.240  
Nietzsche has a distinct phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation and creativity, 
which we can recognise from his conception of ‘idealisation’ and the role of Rausch in it. A 
key step to making sense of this distinct phenomenology is to recognise the viewpoint from 
which he approaches aesthetics and the arts. As Reginster rightly claims, his viewpoint is 
that of the artist or creator: 
 
                                               
240 I leave aside how the conceptual link between communal life, consciousness, language etc. features in his views 
on aesthetics and the arts. I will focus on his phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation. Nevertheless, my analysis 
implies some relationship to it, but I was unable to explore it at length here.  
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“Schopenhauer, Nietzsche remarks, ‘instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from 
the point of view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely 
from that of the “spectator”’ (GM, III, 6; see Z, II, 15). The fundamental assumption 
of Schopenhauerian aesthetics is that the purpose of art is to induce a certain view of 
things.” (Reginster 2014, 24) 
We cannot dissociate Schopenhauer’s views on aesthetic contemplation and its role in the 
arts from their implications with respect to the affirmation or negation of the will to life. My 
reason is that Schopenhauer sought to derive an overarching evaluative framework from his 
views on aesthetic contemplation. Accordingly, Reginster’s suggestion that, according to 
Schopenhauer, the arts aim only to provide a certain ‘view’ of things can be misleading, 
because that view borrows its relevance from whether or not it facilitates affirmation or 
negation of the will to life. Schopenhauer aims for a more direct relationship between the 
arts and the will to life as is evident by his views on tragedy and his psychological insights 
into the arts and aesthetics. I cannot address the previous at length; instead, I will focus on 
why and how Nietzsche avoids conflating the ‘veracity’ of a cognition (the ‘view of things’) 
with aesthetic contemplation. I will argue that he does so by having a different account of 
aesthetic contemplation and objectivity.  
  Came’s useful reading of Schopenhauer’s account of ‘disinterestedness’ helps us see 
how Nietzsche’s phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation differs from his predecessor’s, 
but also how it is built out of his objections to it. I do not think Came aims to demonstrate 
this difference and he does not defend it here, but his reading helps us reveal it through the 
claim that Nietzsche confuses disinterestedness with apathy: 
“Schopenhauer defines disinterestedness as a state in which objects ‘stand in no 
relation to our will’… Nietzsche, at times, seems to understand this radical 
detachment as apathy. But to be disinterested does not mean to fail to be interested. 
My attitude towards an object is disinterested, if and only if, in attending to it, I focus 
only on the object and not any relations that obtain between the object and anything 
apart from the object itself. Disinterestedness is therefore an attitude of reflective 
disengagement from all considerations of utility, which considers only what the object 
is ‘in itself’.” (Came 2009, 95) 
There are two propositions embedded in the above passage that demonstrate Schopenhauer 
conflates a phenomenological description with a metaphysical proposition or consideration 
about the cognition he describes. First, Came’s reading describes disinterestedness as one’s 
focusing wholly on the ‘object’ as the correct phenomenological account. Second, he infers 
from focusing wholly on the object (or the description of this focus) that it entails “reflective 
disengagement from all considerations of utility, which considers only what the object is ‘in 
itself’”. We can distinguish between ‘reflective disengagement from all considerations of 
utility’ and considering ‘what the object is in itself’ and so show a second inference implicit 
to his reading, but we need only assess the first inference for the point at hand. Accordingly, 
I will analyse the inference from ‘focusing on something’ to ‘considering what the object is 
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in itself’, i.e., to its implications about the veracity of the cognition in light of Nietzsche’s 
views.  
Came’s reading rightly shows that Schopenhauer conflates or, at least, does not seem 
to recognise a difference between the following propositions: 
A) Focusing wholly on something. 
B) Considering what it is ‘in itself’.  
I will argue that we cannot ascribe this conflation to Nietzsche, because he offers his own 
phenomenological account and analysis of focusing wholly on something as we do during 
our aesthetic contemplation. The previous account is unconcerned with what the target is in 
itself. Nietzsche’s Rausch characterises A), which also demonstrates his account of aesthetic 
contemplation. It describes A) without entailing the second proposition, which ties aesthetic 
contemplation to the veracity of our cognition. The veracity of our cognition and aesthetic 
contemplation are separate considerations and interests, for Nietzsche. Accordingly, he does 
not reject the proposition that we can be disinterested and take an interest in something. He 
rejects the proposition that disinterestedness has implications with respect to the veracity of 
our cognition or that we are interested in what the target is ‘in itself’. I will assess another 
reading of the relationship between Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetics to show the 
need for assessing again where Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer.  
 Young’s reading of Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s disinterestedness takes 
the view that Nietzsche’s aesthetics is closer to Schopenhauer’s than he is willing to admit. 
According to Young, Nietzsche misreads ‘disinterestedness’:  
“Nietzsche’s objection to the disinterestedness theory is, it seems to me, a simple one: 
disinterested, will-less contemplation is not a state out of which anything is created. 
Yet art, the state which produces it, essentially is creative. Hence “objectivity, 
mirroring, suspended will” are “inartistic states” (WP 812). Art, in short, is not 
contemplation but action. Nietzsche’s activist vocabulary for talking about artists - he 
refers to them as creators, makers, doers, violators and as rapists (TI, ix, 8) - 
continually emphasises this.” (Young 1992, 121)  
In defense of Schopenhauer’s account, Young argues that Nietzsche failed to distinguish 
two phases in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics: the contemplative and creative phase (cf. Young 
1992, 122). Accordingly, Nietzsche focused on objecting to the contemplative and ignored 
how the previous informs the artist’s creativity, which meant that he does not admit how his 
‘transfiguration’ derives from Schopenhauerian ‘disinterestedness’. Nietzsche’s objections, 
then, are limited: they aim at the contemplative phase of the process ignoring the creative 
and that ‘transfiguration’ captures another phase in the artistic process phase:  
“In describing aesthetic perception as disinterested Schopenhauer means that in the 
aesthetic state these normal categories of perception are suspended, thereby enabling 
us to become alive to usually unnoticed aspects and construals of objects: in 
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Nietzschean language, the object undergoes “transfiguration.” And this, surely, is 
essential to (good) art.” (Young 1992, 124) 
Young’s reading is misleading, because he does not recognise the veridical considerations 
central to Schopenhauer’s account of the artistic process and specifically the contemplative 
phase. Nietzsche forgoes veridical considerations and formulates a new phenomenological 
account of aesthetic contemplation that aims to avoid them.  
The ‘aspects and construals of objects’ that a contemplator ‘becomes alive to’ and to 
which Young refers, are wholly determined by the target (i.e., the Idea) in Schopenhauer’s 
case, as Denham rightly suggests. The target ‘wholly determines’ its ‘ideal representation’ 
and ‘perfection’, which the artist perceives during the contemplative phase and then actively 
turns into artefacts in the creative phase with the aim of communicating that perfection to 
others. Nietzsche rejects the previous on two grounds. First, he does not distinguish between 
the contemplative and creative phase of the artistic process. Second, a target cannot possibly 
‘wholly determine’ these new ‘aspects and construals’, since the artist is active throughout 
the artist process. We suspend willing during aesthetic contemplation and project it on the 
target, according to Schopenhauer. We become genuinely pure subjects of cognition and so 
conduits for its ‘Idea’, which is a veridical concern alien to Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Young 
does not sufficiently portray the veridical concerns inherent to Schopenhauer’s description 
when formulating his reading of Nietzsche’s aesthetics and thus he misses a pertinent aspect 
of Nietzsche’s alternative and revisionist account. Although, we should omit that we notice 
Nietzsche’s departure from Schopenhauer’s views more clearly in his later works than in 
his earlier work, e.g., in BT. 
In sum, Schopenhauer’s description of aesthetic contemplation invites assessments 
over the veracity of the cognition, because it borrows its value precisely from that veracity. 
In Nietzsche’s terms, Schopenhauer pays homage to ‘truth’ or shows his insurmountable 
‘will to truth’. When he construes the Idea as a product of aesthetic contemplation and its 
veracity as its essential aspect, Schopenhauer champions truth over aesthetics. Truth and 
perfection are equivalents in Schopenhauer’s view, whereas the two are unrelated, according 
to Nietzsche. Nietzsche objects to the veracity of the Ideas and to the proposition that the 
subjective correlate of ‘meaningful truths’ is ‘disinterestedness’, in Schopenhauer’s sense.241  
 
                                               
241 See, for example: “[w]herever people think that their pedigree gives them the right to contemplate Reality and 
gaze out into the distance . . . The idealist, like the priest, holds all the great concepts in his hand (- and not just his 
hand); he plays them with a sort of good-natured disdain for ‘understanding’, the ‘senses’, ‘honour’, ‘the good 
life’, ‘science’; he thinks that these sorts of things are beneath him, like so many pernicious, seductive forces over 
which ‘spirit’ hovers in its pure ‘for-itself’-ness: - as if humility, chastity, poverty (in a word: holiness) have not 
done life unspeakably more harm than any vices or horrors ever have… Pure spirit is a pure lie… As long as the 
priest is considered a higher type of person - this professional negater, slanderer, poisoner of life there will not be 
an answer to the question: What is truth? Truth has already been turned on its head when someone who consciously 
champions nothingness and negation passes for the representative of ‘truth’…” (A 8). Compare the previous 
passage with the following (A 14). 
  409 
Do Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation 
entail that he is not concerned with the ‘truth’ or that he places a higher value on falsehoods? 
On the contrary, I will argue that Nietzsche distinguishes considerations regarding ‘truth’ 
from those regarding aesthetics and its defining features, which are creativity, beauty and 
the sublime.242 His later writings construe the ‘truth’ as wholly unrelated to ‘aesthetics’. He 
approaches the ‘truth’ as a ‘problem of life’ (or health) and argues that aesthetics can help 
‘manage’ it, but not that truth is a decisive feature of aesthetics. What aesthetics manages is 
not the truth, but its effect on us and our life.243 He rejects the proposition that the demands 
of aesthetics are synonymous with those of truth. Thus, there is a dissociation between truth 
and aesthetics, which, according to Nietzsche, is valuable for life.  
We find Nietzsche’s phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation in what he calls 
Rausch, which we often translate as ‘intoxication’ in the Anglophone commentary on his 
philosophy. However, his conception of Rausch changes from its outline in BT to his later 
work, such as TI. In BT, he construes Rausch as the defining characteristic of the Dionysiac 
drive in juxtaposition to the dream or image characterising the Apolline244: 
“In order to gain a closer understanding of these two drives, let us think of them in 
the first place as the separate art-worlds of dream and intoxication [Rausch].” (BT 1, 
14) 
 
“[E]very artist is an ‘imitator’, and indeed either an Apolline dream-artist or a 
Dionysiac artist of intoxication or finally - as, for example, in Greek tragedy - an artist 
of both dream and intoxication at once.” (BT 2, 19) 
In his later work, Rausch is a characteristic of both Dionysian and Apolline drives, which 
reflects his aim to conceive of Rausch as a precondition of artistic creativity, i.e., an activity 
of all artistic drives, rather the defining characteristic of one artistic drive (or drive relation):  
“The contrasting concepts of Apollinian and Dionysian that I introduced into 
aesthetics-what do they mean, as types of intoxication? – Apollinian intoxication 
stimulates the eye above all, so that it gets the power of vision... In the Dionysian 
state, on the other hand, the entire system of affects is excited and intensified: so that 
it discharges all its modes of expression at once, releasing the force of presentation, 
imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and all types of mimicry and play acting, 
all at the same time.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 10) 
This change in Nietzsche’s use of Rausch demonstrates he aims to overcome the limitations 
and errors he accepts with respect to his first book, which he acknowledges in later works: 
 
                                               
242 I discuss the relationship between truth, art and science further in the next chapter where I analyse Nietzsche’s 
views on Mitleid and the ascetic ideal. 
243 For an illuminating reading of Nietzsche’s views on the relationship between ‘aesthetics’ and ‘truth’, see 
Janaway (2014).  
244 See likewise Young (1992, 125-6) on this change in conception.  
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“Perhaps it may be recalled, at least among my friends, that initially I approached the 
modern world with a few crude errors and overestimations and, in any case, with 
hope. I understood - on the basis of who knows what personal experiences? - the 
philosophical pessimism of the nineteenth century as a symptom of a higher force of 
thought, of a more victorious fullness of life than had been expressed in the 
philosophies of Hume, Kant, and Hegel, - this tragic insight struck me as the most 
beautiful luxury of our culture, its most precious, noblest, and most dangerous type 
of squandering; but still, in view of its over-richness, as its permitted luxury. 
Similarly, I explained Wagner’s music to myself as the expression of a Dionysian 
might of the soul: I believed that I heard in it the earthquake through which some 
pent-up primordial force is finally released - indifferent about whether it sets 
everything else which is called culture atremble. You see what I misjudged, you also 
see what I gave to Wagner and Schopenhauer - myself . . .” (NCW, ‘Antipodes’, 271)  
He construes the relationship between Rausch, aesthetics and the arts differently in his later 
work. He construes it as a bodily state and precondition of aesthetic creativity. What remains 
the same and he builds on throughout his work is the proposition that artistic and aesthetic 
creativity are inherently active. What seems as passivity with respect to aesthetics and the 
arts reflects another kind of activity. When an artist claims she is a passive conduit for the 
target of cognition to impress its ideal representation on her, she engages in something akin 
to what we saw in the pale criminal after he recognises his urge to kill. She manages her 
‘shame’ by rationalising it. She uses the moral value of ‘truth’ to ‘rationalise’ her non-moral 
(or immoral) urge to be ‘creative’ or ‘distort’ the target by striving to make it beautiful or 
sublime, for her. The high ‘moral’ value we afford to ‘truth’ and thus our construing it as an 
‘ideal’ (more on this below), does not permit us to distort things as artists ordinarily do with 
natural objects; we morally berate pleasurable falsehoods or even superficial adornments of 
things. Nevertheless, what motivates the so-called ‘delusion’ of artists is the high value they 
afford (or think others afford) to truth. In Nietzsche’s attuned lexicon, the herd instinct takes 
precedence in their rank order of drives, which, in turn, distorts their self-conception of their 
aesthetic creativity.   
To defend adequately the psychological explanations of the artist’s delusion (cf. GS 
301) requires me to appeal to the conceptual link, which I cannot convincingly do at length 
here. I resign to making the negative proposition that we cannot read Nietzschean concepts 
such as ‘transfiguration’, ‘sublimation’ and ‘spiritualisation’ as rehashes of Schopenhauer’s 
aesthetic contemplation, that is, as ‘passive’ or ‘quasi-passive’ states following a suspension 
of our personal or impersonal interests. The artist’s creativity is the same as any other human 
activity, for Nietzsche: it reflects a drive(s) or drive relation(s), namely, the total state of the 
drives at some moment. This includes how artists comprehend their own creativity, that is, 
their self-conception as disinterested. Given that Nietzsche does not aim to explain the focus 
on the target inherent to aesthetic contemplation by appealing to truth, passivity, receptivity 
or veracity, how, then, does he explain the focus, which he does not reject and could not do 
so reasonably? 
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Nietzsche describes the focus inherent to aesthetic contemplation as an active, rather 
than passive engagement with a target of cognition.245 The artist is wholly active in the artistic 
process. She projects her will and standards onto the target, but due to the value she affords 
to ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘disinterestedness’, she often misconstrues her activity as a target 
imprinting or acting upon her. We can identify the nuances of the active account of aesthetic 
contemplation by assessing another component of it, which he calls ‘idealisation’. Analysis 
of ‘idealisation’ offers a good basis for comparing Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s accounts 
of aesthetics. Schopenhauer’s views on the genius in the supplementary essays is useful as 
a point of departure for the comparison.  
For Schopenhauer, geniuses are more susceptible to aesthetic contemplation because 
they approach things as an impure subject of cognition. Their approach means they are more 
susceptible to perceiving beauty and sublimity, which incite aesthetic contemplation. What 
is important for our aims is his phenomenological description of a genius’s activities, which 
runs as follows: 
“Genius, however, consists in a wholly abnormal, actual excess of intellect, such as is 
not required for the service of any will. For this reason, the men of genuine works are 
a thousand times rarer than the man of deeds. It is just that abnormal excess of intellect, 
by virtue of which it obtains the decided preponderance, emancipates itself from the 
will, and, forgetful of its origin, is freely active from its own force and elasticity. It is 
from this that the creations of genius result.” (WRII, 388)  
I want to direct our attention to is the conception of the ‘excess’ of the intellect. Elsewhere, 
he calls it ‘surplus’ (cf. WRII, 377). Compare this ‘excess’ with how he juxtaposes geniuses 
from practical men and the ‘passionate excitement’ of the former: 
“What reasonableness, quiet composure, comprehensive survey, complete certainty 
and regularity of conduct are shown by the well-equipped normal man in comparison 
with the now dreamy and brooding absorption and now passionate excitement of the 
genius, whose inner affliction is the womb of immortal works!” (WRII, 389f) 
Schopenhauer’s phenomenology of genius suggests they are ‘passionate’ individuals who 
have an excess in irritability and excitability. Their passion is matched by their refined and 
excessive intellect, which (somehow) takes over that passion and then makes them inclined 
to aesthetic contemplation over objective reflection in service to the will.  
Nietzsche offers his own phenomenology of genius, which also takes into account 
its passionate nature. Nevertheless, he describes the ‘passion’ and ‘excesses’ of the genius 
differently. He argues that what typifies the genius is the state of Rausch, which is not a by-
product of the agent’s ‘excessive’ intellect that is surplus to the requirements of the will and 
is somehow liberated from its service to the will. Rather, Rausch is synonymous to the act 
 
                                               
245 For more on the distinction between passivity and activity in Nietzsche’s aesthetics see Young (1992, 119-126), 
also Soll (1998, 107-115).  
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of idealisation itself. It constitutes aesthetic contemplation proper and what follows from it. 
Nietzsche does not refer to two distinct states, but the same state as from two perspectives. 
Rausch is what idealisation looks like as from the third-person perspective of our body and 
its drives. Thus, his conception of idealisation is revisionist and it follows from the ‘bridge’, 
which we discussed previously.  
Nietzsche’s conception of idealisation or Rausch differs from Schopenhauer’s in two 
central ways. Firstly, he rejects Schopenhauer’s veridical account of the Ideas that conflates 
aesthetic contemplation with the veracity of a cognition. He achieves this by distinguishing 
‘objectivity’ from ‘aesthetic contemplation’ and arguing the latter is fundamentally creative. 
Furthermore, he construes both objectivity and aesthetic contemplation as active and wholly 
determined by the person herself, albeit their respective ‘activities’ are different. Secondly, 
he has a different account of what it means to focus wholly on something as we do during 
aesthetic contemplation. The preconditions of focusing wholly on something do not entail 
passivity, but a different kind of activity. What defines aesthetic contemplation and thereby 
distinguishes it from objective reflection is the artist’s ‘creativity’ and ‘choice’, according 
to Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche’s description of Rausch as ‘idealisation’ in the following passage on the 
‘psychology’ of the artist demonstrates his distinct conception of aesthetic contemplation: 
“One physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort of 
aesthetic action or vision: intoxication [Rausch]. Without intoxication to intensify the 
excitability of the whole machine, there can be no art. The essential thing about 
intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength. This feeling makes us 
release ourselves onto things, we force them to accept us, we violate them, - this 
process is called idealising. We can get rid of a prejudice here: contrary to common 
belief, idealisation does not consist in removing or weeding out things that are small 
and incidental. Much more decisive is an enormous drive to force out the main features 
so that everything else disappears in the process.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 8; some emphasis 
is mine) 
Notice Nietzsche’s indirect objection to Schopenhauer’s account of the artistic products of 
aesthetic contemplation, i.e., artwork, which, according to Schopenhauer, “presents things 
more clearly and characteristically by emphasising the essential and eliminating the 
inessential” (WRII, 370). According to Nietzsche, idealisation is active and creative. Equally, 
it accords with the higher explanatory value he places on the body for comprehending an 
activity of the intellect or mind. In short, idealisation is synonymous with the bodily state of 
Rausch, not an effect or a by-product of it. He construes the idealisation of the target inherent 
to aesthetic contemplation in terms of what occurs in our whole body, not what occurs in the 
‘mind’ as distinct or as free from the ‘will’.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s description does not any invite metaphysical implications or 
considerations: the ‘veracity’ of our cognition is not the issue. The act of idealisation is an 
activity that restuls from psychological and physiological preconditions. It yields cognition 
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of the target that urges the contemplator to impose herself on it and so it reflects her activity 
on it, rather than its activity on her or the target as it is in itself: 
“Someone in this state has enough fullness to enrich everything: everything he sees, 
everything he wants, he sees swollen, driven, robust, overloaded with strength. 
Someone in this state transforms things until they reflect his own power, - until they 
are the reflexes of his perfection. This need to make perfect is – art. He even finds 
inherent pleasure in things that he himself is not; in art, people enjoy themselves as 
perfection.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 9; some emphasis is mine) 
Ideas do not represent the target’s ideal, but the artist’s ideal. Idealisation or transfiguration 
mean conforming it to our reality; we do not conform to its reality. We make the target fit 
our standards, values, norms and interests; the broadness of those values etc. depends on the 
rank order of drives and the position of the herd instincts in theorder.246 His assessment of 
beauty further intimate the previous definition and standpoint:  
“People think that the world itself is overflowing with beauty, — they forget that they 
are its cause. They themselves have given the world its beauty — but oh! only a very 
human, all too human beauty… Fundamentally, humanity is reflected in all things, 
people find beauty in everything that throws their image back at them: the judgment 
‘beautiful’ is the vanity of their species…Of course a sceptic might hear a suspicious 
little whisper in his ear: does the world really become beautiful just because it is seen 
that way by human beings, of all creatures? People have humanised it: that is all. But 
nothing, absolutely nothing, guarantees that a human being is the standard of beauty.” 
(TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 19)   
Compare the above propositions with the following: 
“Nothing is beautiful, only people are beautiful: all aesthetics is based on this naïvete, 
this is its first truth. Let us immediately add its second: the only thing ugly is a 
degenerating person, - this defines the realm of aesthetic judgment. - Physiologically, 
everything ugly weakens and depresses people… His feeling of power, his will to 
power, his courage, his pride - these sink with ugliness and rise with beauty… In both 
cases we are drawing a conclusion: the instincts are filled to the brink with 
accumulated premises. Ugliness is understood as a sign and symptom of 
degeneration…A hatred leaps up: what is it people hate when this happens? But there 
 
                                               
246 Nietzsche has a limited conception of ‘idealisation’, which, we recall, fits with his claims on the limits of 
‘knowledge’: “[it] is not the opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that distinction 
to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk metaphysics). Even less am I 
concerned with the opposition between ‘thing in itself’ and appearance: for we ‘know’ far too little to even be 
entitled to make that distinction. We simply have no organ for knowing, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or believe or 
imagine) exactly as much as is useful to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here called ‘usefulness’ 
is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that supremely fatal stupidity of which we some day will 
perish” (GS 354). The previous echo in the famous passage where he details his ‘perspectivism’ (cf. GM III, 12); 
for more on Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the limits of knowledge see Janaway (2007, 203-213). 
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is no doubt: the decline of their type. They hate out of the deepest instinct of their 
species; this is a hatred full of shudders, caution, depth, far-sightedness, - it is the 
most profound hatred there is. Art is profound for the sake of this hatred…” (TI, 
‘Skirmishes’, 20) 
Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s claim that we possess an insight into the target indirectly, 
i.e., through our first-person experience of willing something. We possess an interest that 
we project onto the target and thus ‘anthropomorphise’ it. We project how and what we will. 
We cannot use our ‘will’ as grounds for a concept that indirectly hooks onto the target as it 
is in itself when we are in the state of Rausch for two reasons. Firstly, we cannot possibly 
determine whether or not we got it right. We know the targets of cognition undergo changes, 
but we cannot possibly know whether or not those changes are ‘willed’ by it in the same (or 
in a similar) way as we will something.247 Secondly, the state of Rausch impels us to violate, 
shape, mold and distort it. The ‘Ideas’, then, reflect our ‘ideal’, not its ideal impressed upon 
us after we assume some ‘passive’ or ‘receptive’ state of mind independent from the body.  
Does the above mean that Nietzsche rejects the possibility of ‘objectivity’ or ‘truth’? 
I will argue that he distinguishes ‘objectivity’ (i.e., ‘objective reflection’) from ‘(aesthetic) 
contemplation’.248 Schopenhauer distinguishes ‘aesthetic contemplation’ from ‘objective 
reflection’ by ascribing the latter to the sciences and the former to the aesthetically inspired 
arts. Nietzsche’s account of contemplation and objectivity are strikingly different, however.  
Nietzsche attributes ‘objectivity’ to the sciences249, i.e., to so-called ‘truly scientific 
people’ or ‘ideal scholars’: 
“Of course: with scholars, the truly scientific people, things might be different – 
“better” if you will –, with them, there might really be something like a drive for 
knowledge, some independent little clockwork mechanism that, once well wound, 
ticks bravely away without essentially involving the rest of the scholar’s drives. For 
this reason, the scholar’s real “interests” usually lie somewhere else entirely, with the 
family, or earning money, or in politics; in fact, it is almost a matter of indifference 
whether his little engine is put to work in this or that field of research, and whether 
the “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist or fungus expert 
or chemist: – it doesn’t signify anything about him that he becomes one thing or the 
other. In contrast, there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philosopher; and 
in particular his morals bear decided and decisive witness to who he is – which means, 
 
                                               
247 Nietzsche’s views on our knowledge of things in themselves become more complex once we factor in his 
rejections of the ‘will’ and unity of the self-conscious ‘I’, but the previous are not relevant to the current point. 
248 Nietzsche’s term for contemplation, which is distinct from reflection, is the ‘vita contemplativa’ (cf. D 42), or 
in his later work, he calls it ‘vis contemplativa’ (cf. GS 301). There are two noteworthy aspects of this concept. 
First, he links it to the creativity and delusion that characterises an artist’s self-reflection over her creative activity 
and philosophers’ accounts of artistic creativity. Second, he distinguishes it from objectivity. I will focus on the 
latter aspect here. There is room for an account of this concept using the conceptual link, which would be similar 
in approach to the pale criminal, but it would send me far afield from the central focus of the chapter and thesis.  
249 For an illuminating reading of Nietzsche’s views on science and objectivity see Gemes (2006). See likewise 
Clark (1998) for a detailed discussion on Schopenhauer’s influence in Nietzsche’s views on knowledge and truth.  
  415 
in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand with respect to each 
other.” (BGE 6; some emphasis is mine) 
Recall, that Schopenhauer argues that the objectivity of the sciences is not as meaningful or 
‘pure’ as the objectivity of aesthetic contemplation. Nietzsche’s conception of objectivity is 
more limited. An agent can have a ‘drive for knowledge’ and so be ‘objective’ (i.e., a truth-
seeker), but her objectivity will be limited to her area of inquiry and expertise, which she 
construes as her ‘profession’. Moreover, her drive for knowledge and thus her ‘profession’ 
do not determine her ‘real interests’. The truth-seeker has other areas of her life wherein she 
applies her efforts and wherein we find her ‘real interests’. These interests underpin and so, 
at least, partake in driving her pursuit for knowledge and her profession; they co-determine 
the limits of her objectivity. Nietzsche’s example of these real interests are ‘family, money 
or politics’. What is fundamental, however, is that they indirectly relate to her objectivity by 
partaking in driving her to be ‘a good philologist or fungus expert or chemist’ and so on. In 
other words, her profession does not signify anything about her personally, i.e., about her 
‘real interests’. He construes her ‘profession’ and ‘objectivity’ as the activity of a ‘worker’, 
something she does ‘for a living’, so to speak.  
We can infer from Nietzsche’s account that a truth-seeker’s real interests can distort 
her objectivity, because they have motivational priority. They are higher in her rank order of 
drives (and values) or can be at some moment in time. What is fundamental to his account 
of objectivity, however, is that it rejects the proposition that a truth-seeker can be wholly or 
only ‘objective’, i.e., what drives her necessarily transcends all other interests. Objectivity 
does not represent drives wholly independent from other drives. Her other drives continue 
to exert an influence. Accordingly, the proposition that a truth-seeker has no (other) interests 
except in the target of cognition itself, and thus in cognising it as it is in itself, is misleading. 
Nevertheless, he accepts a version of Schopenhauer’s disinterested spectator, but construes 
this spectator without the metaphysical baggage of Schopenhauer’s account. 
We can compare the above with the following passage on the ‘drive for knowledge’ 
where, apparently, her real interests do not distort her objectivity, which is the closest250 a 
truth-seeker can get to an independent ‘drive for knowledge’: 
“The objective man who no longer swears or complains like the pessimist does, the 
ideal scholar who expresses the scientific instinct as it finally blossoms and blooms all 
the way (after things have gone partly or wholly wrong a thousand times over) – he 
is certainly one of the most expensive tools there is: but he belongs in the hands of 
someone more powerful. He is only a tool, we will say: he is a mirror, – he is not an 
“end in himself.” The objective man is really a mirror: he is used to subordinating 
 
                                               
250 I say closest because, as we will see under closer scrutiny and analysis, the truth-seeker Nietzsche describes 
still possesses ‘real interests’, but they are not as pronounced and obvious as other individuals: “[h]e does not 
command; and neither does he destroy. “Je ne méprise presque rien [I despise almost nothing],” they say with 
Leibniz: that presque should not be overlooked or underestimated…he is a tool, a piece of slave (although, without 
a doubt, the most sublime type of slave) but nothing in himself, – presque rien” (BGE 207; some emphasis is 
mine).  
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himself in front of anything that wants to be known, without any other pleasure than 
that of knowing, of “mirroring forth” … The objective person is a tool, an expensive 
measuring instrument and piece of mirror art that is easily injured and spoiled and 
should be honored and protected; but he is not a goal, not a departure or a fresh start, 
he is not the sort of complementary person in which the rest of existence justifies 
itself. He is not a conclusion – and still less a beginning, begetter or first cause; there 
is nothing tough, powerful or self-supporting that wants to dominate.” (BGE 207; 
some emphasis is mine) 
A truth-seeker can be objective with respect to some particular inquiry and area of expertise, 
which characterises her profession, but not with respect to her life, which underpins and can 
sometimes distort her professional reasons and judgments. Her interest in the ‘profession’ 
may be unrelated to her real interests, but her real interests can intervene. If her real interests 
no longer intervene, for whatever reason, then she can be (seemingly) wholly objective; she 
becomes a mirror, reflecting the influence of something or someone else, possibly even the 
target’s influence. The reasons why a truth-seeker’s real interests no longer intervene is not 
a result of her ‘intellect’ being excessive or surplus to the will’s requirements, however. On 
the contrary, he provides the following reasons for the above case: ‘things have gone partly 
or wholly wrong a thousand times over’ with her, meaning in her personal life wherein we 
find her real interests. In the same passage, he explains what he means by the previous using 
his own psychological description or survey of the truth-seeker’s character and approach to 
personal matters, which merits quoting in full: 
“He waits until something comes along and then spreads himself gently towards it, 
so that even light footsteps and the passing by of a ghostly being are not lost on his 
surface and skin. He has so thoroughly become a passageway and reflection of strange 
shapes and events, that whatever is left in him of a “person” strikes him as accidental, 
often arbitrary, and still more often as disruptive. It takes an effort for him to think 
back on “himself,” and he is not infrequently mistaken when he does. He easily 
confuses himself with others, he is wrong about his own basic needs, and this is the 
only respect in which he is crude and careless. Maybe his health is making him suffer, 
or the pettiness and provincial airs of a wife or a friend, or the lack of companions 
and company, – all right then, he makes himself think about his sufferings: but to no 
avail! His thoughts have already wandered off, towards more general issues, and by 
the next day he does not know how to help himself any more than he knew the day 
before. He has lost any serious engagement with the issue as well as the time to spend 
on it: he is cheerful, not for lack of needs but for lack of hands to grasp his neediness. 
The obliging manner in which he typically approaches things and experiences, the 
sunny and natural hospitality with which he accepts everything that comes at him, his 
type of thoughtless goodwill, of dangerous lack of concern for Yeses and Noes: oh, 
there are plenty of times when he has to pay for these virtues of his! – and being 
human, he all too easily becomes the caput mortuum [worthless residue] of these 
virtues.” (BGE 207) 
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The above examination of the truth-seeker implies that what (sometimes) drives her to be 
objective and thus leave aside her ‘real interests’ is her personal ‘problems’, ‘failures’ or ‘ill-
health’, namely, a block (or a deficiency with respect) to realising her personal ends. What 
motivates her to leave aside her real interests is that she becomes ‘sick to death’ (cf. BGE 
207) with them. What drives her objectivity in this instance, i.e., what makes her a ‘tool’, 
‘piece of slave’, ‘mirror’ etc., is her ‘neediness’ against the backdrop of her failure to realise 
and cater to her ‘real interests’. She leaves aside her real interests, because she struggles to 
cater to them, but they do not thereby stop exerting their influence on her. Their influence 
continues, albeit in ever more subtle ways. What drives her to pursue objectivity and thereby 
to be a ‘tool’ or ‘mirror’ of something more powerful than her are her needs themselves. She 
uses her objectivity as a means to fulfil her needs through the more powerful individuals 
whose influence on her she mirrors and in whose power she indirectly partakes with the aim 
of realising her real interests.  
Nevertheless, we can also argue that a truth-seeker need not only leave aside her real 
interests because of personal ‘problems’, ‘failures’ etc., i.e., as a distracting (or palliative) 
exercise or attempt to invite another, more powerful individual to ‘help’ with her problems. 
We can imagine individuals—as Nietzsche does with some artists and ideal philosophers—
that are ‘sovereign’ and thus approach the truth and the arts from their sovereignty. These 
sovereign individuals deal effectively with their ‘real interests’ by harmonising and unifying 
them under a single project. Thus, they succeed in fulfilling their real interests and therefrom 
apply themselves to becoming experts and become wholly objective. In other words, we can 
imagine a truth-seeker whose ‘objectivity’ is an achievement that reflects her success in her 
life and so with respect to her real interests, not the result of failure or an alternative way of 
satisfying them. 251  
We can be objective and truth-seekers, but our objectivity and truth-seeking depend 
on our failures or successes with respect to our real interests or our personal life. We can be 
objective, but only if we meet certain conditions with respect to our life, for Nietzsche. Truth 
is an achievement that takes into account the truth-seeker’s other drives and their influence 
over her truth-seeking activity and its ‘objectivity’. Consequently, he revises objectivity by 
taking into account the difficulties that arise from the pursuit of genuine or pure objectivity. 
The high value we afford to objectivity can distort our self-image by leading us to rationalise 
our activities in accordance with the high value we ascribe to the truth and so at the expense 
of the truth we aim to obtain. Why does Nietzsche not simply defend a limited version of 
 
                                               
251 What is particularly noteworthy about Nietzsche’s passage on the truth-seeker who is motivated by ‘personal 
failure’, is that she is a tool influenced by ‘powerful individual(s)’ and ‘other interests’ or a mirror reflecting more 
powerful individuals and other interests before whom she is ‘willing’, ‘obliging’, ‘subordinate’ etc. with respect 
to the target of her cognition. The previous characterises Nietzsche’s rejection of ‘pure objectivity’ and reflects his 
perspectivism (cf. GM III, 12). His reasons for why she is ‘willing’ towards something external from her and so a 
more powerful individual is that via her ‘willingness’ she hopes to realise her real interests indirectly. She hopes 
to utilise the powerful individual towards her personal ends; at least, this is how her real interests partake in her 
objectivity and seek to preserve their motivational priority. There are ways to relate the previous account to the 
conceptual link, but I will leave this relationship aside for now.  
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‘objectivity’ as apt for describing an equally limited version of aesthetic contemplation? 
Why does he not defend a conception that removes metaphysical or veridical baggage? Why 
does he argue that ‘aesthetic contemplation’ is fundamentally not ‘disinterested’, even in 
the limited sense? I will suggest an answer by distinguishing between ‘objective reflection’ 
and ‘aesthetic contemplation’. He rejects the application of objectivity to aesthetics and the 
arts. An aesthetically inspired artist is not ‘objective’ in any sense, for Nietzsche. Her claims 
to objectivity are, at best, a ‘delusion’ driven by the high value her community ascribes to 
‘truth’ or its corresponding professions.  
We can compare the products of Rausch to the ‘Ideas’. What Schopenhauer describes 
is not ‘aesthetic contemplation’ or a precondition of aesthetics and the arts, according to 
Nietzsche. Schopenhauer describes ‘objectivity’ in the sciences and then wrongly applies it 
to aesthetics and the arts to explain why we (should) value aesthetics and the arts as highly 
as we do the sciences. Nietzsche explains Schopenhauer’s account as merely reflecting the 
high value that he ascribes to truth, i.e., his ‘will to truth’, not the value of aesthetics and the 
arts. The idealisation inherent to aesthetics and the arts differs from the ‘ideal’ objectivity 
of scientific people or genuine scholars. What drives the philosopher, moralist and priest, is 
not synonymous with what drives the truth-seeker and artist; each relates differently to their 
target of their cognition.  
Nietzsche conceives of Rausch as a precondition for aesthetics and the arts, which, 
he claims, invokes a distinct kind of activity to the disinterestedness Schopenhauer defends: 
“Someone in this state has enough fullness to enrich everything: everything he sees, 
everything he wants, he sees swollen, driven, robust, overloaded with strength. 
Someone in this state transforms things until they reflect his own power, - until they 
are the reflexes of his perfection. This need to make perfect is - art. He even finds 
inherent pleasure in things that he himself is not; in art, people enjoy themselves as 
perfection.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 9; some emphasis is mine)252 
The product of our ‘need’ to make ‘perfect’ reflects wholly us, not the target. This does not 
mean he rejects the possibility of objective reflection, rather his proposition is that the only 
conception of ‘perfection’ we have, or we can possibly have, which drives our aesthetic and 
artistic creativity, is our perfection as an individual, a herd or species. What we perceive as 
‘perfect’, ‘beautiful’ or ‘ideal’ is a reflection of our ‘perfection’, our ‘beauty’ and our ‘ideal’.  
We can likewise imagine a non-aesthetic or ‘anti-artistic’ perspective on the target 
of cognition and its correlate ‘condition’ (in us), however. This perspective and its correlate 
condition opposes the need to make perfect, but it apparently also stems from that need itself. 
We can apprehend the previous as what he calls the ‘self-sublimation’ of the ‘need to make 
perfect’, which he describes in the following way:  
 
                                               
252 Nietzsche’s proposition that we have a need to make perfect has implications with respect to the will-body 
identity and so we require an account of it that attune to Nietzsche’s Weltanschauung. The conceptual link can be 
useful in that regard; ‘consciousness’, the ‘herd perspective’ and ‘bad conscience’ are essential ingredients of it. I 
decided to sideline that approach and reading here due to my constraints.  
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“We could imagine the opposite condition, a specific anti-artistry of the instinct, - a way 
of being that impoverishes all things, dilutes them, makes them waste away. And in 
fact, history presents an abundance of anti-artists like this, the starvation victims of 
life who necessarily have to snatch things up, drain them dry, and make them thinner. 
This is the case with genuine Christians like Pascal: a Christian who is also an artist 
just does not happen… Don't try to be clever and throw Raphael or some other 
homoeopathic nineteenth-century Christian at me as a counter-example: Raphael said 
yes, Raphael did yes, which means that Raphael was no Christian…” (TI, 
‘Skirmishes’, 9; some emphasis is mine) 
The proposition, then, is that the artistic ‘instinct’ can discharge as its opposite, in certain 
cases; one’s need to make perfect can appear in some as the action of rendering imperfect. 
These individuals likely ‘construe’ the products of their particular expression of the need to 
make perfect as perfect or as a representation of perfection. Therefore, Rausch can invoke a 
different, non-aesthetic and non-artistic response in some individuals, but what is important 
for our purposes is that whatever it does invoke is unrelated to the target as it is in itself.  
In Nietzsche’s view, Schopenhauer’s passive account of aesthetic contemplation and 
Wagner’s later works are an example of the previous expression of the need to make perfect 
appearing as the action of making imperfect. The following passage shows his views on 
Schopenhauer and Wagner’s aesthetics: 
“Every art, every philosophy can be considered a cure and aid in the service of 
growing or declining life: it always presupposes suffering and sufferers. But there are 
two types of sufferers: first, those who suffer from a superabundance of life - they 
want a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight into life - then, those who 
suffer from an impoverishment of life and demand quiet, stillness, calm seas or else 
intoxication, paroxysm, stupor from art and philosophy. Revenge against life itself - 
the most voluptuous type of intoxication for people who are impoverished in this way! 
. . . Wagner as well as Schopenhauer responds to the dual need of the latter type - they 
negate life, they slander it, and this makes them my antipodes.” (NCW, ‘Antipodes’, 
271; see also GS 370)253 
It is pertinent to ask why, for Nietzsche, the same ‘instinct’, ‘need’ or ‘suffering’ produces 
such distinct and opposed effects, cognitions, activities and products in different people. I 
cannot suggest an answer here because it requires me to introduce the conceptual link, but 
an answer to it will have to appeal to his drive psychology and to the individual’s rank order 
of drives.  
Nietzsche’s views on ‘spirituality’ gives us further insight into his phenomenological 
account of contemplation. Likewise, it gives us an insight into his normative account of the 
genuine artist and ideal philosopher. I read ‘spirituality’ as an extension of ‘spiritualisation’, 
 
                                               
253 These views on the dual-aspect of the effects of intoxication are not limited to his later work; we find them also 
in earlier work. See, for example: (D 50, 52, 188, 269, 329; GS 86, 89, 370).  
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but likewise as linked to what he calls ‘transfiguration’, ‘sublimation’ etc.; he describes it 
as follows:   
“Learning to see—getting your eyes used to calm, to patience, to letting things come 
to you; postponing judgment, learning to encompass and take stock of an individual 
case from all sides. This is the first preliminary schooling for spirituality: not to react 
immediately to a stimulus, but instead to take control of the inhibiting, excluding 
instincts. Learning to see, as I understand it, is close to what an unphilosophical way 
of speaking calls a strong will: the essential thing here is precisely not ‘to will’, to be 
able to suspend the decision… A practical application of having learned to see: your 
learning process in general becomes slow, mistrustful, reluctant. You let foreign 
things, new things of every type, come towards you while assuming an initial air of 
calm hostility, — you pull your hand away from them. (TI, ‘Germans’, 6; some 
emphasis is mine) 
He makes a subtle phenomenological distinction between Schopenhauer’s view of aesthetic 
contemplation and his own, by replacing ‘suspension of the will’, which Schopenhauer 
construes as the defining feature of aesthetic contemplation, with self-control. We initially 
suspend the urge to act (decide, will etc.) such that we can reflect on and evaluate the target 
from multiple perspectives, not to determine what the target is in itself. We permit various 
affects in relation to it while suspending our urge to act.254 Each affect represents multiple 
interests, drives and drive relations; it represents a different rank order of drives, which we 
can have in relation to something and thus the different actions we can take upon it. What 
is aesthetic about our contemplation is Rausch (or act of idealisation) and the creativity that 
is its characteristic feature, however. In other words, it is what we choose as a result of this 
contemplation through self-control, which we then bring together in an artwork.  
Nietzsche’s account of aesthetic contemplation is thus distinctive in two key ways. 
Firstly, ‘self-control’ does not necessarily render us inactive, wholly receptive or yielding in 
relation to the target of cognition. We do not demonstrate a willingness in relation to it such 
that we project willing on it and identify with it. Instead, we are active in suspending or in 
suppressing a decision and action, just as we are active in permitting our affects in relation 
to it and finally choosing one of those affects. This suspension of actions leads to what we 
may describe as the bodily swelling that is Rausch. Secondly, self-control during aesthetic 
contemplation is unrelated to the target’s veracity, but rather aims for creativity. It does not 
represent a veridical drive, but a creative drive that seeks to imprint itself upon things such 
that they more fully reflect the agent’s perfection. We control our urges and our actions for 
a representation that fits with as many interests and drives as possible before we make the 
decision and act upon it. Thus, if we remove the metaphysical baggage of Schopenhauer’s 
 
                                               
254 See likewise: “by spirit I mean caution, patience, cunning, disguise, great self-control, and everything involved 
in mimicry (which includes much of what is called virtue)” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 14; my own emphasis). 
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account and the veridical implications he commits to, then we are left with something like 
the following description:  
“Every characteristic absence of spirituality, every piece of common vulgarity, is due 
to an inability to resist a stimulus—you have to react, you follow every impulse. In 
many cases this sort of compulsion is already a pathology, a decline, a symptom of 
exhaustion,—almost everything that is crudely and unphilosophically designated a 
‘vice’ is really just this physiological inability not to react. …To keep all your doors 
wide open, to lie on your stomach, prone and servile before every little fact, to be 
constantly poised and ready to put yourself into — plunge yourself into — other things, 
in short, to espouse the famous modern ‘objectivity’ — all this is in bad taste, it is 
ignobility par excellence.” (TI, ‘Germans’, 6; some emphasis is mine) 
The key feature of disinterestedness stripped of its veridical implications is our inability to 
resist a stimulus and so our becoming ‘willing’ with respect to the target driven by and thus 
based on (as we saw above) the urge to act, i.e., our ‘real interests’. The previous reveals 
that we have not yet mastered our real interests enough to enable us to approach something 
genuinely objectively, in Nietzsche’s sense. We ‘yield’ to stimulation and our affections in 
relation to it. He construes the latter as immediate reactions of acknowledgement before the 
target as before something wholly significant. We exhibit a so-called servile stance towards 
it, which Nietzsche bemoans in Schopenhauer’s account.  
We can link his objection to passive accounts with the following passage on artistic 
inspiration that offers insight into Nietzsche’s phenomenology of aesthetic contemplation. 
Likewise, it offers insight into the reasons why he rejects their application in aesthetics and 
the arts:  
“Every artist knows how far removed this feeling of letting go is from his “most 
natural” state, the free ordering, placing, disposing and shaping in the moment of 
“inspiration” – he knows how strictly and subtly he obeys thousands of laws at this 
very moment, laws that defy conceptual formulation precisely because of their 
hardness and determinateness (compared with these laws, there is something 
floundering, multiple, and ambiguous about even the most solid concept –).” (BGE 
188; my own emphasis) 
The ‘feeling of letting go’ links to his phenomenological description of what he calls the 
‘famous modern objectivity’, which he associates with Schopenhauerian disinterestedness. 
The essential feature of passive accounts of aesthetic contemplation is the representation of 
aesthetic contemplators as struggling with self-control, i.e., to suspend the will long enough 
to permit multiple affects and corresponding interests to offer different perspectives on the 
target. The contemplator succumbs to its stimulation; she struggles to control herself and so 
yields to it so that she can will something indirectly through it and at its expense. The active 
account of aesthetic contemplation that Nietzsche defends does not yield to the target in the 
previous way, or prematurely to any particular affect in relation to it. We allow many affects 
to represent their various perspectives; we ensure that our urge to act swells to the point of 
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Rausch, where we can no longer contain it.255 In the latter and final moment, we choose a 
perspective and thus discharge our actions in the production of an artwork. We fix upon a 
rank order of drives and thus produce an artwork saturated by that rank order. In aesthetic 
contemplation, the ‘need to make perfect or idealise’, ‘to imprint upon something’ are at the 
forefront of that rank order, which we may construe as an aesthetic or artistic rank order.     
The self-control that is a precondition of ‘contemplation’ in Nietzsche’s view has a 
striking resemblance to his perspectivism and thus his views on ‘future objectivity’: 
“Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute reversals of 
familiar perspectives and valuations with which the mind has raged against itself for 
far too long, apparently to wicked and useless effect: to see differently, and to want 
to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect 
for its future ‘objectivity’… There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival 
‘knowing’; the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, 
various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 
‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’.” (GM III, 12) 
The above implies that Nietzsche has a descriptive and normative account of objectivity, 
which I cannot assess at length. Nonetheless, I think we can construe this future ‘objectivity’ 
as the truth-seeker’s ‘achievement’ with respect to her personal life. In other words, a person 
need not aspire to objectivity solely by virtue of some failure with respect to her personal 
life, but as an expression of self-mastery and self-control. Something analogous is the case 
with the aesthetically inspired artist. Nietzsche’s normative account of the truth-seeker and 
the artist leave aside her personal life and real interests, but only after having mastered them, 
i.e., unified or harmonised them.  
In sum, Nietzsche’s accounts of objectivity and aesthetic contemplation have three 
components that fundamentally deviate from Schopenhauer. First, aesthetic contemplators 
and truth-seekers are wholly active before, during and after their aesthetic contemplation or 
objective reflection. Second, we should comprehend an artist’s activity in terms of the whole 
body and her drives, rather than as an activity of her ‘mind’ servicing exclusively the target 
of cognition as opposed to her own will, or as one drive operating independently from other 
drives. In short, his views accord with the will-body identity and the explanatory value of 
the body for demystifying seemingly ‘miraculous’ activities, phenomena and achievements 
of the mind independent from it. Third, we should not conflate an artist’s creativity with her 
aiming for a veracious representation of the target in her artworks; the two are unrelated. 
Our ‘focusing’ on the target of cognition represents an activity and so relations between our 
drives and interests, not the target’s effect on us. Even the so-called ‘drive for knowledge’ 
of the truth-seeker relates to her other drives; the success of her drive for knowledge depends 
on the success or failure with respect to her so-called ‘real interests’. 
 
                                               
255 With respect to what counts as ‘premature’ here, consider Nietzsche’s description of the artist and philosopher 
as ‘pregnant’ (cf. GM III, 4 & 8).  
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In the next and final chapter, I will assess the relationship between the ascetic ideal 
and the morality of Mitleid. I will also assess the relationship between the arts, the sciences 
and morality when I inquire into Nietzsche’s alternative to the ascetic ideal.  
2.13 The Morality of Mitleid and the Ascetic Ideal 
My focus in the current chapter will be on defending two central propositions to Nietzsche’s 
criticism of Mitleid256. These propositions show how he conceives of Mitleid’s relationship 
to the ‘ascetic ideal’ and why he argues it signifies a “great danger to mankind” (GM Pref., 
5). I argue that Nietzsche’s criticisms aim at the ‘morality’ of Mitleid or at construing Mitleid 
and its cognates, i.e., self-denial, self-sacrifice etc., as ‘values as such’.257 I will compare his 
approach to morality with Schopenahuer’s approach, because I think the underlying aspect 
of his criticsm of Mitleid aims at the extraordinary high value Schopenhauer ascribed to it.  
Schopenhauer construes morality as something we cannot criticise without implying 
an immoral or morally worthless standpoint from which we enact our criticism. We can only 
ground morality by explaining its relationship to other, non-moral actions. He assesses what 
drives those actions we deem to be morally worthy without any doubt, which he argues are 
actions of freely willed justice and genuine loving kindness. Mitleid is the mainspring or the 
source of these actions. Furthermore, Mitleid is possible only for individuals that have seen 
through the PI, which allows them to overcome egoism and project their will-body identity 
on a target of cognition, perceive it as a willing, striving etc. thing and finally identify with 
it before acting on its behalf for its sake.  
Nietzsche rejects theories arguing that morality is settled or that we can only ground 
moral values, rather than criticise them. Moreover, he rejects the assertion that there is some 
metaphysical ground for a morality or moral value. A morality or moral value is one among 
many others in history, which does not mean that his propositions are not exempt from any 
metaphysical implications. Rather, he strives to make his propositions consistent with what 
we may construe as ‘moral pluralism’ as from a historical point of view. His account implies 
a metaphysical standpoint, but he rejects those who appeal to propositions with no objective 
representation. Recall that he rejects the appeal to the ‘causal efficacy’ of ‘things’ we cannot 
perceive—such as, the ‘self-conscious ‘I’’ or ‘incorporeal soul’—to explain phenomena like 
 
                                               
256 For an insight into the debate on Nietzsche’s use of Mitleid as juxtaposed to Schopenhauer’s use see Cartwright 
(1988), Leiter (2002, 56-8); for more on the distinction between pity and compassion in Nietzsche see von Tevenar 
(2007).  
257 We can translate ‘Mitleid’ as ‘compassion’ or ‘pity’ in English, but I decided to leave it untranslated to avoid a 
debate over whether Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are talking past each other, because they are addressing two 
different emotions, attitudes and their corresponding actions. Whether we construe Mitleid as ‘pity’ or 
‘compassion’ is only partially relevant to the point I aim to make, because I think Nietzsche would make similar 
arguments about anything we construe as ‘valuable as such’. 
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‘selfhood’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘morality’. He offers a revisionist, historical account of the 
latter, which aims to be consistent with immanence and his view of ontological monism.  
Nietzsche’s view of morality is genealogical; it arises from contractual relationships, 
which, in turn, emerge from command-obedience relationships premised on strength and 
violence. The infliction of pain characterising command-obedience relationships, over time, 
turns into a memory of inflicted pain, which he explains via the process of ‘internalisation’. 
The memory of inflicted pain motivates obedience to customs, obligations etc., but it likewise 
explains how contractual relationships emerge out of command-obedience relationships that 
are premised on strength and violence. The recurrence of violence inherent to the command-
obedience relationships that created and preserved the community entrenches a memory of 
pain associated with disobeying a command. Thus, the memory of pain underpins obedience 
without violence and so without the direct intervention from the commanding individual or 
group. This obedience without direct intervention underpins contractual relationships. Thus, 
morality is a tacit contract represented in the actions we undertake as conditions for living 
within a particular community without the need for a command. We can call these our ‘herd 
actions’, for brevity and to adhere to Nietzsche’s lexicon. Herd actions represent the moral 
values of a particular community, which are context-dependent and can change according 
to the political state of affairs in that community.  
In sum, for Schopenhauer, morality stems from the mainspring of Mitleid that we can 
access after we see through the PI using the will-body identity. Conversely, for Nietzsche, 
it is the internalisation of command-obedience relationships that then produces contractual 
relationships. Morality is a tacit contract of the community, which leads members to agree 
upon certain values and norms on pain of punishment (or the memory of punishment). The 
morality of Mitleid is one of many in history, but also one of many possible future moralities. 
Essentially, a particular morality reflects a community’s political state of affairs and its rank 
order of values, norms and, by extension, its ‘herd’ actions.  
Using the above differences between the two, I will clarify Nietzsche’s objections to 
‘Mitleid’ and its relationship to the ‘ascetic ideal’. I will suggest two propositions that typify 
these objections. Finally, I will use these propositions to argue that his objections to Mitleid 
aim at something other than Mitleid itself.  
 The first proposition is that Nietzsche distinguishes Mitleid the emotion (or attitude) 
aimed at others’ suffering and its corresponding action(s) from what he calls the ‘morality’ 
(or value) of Mitleid. He does not object to Mitleid itself or its ‘value’ in some circumstances, 
but, in fact, promotes it. See, for example, the following: 
“Good-naturedness, friendliness, politeness of the heart are never-failing emanations 
of the unegoistic drive and have played a far greater role in the construction of culture 
than those much more celebrated expressions of it called pity [Mitleid], compassion 
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[Barmherzigkeit] and self-sacrifice. But usually they are neglected and 
undervalued…” (HHI 49)258 
Notice that he focuses on the ‘value’ or the ‘neglect’ of Mitleid and its cognates. Notice also 
that he construes Mitleid and its cognates as activities or expressions of an ‘unegoistic drive’. 
The implication is that we can variously express this unegoistic drive, but also differently 
evaluate these various expressions. Moreover, we may construe these ‘various expressions’ 
as representations of power-relations between drives. They represent how drives fix into a 
rank order and engender some action or perspective. Consequently, how we express Mitleid 
represents its position in the rank order of drives, i.e., how they fix in relation to something. 
Compare the above with the following passage, which demonstrates that he is sympathetic 
to how some individuals express Mitleid and so how it features in their rank order: 
“…a man who is naturally master, – if a man like this has pity [Mitleid], well then! 
this pity is worth something! But what good is the pity of the sufferer! Or particularly, 
the pity of those who preach it!” (BGE 293; some emphasis is mine) 
We can compare the above with the following objection and corresponding warning he gives 
over what he calls the ‘thirst for Mitleid’: 
“Observe children who weep and wail in order that they shall be pitied, and therefore 
wait for the moment when their condition will be noticed; live among invalids and 
the mentally afflicted and ask yourself whether their eloquent moaning and 
complaining, their displaying of misfortune, does not fundamentally have the 
objective of hurting those who are with them: the pity [Mitleid] which these then 
express is a consolation for the weak and suffering, inasmuch as it shows them that, 
all their weakness notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one power: the power to 
hurt. In this feeling of superiority of which the manifestation of pity makes him 
conscious, the unfortunate man gains a sort of pleasure; in the conceit of his 
imagination he is still of sufficient importance to cause affliction in the world. The 
thirst for pity is thus a thirst for self-enjoyment, and that at the expense of one’s fellow 
men; it displays man in the whole ruthlessness of his own dear self…” (HHI 50) 
The difference between Mitleid itself and the so-called thirst for Mitleid is how it relates to 
other drives in the rank order. The drive in reference to the above passage that Mitleid clearly 
relates to is the ‘drive to overpower’ or ‘inflict pain on’ someone. Seemingly, by describing 
the different, objectionable and commendable expressions of Mitleid, Nietzsche focuses on 
the ‘value’ of Mitleid and thus its position in the ‘rank order’ of values and drives, not on its 
expression as such or on Mitleid itself, so to speak.  
Nietzsche is not concerned with Mitleid itself, i.e., with acting for another’s welfare 
as such. The following passage reflects a similar concern over Mitleid’s position in the rank 
order of drives and values, not Mitleid itself:  
 
                                               
258 We can also translate ‘Barmherzigkeit’ as ‘mercy’.  
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“Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, eudamonianism: these are all ways of thinking 
that measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, which is to say 
according to incidental states and trivialities. They are all foreground ways of thinking 
and naivetés, and nobody who is conscious of both formative powers and an artist’s 
conscience will fail to regard them with scorn as well as pity… Our pity is a higher, 
more far-sighted pity: – we see how humanity is becoming smaller, how you are 
making it smaller! – and there are moments when we look on your pity with 
indescribable alarm, when we fight this pity –, when we find your seriousness more 
dangerous than any sort of thoughtlessness… And that your pity is aimed at the 
“creature in humans,” at what needs to be molded, broken, forged, torn, burnt, seared 
and purified, – at what necessarily needs to suffer and should suffer? And our pity – 
don’t you realise who our inverted pity is aimed at when it fights against your pity as 
the worst of all pampering and weaknesses? – Pity against pity, then! [Mitleid also 
gegen Mitleid!] – But to say it again: there are problems that are higher than any 
problems of pleasure, pain, or pity; and any philosophy that stops with these is a piece 
of naiveté.” (BGE 225) 
His objections to Mitleid aim at our construing it as worthy of pursuit or affording it a ‘high 
value’, so to speak.259 How Mitleid relates to other drives reflects the high (or the low) value 
we afford to it and its corresponding actions by comparison to and thus to the disadvantage 
(or the benefit) of other drives and actions. Accordingly, his criticisms aim at the ‘morality’ 
that we construct from Mitleid, i.e., those actions we deem permissible or impermissible as 
a trade-off for communal life, not at Mitleid itself.  
The second proposition is that Mitleid relates to the ‘ascetic ideal’ if and only if we 
evaluate it as ‘something to aspire to’, i.e., if we construe it as an ‘ideal’, which he construes 
as one goal or will. I will suggest that Mitleid itself (the emotion, attitude and corresponding 
actions) does not relate to the ascetic ideal and cannot possibly do so of its own accord. The 
‘value’ we afford it, however, which is represented in the morality of Mitleid, does relate to 
it. To show the previous relation, I will assess what typifies the ascetic ideal.  
The key characteristic of the ‘ascetic ideal’ is that the values and actions it champions 
do not permit evaluation. Simon May offers a clear and illuminating account of the previous 
in the following passage: 
“The value-hierarchy of the ascetic conceptual form differs from ordinary rankings 
of values in two ways. First, the ascetic form structures one’s whole world—ethical, 
religious, aesthetic, and so on—and is therefore the axis on which all other values 
must be situated. To that extent, the hierarchy is regarded as fixed and sometimes, as 
we will see, as unconditioned. Second, in ascetic thought, the lower value-domain is 
 
                                               
259 See also the following passages regarding the value of Mitleid: (HHI 92 & 103; WS 50).  
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not simply a lesser or an opposed value, but is the thing to be overcome or repudiated 
if the higher value is to be attained.” (May 1999, 28)  
May describes the conceptual structure of the ascetic ideal in terms of what I will read as 
‘complete’, which means it does not permit of addition or subtraction and it does not permit 
of evaluation, because it is that in virtue of which we evaluate anything. Additionally, it is 
‘parasitic’ on other structures, values and methods of evaluation; it construes them as lower 
in rank and strives to utilise them toward its own ends. Is the conceptual structure that May 
describes limited to the ascetic ideal or is it the structure of any ideal, however?  
There is an implicit distinction between any ‘ideal’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’, which I 
will stress for clarity over the scope of May’s definition of the ‘ascetic ideal’. The following 
passage shows Nietzsche’s use of this distinction:  
“The ascetic ideal expresses a will: where is the opposing will, in which an opposing 
ideal might express itself? The ascetic ideal has a goal, - this being so general that all 
the interests of human existence appear petty and narrow when measured against it; 
it inexorably interprets epochs, peoples, man, all with reference to this one goal, it 
permits of no other interpretation, no other goal, and rejects, denies, affirms, confirms 
only with reference to its interpretation (- and was there ever a system of interpretation 
more fully thought through?); it does not subject itself to any power, in fact, it believes 
in its superiority over any power, in its unconditional superiority of rank over any 
other power, - it believes there is nothing on earth of any power that does not first 
have to receive a meaning, a right to existence, a value from it, as a tool to its work, 
as a way and means to its goal, to one goal… Where is the counterpart to this closed 
system of will, goal and interpretation? Why is the counterpart lacking? … Where is 
the other ‘one goal’?” (GM III, 23) 
Likewise, consider what he claims earlier about ‘ideals’ generally: 
“‘Is an ideal set up or destroyed here?’ you might ask me . . . But have you ever asked 
yourselves properly how costly the setting up of every ideal on earth has been? How 
much reality always had to be vilified and misunderstood in the process, how many 
lies had to be sanctified, how much conscience had to be troubled, how much ‘god’ 
had to be sacrificed every time? If a shrine is to be set up, a shrine has to be destroyed: 
that is the law - show me an example where this does not apply! . . .” (GM II, 24) 
Notice that the major premise is that ‘every ideal on earth’ has been costly and not only the 
ascetic ideal. Later in the same passage, he proceeds to describe those costs.  
It is unclear if Nietzsche aims to offer another ideal or laying the ground for a future 
ideal by espousing the characteristics, behaviors and values of those who set up ideals. Yet, 
the following passage, which merits quoting in full, offers a reason to read him as espousing 
the latter approach to ideals: 
“A reverse experiment should be possible in principle - but who has sufficient 
strength? - by this, I mean an intertwining of bad conscience with perverse 
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inclinations, all those other-worldly aspirations, alien to the senses, the instincts, to 
nature, to animals, in short all the ideals which up to now have been hostile to life and 
have defamed the world. To whom should we turn with such hopes and claims today? 
… For that purpose, we would need another sort of spirit than those we are likely to 
encounter in this age: spirits who are strengthened by wars and victories, for whom 
conquest, adventure, danger and even pain have actually become a necessity; they 
would also need to be acclimatised to thinner air higher up, to winter treks, ice and 
mountains in every sense, they would need a sort of sublime nastiness [Bosheit] itself, 
a final, very self-assured wilfulness of insight which belongs to great health, in brief 
and unfortunately, they would need precisely this great health! . . . Is this at all 
possible today? … But some time, in a stronger age than this mouldy, self-doubting 
present day, he will have to come to us, the redeeming man of great love and contempt, 
the creative spirit who is pushed out of any position ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ by his 
surging strength again and again, whose solitude will be misunderstood by the people 
as though it were flight from reality -: whereas it is just his way of being absorbed, 
buried and immersed in reality so that from it, when he emerges into the light again, 
he can return with the redemption of this reality: redeem it from the curse which its 
ideal has placed on it up till now. This man of the future will redeem us, not just from 
the ideal held up till now, but also from those things which had to arise from it, from 
the great nausea, the will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of 
great decision that makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man 
his hope again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and of 
nothingness - he must come one day…” (GM II, 24) 
We cannot infer from the above whether our making the ‘will free again’ implies erecting 
another ideal in its place or it simply demonstrates his commitment to a pluralism of ideals 
and to the historical principle that shows that we regularly dispense with old ideals. What is 
clear, however, is that he seeks the character or individual that will ‘redeem’, i.e., transcend 
and replace the ascetic ideal, which shows he has his own conception of ‘redemption’. It is 
not redemption from this world and history, as Schopenhauer argues, but redemption of this 
world and its history. There is considerable room for debate on the above themes and their 
distinctions, but I cannot venture into them at length here. I will focus on whether or not we 
may find in Nietzsche an alternative to the ascetic ideal that shows a clear ethical position. 
Some philosophical commentators argue that Nietzsche does suggest another ideal, 
which they construe as espousing moral or ethical values260. I think the previous conclusion 
 
                                               
260 See, for example, Nussbaum’s (1994) reading of Nietzsche as aiming “to bring about a revival of Stoic values 
of self-command and self-formation within a post-Christian and post-Romantic context” (Nussbaum 1994, 140). 
I think we should distinguish between defending a particular set of values—e.g., Stoic values—and championing 
the conditions under which flourishes the individual or character that creates values. The first represents an ‘ideal’, 
whereas the second represents the preconditions of creativity with respect to ideals (more on this below). I read 
Nietzsche as aiming for the second and using the first to challenge the morality of Mitleid as a prerequisite step to 
challenging the ascetic ideal and finally for cultivating the individual required to create a new ideal. For reasons I 
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is premature even if the reasons for making it are substantiated by passages from Nietzsche’s 
work. The above passage I have been analysing implies that he aims for another ideal, but 
it likewise implies that he has not determined what that ideal actually is or whether replacing 
one ideal with another aptly addresses his concerns over ideals themselves, which have been 
‘costly’. He leaves us with an ambiguity which poses a conceptual problem. It is unclear if 
the properties of the ascetic ideal, i.e., completeness and parasitism, represent the conceptual 
structure of all ideals or strictly the ascetic ideal. Are all ideals complete and parasitic? Do 
all wills entail completeness and parasitism with respect to other and so opposing wills (and-
or ideals)?  
In the previous chapter, I assessed his conception of ‘idealising’ something and how 
Rausch features in it, but I did not discuss the conceptual structure of ideals. I believe further 
insight into Rausch using his drive psychology and his use of the concept of ‘health’ are 
potential areas for further research into elucidating the opposing ideal and the conceptual 
structure of all ideals. He does describe the features of the redeeming individual who will 
be able to transcend the ascetic ideal, however. I will opt for the reading that Nietzsche aims 
to cultivate what he calls the ‘spirit’ or the ‘great health’ that will make the ‘will free again’, 
presumably free from the ascetic ideal, by overcoming and replacing it. I read his objections 
to the ascetic ideal as an expression of his attempt to cultivate the agent(s) who will critique, 
overcome and replace it, rather than offering another ideal. Thus, his approach is facilitating 
or therapeutic, rather than normative in the moral or ethical sense.  
With the above in mind, I will analyse the various ideals he considers as potentially 
capable of replacing the ascetic ideal in GM and the reasons he gives for rejecting them. By 
doing so, I hope to offer insight into why Nietzsche construes the morality of Mitleid as an 
expression of the ascetic ideal, not of Mitleid itself. Finally, I hope to show that his concerns 
aim at morality itself, not any ‘particular’ morality. 
Nietzsche analyses two potential opponents of the ascetic ideal. The first is ‘science’, 
which he rejects and argues that in many cases it represents the evolution of the ascetic ideal 
itself: 
“Do not come to me with science when I am looking for the natural antagonist to the 
ascetic ideal, when I ask: ‘Where is the opposing will in which its opposing ideal 
expresses itself?’ Science is not nearly independent enough for that, in every respect 
it first needs a value-ideal, a value-creating power, in whose service it can believe in 
itself, - science itself never creates values. Its relationship to the ascetic ideal is 
certainly not yet inherently antagonistic; indeed, it is much more the case, in general, 
that it still represents the driving force in the inner evolution of that ideal.” (GM III, 
25) 
 
                                               
will defend below, it is misleading to argue Nietzsche’s championing self-formation and command as his aiming 
to revive Stoic values and so avow Stoicism. In short, Nietzsche is not defending a Stoic ideal, but utilising Stoic 
values to challenge the morality of Mitleid, under which resides our current, established ideal, i.e., the acetic ideal. 
Accordingly, Nietzsche construes Stoic values as instrumental, rather than intrinsic.  
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The ascription of ‘unconditional’ value to ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’, which he construes as 
inherent to science, renders it vulnerable to the appeal of the ascetic ideal: it demonstrates 
the properties of completeness and parasitism that typify the ascetic ideal. He summarises 
his reasons for claiming that science does not oppose the ascetic ideal as follows: 
“[T]he compulsion towards it, that unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic 
ideal itself, even if, as an unconscious imperative, make no mistake about it, - it is the 
faith in a metaphysical value, a value as such of truth as vouched for and confirmed by 
that ideal alone (it stands and falls by that ideal).” (GM III, 24) 
 
“Both of them, science and the ascetic ideal, are still on the same foundation - I have 
already explained -; that is to say, both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share 
the same faith that truth cannot be assessed or criticised), and this makes them both 
necessarily allies, - so that, if they must be fought, they can only be fought and called 
into question together. A depreciation of the value of the ascetic ideal inevitably 
brings about a depreciation of the value of science: one must keep one’s eyes open 
and prick up one’s ears for this in time!” (GM III, 25)261 
Using his drive psychology, we may comprehend this ‘faith’ in ‘truth’ as another expression 
of the ascetic ideal. The ‘faith’ in truth shows the ascetic ideal becoming parasitic on those 
drives that correspond to scientific practices and values. The unconditional value we ascribe 
to the ‘truth’ reflects how scientific practices and their correlate drives relate to the ‘herd 
perspective’ that champions the ‘ascetic ideal’.  
Science is also receptive to the ascetic ideal from another angle, however. His reason 
is that science requires an ideal, i.e., a ‘philosophy’, ‘faith’ and-or a ‘will’:  
“[T]here is no ‘presuppositionless’ knowledge, the thought of such a thing is 
unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a ‘faith’ always has to be there first, for 
knowledge to win from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist. 
(GM III, 24) 
This ‘need’ for an ideal makes science vulnerable to the ascetic ideal, but, presumably, also 
open to other ideals. We know that science driven by the ascetic ideal evaluates ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’ as highly as an article of faith. Assuming it exists, how will the opposing ideal 
 
                                               
261 Compare this passage with the following: “[w]e see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is simply no 
‘presuppositionless’ science. The question whether truth is necessary must get an answer in advance, the answer 
‘yes’, and moreover this answer must be so firm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the conviction: 
‘Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything else has only secondary value.’ This 
unconditional will to truth — what is it? Is it the will not to let oneself be deceived? Is it the will not to 
deceive?...So, the faith in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a calculus of 
utility; rather it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility and dangerousness of ‘the will to truth’ 
or ‘truth at any price’ is proved to it constantly. ‘At any price’: we understand this well enough once we have 
offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar! Consequently, ‘will to truth’ does not mean ‘I do not 
want to let myself be deceived’ but — there is no alternative — ‘I will not deceive, not even myself’; and with 
that we stand on moral ground.” (GS 344).  
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evaluate truth and knowledge? Will it devalue them by comparison? His analysis of the other 
potential opponent to the ascetic ideal answers the previous.    
Nietzsche also analyses how ‘art’ relates to the ascetic ideal and whether or not it is 
in a better place to oppose and replace it. He argues art is ‘closer’ to opposing it, because an 
artist shows ‘good conscience’ with respect to ‘deception’ and because she sanctifies ‘lies’: 
“Art, let me say at the outset, since I shall deal with this at length some day, - art, in 
which lying sanctifies itself and the will to deception has good conscience on its side, 
is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than science is: this was 
sensed instinctively by Plato, the greatest enemy of art Europe has yet produced. Plato 
versus Homer: that is complete, genuine antagonism - on the one hand, the sincerest 
‘advocate of the beyond’, the great slanderer of life, on the other hand, its involuntary 
idolater, the golden nature.” (GM III, 25) 
Does having a good conscience with respect to ‘deception’ and sanctifying ‘lies’ imply the 
agent does not evaluate ‘truth’ as highly as does science (driven by the ascetic ideal)? I think 
we may distinguish a ‘lie’ [Lüge] or ‘deception’ [Täuschung] from ‘falsehood’ [Unwahrheit], 
in the above passage. Truth and falsity constitutes the evaluative framework underpinning 
scientific discourse; falsehood opposes the truth [Wahrheit]. Based on the latter framework, 
agents can propose something which they think or assume to be true that turns out to be false 
following further scrutiny and investigation. Whereas a lie or a deception implies the agent 
is conscious of the ‘truth’ or that she is minimally conscious of ‘not possessing the truth’. 
Seemingly, then, she has an interest in not uttering the truth that she possesses or she has an 
interest in not showing to others that she does not possess the truth. She may have an interest 
in not demonstrating that she possesses it; she may be interested in inspiring a sense of the 
mysterious about her in other people’s eyes. Accordingly, she can exhibit self-control with 
respect to her drive for ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ and their expression through words, actions 
and-or works. She is able to exhibit this self-control, because the artistic framework differs 
from that framework which guides scientific practice and discourse; the artistic framework 
is, in certain respects, superior to the scientific framework.  
The relationship between art, science and the ascetic ideal in Nietzsche is much more 
complex than my current assessment can cover. What seems prima facie noteworthy about 
his evaluation of ‘truth’, however, is that his seeming critique of science and high evaluation 
of lies and deception do not necessarily contradict or conflict. Espousing lies and deceptions 
do not necessarily entail devaluing the truth, because lies and deceptions can presuppose we 
possess the truth or at least knowledge that we do not possess it.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s ascription of various ‘properties’ to truth or his pointing to 
the various ‘effects’ of truth on truth-seekers shows that our relationship to ‘truth’ is more 
complex than the simple opposition between truth and falsehood. Possessing the truth relies 
on the activity of truth-seeking by an agent who is composed of various drives and how they 
fix upon some activity. The following passage reveals the previous: 
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“I sincerely hope that the reverse is true, - that these analysts holding a microscope to 
the soul are actually brave, generous and proud animals, who know how to control 
their own pleasure and pain and have been taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, 
every truth, even a plain, bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral truth… Because there 
are such truths.” (GM I, 1) 
Notice the various properties he ascribes to truth in the above passage, for example: ‘plain, 
bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral’, which shows that the activity of truth-seeking (and 
so our interest in the truth) is in the trenches with other drives, interests and activities. The 
value we ascribe to the truth expresses an activity of the drives as a whole. Accordingly, the 
drive(s) underpinning our truth-seeking forms power-relations with the other drives. There 
are some truths we have reason not to recognise, because of the strength and priority of other 
drives, interests and values. We can be demotivated in relation to acquiring or to accepting 
certain truths; we can even be in denial over them.  
What is particularly noteworthy about the relationship between science and art is that 
art does not evaluate ‘falsity’ as higher than ‘truth’, but bypasses the evaluative framework 
inherent to scientific practice and discourse entirely. The arts exercise good conscience witth 
respect to ‘deception’ and ‘lies’, both of which presuppose either that we possess the ‘truth’ 
or, minimally, we recognise that we do not possess it. Art preserves the truth by necessitating 
its grasp for the interest of better ‘lies’ and ‘deceptions’, i.e., better self-control in respect to 
engendering mystery, for example. Thus, the arts work with an entirely different evaluative 
framework than the sciences. They can preserve the value of the ‘truth’ without ascribing to 
the ascetic ideal where we have to sacrifice everything for the truth.  
The relation between science and art is thus not mutually exclusive or contradictory, 
but complimentary. Artists avoid ‘idealising’ the truth, which is what we recognise in those 
scientists driven by the ascetic ideal, because scientists, according to Nietzsche, require an 
ideal. Artists have a different relationship to the ‘truth’ and ideals than scientists driven by 
the ascetic ideal, which does not necessarily lead them to devalue the truth. An artist changes 
her way of expressing the truth; she utilises lies, deceptions and an ability to invoke mystery 
in her interlocuters or audience. Accordingly, we should not construe artists as championing 
falsehoods, but as championing life and the creativity and adaptability inherent to it.  
Nietzsche’s claim that art is more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than is 
science is not the same as the claim that art is the opposing ideal to the ascetic ideal. Artists 
are also susceptible to the ascetic ideal, according to him: 
“Artistic servitude in the service of the ascetic ideal is thus the specific form of artistic 
corruption, unfortunately one of the most common: for nothing is more corruptible 
than an artist.” (GM III, 25)  
He offers an insight into this ‘corruptibility’ of artists in his analysis of Wagner’s later work. 
Wagner’s obsession with Schopenhauer’s philosophy, aesthetic contemplation and the high 
value he affords to music made him receptive to the ascetic ideal. Schopenhauer construes 
the musician as having a direct access to the thing in itself. He allows musicians to entertain 
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the self-conception that their practice is closer to the truth than the other artistic genres and 
practices. Given the morality of the time and its high evaluation of truth, the previous meant 
that music had the highest possible value and, by extension, so did the musician (cf. GM III, 
5). He summarises his views on the artist’s relationship to the ascetic ideal in the following 
way: 
“So what do ascetic ideals mean? In the case of an artist, we have concluded: nothing 
at all! . . . Or so many things that it is tantamount to nothing! … Let us put aside artists 
for the time being: their position in the world and against the world is far from 
sufficiently independent for their changing valuations as such to merit our attention! 
Down the ages, they have been the valets of a morality or philosophy or religion: 
quite apart from the fact that they were, unfortunately, often the all-too-glib courtiers 
of their hangers-on and patrons and sycophants with a nose for old or indeed up-and-
coming forces. At the very least, they always need a defender, a support, an already 
established authority: artists never stand independently, being alone is against their 
deepest instincts.” (GM III, 5) 
The ‘changing valuations’ that typifies an artist’s character explains her proneness to the 
ascetic ideal, but it also explains why she can successfully oppose the ideal, at least in certain 
moments and some respect. To understand the connection between changing valuations and 
creativity we should appeal to his drive psychology.  
Values correspond to a rank order of drives and thus changing valuations correspond 
to changes in that rank order. Changing valuations explain the artist’s ‘corruptibility’, but 
also the possibility of ‘great health’ after corruption has occurred. What he concludes about 
artists is that we cannot rely on them to oppose and replace the ascetic ideal. However, their 
‘creativity’ (and its changing valuations) is a key ingredient of the character that is capable, 
reliable and who will oppose and replace the ascetic ideal. He construes the artists’ value 
with respect to overcoming the ascetic ideal in terms of their commitment to life: 
“[I]t should seem—and it does seem! —as if life aimed at semblance, i.e. error, 
deception, simulation, blinding, self-blinding, and when life on the largest scale has 
actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi…” 
(GS 344; some emphasis is mine) 
Their changing valuations makes them more capable of creating new things ‘to will’ and so 
laying the ground for new ‘ideals’, but without necessarily being able to enforce them. To 
enforce new ideals requires changing the political state of affairs of a community, according 
to him. Therefore, he values artists highly as from the standpoint of life, because they exhibit 
behaviours he sees as inherent to successful agents in life. However, they are not sufficiently 
shielded by their creativity from the thrall of the ascetic ideal.  
Nietzsche demonstrates an ambivalence about the role of artists in their opposition 
to the ascetic ideal, but accepts art’s instrumental role through its creativity and the artist’s 
proneness to changing valuations. Creativity is instrumental to overcoming the ascetic ideal, 
but insufficient for replacing it. He does not suggest a ‘fundamental opponent’ to the ascetic 
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ideal. The closest opponent I could identify is a description of those individuals tasked with 
creating, expressing and defending this opposing ideal, which comes as a Nietzschean plea. 
Nevertheless, regarding the relationship between Mitleid and the ascetic ideal, his analysis 
shows that the ascetic ideal infringes upon Mitleid, its cognates and actions under the banner 
of ‘morality’. In closing, I will clarify why and how the ‘morality’ of Mitleid is an expression 
of the ascetic ideal by bringing together what we discussed so far.  
Nietzsche’s rejection and warnings over the morality of Mitleid become clearer if, as 
Leiter remarks, we recognise it aims at Schopenhauer’s views on Mitleid and morality: 
“Nietzsche’s well-known polemics against Mitleid as a moral ideal (e.g., HAH: 50, 
103; D: 134; GS: 99; BGE: 201, 225) are clearly directed at Schopenhauer’s ethics. 
(This point is obscured in English by the fact that most translators of Schopenhauer 
render Mitleid as “compassion,” while most translators of Nietzsche render the same 
German word as “pity.”)” (Leiter 2002, 57) 
Translating Nietzsche’s use of Mitleid as ‘pity’ and Schopenhauer’s use as ‘compassion’ 
obscures the fact that Nietzsche aims at Schopenhauer’s views on morality according to his 
philosophy of the will; the implication of this translation is that the two talk past each other. 
Nietzsche criticises the morality of Mitleid, not Mitleid itself, which means he objects to the 
high (or unconditional) value we ascribe to Mitleid compared to other affects. Some readings 
argue his objections stem from his defending some typically Nietzschean morality or moral 
ideal, for example, the morality of self-command.262 These readings are compelling, albeit 
premature.  
Nietzsche does make claims indicative of a normative theory and he makes normative 
propositions, but he resists construing them as expressing a particular morality or an ideal. 
He has a unique perspective on criticising moral values and ideals, namely, the non-moral 
perspective of individuality, health and life, which do not imply a replacement or a ‘better’ 
morality. Rather, he challenges his readers’ moral values or ideals by showing how, in fact, 
they commit to, realise or appreciate the values their morality or ideals oppose. He tries the 
previous without undermining their need for a morality or ideal, however, which implies he 
has a unique perspective on evaluating and criticising morality.263  
Nietzsche’s objection to Schopenhauer’s views on morality demonstrate clearly why 
he fiercely opposes the morality of Mitleid. First, he objects to the proposition that ‘Mitleid 
grounds morality’. Schopenhauer’s approach to morality is as something whose ground we 
seek, which means the question ‘what is morally right or wrong’ does not arise, in the first 
place, because we know that morally worthy actions are those which express freely willed 
 
                                               
262 See for example Nussbaum’s (1994) reading of Nietzsche’s objections to Mitleid as his attempt “to bring about 
a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation within a post-Christian and post-Romantic context” 
(Nussbaum 1994, 140). Other commentators argue that Nietzsche ascribes to ‘virtue ethics’ (cf. Solomon 2001) or 
‘perfectionism’ (cf. Hurka 2007).  
263 This unique perspective requires considerably more discussion and debate than I am able to offer. However, I 
believe the place to start is the concept of ‘health’ and his individualistic conception of it. 
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justice and genuine loving kindness. The will grounds everything, for him, and, in morality’s 
case, a constituent of the will grounds morally worthy actions. What makes actions morally 
worthy is Mitleid. Second, our experiencing Mitleid for someone means we perceive her as 
‘willing, striving etc.’ and we identify with her, which is the most veracious cognition of 
something we can have. Thus, Mitleid has both moral value and truth-value. Morality is not 
a ‘principle’ whose moral worth we can evaluate and juxtapose to others; it is what we use 
to determine moral worth and so generate moral principles. In short, Mitleid is ‘complete’ 
in two ways. First, it grounds morally worthy actions. Second, the cognition that underpins 
Mitleid (seeing through the PI, seeing something as ‘willing’ etc.) possesses the highest 
possible truth-value. Its truth-value also shows its ‘parasitism’. The veracity of the cognition 
underpinning Mitleid is valued more highly than its counterpart cognitions. In other words, 
we value the veracity of cognising something as a ‘willing’ thing higher than the cognising 
it as an object, for example. The previous evaluation means that Mitleid is parasitic on other 
cognitions of something, which, in turn, makes it parasitic on the mainsprings underpinning 
them. The conceptual structure of the morality of Mitleid Schopenhauer defends is the same 
as the structure of the ‘ascetic ideal’ that May aptly described.264 Construing Mitleid as the 
ground of morally worthy actions, as Schopenhauer did, creates a link between Mitleid and 
the ascetic ideal, which thus entangles moral value with truth-value. The previous places an 
extraordinarily high value on Mitleid at the expense of other mainsprings, actions and their 
cognates.  
Nietzsche is skeptical of high evaluations themselves, rather than the high evaluation 
of a particular ‘thing’. He grounds his skepticism on his method of historical philosophising. 
The following summarises his approach and expresses his worries about the high value we 
afford to things: 
“[I]n accordance with their intellectual habit, men have forgotten the original purpose 
of so-called just and fair actions, and especially because children have for millennia 
been trained to admire and imitate such actions, it has gradually come to appear that 
a just action is an unegoistic one: but it is on this appearance that the high value 
accorded it depends; and this high value is, moreover, continually increasing, as all 
valuations do: for something highly valued is striven for, imitated, multiplied through 
sacrifice, and grows as the worth of the toil and zeal expended by each individual is 
added to the worth of the valued thing.” (HHI 93) 
As Leiter rightly claims, Nietzsche’s warnings about the morality of Mitleid aim at the 
‘pessimistic verdict’ (Leiter 2002, 58) over life, i.e., at the ‘negation of life’, which typifies 
the ‘will’ of the ascetic ideal. This verdict transcends Mitleid and its corresponding actions 
and expresses itself in the morality of Mitleid. The previous reveals Nietzsche’s skepticism 
about evaluating anything as highly as an ‘ideal’. His scepticism is as from the standpoint 
of history and an individual’s life and health. His reluctance to suggest an alternative to the 
 
                                               
264 I will to leave aside whether this structure applies to all ideals or only to the ascetic ideal. 
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ascetic ideal and his conception of sovereign individuality as a preparatory step to a genuine 
critique of morality show that he did not arrive at his own ideal, but left us with the pieces 
to it. He left us with questions, pleas, objections and hopes, not answers or suggestions about 
what is worthy of willing or what ideal human beings should strive towards given that the 
‘ascetic ideal’ had become and was destined to become untenable.265   
I close by suggesting that Nietzsche leaves his readers with a direction of travel toward 
finding a way to harmonise the individual with the herd. He sought to find a place and role 
for individuality in communal life, but struggled to show how we can achieve that.  
 
 
                                               
265 Included in the reasons for why he did not offer a substitute for the ascetic ideal is that he acknowledges its 
positive outcomes, which are not limited to self-control and sovereignty: “[p]riests make everything more 
dangerous, not just medicaments and healing arts but pride, revenge, acumen, debauchery, love, lust for power, 
virtue, sickness; - in any case, with some justification one could add that man first became an interesting animal 
on the foundation of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priest, and that the human soul 
became deep in the higher sense and turned evil for the first time - and of course, these are the two basic forms of 
man’s superiority, hitherto, over other animals” (GM I, 6; compare the previous with GM II, 22). See also: “the 
old depression, heaviness and fatigue were thoroughly overcome by this system of procedures, life became very 
interesting again: awake, eternally awake, sleepless, glowing, burned out, exhausted and yet not tired, - this is how 
man, the ‘sinner’, looked when initiated into these mysteries” (GM III, 20).  
  437 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this thesis was to defend two related propositions about the relationship 
between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s philosophies. First, our focusing primarily on their 
differing and opposed viewpoints on (and evaluations of) life, willing, aesthetics, morality 
and ascetic resignation ensures we ignore the fundamental agreements between them and 
the philosophical value of those agreements. Second, both agree about the will-body identity 
and both commit to immanence and ontological monism, but derive different conceptual 
frameworks from them. Schopenhauer derives the correlation theory of cognition. Nietzsche 
derives the drive psychology, but we what we rarely notice in the philosophical commentary 
is how he tries to combine his drive psychology with ‘historical philosophising’ to yield a 
unique explanation of certain phenomena. Furthermore, this combination yields a revisionist 
way of addressing philosophical problems that arise in relation to phenomena such as self-
consciousness, responsibility, morality, ascetic resignation and so on.  
I presented Schopenhauer, first, before comparing him to Nietzsche after realising 
that there were inconsistencies in the dominant philosophical readings and commentary on 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. These inconsistencies obscured the relationship between them 
by focusing us on Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This focus leads 
us to construe Schopenhauer’s philosophy as promoting negation of the will to life, which 
is common especially in the Anglophone philosophical commentary on his philosophy. The 
previous limits our attempts to give an insight into the extent of Schopenhauer’s influence 
on the maturity of Nietzsche’s thoughts. To overcome the previous limitation, I focused on 
giving Schopenhauer’s philosophy a chance by assessing it on its own merits and attempting 
to resolve any inconsistencies that arose internally, i.e., by appealing to its propositions and 
distinctions. I identified three propositions concealing inconsistencies, which I challenged 
by arguing that they are mostly premised on errors in our reading:   
1. The will to life is egoistic.  
2. Self-knowledge causes negation of the will to life.  
3. Schopenhauer’s philosophy is inherently pessimistic. 
The correlation theory of cognition proved useful for challenging these propositions. The 
third of them was particularly helpful in revealing that the negation of the will to life does 
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not necessarily stem from his philosophy of the will. His conceptual framework cannot 
explain why the will to life negates itself, but it can coherently construe this negation as 
another mainspring of the will. It can explain certain attitudes and behaviours, which would 
otherwise remain inexplicable using the mainsprings of egoism, compassion and malice. 
The method of explanation that appeals to the will and its mainsprings shows its limitations 
in his comments on the relationship between tragedy and ascetic resignation, however. 
Nietzsche aimed to overcome the above limitations by revising and naturalising the 
concept of the ‘will’, but also by arguing for what he calls ‘historical philosophising’, which 
complements his revised conception of the will as a complex of drives.  
My reading and analysis of Schopenhauer is not complete, however. Further research 
may be required on the implicit distinction between the ‘will’ and the ‘will to life’. Although 
I applied it extensively, I was unable to assess at length what underpins it. I argued that the 
will to life is his attempt to ground the meaningfulness of the movements and changes we 
perceive in ‘objects’ using our first-person experience of our own bodily movements and 
changes. The ‘will to life’ aims to characterise the directionality of the will as thing in itself. 
It refers to willing itself irrespective of its expression, i.e., the mainspring through which it 
‘objectivates’. I leave the reader with some questions I was unable to address fully, which 
might be useful for further philosophical discussion. If the will to life is a cognition and 
some particular bodily movement is always its objective correlate, then what permits us to 
extend its application to all ‘changes’ and ‘movements’ we perceive irrespective of who or 
what is changing and moving? In short, what permits us to use it as a blanket term for all 
movements and changes? What legitimates the seamless transition from the particular to the 
universal here? If the will to life captures the directionality of the will as thing in itself and 
so the cognition of ‘something’, then why do we not settle for the claim that it catpures the 
directionality of the (individual) will, i.e., the particular target of cognition and its particular 
striving, rather than the ‘general’ striving of everything that we perceive irrespective of its 
individuality or particularity?   
 Moreover, I did not sufficiently assess Schopenhauer’s conflicting views on tragedy, 
the arts and the negation of the will to life. Our understanding of his philosophy of the will 
would benefit greatly from an analysis and resolution of his conflicting propositions on this 
topic. He claims that tragedy “demands an existence of an entirely different kind, a different 
world” (WR, 433; my emphasis), which contradicts his philosophical commitment to 
immanence. Related to the previous is his explanation of why we feel pleasure in tragedy: 
he states that “in the depth of his being the consciousness is then stirred that for a different 
kind of willing there must be a different kind of existence” (WR, 433; my emphasis). The 
previous propositions substantially muddle the distinction between the will, the will to life 
and the intellect. They likewise muddle his views on the relationship between aesthetics, 
the arts and ascetic resignation. His views on tragedy may prove to be the most fatal error 
of his philosophy of the will, but I was unable to demonstrate fully why I think so.  
 My reading and assessment of Nietzsche, on the other hand, aimed to arrive as close 
to his Weltanschauung as possible by seeking the guiding thread that offers an access to what 
grounds his objections, evaluations and accounts of phenomena. I approached the previous 
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in two ways. Firstly, I inquired into his fundamental concept of the ‘drive’ and found a split 
in the philosophical commentary between two accounts of the drives. Contra the previous 
split, I argued for a different, non-mechanical conception of the drives and thus a different 
conception of Nietzschean agency. Secondly, I defended the previous conceptions starting 
by demonstrating Schopenhauer’s influence at the philosophical foundations of Nietzsche’s 
thought. He developed a unique conceptual framework and philosophical method that builds 
upon and thus addresses the limitations of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. Nietzsche 
offers a revisionist account of agency and the will as well as a novel understanding of how 
morality partakes in our lives. Likewise, he offers another way of critiquing morality as well 
as a distinct phenomenology of the aesthetic experience, the excesses of genius, aesthetic 
contemplation and objectivity. Lastly, he proposes a new conception of the relation between 
the ‘high evaluation of something’ (e.g., compassion) and the ascetic ‘ideal’.  
Despite my aims and analyses, my reading and assessment of Nietzsche was limited 
in presentation, philosophical depth and juxtaposition with other readings. There is thus 
considerable room for further research and debate on how to disambiguate his propositions, 
how to evaluate Nietzsche’s revisionist and naturalist conceptual framework and so how to 
compare my reading with that of other commentators. Below, I suggest some key concepts 
and areas that were incomplete and would benefit greatly from further research and debate. 
Arguably the central concept requiring further disambiguation and debate is what 
Nietzsche calls ‘internalisation’. The definitions I recognised were as follows:  
A) Internalisation is the act of discharging one’s blocked drives inwardly.  
B) Internalisation means acquiring the ‘herd perspective’ and the ‘herd instinct’, i.e., 
acquiring a community’s rank order of values and actions, which then become a 
behaviour(s).  
Nietzsche construes ‘internalisation’ as a process with various stages. The two definitions 
may reflect two different stages in the same process. It is also likely that he construes A as 
explaining how B comes about. I was unable to assess fully the merits and coherence of the 
‘process’ view, or the view that A is the definition and B is its application. Further research 
into his conception of ‘internalisation’ would be immensely useful for building upon his 
conceptual framework. One way we can approach this research is by inquiring into whether 
or not internalisation is a process with various stages, a concept describing how we ‘acquire’ 
new drives, or even both. Another and perhaps complimentary approach is by juxtaposing 
internalisation to what he calls ‘sublimation’266 and ‘spiritualisation’267, which seem to have 
similar connotations and may turn out to be pleonasms.  
Likewise, there is room for further research and debate on the scope of the concept 
of ‘communication’ in Nietzsche, which is not limited to language in the sense of using 
words, but extends to any signs we might use to refer to something or to direct someone’s 
 
                                               
266 See the following passages: (HHI 1, 107 & 261; WS 181; D 4, 202 & 248; GS 357; BGE 58, 189; WLN 7[3] & 
14[111]; GM II, 7 & 10; GM III, 27). 
267 See the following: (D 60; GS 3; A 20; TI, ‘Morality’, 1, 3; BGE 198, 219, 229, 252 & 271). 
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attention to it. In short, his metaphorical definition of communication as a ‘bridge between 
people’ would benefit from further scrutiny: 
“[N]ot only language serves as a bridge between persons, but also look, touch, and 
gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense impressions, our power to fix 
them and as it were place them outside of ourselves, has increased in proportion to 
the need to convey them to others by means of signs. The sign-inventing person is 
also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious of himself; for only as a social 
animal did man learn to become conscious of himself—he is still doing it, and he is 
doing it more and more” (GS 354; see also HHI, 216)  
His distinction between signs and words seemingly implies a distinction between a broader 
and narrower vehicle for communication. These considerations have major implications for 
his views on the nature of consciousness, since he construes consciousness as requiring the 
ascription of a communication symbol. It would have implications for the philosophical 
commentary on Nietzsche’s philosophy, too, most notably for Katsafanas’ (2005) reading 
of consciousness as a mental state with conceptual content. Nietzsche may be operating with 
a thinner account of concepts than we initially assumed, which may not be linguistic in the 
sense of requiring the ascription of a ‘word’, but are nevertheless ‘communicable’ or aim to 
‘communicate’. In short, consciousness is the internalisation of another’s perspective and 
deliberation means acting based on that perspective. Likewise, and following the conceptual 
link, this has implications for his account of the herd perspective, self-conscious agency and 
even his descriptive account of morality. 
Nietzsche’s concept of ‘health’ is central to his evaluative views on morality and it 
requires further scrutiny than I could provide. I attempted a brief outline of it and suggested 
a potential definition. I also suggested how we might construe the use to which he puts it in 
his evaluation of morality. However, this attempt is incomprehensive or insufficient. Given 
that concept is so important, it is stricking that there are mainly brief mentions of it in the 
philosophical commentary. I argued that ‘health’ typifies how he introduces the individual’s 
perspective into our moral deliberations, which are often dominated by the herd perspective. 
Likewise, health underpins his attempt to harmonise our herd and individual aspects and 
explains the sense in which ‘sovereign individuality’ is a developmental stage explicable 
through the process of internalisation. However, there is a pressing need for further debate 
and research into the concept; specifically, on how it relates to his drive psychology and so 
what health might look like as from the point of view of the drives and drive relations. Also, 
what it would look like from the first-person experience of willing and its relationship to 
individuality and so on. Another approach may be to inquire into why he thinks health is an 
‘individual’ concept. What grounds his claim that what determines whether or not what we 
‘consume’, ‘value’ or ‘do’ is healthy is wholly individual? Why can we not have a definition 
of health that applies to everyone, namely, a general concept or definition of health? Another 
approach might be to inquire into the relationship between affirmation of life and health.  
Another area of further research is how the conceptual link (between communal life, 
communication, consciousness, language etc.) features in his views on aesthetics and the 
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arts. Can his account of what motivates aesthetic contemplation and creativity be construed 
in terms of the conceptual link? This would explain Nietzsche’s objections to the conception 
of aesthetic contemplation as offering a veracious view of the target. For example, he may 
argue that the high value that we ascribe to ‘truth’ stems from the dominance of the herd 
instincts. He may explain an artist’s erroneous and delusive account of her creative activities 
like he explained the pale criminal’s decision to rob after killing. An artist conflates her 
creativity with divine inspiration (as he argues Wagner did). She conflates the demands of 
truth with those of aesthetics; so, she conflates the act of beautifying something or rendering 
it sublime with revealing its ‘essence’. What explains this conflation is how her drive to 
creativity relates to her herd instinct(s), the latter introduces the high evaluation of the ‘truth’ 
into her creativity and thus distorts that creativity. 
Finally, the distinction between an ‘ideal as such’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’ also merits 
closer scrutiny than I provided. One approach may be to determine how Rausch (and so the 
act of idealisation) relates to ideals. Likewise, on what basis can an ideal and Rausch be 
‘healthy’ or affect our ‘health’? The previous could demonstrate how Rausch and ‘health’ 
relate to his critique and alternative approach to morality and its treatment as a problem. 
In sum, the thesis attempted to restore the significance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of the will to Nietzsche’s views, notably in their aesthetics and ethics. It tried to show that 
the significance extends beyond their disagreements in ethics and aesthetics. The correlation 
theory of cognition made a key contribution to determining this significance by helping us 
resolve certain inconsistencies and by showing that pessimism is not a necessary feature of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. His foundational concept of the will-body identity 
and his philosophical commitments shaped Nietzsche’s conceptual framework. The latter 
had a revisionist and naturalist project with respect to morality, the arts, objectivity, ideals 
and ascetic resignation, which was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the 
will. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s advances on the descriptive front markedly undermine the 
clarity of his evaluative project. He leaves his readers with an aborted attempt at offering an 
alternative ethics or an (healthier) ideal that would replace the ascetic ideal.  
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English Summary 
Willing and Idealising 
An Investigation into Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s Philosophies of Value and Life 
The aim of this dissertation is to show the extent to which Nietzsche’s philosophy of value 
and life is influenced by that of Schopenhauer, and how it can be better understood when 
this influence is recognised. The dissertation is split into two parts, the first of which is an 
investigation into Schopenhauer’s philosophy and sets the foundations for the investigation 
into that of Nietzsche in the second part. Here, I offer a brief overview of what the 
investigation yielded and so what the reader may find in the thesis. 
Schopenhauer’s conceptions of aesthetic contemplation, the moral value of 
compassion and the role of self-knowledge in agency and ascetic resignation are the core 
topics of the research. According to Schopenhauer, our ‘human’ experience is composed of 
two ostensibly albeit not fundamentally distinct aspects: the intellect and the will. We do not 
encounter these two aspects separately, but there is a clear difference in their respective 
contributions to our experience. The will is responsible for our affective orientation and 
actions. The intellect provides us with a target we can respond to and so a perspective on 
the world that correlates to the will, but this target and perspective is determined by will’s 
interests. In sum, the intellect offers a target for the will and the will determines which of 
the countless targets are worthy of striving towards or away from, or worthy of identifying 
with, as is the case with aesthetic contemplation.  
How the will and the intellect relate changes after Schopenhauer introduces his 
account of aesthetic contemplation. The subjective correlate of aesthetic contemplation is 
disinterestedness. When we take a disinterested stance in relation to something, we project 
the will onto the target of cognition. This projection underpins our perceiving it as an Idea 
rather than an object. Moreover, Schopenhauer’s psychological analysis of beauty and 
sublimity demonstrates that an indirect relationship to willing motivates aesthetic 
contemplation. The aesthetic pleasure we feel over some objects that thereby incite aesthetic 
contemplation shows that their value for the will is in distracting us from our personal 
projects and aims, which are sources of suffering. 
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Schopenhauer’s psychological analysis of the aesthetic contemplator is nuanced and 
rich. It considers what could motivate someone to project the will onto things. He shows 
how frustration with our projects and aims, namely, a thwarted will, partakes in that 
projection. The preconditions of ‘aesthetic contemplation’ should not be confused for 
aesthetic contemplation itself, however. They are the causal or motivational factors, not the 
descriptive factors of aesthetic contemplation. Aesthetic contemplation is cognition of an 
Idea. Beauty and sublimity are properties of objects that meet us halfway to that cognition, 
but do so only following our receptivity to them, i.e., the right subjective correlate. In 
beauty, we are receptive because of our personal limitations. In the sublime, it is the 
limitations of humanity that make us receptive to the object, but they do so because we 
know that we are an extension of humanity and we use reason to construe our body as a 
token of humanity’s type.  
Aesthetic contemplation does not abolish the will, but projects it on the target of 
cognition. In aesthetically contemplating, we feel no urge to act on the target of our 
cognition, but this does not mean we feel no urge to act at all. We identify with the target 
and perceive it as willing, striving and so on. We feel an urge to act on its behalf and for its 
sake. By analogy, we are receptive to it and its movements as the follower in a dance is 
receptive to the leader’s movements. Thus, aesthetic contemplation is will-less in the sense 
that our personal will is not what permeates and thus distorts our cognition of the target. It 
is still a cognition, however: we perceive it as willing, striving and so on. We use reason to 
recognise that it wills and we use imagination to perceive it as willing something. I present 
this conception to help make sense of Schopenhauer’s purportedly smooth transition and 
harmony between aesthetics and ethics, which is supposedly the hallmark of his philosophy 
of the will.  
Schopenhauer’s views on morality rest on the agent’s ability to suspend egoism 
enough to recognise another as willing something, i.e., as a person, rather than an object 
permitting use. The previous perception is a prerequisite of morality. We are moral or 
immoral, morally praiseworthy or morally reprehensible, in relation to our ability or 
inability to perceive someone as willing something like we will something. Absent this 
recognition of the person as willing something, i.e., as a something or someone with wishes, 
desires etc., we are at best morally neutral or incapable of moral reasoning. The sphere 
delineating moral worth or reprehensibility requires the recognition that the object(s) of our 
cognition represents a willing thing.  
Finally, the correlation theory of cognition allows Schopenhauer to argue that the 
human intellect can recognise the identical object of the will and then formulate a self-
image. Human reason is a means for the will to acquire self-cognition or make an object of 
itself, i.e., to perceive its identical object in the world. For the individual’s will, this identical 
object is one’s body and actions over time, whereas for the will to life, it is the world itself. 
Through the identical object, the will and the will to life can act in an enlightened manner: 
they can respond to their self-image. This response peaks in the affirmation or negation of 
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the will to life, which would not have been possible without the faculty of reason that, as 
Schopenhauer says, “allows us to survey the whole in the abstract”.  
My interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will serves as the foothold 
into the philosophical foundations of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It behoves us as philosophical 
commentators on Nietzsche to not only consider whether there is a guiding thread to his 
thoughts that gives access to the grounds for his evaluations, objections and his account of 
certain phenomena. As is common with attempts to find a unified and coherent thread in 
Nietzsche’s thoughts, his writing style and the unfortunate fact that he does not provide any 
adequate and straightforward definitions of his terms has immensely impeded my efforts. 
His terms change with the text, the approach he adopts and the argument he makes, which 
makes it considerably harder to hook onto a consistency. To overcome this challenge, I use 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will as a backdrop.  
The fundamental entry point of my investigation into Nietzsche’s philosophy is his 
critique of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will and the world-view underpinning it. I 
focus on the ethical and aesthetic themes of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but to make the 
agreement and differences between the two thinkers clearer, I mainly consider their 
respective conceptions of the ‘will’, ‘agency’, ‘self-knowledge’ (or ‘self-consciousness’), 
‘morality’ and ‘aesthetic contemplation’. Nietzsche picks up many distinctions, arguments 
and themes that preoccupied Schopenhauer, but assesses them from a different perspective. 
For example, he accepts ontological monism and immanence, also the will-body identity, 
which are basic tenets of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the will. However, he derives a 
different and unique philosophical method from them. First, he favours the concept of the 
‘drive’ over that of the ‘will’. Second, he favours a historical explanation of phenomena, 
after rejecting the legitimacy of metaphysical and logical explanations. I clarify how these 
relate by introducing a concept I call the ‘conceptual link’. I conclude from the previous 
that Nietzsche’s account of agency, morality, aesthetic contemplation and objectivity are 
revisionist. Accordingly, he revises Schopenhauer’s account while aiming to be preserve its 
philosophical foundations.  
Nietzsche’s own theme is ‘ideals’—specifically, the ‘ascetic ideal’—and their effect 
on our lives as individuals. He inherits his focus on the ‘ascetic ideal’ from Schopenhauer, 
specifically, the latter’s positive evaluation of the negation of the will to life. This concern 
permeates three key areas of Nietzsche’s philosophy. These are, a) the possibility of self-
conscious agency, b) the limits and evaluation of morality and c) the role of aesthetic 
contemplation in the arts. The ascetic ideal is a framework for making sense and evaluating 
one’s actions and aims in a manner permitting “of no other interpretation, no other goal” as 
Nietzsche says. We cannot question its truth-value, legitimacy, value or even set limits to 
it, since doing so would entail transgressing or suspending the ideal. It is due to this that he 
construes it rhetorically as a “fixed idea”, as Nietzsche described it. He critiques the ascetic 
ideal by assessing its value for life, not its truth-value or moral value. Thus, he has an entirely 
different approach for comprehending and critiquing ideals, which, I argue, we can 
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comprehend by making sense of what he means by ‘health’. The meaning of the ‘value for 
life’ is not clear. I attempt to disambiguate it by assessing the perspective from which he 
approaches life and living. I aim to explain what this perspective amounts to, what motivates 
his turn to it most notably in the evaluative part of his philosophy and how far reaching it 
is. I argue that this perspective is crucial for revealing his Weltanschauung.  
The main structure of my investigation into Nietzsche’s philosophy is the following. 
First, I assess his views on agency and self-knowledge in light of the recent philosophical 
commentary. Second, I analyse his descriptive account and subsequent evaluation of 
morality. Third I propose an alternative solution to what we construe as the ‘lack of fit’. 
Fourth, I assess his objections to Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic contemplation and 
objectivity. Lastly, I assess why he argues that compassion [Mitleid] is a “great danger to 
mankind” by looking at the grounds he gives for the pernicious relationship between 
‘morality’ and the ‘ascetic ideal’. I show that he leaves open the possibility of an opposing 
ideal to the ascetic ideal, and thereby for an alternative ethics. I believe his evaluative 
project was and remains incomplete.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Willen en Idealiseren 
Een onderzoek naar de filosofieën van waarde en leven van Schopenhauer en 
Nietzsche 
 
Deze doctoraatsverhandeling heeft als doel aan te tonen in welke mate Nietzsches filosofie 
van waarde en leven beïnvloed is door deze van Schopenhauer, en hoe ze beter begrepen 
kan worden wanneer deze invloed erkend wordt. De verhandeling valt uiteen in twee delen, 
waarvan het eerste een onderzoek naar Schopenhauers filosofie is, en de fundering legt voor 
het onderzoek naar Nietzsches filosofie in het tweede deel. In wat volgt geef ik een kort 
overzicht van de resultaten van het onderzoek en van wat de lezer dus kan vinden in de 
verhandeling. 
Schopenhauers opvatting over esthetische aanschouwing, de morele waarde van 
medelijden, en de rol van zelfkennis in handeling en ascetische berusting zijn de 
kernthema’s van dit onderzoek. Onze ‘menselijke’ ervaring is volgens Schopenhauer 
samengesteld uit twee aantoonbaar, zij het niet fundamenteel, onderscheiden aspecten: het 
intellect en de wil. We treffen deze beide aspecten niet afzonderlijk aan, maar er is wel een 
duidelijk onderscheid tussen hun respectieve bijdragen tot onze ervaring. De wil is 
verantwoordelijk voor onze affectieve oriëntatie en handelingen. Het intellect levert ons een 
doelwit waaraan wij kunnen beantwoorden en daarmee een perspectief op de wereld dat 
deze correleert met de wil, maar dit doelwit en perspectief is bepaald door de belangen van 
de wil. Kortom: het intellect biedt een doelwit voor de wil, en de wil bepaalt welke van de 
talloze doelwitten het waard zijn om na te streven of weg van te streven, of waard zijn om 
mee te identificeren, zoals in het geval van esthetische aanschouwing. 
Hoe de wil en het intellect zich tot elkaar verhouden, verandert nadat Schopenhauer 
zijn opvatting over esthetische aanschouwing introduceert. Het subjectieve correlaat van 
esthetische aanschouwing is belangeloosheid. Wanneer wij een belangeloos standpunt ten 
aanzien van iets innemen, projecteren wij de wil op het doelwit van cognitie. Deze projectie 
onderbouwt onze perceptie ervan als een Idee eerder dan als een object. Bovendien toont 
Schopenhauers psychologische analyse van het schone en het sublieme dat een indirecte 
verhouding tot het willen een esthetische aanschouwing motiveert. Het esthetische genot dat 
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wij voelen bij sommige objecten die daarbij esthetische aanschouwing opwekken toont dat 
hun waarde voor de wil ons afleidt van onze persoonlijke projecten en doelstellingen, die 
bronnen van lijden zijn. 
Schopenhauers psychologische analyse van de esthetische aanschouwer is 
genuanceerd en rijk. Ze neemt in aanmerking wat iemand zou kunnen motiveren om de wil 
op dingen te projecteren. Schopenhauer toont daarbij hoe frustratie bij onze projecten en 
doelstellingen, met name een verijdelde wil, participeert in die projectie. De voorwaarden 
van ‘esthetische aanschouwing’ mogen echter niet verward worden met de esthetische 
aanschouwing zelf. Zij zijn de causale of motivationele factoren, niet de descriptieve 
factoren van esthetische aanschouwing. Esthetische aanschouwing is cognitie van een Idee. 
Schoonheid en het het sublieme zijn eigenschappen van objecten die ons halverwege tot die 
cognitie ontmoeten, maar dit enkel doen ten gevolge van onze ontvankelijkheid voor hen, 
d.w.z. ten gevolge van het juiste subjectieve correlaat. In het geval van schoonheid zijn wij 
ontvankelijk door onze persoonlijke beperkingen. In het geval van het sublieme zijn het de 
beperkingen van de menselijkheid die ons ontvankelijk maken voor het object, maar zij 
doen dit omdat wij weten dat wij een extensie van de menselijkheid zijn en omdat wij de 
rede gebruiken om ons lichaam op te vatten als een token van het type van de menselijkheid. 
Esthetische aanschouwing schaft de wil niet af, maar projecteert het op het doelwit 
van cognitie. In esthetische aanschouwing voelen wij geen drang tot handelen naar het 
doelwit van onze cognitie, maar dit betekent niet dat we helemaal geen drang tot handelen 
voelen. We identificeren met het doelwit en percipiëren het als willend, strevend, … We 
voelen een drang om ten behoeve en ter wille ervan te handelen. Bij analogie zijn wij er 
ontvankelijk voor, en voor de bewegingen ervan as de volger in een dans ontvankelijk is 
voor de bewegingen van de leider. Bijgevolg is esthetische aanschouwing wil-loos, in de 
zin dat onze persoonlijke wil niet is wat onze cognitie van het doelwit doordringt en 
vertekent. Het is echter nog steeds een cognitie: we percipiëren het als iets willend, strevend, 
enz… We maken gebruik van de rede om te erkennen dat het wil, en we maken gebruik van 
de verbeelding om het percipiëren als iets willend. Ik bied deze opvatting om bij te dragen 
tot een beter begrip van Schopenhauers vermeend vlotte overgang en harmonie tussen 
esthetica en ethiek, die verondersteld wordt het waarmerk van zijn filosofie van de wil te 
zijn. 
Schopenhauers opvattingen over moraliteit zijn gebaseerd op het vermogen van de 
handelende om het egoïsme voldoende op te heffen om de ander te erkennen als iets willend, 
d.w.z. als een persoon, eerder dan als een object dat gebruik toestaat. Deze perceptie is een 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor moraliteit. We zijn moreel of immoreel, moreel 
prijzenswaardig of laakbaar in verhouding tot ons vermogen of onvermogen om iemand te 
percipiëren als iets willend op de manier waarop wij iets willen. In afwezigheid van deze 
erkenning van de persoon als iets willend, d.w.z. als een iets of iemand met wensen, 
verlangens, enz., zijn wij hoogstens moreel neutraal of niet in staat tot moreel redeneren. De 
sfeer die morele waarde of laakbaarheid aflijnt vereist de erkenning dat het/de object(en) 
van onze cognitie een willend ding representeren. 
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De correlatietheorie van cognitie laat Schopenhauer tot slot toe te beargumenteren 
dat het menselijke intellect het identieke object van de cognitie kan erkennen en daarop een 
zelfbeeld formuleren. De menselijke rede is een middel voor de wil om zelf-cognitie te 
verwerven of een object van zichzelf te maken, d.w.z. zijn identieke object in de wereld te 
percipiëren. Voor de wil van het individu is dit identieke object zijn lichaam en zijn 
handelingen doorheen de tijd, terwijl  het voor de wil tot leven de wereld zelf is. Door het 
identieke object kan de wil en de wil tot leven op een verlichte wijze handelen: ze kunnen 
beantwoorden aan hun zelfbeeld. Dit antwoord culmineert in de affirmatie of negatie van 
de wil tot leven, die niet mogelijk zouden geweest zijn zonder het vermogen van de rede 
dat, zoals Schopenhauer stelt, “ons toestaat het geheel in het abstracte te overzien”. 
 Mijn interpretatie van Schopenhauers filosofie van de wil dient als steunpunt in de 
filosofische grondslagen van Nietzsches filosofie. Het betaamt ons als wijsgerige 
commentatoren van Nietzsche om niet enkel te overwegen of er in zijn denken een leidraad 
is die ons toegang verschaft tot de gronden van zijn evaluaties, tegenwerpingen en zijn 
opvatting over bepaalde fenomenen. Zoals gewoonlijk bij pogingen om een geünificeerd en 
coherent relaas te vinden in Nietzsches denken, werden mijn inspanningen enorm 
belemmerd door zijn schrijfstijl en het onfortuinlijke feit dat hij geen enkele adequate en 
duidelijke definitie van zijn termen verschaft. Zijn termen veranderen samen met elke tekst, 
elke benadering die hij aanneemt en elk argument dat hij levert, wat het substantieel 
moeilijker maakt om een consistentie vast te krijgen. Om deze uitdagingen tegemoet te 
treden maak ik gebruik van Schopenhauers filosofie van de wil als achtergrond. 
Het fundamentele toegangspunt van mijn onderzoek naar Nietzsches filosofie is zijn 
kritiek op Schopenhauers filosofie van de wil en het wereldbeeld dat eraan ten basis ligt. Ik 
focus op de ethische en esthetische thema’s van Schopenhauers filosofie, maar om de 
overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen beide denkers helderder te maken, behandel ik 
hoofdzakelijk hun respectieve opvattingen over de ‘wil’, ‘handeling’, ‘zelfkennis’ (of 
‘zelfbewustzijn’) en ‘moraliteit’. Nietzsche neemt vele onderscheiden, argumenten en 
thema’s over waarom ook Schopenhauer bekommerd was, maar beoordeelt hen vanuit een 
ander perspectief. Zo aanvaardt hij bijvoorbeeld monisme en immanentie, alsook de wil-
lichaam identiteit, die basisprincipes van Schopenhauers filosofie van de wil zijn. 
Desondanks leidt hij er een verschillende en unieke filosofische methode uit af. Ten eerste 
verkiest hij het concept van de ‘drift’ boven dat van de ‘wil’. Ten tweede verkiest hij een 
historische verklaring van fenomenen, aangezien hij de geldigheid van metafysische en 
logische verklaring afwijst. Ik helder op hoe deze beide zich tot elkaar verhouden door een 
concept te introduceren dat ik de ‘conceptuele schakel’ noem. Ik besluit uit het voorgaande 
dat Nietzsches opvatting over handeling, moraliteit, esthetische aanschouwing en 
objectiviteit revisionistisch zijn. Dienovereenkomstig reviseert hij Schopenhauers 
opvatting, ook al tracht hij haar wijsgerige fundamenten te behouden. 
Nietzsches eigen thema is ‘idealen’ – in het bijzonder, het ‘ascetische ideaal’ – en 
hun effect op ons leven als individu. Hij erft deze focus op het ‘ascetische ideaal’ van 
Schopenhauer, meer bepaald van diens positieve evaluatie van de negatie van de wil tot 
leven. Deze bekommernis doordringt drie kerndomeinen van Nietzsches filosofie. Dit zijn 
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a) de mogelijkheid van zelfbewuste handeling, b) de grenzen en evaluatie van moraliteit, c) 
de rol van esthetische aanschouwing in de kunsten. Het ascetische ideaal vormt een kader 
voor het begrijpen en het evalueren van onze handelingen en doelstellingen op een manier 
die, zoals Nietzsche stelt, ‘geen andere interpretatie, geen ander doel’ toestaat. We kunnen 
de waarheidswaarde, geldigheid of waarde ervan niet in vraag stellen, of er zelfs maar 
grenzen aan stellen, omdat dit een overtreding of opheffing van het ideaal zou impliceren. 
Het is ten gevolge hiervan dat Nietzsche het retorisch invult als een “idee-fixe”, zoals hij 
het beschrijft. Hij bekritiseert het ascetische ideaal door zijn waarde voor het leven in te 
schatten, niet zijn waarheidswaarde of morele waarde. Bijgevolg heeft hij een volledig 
verschillende benadering voor het begrijpen en het bekritiseren van idealen, die wij, zo 
beargumenteer ik, kunnen verstaan door duidelijk te maken wat hij bedoelt met 
‘gezondheid’. De betekenis van ‘waarde voor het leven’ is niet duidelijk. Ik tracht deze te 
desambigueren door haar te beoordelen vanuit het perspectief van waaruit Nietzsche het 
leven en het levende benadert. Ik poog uit te leggen wat dit perspectief inhoudt, wat 
Nietzsches keuze ervoor, voornamelijk in het evaluatieve deel van zijn filosofie, motiveert, 
en hoe ingrijpend het is. Ik argumenteer dat dit perspectief cruciaal is om zijn 
Weltanschauung aan het licht te brengen. 
De hoofdstructuur van mijn onderzoek naar Nietzsches filosofie is als volgt. Eerst 
beoordeel ik zijn opvattingen over handeling en zelfkennis in het licht van recente 
wijsgerige commentaar. In een tweede stap analyseer ik zijn descriptieve opvattingen en 
daaropvolgende evaluatie van moraliteit. In een derde bied ik een alternatieve oplossing 
voor datgene wat wij invullen als ‘lack of fit’. In een vierde stap evalueer ik zijn 
tegenwerpingen tegen Schopenhauers opvatting over esthetische aanschouwing en 
objectiviteit. Ten slotte ga ik na waarom hij beargumenteert dat medelijden [Mitleid] een 
“groot gevaar voor de mensheid” vormt, door te kijken naar de redenen die hij geeft voor 
de schadelijke verhouding tussen ‘moraliteit’ en het ‘ascetische ideaal’. Ik toon dat hij de 
mogelijkheid openlaat voor een ideaal dat tegengesteld is aan het ascetische, en daarmee 
dus ook voor een alternatieve ethiek. Ik geloof dat zijn evaluatieve project onvolledig was 
en gebleven is. 
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